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Does growing reliance on private military and security companies (PMSCs) lead to the re-configuration of the state as a security and defence actor in Europe? Building on the multiple-networks-approach in organisation theory (Padgett and Powell), the current paper develops an analytical approach for studying the rise of new organizational forms in interstitial spaces via mechanisms including extension and differentiation; fusion and hybridity; transposition and refunctionality; and multivocality. The empirical analysis focuses on the rules and practices of Vesper Group - a PMSC working closely with the Swedish government. Several findings are reported. First, a new organizational form seems to be emerging as a result of the ongoing multiple network dynamics – national defence entrepreneurial firm. This is a type of a firm different from mainstream PMSCs in that it is owned by venture capital companies from their home state and also in that it is closely associated with its respective state in terms of its personnel policies, expertise and operational goals and scope. Second, the case of Sweden's Vesper Group and its cooperation with the Swedish government indicates that some EU member states may also be in the process of structural and institutional mutation as providers of defence and crisis management capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though the same descriptors have been applied to Wagner Group and US/Western Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), this article differentiates the two experiences to better appreciate Wagner Group's unique characteristics. To make this differentiation, the article examines the distinctions between defensive and offensive violence, the access to crewed weapons, and an integrated team approach. In this way, the article presents Wagner Group as offensively minded, kitted out with crewed weapons, and operating outside of an integrated team. The article closes with resulting questions to consider regarding Russia's stance toward weaponry and how Wagner Group's characteristics might have contributed to the June 2023 uprising. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an era of globalization, states employ private military and security companies (PMSCs) to carry out various military functions. This signals an international shift in military strategy away from traditional state actors and towards the use of nonstate actors motivated by profit. The result has been an unequal application of international humanitarian law (IHL) towards PMSC personnel in international armed conflict. This Comment offers three suggestions on how to standardize the treatment of PMSC personnel in international armed conflict and ensure accountability and compliance with IHLs: (1) treat PMSCs engaged in international armed conflict as personnel of the state employing them, (2) outlaw PMSCs operating in international armed conflict, or (3) require PMSCs to apply for international licenses. Each option is examined through the lens of Blackwater operations in Iraq and Wagner operations in Ukraine, two of the most notorious PMSCs widely criticized in the media for their blatant disregard for IHL. These suggestions aim to strike a balance between an evolving military landscape, the profit-driven motivations of nonstate actors, and IHL considerations. Ultimately, this will create a more equitable and legally sound framework for addressing the role of PMSCs in contemporary armed conflicts, ensuring that they are held accountable for their actions and that IHL is upheld. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The existing literature is unclear about whether private military and security companies (PMSCs) are a cause of increased conflict severity, or rather are simply hired within more severe conflicts. We argue that PMSCs do increase conflict severity, yet this is the result of an escalation strategy by states to regain territory from rebels. If contracted, PMSCs either substitute for host nation forces, or free up such conventional forces to engage in offensive operations. In both cases the conflict severity increases substantially. This argument is tested with OLS regression using data from 30 weak states from 1990 to 2007. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) as active participants within global security environments has increased in the last two decades exponentially. States have progressively incorporated PMSCs in their security functions, both domestically and internationally. Since the conflict in Iraq in the early 2000s, there have been numerous plausible reports of PMSCs violating international humanitarian law. Despite this, only a few have ever been prosecuted, suggesting a fundamental challenge to understandings regarding state control and monopoly over violence. Utilising a historical case study of an Australian PMSC in Operation Iraqi Freedom, this article argues that PMSCs undermine Australian sovereign legitimacy. It demonstrates how Australian oversight and accountability regarding its use of PMSCs is significantly fractured and current regulatory mechanisms concerning PMSCs are deficient. Thus, the Australian government's ability to provide control over the actions of PMSCs is diminished, affecting its sovereign legitimacy and ability to monopolise violence. The article overall conveys the dubious position states come into when the use‐of‐force is wielded by actors for distinct material incentives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stakeholders use a number of different terms to refer to the contractors supporting expeditionary military operations. Often, these terms are inconsistently-applied, stigmatising, and unclear. This analysis uses the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) as a case study for exploring the efforts that the U.S. military has taken to improve contractor terminology. The study finds that DoD uses the terms contractor, contractor personnel, and contractor employee to refer to organisations, groups of employees, and individual employees providing outsourced expeditionary services. DoD also uses a number of more specific terms to refer to certain contractors and relationships. However, there are gaps and inconsistencies in DoD's terminological scheme, and challenges remain in differentiating contractors from other actors in war and in reconciling terminology across the U.S. Government and the international community. By contextualising DoD contractor terminology within the framework of the Confucian Rectification of Names, this study offers insights regarding contractors' normative roles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The two decades of war in Afghanistan left a mark on the American armed forces and redefined the American ways of war-making. One of this war's legacies is the reimagining of the role of private military and security contractors in contemporary warfare. Due to the massive involvement of the private sector in the American war machine, this industry transformed from a marginal participant into a central partner. The privatization of military and security functions became a norm, an integral part of security architecture and military operation. In this study, I provide a brief review of this development and its implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-Cold War era, private military security firms are increasingly used in many areas of armed conflict. Especially in this period, using private military companies in low-intensity armed conflicts in many parts of the world was one of the modes developed to cope with the problems in these regions. Although the use of these companies is highly controversial in terms of legal and political aspects, their areas of service are increasing. It is observed that these structures, which also undertake armed conflict functions in some cases, are generally used effectively in the logistics area and various protection services. These companies gained appreciation quickly due to their professionalism, expertise, and sound organizational structure. Since the 1980s, they have been widely used by states and international organizations such as the United Nations other international humanitarian organizations, and multinational companies. It is estimated that these companies, which operate in very different formats and have been established for various purposes, will continue to take active roles in international security architecture. In addition, the financial volume of this sector has recently reached significant dimensions. In this case, examining and understanding these structures will be helpful. In this study, the historical development of private military and security companies operating in a wide range within the changing system of the security environment, in this context, their current structures and the reasons for their preference, the roles they undertake, and their place within the scope of existing international law are examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fifty-two years ago, in 1971, President Nixon declared the "War on Drugs", identifying drug abuse as a public enemy in the United States. Since then, US drug policy has been militarized and, more recently, privatized. Every year, the US government increasingly contracts private military and security companies to provide intelligence, logistical support and training to armed forces in drug-producing or drug-transit States. In Latin America, this militarization and privatization has increased the intensity of violence and has complexified domestic situations, to the extent that the existing international legal regimes now seem inappropriate to respond to the challenges posed by the War on Drugs. On the one hand, human rights law does not adequately address situations where the State faces organized crime groups that are able to control territory. On the other hand, international humanitarian law (IHL) was not created to address law enforcement situations, which the War on Drugs and the fight against organized crime ostensibly are. This article examines the situation in Latin America, looking at examples of different types of situations through the lens of intensity and organization of the group involved and, in some cases, the group's control over territory. It discusses the application of IHL and human rights law (focusing on the inter-American system of human rights) in these situations and their complementarity, and debates how these bodies of law are adapting or may need to be adapted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past, the demand for better security forced states to adopt various private security arrangements, most of which were ad hoc, secret, and temporary. Today, private military and security companies (PMSCs) dominate the security industry, and their international operations reflect growth rather than contraction. This research article does not provide an exhaustive analysis of PMSCs' involvement in counterterrorism but focuses on core aspects of this seminal issue. The article assesses the involvement of private military and security companies in counterterrorism to identify trends, implications for international security, and trajectory. It concludes that further research is needed to compare the role and activities of PMSCs in security and counterterrorism and to compare national legal and regulatory frameworks to find overlaps and parallels for an internationalized regulatory framework and oversight of the private security industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International organisations (IOs) have increasingly resorted to private military and security companies (PMSCs) as providers of armed protection, training, intelligence, and logistics. In this article, we argue that IOs, seeking to reconcile conflicting international norms and member states' growing unwillingness to provide the manpower required for effective crisis management, have decoupled their official policy on and actual use of PMSCs, thereby engaging in organised hypocrisy. Due to its stricter interpretation of norms like the state monopoly of violence, the United Nations (UN) has showcased a more glaring gap between talk and action than the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which display a more pragmatic, but not entirely consistent, approach to the use of PMSCs. By examining the decoupling between UN, EU, and NATO official contractor support doctrines and operational records, this article advances the debate on both security privatisation and organised hypocrisy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Private military and security companies (PMSCs) and mercenaries are a common feature in civil wars, yet little systematic analysis of PMSC involvement and conflict dynamics exists. This article explores whether civil conflicts that feature PMSC forces in combat are more likely to recur. We contend that the presence of PMSCs in fighting exacerbates the postwar credible commitment problem, as belligerents will be concerned about the possibility to redeploy such forces in the future. Belligerents pay more attention to more recent and more visible information, meaning that the effects should be greatest if PMSCs feature extensively in combat and at the end of the conflict. A duration analysis of data from the Private Security Events Database and Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 1990–2014, offers robust support for these claims. Our results suggest that conflict management should consider aspects beyond the local context as risk factors for civil war recurrence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues for the utility of remote warfare as a means of analysing the geopolitics of American primacy. Through the use of new technologies and surrogate forces to address security challenges with a minimal military footprint, remote warfare (re)imposes political distance between the United States and the sites of its military interventions. Its constitutive modalities of intervention range from drones and Special Operations Forces to Private Military Security Companies, security cooperation programmes and emerging technologies associated with Artificial Intelligence. As public support for large-scale overseas interventions has dwindled and strategic competition with China has intensified, remote warfare represents a means of 'retooling' US primacy, which is both a structural condition and a strategic orientation. As a strategic approach to the use of force, remote warfare enables the American state to project military power in a more flexible and sustainable manner. This has supported the maintenance of US primacy as Washington's strategic focus has shifted from counterterrorism towards a renewed emphasis on great power competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

France has appointed Jean-Marie Bockel as a special envoy to Africa with the mission to change the status, format, and tasks of French military bases in Africa. This appointment comes after France had to reduce its military presence in Africa due to conflicts with Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Bockel's first official trip was to Côte d'Ivoire, where he discussed plans for reducing the number of French troops in the country and shifting towards a training mission. Meanwhile, Russia has deployed a new Africa Corps to Burkina Faso, taking over from the defunct Wagner Group. This new unit will be directly subordinate to Russia's Defense Ministry and is intended for deployment in Burkina Faso, Libya, the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, and Niger. In CAR, the government plans to open an official Russian military base in the town of Berengo. This move has triggered a debate about the geopolitical motives behind the presence of both Russian and American security firms in CAR. [Extracted from the article]

What explains the rise of maritime private military security companies (PMSCs)? How do they differ from land-based PMSCs? I argue that PMSCs have become major providers of security at sea. Yet maritime PMSCs are not hired by states but by the maritime industry. The United States and allied forces do not guarantee merchant vessels' day-to-day security. Consequently, shipowners rely on PMSCs and war and piracy insurance to operate their vessels in dangerous waters. The United States, however, plays a vital role in regulating PMSCs and creating environments in which PMSCs can operate effectively. This paper shows that order at sea depends not on the United States' "hard" naval power but on its leadership in global governance and on its ability to create rules and norms for maritime behavior. It also shows that PMSCs can help secure the oceans if regulated and supported by state authorities. I illustrate this logic through three case studies of how the United States has facilitated private security efforts: during the Iran–Iraq Tanker War, in piracy-prone shipping lanes off Somalia, and in the Persian Gulf following attacks there in 2019. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A prominent anti-mercenary norm entrepreneur in the second half of the twentieth century, the United Nations (UN) has become an equally prominent user of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) services in the twenty-first century. In this article, we explain the gap between UN talk and action on private providers of security as a form of organized hypocrisy. To map the mismatch between UN rhetoric and behaviour in a measurable fashion, we combined official data on the use of PMSCs with an in-depth content analysis of the reports written by the UN Working Group on Mercenaries and an examination of the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) contracting policy. The Working Group's very negative portrayal of PMSCs and the UNDSS caveat that armed contractors should only be used as a last resort and stands in stark contrast with UN agencies' widespread use of private security providers. Although a decoupling between talk and action is often inevitable for complex organizations simultaneously pursuing contradictory objectives like the UN, our findings have important implications for peacekeeping. Most notably, organized hypocrisy is in danger of challenging the UN's credibility as a norm entrepreneur, hindering the effectiveness of its agencies' outsourcing practices and delaying the reform of UN peacekeeping and crisis management at large. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

9/11 and the war on terror acted as a catalyst for a new wave of privatized security, which in turn resulted in a wide debate on topics like the definition of mercenaries, control and accountability, as well as new research on gender and post-colonialism. At the same time several stereotypes and misperceptions were kept alive when it comes to supposed salaries, the immunity of private military companies' (PMC) personnel in Iraq or the role of women in PMCs. This article shortly recounts the academic discourse of the last 20 years and furthermore examines said misperceptions. Adding to that, it provides an overview on current developments and implications in the realm of private military companies and their geopolitical ramifications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International relations scholarship has paid insufficient attention to security providers' tendency to emulate the visual attributes of other actors in an attempt to (re)construct their identities and increase their legitimacy by signalling adherence to prevailing norms. Research on the discourses deployed by private military and security companies (PMSCs), for instance, has relied almost exclusively on the analysis of written documents. This article argues that even basic visual units like logos serve as windows into the genealogy and evolution of the international market for force. By combining insights from Peircean semiotics and institutionalist theory, I show that PMSCs' logos are not only marketing tools, but also symbolic acts that shed light upon the shifting identities and legitimization strategies of the international private security industry. Specifically, I argue that PMSCs' logos can be conceptualized as forms of camouflaging, blame-shifting, mirroring and socialization into corporate identities. These overlapping processes have reshaped the international private security industry brandscape, informing a shift away from the use of logos displaying symbols and colours borrowed from military visual identity systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) have become a vital part of the global regulatory agenda. For some, MSIs are a way to reassert democratic control and accountability over corporations. For others, they merely represent the private capture of regulatory power. Based on an analysis of three MSIs in an issue area where the prospects for politicisation seem particularly promising, the regulation of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), this article engages the debate about the political dynamics of MSIs. Using a three-face approach to depoliticisation that embraces its governmental, societal and discursive dimensions, the article shows that these governance arrangements have fostered depoliticisation along all three dimensions: The launch of MSIs has not only enabled states to evade a binding licencing regime; they have also diverted NGO attention into more amicable venues and turned the privatisation of security from a normative into a narrow, technical issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article focuses on the accountability challenges raised by the increased involvement of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSC) in migration control. I argue that migration control activities outsourced to PMSC can be classified as high-risk operations for the purposes of the application of relevant business and human rights standards. This reclassification of migration control activities as high-risk business operations, in turn, has two significant implications in terms of establishing accountability for PMSC's wrongful conduct. First, it acknowledges that the privatization of migration control, especially within the context of continued containment and deterrence trends, entails a high risk of human rights abuses to which PMSC may contribute, both directly and indirectly. Second, this reclassification enables us to identify heightened obligations vested upon the home state of a PMSC, as well as the heightened responsibility of PMSC themselves. The article also examines what these heightened obligations and responsibilities entail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethical issues are an integral part of business life and daily life. Business ethics concern the ground rules of individual, company and societal behavior. With industrialization, business activities have become more complex and this occasionally causes violations of rights. The number of private military companies increased rapidly in the conflict areas after 1990. The purpose of this study is to examine the activities of private military companies in terms of business ethics and to emphasize the necessity of a human-centered thinking system. In the study, firstly, the definition of private military companies was made and then the differences between private security companies were mentioned. Then, the definition of business ethics was made. Finally, the situation of private military companies in terms of business ethics has been evaluated by considering some experienced events. In the 21st century, non-ethical activities such as operations of private military companies, severe human rights violations, ill-treatment of prisoners of war, torture and rape were recorded in various official reports in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, it cannot be said that private military companies are very successful in practice morally and legally. These new companies, known in the past as names such as legionnaires or mercenaries, but nowadays referred to as private military companies or private military contractors, have reached an annual turnover of over $ 200 billion and the number of employees expressed in hundreds of thousands. However, the uncertainty of the positions and responsibilities of private military companies in armed conflicts brings along many moral and legal problems. Along with the law, violations of rights can be prevented by addressing people's moral worlds, hearts and consciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From an obscure sector synonymous with mercenaryism, the private military and security industry has grown to become a significant complementing instrument in military operations. This rise has brought with it a considerable attention. Researchers have examined the role of private military and security companies in international relations as well as the history of these companies, and, above all, the legal implications of their use in the place of military organizations. As research progresses, a significant gap has become clear. Only a handful of studies have addressed the complex of issues associated with contractors' demographics and lived experience. This article sheds some light over this lacuna, examining contractors' demographics using descriptive statistics from an original data set of American and British contractors who died in Iraq between the years 2003 and 2016. The article augments our understanding of an important population of post-Fordist-contracted workforce, those peripheral workers supplementing military activity in high-risk occupations with uncertain long-term outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the Russian private security and military company (PMSC) industry has evolved to serve the needs of both business clients as well as governments. Thus far, the ties between the Kremlin and the Russian PMSC industry are ambiguous and seem to vary across the different companies. What seems clear though, is that the Kremlin is experimenting with the utility of these companies and that the use of PMSCs is on the rise. Private security and military companies are neither explicitly legal nor illegal in Russia, a status that may serve Russian authorities well in situations where attribution and attention is unwanted. While the exact shape and role of the Russian PMSC industry may not be carved out fully, Russia is now home to a small, but potent, PMSC industry that can be mobilized to inflict harm on the country's enemies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) impact peace duration after civil war? I argue that the role these organisations play in a conflict can impact post-conflict stability. Specifically, I suggest that variance in services provided by PMSCs can influence rebels' calculations about relative capabilities. These calculations then contribute to the probability for civil war recurrence. Building on the bargaining framework, with a focus on information and commitment problems, this article demonstrates that PMSCs participating in armed combat operations can jeopardise the stability of peace following civil war. Three case narratives (Angola, Sierra Leone and Croatia) are used to probe the theoretical argument and results are illustrative – PMSCs serving as force multipliers contribute to an increase in the probability for conflict recurrence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyses how the norm against mercenarism shapes the legitimate parameters of exchange in the market for military outsourcing. The dominant interpretation of this dynamic is that neoliberal states and private military companies (PMCs) have come to restrict their transactions to non-combat functions in order to circumvent contemporary articulations of this norm. The article, by contrast, contends that even within these narrowed parameters of exchange, neoliberal states and PMCs have been required to work through the norm against mercenarism. Using the ‘global security assemblages’ approach, and drawing upon new data relating to the UK case, it explores how the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and PMCs have sought to appropriate symbolic capital from a domestic private security licensing regime so as to distance their non-combat transactions from the norm against mercenarism. In so doing, it facilitates a reappraisal of the regulatory potential of this norm within today’s pluralised military landscape. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multistakeholder initiatives that bring together actors from the state, the business sector and society to formulate, implement and/or monitor rules governing different policy fields have assumed a prominent role in global governance since the 1980s. In the governance literature, it is generally assumed that the actors from the three sectors have diverse interests, but contribute different resources. This should allow to address transnational problems more effectively. While cooperation among the various collective actors in these initiatives might be based in part on complementary resources, we argue here that such cooperation is also shaped and conditioned by ideational prealignments of the participating actors. Such ideational prealignments are consequential, because they predetermine (1) the composition of multistakeholder forums in terms of which actors participate and which do not, (2) the processes that govern these forums, (3) the results of these forums and (4) the relations among the collective actors who participate in these forums and the stakeholders they are deemed to represent. When viewed from this perspective, multistakeholder initiatives are a form of club governance that is based on ideational factors. We illustrate this argument by drawing on research that examines the setting of standards for private military and security companies (PMSCs). [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Discussions about the legitimacy of private security companies (PSCs) in multilateral military interventions abound. This article looks at how the United States has sought to legitimize the outsourcing of security services to PSCs through performance-based contracting and performance assessments. Both mechanisms aim to demonstrate the effective provision of publicly desirable outcomes. However, the immaterial and socially constructed nature of security presents major problems for performance assessments in terms of observable and measurable outcomes. Performance has therefore given way to performativity – that is, the repetitive enactment of particular forms of behaviour and capabilities that are simply equated with security as an outcome. The implications of this development for the ways in which security has been conceptualized, implemented and experienced within US interventions have been profound. Ironically, the concern with performance has not encouraged PSCs to pay increased attention to their impacts on security environments and civilian populations, but has fostered a preoccupation with activities and measurable capabilities that can be easily assessed by government auditors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Private military and security companies ( PMSCs) are a fast-growing global industry. While the rise of PMSCs and their activities have attracted much media coverage and growing scholarly attention, little is known about their sourcing of masses of military labour from the global South. This exploratory study examines the case of Fiji, whose thousands of ex/current disciplinary force personnel and unemployed men have been contracted by PMSCs to provide security work in Iraq and other high-conflict areas. The article shows this to be an instance of unequal core-periphery military labour trade, outlining its scale, processes and impacts on the migrants. It also illuminates how the migrants' collective agency is demonstrated even under powerful structural constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The burgeoning use of private military and security company (PMSC) contractors in the wake of the 2003 Iraq War years has given rise to calls for regulation and oversight of PMSCs. The UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries advocates a convention that bans states from outsourcing ‘inherently State functions’, including ‘direct participation in hostilities’, to PMSCs. Others, especially Western states and others behind the boom of the PMSC industry after the 2003 Iraq War, argue that codes of conduct and self-regulation are sufficient to regulate PMSCs. Treaty, principle and policy norms all encompass shared expectations about proper conduct, but treaty norms take form in hard law whereas principle norms are evinced in customary or soft law (or both) and policy norms are evinced in policy statements issued by international organisations and industry bodies. This article hypothesises that norms on PMSCs that are neither puritanical nor overly strong and yet appear to be both normative and concrete are the most likely to be institutionalised by a critical mass of state actors and by the PMSC industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2004 private military and security companies lacked effective transnational governance. Ten years later, however, an agreed-upon framework drew these services within established international law. It inspired various complementary nonbinding instruments and instigated changes in government policy. Hegemonic-order theories, whether realist or liberal, would expect this change to reflect shifts in US preferences. But the United States displayed no initial interest in transnational coordination. I build an alternative explanation from pragmatism and network theory. A Swiss-led process created connections among stakeholders around the problem of regulating private military and security companies. Relatively open interactions among participants spurred original ideas, which in turn appeared useful for addressing the issue. Their usefulness, led more actors to "buy into" the process. This relational-pragmatic account offers new ways for understanding the nature and development of governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In spite of its sensitivity, diplomatic protection has received very sporadic scholarly attention. This article provides a comparative analysis of US and UK diplomatic security policies, focusing on the increasing use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) for the protection of foreign service and development agencies’ personnel. The existing theoretical explanations of the privatization of security tasks cannot explain why countries displaying similar material incentives and similar political and market cultures have outsourced diplomatic protection to different degrees, nor can they account for variance in the use of PMSCs by different agencies within the same country. Our analysis highlights the importance of investigating organizations’ interests in providing a more accurate explanation of the varying propensity to outsource armed protection. In both the United States and the United Kingdom, the outsourcing of diplomatic security was a resultant of foreign policy bureaucracies and military organizations’ preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the ethics of using private security companies to undertake combat operations in modern conflict zones. Previous studies on this topic, including those that have drawn on the principles of just war theory, have, out of necessity, been highly speculative because they lacked a strong empirical basis on which to evaluate the behaviour of private security personnel during their operations. Indeed, most scholarship on the ethics of private security companies has relied on a handful of anecdotal examples that happened to receive extensive media coverage. In contrast, this article undertakes the first quantitative analysis of how well the employees of a dozen private security companies adhered to the jus in bello tenets of just war theory and also how their degree of adherence to these tenets affected their tendency to suffer friendly casualties during their security operations in Iraq. It finds that the employees of most of the firms under study exhibited a moderate or high level of adherence to the jus in bello principles of proportionality and discrimination during their security operations in Iraq. Moreover, it also finds that close adherence to these principles did not necessarily expose private security personnel to greater risk of suffering harm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past two decades, governments have increasingly contracted private military and security companies (PMSCs) to support military operations in conflicts. However, many observers have argued that such companies are ‘greedy market actors’ or ‘reckless mercenaries’ and their level of performance very poor. A minority has defended them as security professionals. If market competition is present, the level of performance is high and positive contributions to the client’s military operation can be expected. However, neither PMSC opponents nor proponents can account for the variance in the level of performance in three crucial cases – Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This article argues that different market structures explain this variance. At least three ideal configurations exist: collaborative, competitive, and rival structures. These structures influence the level of performance. PMSC performance levels are expected to decrease from the first configuration, being positive, to the last, being negative. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Although the privatisation of military support is increasingly widespread, advanced military organisations have not relied on Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) to the same degree. The existing scholarship on PMSCs cannot explain why countries sharing similar material incentives and similar market and political ideologies like the United States and the United Kingdom have not outsourced the same operational tasks. This article contends that introducing military role conceptions as a factor enabling or inhibiting the outsourcing of certain functions provides important insights into the scope of military privatisation, explaining why the US military has systematically privatised armed security and foreign military training, while the UK military has not [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the legislative processes and the creation of security governance structures in a recent move by Scandinavian countries to authorize the use of armed guards on commercial vessels. Findings reveal that while there are many similarities, the cases (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden) differ in terms of government control, oversight, and governance of private security providers, as well as in the management of firearms and the use of force. The article concludes that all three countries have adopted an approach that creates a “semblance” of state control and regulation but which also entails substantial delegation of authority to private actors. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) has become an increasingly popular measure to counter maritime piracy. This article examines how two established maritime nations, Germany and Spain, have approached the regulation of maritime PMSCs. The article demonstrates that there are similarities but also significant differences between the two regulatory systems and concludes that the governance frameworks that emerged are tailored to the needs of each state. While Germany underwent a long process to establish a sophisticated licensing scheme specifically designed for maritime PMSCs, Spain swiftly applied the framework that governs PMSCs active on land to those companies operating at sea. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Initially based mainly on the use of Navy Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs) paid by shipowners, Italian maritime security legislation also allows for the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) when VPDs are not available. Hence, Italy has adopted a hybrid antipiracy approach that entails two different forms of private sector involvement: the financing and partial control of public military forces by the maritime industry and the provision of armed security by PCASP, an option that includes Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs). This opening to the commercial sector is significant as one of the first of its kind in a state that has adopted a tight monopoly over the provision of armed services and can be explained as the interplay between the willingness to respond to the needs of the maritime industry and a long-standing resistance against loosening state control over the use of force. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The U.S. and the UK supported the introduction of PMSCs on merchant vessels to address Somali piracy. This article describes U.S. and UK regulations and guidelines for PMSCs and shippers seeking to hire them. A central concern for each has been ensuring control of the weapons to be used by PMSCs. The U.S. has also sought to vet contractors to ensure the security of U.S. ports and transport facilities, while the UK has focused on ensuring that contractors and companies meet its firearms requirements. These distinctions reflect differences in the regulation of firearms in the U.S. and the UK. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In response to the increasing employment of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) to protect vessels against pirate attacks, some flag states introduced new regulations that allow the use of PCASP. The introduction of these new regulations was at least in part an attempt to (re)establish state control of violence. This article provides the background and theoretical framework for this special issue, which discusses how states with national registers approached the regulation of PCASP. Summarizing its major findings, the article concludes that even when states attempted to govern the use of PCASP, operational difficulties resulted in significant shortcomings in state control. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Private military and security companies (PMSCs) have been gaining increasing media and scholarly attention particularly due to their indispensable role in the wars in Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq 2003. Nevertheless, theoretical insights into the agency problems inherent when hiring PMSCs and how to optimally incentivize them are scarce. We study the complex relationship between intervening state, host state, and PMSC, taking into account the diverging interests of all involved parties as well as potential agency problems. We develop a theoretical model to characterize a state's optimal choice whether to perform a task associated with an intervening mission itself, or hire a PMSC and optimally design the contract. We find that it might be optimal to hire PMSCs even if they are expected to do a worse job than the intervening state would do itself. Furthermore, the government's reputation in rewarding PMSCs for a good performance is crucial and might render it optimal to only deal with a limited number of PMSCs — who are not necessarily always the most efficient providers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Outsourcing military and security services to the private sector is an emerging trend under international law. The shift to using private military and security companies (PMSCS) in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan has brought attention to the role that these companies may play in fulfilling functions that are normally monopolised by States or international organisations. The reliance of the UN on PMSCS has increased considerably in recent years, leading to the question of the legality of their use in various UN operations. This paper focuses on two main aspects of the UN's use of such companies; (i) The engagement of PMSCS in peacekeeping operations, either when hired by the UN directly or when hired by a State and subsequently seconded to the UN; and (ii) The participation of PMSCS in peace enforcement measures adopted by the UN Security Council according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This paper argues that the use of PMSCS in peacekeeping operations is lawful under international law, while their use in peace enforcement operations is not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2012, the United Nations approved new Guidelines on the Use of Armed Private Security Companies by its agencies, funds and programmes. The Guidelines hold the potential to not only enhance the quality of armed security services contracted by the UN, but also raise professional standards within the military and security industry more generally by serving as a model for other consumers and companies. Nevertheless, a close reading of the Guidelines indicates that there is still room for improvements. Drawing on best practices identified by industry associations, major clients and academic research, this article makes six recommendations for revision. Specifically, the article contends that expanding the scope, content and enforcement of the Guidelines would contribute to strengthening the control over private security contractors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UN is increasingly relying on private military and security companies (pm s c s ) for a wide range of services. Until recently, UN use of PMSCS was not governed by systemwide rules and standards. The establishment of guidelines on the use of armed private security in late 2012 has led to greater accountability and transparency around this practice. The guidelines clarify the decision-making process and the criteria for the selection and hiring of companies providing armed security. However, they are overly reliant on self-regulation by PMSCS and remain limited, raising questions about their capacity to avoid companies with objectionable records and prevent potential incidents. Moreover, the guidelines raise concerns that the use of PMSCS by the UN may become normalised, with yet unexamined effects on the organisation's security policies and its image. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the role of private security and military companies within the wider confinements of peace operations governance. To do so, the paper looks at the roles that PMSCS play within two different us peace support initiatives as well as within UN peace operations. Using theory lenses derived from the governance literature, the article finds that private military and security companies are already established actors within what it calls 'the peace operations network'. By training forces, by building or reforming institutions, by supplying security and advisory services, or by being technological experts, private providers of military and security services carry out key tasks in the planning and implementation of peace operations. In the process, the paper argues, they ultimately exercise authority, make decisions and establish practices that often lay the foundations for the future management of security of local populations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of the present analysis is to investigate whether the law of collective security could play a normative function in the determination of which services may or may not be outsourced in the context of UN peacekeeping operations. The key question is whether PMSCS should only perform those activities instrumental to the life of the UN, or should also cover those functions that are a direct expression of the competences attributed to it for the maintenance of international peace and security. The point is made that since peacekeeping is aimed at preserving fundamental values of the international community, peace and increasingly human rights, PMSCS might play a part in it, but only in a secondary way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The work of private military and security contractors is extremely controversial from the point of view of international law and of practice. Sometimes there are doubts as to whether some of their activities should be considered legal activities or illegal mercenarism. Like any other entities using force, they can violate human rights as well as international humanitarian law. They provide their services to, amongst others, states and intergovernmental organisations, including the UN. This requires a precise definition of the rules under which such contractors operate, both with regard to the law of treaties and the domestic law of the entities using their services. A question also arises as to whether there is any legal limit to their services being used by intergovernmental organisations, i.e. entities deriving their competences from the will of their member states. The work of the UN is an interesting example here. The organisation uses such contractors, but on the other hand, it undertakes various activities to eliminate any potential threats in this respect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been widespread and vociferous condemnation of Somali piracy and several states have used force against the pirates. This reflects the prevailing view of pirates as belligerents and aggressors who act wrongly. In this article, I challenge this view by defending the conditional moral permissibility of piracy. More specifically, I first argue that piracy can be morally permissible when certain conditions are met. These are what I call the principles of ‘justa piratica’, that is, the principles of just piracy. Second, I claim that these conditions are likely to apply to some Somali pirates. Third, as a corollary, I argue that the case of piracy shows that one of the shibboleths of Just War Theory – that a war cannot be just on both sides – is mistaken. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]