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Describes the history, size and scope of the public enterprise sector in Brazil. Contribution of state-owned enterprises to the industrialization process; Political and institutional framework in which privatizations are implemented; Consequences of privatization in terms of corporate governance.

The paper discusses the contradictions of state policy in the sphere of public ownership. It is noted that in the Ukraine there is a movement towards liberalization of all areas of public life which, on the one hand, justifies itself in the context of deregulation of certain spheres of the economy but, on the other, assumes a threatening character with regards to the unwarranted privatization of public property, etc. The inconsistency of the dominant scientific point of view on minimizing the participation of the state as the owner (entrepreneur) is emphasized. It is proposed that a system of innovative enterprises be created that would be able to accelerate the renovation of production in Ukraine. A new approach to the creation of state-owned enterprises has been developed. The expected results of the activity of the newly created state-owned enterprises and the directions of their further transformation are determined. The proposals presented in the paper will ensure the growth of the production potential of the domestic economy, which will be key to the accelerated socio-economic development of Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contributes to the understanding of factors that may affect the effectiveness of administrative reforms based on the end of the state monopoly in the provision of public services. The focus is on the scope of measures to encourage the entry of new entrepreneurs. The study compares the sectors of electricity (power generation segment), telecommunications (public services) and oil (production and refining segments), precursors of regulatory reforms in Brazil. This is a descriptive research, which includes bibliographical and documentary research and content analysis of the guidelines, normative acts and main measures aimed at stimulating the entry of new entrepreneurs Analyzes were guided by the premise that such reforms were motivated by the failure of State investment. The results demonstrate that the increase in the supply of products and services is directly associated with the legal certainty offered for private investment. This legal certainty is greater when there is the privatization of state-owned enterprises - SOE and concession contracts with the new providers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modern government is comprised of a complex admixture of public and private actors. From the provision of public services, to growing movements to sell off national parks, to the very task of legislating, the public is unlikely to encounter an area of government that is untouched by privatization. But public transparency mechanisms, including the seminal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), rely upon an outdated, rigid conception of the private-public dichotomy. They fail to provide the public with any meaningful access to what we call the “private government,” which includes the private actors who bear an increasing responsibility for performing governmental functions. A paradigm shift is required, from a focus on who creates or possesses a document, to the public impact and importance of the document. We propose to turn the primary tool of privatization—the private law contract—into a mechanism for injecting public oversight into contractual delegation. Specifically, we outline a framework for a statute which would require agencies to retain ownership of information created pursuant to a contractual relationship or to justify, ex ante, why the public interest in public access is outweighed by other considerations. The agency-owned records would be subject to the full panoply of ordinary FOIA provisions and any decision to exempt records from the ownership requirement would be subject to judicial review. Our proposal mitigates some of the problems inherent in asking private entities to open their books to FOIA scrutiny and properly places the onus on public agencies to fulfill their roles as protectors of the public. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vested interests have been blamed for resisting the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China. Yet, various interest groups have heterogeneous interests in privatization. Using both firm- and provincial-level data, we find that SOE managers and local bureaucrats—two key players of privatization—have contingent, rather than vested, interests in privatization, depending partly on their political connections with the central government. On the one hand, political connections motivate SOE managers to privatize more state ownership while retaining managerial control. On the other hand, central connections discourage provincial leaders from using privatization to boost their economic performance. These results shed light on the conditions under which China implements its economic reforms. With the increasing embeddedness and declining autonomy for policymakers, the once well-performing developmental state models now face serious challenges as politically powerful interest groups can manipulate economic reforms for their own purposes rather than for structural transformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In OECD and many other countries, state-owned public enterprises normally receive various forms of exclusive preferential treatment that directly affect the profits of all firms, motivating firms to lobby politicians. Using the common agency approach, we show that when state ownership of public enterprises is sufficiently low, i.e., the privatization process is sufficiently advanced, corporate lobbying boosts preferential treatment, causing public enterprises to "advance" as the playing field is tilted in their favor. Conversely, when state ownership is high, corporate lobbying can reduce preferential treatment, causing public enterprises to "retreat" as the playing field levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking advantage of the SOEs privatization events in China, our research looks to identify the causal effect of political connections on corporate financial constraints. In a difference-in-differences framework, we demonstrate that after the transfer of control from state to private owners, privatized SOEs hoard more cash, save more cash from incremental cash flow, and exhibit higher cash flow sensitivity of investment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi is the property of University of Cumhuriyet, Faculty of Sciences & Arts and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper analyses privatization as one of development strategies in developing countries. In the last two decades, there has been an increasing trend of privatizing state owned enterprises (SOE) in developing countries. This paper clarifies that the process to decide the implementation of privatization in a developing country is a complex issue. The decision to privatize is not merely weighing the potential benefits of privatization, but also requires consideration of the circumstances of the country itself. The prerequisite circumstances of privatization in developing countries, including macroeconomic stability, the large role of the private sector, and low corruption level, will be discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to focus on understanding of stakeholder attributes and attitudes towards privatisation. It examines the stakeholder attributes through the framework provided by Mitchell et al. (1997). By combining it with the concept of issue salience proposed by Bundy et al. (2013), it addresses the current gap in research on how stakeholders influence the process of privatisation.Design/methodology/approach This research uses a process research approach to examine the privatisation process in New Zealand's electricity industry in order to explore contexts, content and process of change. By collecting real-time data during the period of privatisation, utilising a process approach provided the authors a view of the historical path and associated events which lead to identification of stakeholder attributes and attitudes towards privatisation.Findings The research offers a unique insight into stakeholder attributes exhibited by different groups during privatisation. The authors identified that during privatisation the government is the ultimate stakeholder who sets the rules of the game of privatisation by exhibiting the attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency. The attributes exhibited by other stakeholders were transitory and were impacted by issue salience. The authors also identified that stakeholders exhibiting all three attributes (the government) chose a non-response approach to deal with any conflicting issues raised by other stakeholders.Originality/value The research examined the new public management emphasis on the privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) vis-à-vis stakeholder groups, utilising the complementary concepts of stakeholder salience and issue salience. This research makes a contribution to stakeholder management theory in the public sector by identifying how various stakeholders influence the process of privatisation of SOEs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study formulates a two‐period model of mixed oligopoly in which the government privatizes a state‐owned public firm over multiple periods. We introduce the shadow cost of public funding (i.e., the excess burden of taxation). The government is concerned about both the total surplus and the revenue obtained from the privatization of the public firm. We find that the government may or may not increase the degree of privatization over time depending on the competitiveness of the product market and nationality of private competitors. The government increases the degree of privatization over time if the product market is competitive and the foreign ownership share in private firms is low. Although it adjusts its privatization policy over time, this harms welfare. In addition, this distortion in the ex post incentive leads to too low a degree of privatization in the first period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I examine effects of the privatization process as a whole in Turkey. I show that the privatization process begins before the firm is sold to private agents. I find that privatization causes the firm-level workforce to decline by 65 percent, profit-margin to increase by 18 percent, and no substantial changes in real sales. Based on the evidence presented, I conclude that the direct outcome of privatization is an income transfer from wage earners to profit earners.JEL Classification: L33, H42 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Privatization of state owned enterprises (SOEs) has been a key plank of the neo-liberal counter-revolution against economic development since the 1980s. Privatization's promoters promised improved efficiency and improved fiscal balances, both supposedly contributing to higher economic growth. Privatization was also supposed to ensure improved consumer welfare through increased competition and lower prices. Empirical support for these claims is scant and often contradictory. Thus, in many cases, privatization has been worse as a solution to the ills it purported to overcome. The problems of SOEs are not necessarily due to public ownership per se. In any case, there are alternative governance, management and organization means to improve SOE performance without privatization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an empirical criterion for establishing privatization priorities for state-owned enterprises. The approach uses firm performance, defined as productive efficiency, as the basis for deciding the sequence in which firms are privatized. Sequencing is relevant because the order in which state enterprises are taken up for privatization has efficiency implications, and an appropriate sequence based on such efficiency considerations can be beneficial. Privatizing inefficient enterprises before efficient ones is a superior first-best sequence as compared to on which reverses this order, and the size of the firms to be privatized is an important contingency. An improvement index is constructed for individual firms, and the index makes possible a comparison of multiple firms, thus facilitating the construction of a priority schedule.

Economic and political imperatives of the 1980s have seen governments turn to private sector managerial techniques, practices and orientations to enable them to deliver services more efficiently and effectively. Among these is marketing which has received increasing attention as governments have looked to privatize, corporatize or simply introduce some level of "user-pays" principle into their operations. Despite the ambitious claims of the marketing discipline, the transposition of marketing to the public sector has not proved to be without problems. This paper reviews why such a transposition might be difficult. It also reviews the claim of marketing to be an appropriate discipline at all for widespread application in the public sector. The paper concludes that marketers should be cautious as to the extent to which their discipline can be transposed or modified to assist governments identity, plan, deliver and evaluate services more efficiently and effectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years there has been worldwide interest in 'privatization' and transferring government department functions to quasi-autonomous agencies. This paper presents the results of a study of 10 organizations in the U.K. which underwent changes in their organizational status within government or which crossed the public-private boundary. The focus of the study is the impact of these organizational status changes on financial performance measured using a set of standard financial ratios. These ratios did not provide a consistent set of statistically significant results. Organizational status changes in the direction of privatization do not appear to guarantee improved performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

State-owned enterprises, referred to as 'government owned business corporations' in this paper, are a common phenomenon in Canada, are increasing in number, and are contributing substantially to the economy. The environment for these corporations is examined to establish the principal components and to identify two dominating trends in public policy, privatization and commercialization. The paper suggests that these trends, plus management's desire for flexibility, are resulting in the formulation of autonomy strategies designed to increase management's decision making capability relating to operating and strategic management with less government interference. A final section integrates the environment and autonomy strategies discussions to develop a typology for classifying the behaviour of government owned business corporations. The paper concludes that the managers of government owned business corporations in Canada are formulating and implementing autonomy strategies because of environmental factors, public policies, and management's desire for independence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the relationship between the government and the private sector in the United States in 1967. The author feels that the term "private sector" is overly broad since it can refer to businesses ranging from local retailers to government-funded defense contractors as well as government-regulated utility companies. He calls for the privatization of government corporations as a more effective way to streamline certain businesses that are creatively stagnant. He also suggests that welfare reform and social policies such as federally financed medical care offer great hopes for a better society.

The article examines the organisational transformation of the Russian defence industry during the period of privatisation and radical market reforms. The study is based on the results of an original large-scale longitudinal survey of the directors (CEOs) of the industry. We find that over a decade of transition, 1996-2006, Russian defence industry managers were able largely to preserve the production potential of their enterprises and make them capable of operating under market conditions. Coupled with the restoration of government orders and the 2020 rearmament programme, these newly acquired market skills have contributed to the impressive revival of the Russian defence industry in the Putin era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the role of private debt financing in reducing government transfers and information costs in a state‐owned firm. We show that debt contracts allow the government to reduce socially costly subsidies by letting underperforming state‐owned firms default. When the firm has private information, the government uses debt to reduce the firm's information rents. The option of default and privatization allows the government to stop subsidizing the firm. We identify the conditions under which information costs outweigh privatization costs and a positive debt level benefits governments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT: Canada has had a strong tradition of using state‐owned enterprises for economic development. ‘Crown corporations’, as State‐owned enterprises are known in Canada, were created with a built‐in autonomy for their commercial activities on the condition that they also fulfil policy objectives. Of late, however, policy objectives have been articulated more through regulations and governance models and are issued far more from central agencies such as the Treasury Board Secretariat than from the ‘home department’ of the agency. This article explores the evolution of the use of Crowns from the glory days of their formation to the privatization era of the 1980s and 1990s to the modern day. It examines how governance and control mechanisms have replaced policy directives. The picture given of the Canadian experience could be relevant for the coming years when these enterprises become more international and thus challenge the present arrangement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT: Public enterprises have played a major role in the national development of Australia since the early years of European settlement. More recently, especially since the 1980s, Australian governments at national and state levels, involving political parties of both the left and right, have undertaken a program of major reform of their public sectors. The relentless pace of reform has been driven by a variety of motives from pragmatic through to ideological, within a broad consensus that private delivery of services should be privileged over public. As a result, discourse about public enterprises in Australia has tended to focus on divestment and windfall revenues to assist governments to balance their budgets. The analysis in this paper will detail the major players at the national level, their governance arrangements and some consideration of how these enterprises have performed. We will also outline how the public mission of public enterprises has transformed in recent decades from a role as nation builder to one as enabler of services. In conclusion we will consider the long‐term outlook including the loss of public value with declining standards of service and the reduced opportunities for further divestments with pressure on governments to seek alternative savings and revenue arrangements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT: This paper provides an overview of the major State‐Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in Greece with the aim of identifying the key features of the dominant paradigm and the critical turning points in its evolution. The process of SOEs’ reform is analysed with reference to corporatization, restructuring, privatization and liberalization policies. Drawing on theoretical and empirical evidence, the paper explores the impact of these reforms on the ownership, governance and public mission of SOEs, also addressing their current social and economic role. The hypothesis of a ‘paradigm shift’ is tested within the changing context of government intervention, market structure, management relationships, public service and control and accountability of SOEs. The case studies include 15 major enterprises in key economic‐industrial and utility sectors. The paper concludes that over the past two decades the SOE sector has shifted towards new governance and organizational patterns that have substantially affected the traditional SOE paradigm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of JDM: Jurnal Dinamika Manajemen is the property of Universitas Negeri Semarang, Fakultas Ekonomi, Jurusan Manajemen and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper examines the changing strategies of developmental states using Brazil's oil-based industrial policy as a case study. We analyse the relationship between the state, Petrobras and industrial elites in the context of Brazil's renewed emphasis on sector-specific industrial development strategy. Taking stock and re-examining the developmental state model, we suggest that developmental states are inherently political, particularly their bureaucracy and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and that money politics is intricately woven into state-guided high growth regimes. Given the difficulty of privatisation as a solution to SOE (mis)governance, the challenge for Brazil is to mediate extreme political interventions that have eroded Petrobras' autonomy in the past and to sustain institutional capacity to direct rents towards investment and innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to review several influential empirical studies that examine the performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The paper undertakes a citation analysis of journals, authors and titles in the area of privatization and firm performance in general, and assesses the impact of privatization on the performance of SOEs in particular.Design/methodology/approach The methodology is based on a systematic and structured review of over 100 papers published in economics, public management, business strategy and related social sciences. The systematic review is based on citation analysis of journals, authors and titles. The journal and author citation counts were tabulated by leveraging the databases of SCImago Journal Rankings and Google Scholar and filtered it to find out the most highly cited journals and authors. The structured review is based on the framing opinion with respect to major findings, variables selected, measurement techniques and statistical tools applied by different researchers. The impact is measured through coding a value “P” in case of positive effects, “N” in case of negative effects and “NT” in case the study found both positive and negative effects.Findings The citation analysis reveals that American Economic Review, Journal of Financial Economics, Review of Financial Studies and Journal of Finance as the top-cited journals, and Megginson and Netter (3,468), Megginson et al. (1,737), Djankov and Murrell (1,356), Boardman and Vining (1,320), Balsam et al. (1,094) and DeWenter and Malatesta (1,018) as the top-cited authors in this particular research field. While majority research studies have revealed a significant improvement in the performance of SOEs in the post-privatization period, few studies have reserved their impact as neutral or even negative in some respects.Originality/value Given that economic transitions, corporate governance, and performance of SOEs have attracted a great attention from public management and business strategy scholars in recent years, this paper aims to summarize a large number of empirical studies that examine the performance of SOEs. The paper would be useful to future researchers especially the beginners and early career researchers in terms of its current trends, selection of variables, measurement techniques and statistical tools applied. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to provide a conceptual framework for the intermediation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Governments may apply different form of support with the aim of increasing corporatization and internationalization of SOEs. The paper suggests a strategy based on institutional intermediation as the more efficient to drive corporatization and internationalization.Design/methodology/approach The research selected cases concerning SOEs in different industries in Europe in search of recurrences from a novel theoretical perspective. Among them, a case study concerning the Italian Space Agency explores the development of an institutional intermediary.Findings Government supports to SOEs appear in different forms and contribute to different results. A typology of the most recurrent forms shows three different types of actions governments have taken to support internationalization of firms. Intermediation seems the most suitable to trigger corporatization and internationalization.Research limitations/implications The study explores institutional intermediaries as a novel supporting strategy for governments. It proposes a novel concept based upon a single case study. Further research needs to test and verify the institutional intermediaries’ impact drawing on a larger sample and different contexts.Originality/value So far, few attempts have linked corporatization to globalization. The paper tries to fill this gap between corporatization and internationalization of SOEs. Its value is the provision of a novel view that includes institutional intermediaries as instrumental to governments’ strategy that aims to bridge the two components. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose This paper looks at state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from the angle of the market for corporate control and analyzes in detail the reported rationales of a sample of 355 mergers and acquisition (M&A) deals performed by SOEs as acquirers over the period 2002-2012. The purpose of this paper, after having created a taxonomy of deal motivations, is to empirically test two alternative hypotheses: deviation vs convergence of M&A deal rationales between state-owned and private enterprises.Design/methodology/approach The data set is obtained by combining firm-level information from two sources, Zephyr and Orbis (Bureau Van Dijk). A recursive algorithm is developed to infer the ownership nature of the enterprises at the time the deal took place and then the authors double-checked the identity of the global ultimate owner by visual inspection of all the available information. Motivations are analyzed through a case-by-case analysis and classified into several categories, thereby providing a taxonomy of rationales behind SOE M&As and discussing their differences and similarities relative to private firms.Findings More than 60 percent of the deals performed by SOEs as acquirers are driven by “shareholder value maximization” motives, similarly to private enterprise acquirers. The other 40 percent of deals are almost equally spread among three rationales that specifically relate to the role of modern state capitalism in the economy. “Financial distress” motivation, which is the only one clearly deviating from the objectives of profit maximization typical of private ownership, is far less important than the others.Research limitations/implications The paper does not analyze the case studies in detail. Neither does it correlate the evidence with the quality of corporate governance or the quality of institutions in the country. This would be interesting in order to discover whether the alignment of objectives between public and private enterprises is enhanced by certain features of public sector management, as suggested by the OECD (2015) Guidelines.Practical implications The paper suggests some policy implications in terms of reforms of the corporate governance of the SOEs and accountability of their management against clearly stated public missions. It also calls for the need for citizens to be informed in a transparent way about the rationales of major M&A deals when a SOE is on the acquirer side, and the consistency of such rationales with the mission assigned by governments to the enterprises they own. Finally, it underlines that regulatory concerns raised in many countries by the rise of cross-border SOE M&As are in most of the cases unfounded.Originality/value Existing literature has mainly focused on private corporate M&A deals or has just disregarded the ownership status of the acquiring firm. This paper focuses on the motivations for SOE deals in order to elaborate a taxonomy of SOE deal rationales and to identify the differences and similarities between private corporate firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to introduce the special issue on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the contemporary global business scenario. Against the theoretical background of and the invited themes for the special issue, the paper presents a summary of key findings and practical implications of the accepted papers and suggests future research directions.Design/methodology/approach The paper is conceptual, which organized through utilitarianism or legitimism; SOEs scenario 1 – hungry fox, hunting bears; SOEs scenario 2 – dancing elephant, flying bears; what do we know and what we wish to explore; what have been examined; what we need to study further; closing note by bears’ well-wishers; and protocol of the special issue.Findings By deeply looking into emerging economies (China, India), developed economies (Denmark, Italy, Sweden), transition economies (Tunisia) and diverse sectors (public transport, space), coupled with cross-country sample data, the nine accepted papers have discussed several interesting findings and recommended numerous implications for the policymakers and SOEs’ managers. Drawing upon the interdisciplinary literature, empirical and qualitative papers would deepen the understanding of the growth strategies and performance of SOEs, and the application of management theories such as institutional theory, agency theory, social exchange theory, managerial grid theory, incomplete contracts theory and public governance view, among others. The issue also brings a review-cum-citation analysis paper on the impact of privatization on the performance of SOEs.Originality/value The papers have made unique contributions to the public economics, new public management, international business and organizational development literature by critically analyzing the burgeoning phenomenon of the changing dynamics and globalization of SOEs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper evaluates privatization of public enterprises in Nigeria with a view to determining whether it is a mere recipe for sleaze or that it impacts positively on national development. The study examines the efforts made by both the federal and state governments in Nigeria to divest their interests in running businesses which are assumed to be better handled by private investors. The paper compares privatization in some other countries to assess how the programme is being handled and the kind of results they deliver with a view to replicating such measures in Nigeria. The research made use of a qualitative approach through intensive content analysis. Data for the study were obtained from books, journal articles, published materials from the internet and other public sources. Findings from the study reveal that privatization of public enterprises which is supposed to provide revenue to the government through the sale or concession of such corporations, improve operational efficiency as well as save costs from poor non-regenerative investments have neither helped to improve government revenues nor impact positively on the lives of Nigerians. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider a state holding corporation with two plants that may produce complementary or substitute goods and that competes with one or two private firms. We find that the government partially privatizes the two plants of the state holding corporation and is indifferent between selling them partially to a single investor and to different investors. However, in the former case the government retains a greater (smaller) stake in the state corporation if goods are substitutes (complements). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this paper is to shed light on the antecedents of managerial support for privatisation of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The results of the study, based on 134 Polish SOEs, reveal that managerial autonomy (conceptualized as the extent to which CEOs are free from stakeholder pressure) is negatively related to CEOs' support for privatisation. Moreover, firm performance has an indirect impact on CEOs' support for privatisation, that is, it enhances CEOs' positive attitude towards state control, which, in turn, negatively relates to CEOs' support for privatisation. The study brings important theoretical and practical implications, indicating that privatisation efforts may meet with strong resistance from managers who enjoy a high level of discretion in SOEs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I consider the application of János Kornai’s soft budget constraint (SBC) concept to the state capitalist economy. I argue that interaction of SBC with agency problems within the government bureaucracy helps explaining a major feature of state capitalism – failure to privatize underperforming state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Bureaucrats supervising the failing SOEs prefer to keep them afloat and gamble for resurrection; in contrast, privatization would involve recognizing the loss, which would result in acknowledging the bureaucrat’s failure that is disincentivized by the state. This endogenously emerging preferential treatment of state-owned firms creates a competitive advantage against private firms; this explains why in state capitalism privatization may result in lower rather than higher productivity and therefore remain unpopular. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study formulates a new model of mixed oligopolies in free entry markets. A state-owned public enterprise is established before the game, private enterprises enter the market, and then the government chooses the degree of privatization of the public enterprise (termed the entry-then-privatization model herein). We find that under general demand and cost functions, the timing of privatization does not affect consumer surplus or the output of each private firm, while it does affect the equilibrium degree of privatization, number of entering firms, and output of the public firm. The equilibrium degree of privatization is too high (low) for both domestic and world welfare if private firms are domestic (foreign). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Initiation of Privatization was worked upon as measures of economic reforms for improving the performance of sick state owned entities. In Pakistan privatization reforms fall short to deliver its projected objectives. The current study designated two main part of privatization process addressing the objectives of examining the privatization process in the context of buyer selection and assets evaluation. The sentiments of buyer selection and assets' evaluation were adapted and the structured interviews based questions used for data collection. The study conducted the thematic analysis using N-vivo. Generation of themes was made feasible and tested through word tree analysis. The findings of the study include the suggestions i.e. Buyer selection should be transparent and purely on merit base, Buyer should have the relevant knowledge and operational skills. Moreover, in order to evaluate the assets, the study concluded that market base evaluation has to be critically catered for along with the selection of firm which is going to be evaluated. Assets are required to be evaluated keeping in view their future life and production capacity. The study concluded with the measures of successful privatization process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the effects of state-owned enterprises (SOE) privatization, implemented by the Chinese government in the 1990s, on enterprise efficiency for a sample of non-privatized SOEs and privatized ex-SOEs. The study calculates input-oriented DEA meta-frontier efficiency scores, after accounting for heterogeneity in technology across groups. These scores are used to test whether or not one group's technology dominates the other. A measure of additional input saving is also provided if these enterprises have access to unrestricted meta-technology. The analysis of the Chinese pharmaceutical industry reveals that privatization has not improved enterprise efficiency, at least in the short run. Almost 56% of inputs could be proportionally saved if these privatized ex-SOEs had been efficient, relative to the meta-production technology while non-privatized SOEs could proportionally save only 51%. Privatized ex-SOEs had less ability to access to meta-technology. This finding could be explained by subsequent observations that China, at the time of our analysis, did not have well-established intellectual property rights and formal drug approval procedures; these two factors are important driving forces for developing joint ventures with foreign investors to gain additional capital funding and technology transfer. Broadly speaking, our results are consistent with the subsequent shakeup in the Chinese pharmaceutical industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkmenistan is in the process of privatising the state-owned enterprises that help to provide infrastructure for economic development. Build-operate-transfer (BOT) has become a popular mechanism in developing countries for infrastructural privatisation. A Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats (SWOT) analysis is provided whilst the factors for successful BOT implementation are discussed. To evaluate BOT application in Turkmenistan, a descriptive survey of stakeholders is conducted and the results are used to identify and rank the most significant factors affecting BOT implementation. Recommendations to address future challenges faced by both the private and public sectors are provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite China's effort to privatize many state-owned enterprises (SOEs) after 1978, SOEs remain a prevalent type of enterprise in contemporary China. There is a widespread belief that they are inefficient and only exist because they have captured the government. This belief, however, does not fully explain why SOEs have been privatized in some sectors but not in others. This Article provides an efficiency explanation of SOEs in China. Applying the law and economic theory on the ownership of enterprise to state ownership, this Article conceptualizes the efficiency of SOEs as a tradeoff between two social costs: ownership costs and regulatory costs. SOEs generally have high ownership costs and thus are not common in many developed countries. However, in developing countries with weak regulatory capacity and legal institutions, they may help reduce regulatory costs, including the social costs associated with the enactment, alteration, and enforcement of regulatory rules, and those costs resulting from the failure to regulate enterprises adequately. The magnitude of regulatory costs in a specific country and industry, in turn, is significantly influenced by the regulatory institutions within which the enterprises operate. An important implication is that refining regulatory regimes may reduce regulatory costs and - in part by facilitating privatization of SOEs - enhance social efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite predictions of their demise in the aftermath of the collapse of socialist economies in Eastern Europe, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are very much alive in the global economy. The relevance of listed SOEs--firms subject to government ownership, but with a portion of their shares traded on public stock markets--has persisted and even increased around the world, as policymakers have encouraged the partial floating of SOE shares either as a first step toward, or as an alternative to, privatization. In this Article, we evaluate the governance challenges associated with mixed ownership of enterprise, and examine a variety of national approaches to the governance of listed SOEs, with a view to framing a robust policy discussion in many countries where SOE reform is a topic of major significance. We describe the evolution and current status of the institutional framework applicable to listed SOEs in eight different jurisdictions which reflect a variety of economic, legal, and political environments: France, the United States, Norway, Colombia, Brazil, Japan, Singapore, and China. We leverage the lessons from this comparative analysis by critiquing the policy prescriptions of international agencies such as the OECD and framing our own policy suggestions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many studies have shown that privatisation has the potential to apply the forces of competition and high-powered incentives to reduce costs and innovate. However, few studies investigate whether privatisation can enhance export performance through higher levels of efficiency. Using China's National Bureau of Statistics surveys and customs trade data, we explore the causal effect of privatisation on trade. The wave of 2002 Chinese state-owned enterprise reforms provided a natural experiment that enables us to use the difference-in-differences approach to examine this question. Consistent with the theoretical predications, the empirical results show positive and significant effects of privatisation on all the examined indicators of export performance, including total export value, the intensive margin, and the extensive margin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we trace the history of state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in Laos. Commencing in 1986, SOE reform was a component of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM), a program of changes that moved the economy toward one based on market principles. SOE reform is located within the broader reforms associated with the NEM and is divided into three distinct phases. We present and analyze a case study of the reform of the national electricity company (Électricité du Laos) in terms of a stages model of power sector reform. The overall findings show the importance of context in influencing the specific nature of SOE reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

State-owned enterprise (SOE) reform was introduced into Vietnam as a component of the Doi Moi economic reforms that began in 1986 and aimed to replace central planning with a more market-oriented economy. SOEs had performed poorly and were a drain on government resources. In this article we use a political economy framework to trace SOE reform through the various stages of policymaking and implementation. While the number of SOEs has been reduced, privatization ("equitization" in Vietnam) of large enterprises has proved more difficult as it has threatened the interests of powerful stakeholders. We use two case studies of large Vietnamese SOEs to demonstrate and explain both success and failure in SOE reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we examine the politics of state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in South Korea, specifically the privatization of Korea Electric Power Corporation. We focus on the policymaking process among government agencies and actors involved in SOE reform. The policy actors are identified, as are their preferences--efficiency versus the public good--and the strategies adopted to pursue them. The case illustrates how a particular SOE reform policy can take a long time to work through as each stakeholder attempts to pursue its preferences using various political ideologies and strategies in ever changing social, economic, and political environments. We present the lessons of the case for SOE reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses reformation of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in South Korea, Laos, and Vietnam as well as SOEs being accepted by the Asian government and international financial institutions leads to privatization. Topics discussed include SOEs being sold off to private sectors; increase in diverse forms of public-private partnerships; and privatization of Korea Electric Power Corporation.