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Advocates made exaggerated claims that privatization would reduce governments' fiscal problems while ensuring more efficient, productive and competitive economies by promoting private entrepreneurship, innovation and investments. Led by Margaret Thatcher and the Washington-based international financial institutions from the 1980s, privatization proponents pushed for more private property. Real problems of state-owned enterprises were often misrepresented and exaggerated to make the case for privatization. To minimize public resistance and ensure public acceptability, some benefits accrued to many in the early stages of privatization. However, in the longer term, privatization enriched a few while typically failing to deliver its promised benefits. Privatization was expected by many to promote competition and eliminate corruption. In practice, the converse has often been true as beneficiaries have engaged in new types of corruption to maximize their own gains instead. As the failures and abuses of privatization became apparent, public–private partnerships have been promoted, ostensibly to mobilize private finance for the public purpose. In all too many cases, these partnerships have instead socialized costs and losses while enhancing private financial gains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• The shareholding state in Italy emerges following the partial privatizations of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the 1990s. • The literature finds that states retaining minority stakes in their former SOEs are unlikely to influence corporate strategies. • This paper suggests that state minority stakes may serve state interests. • The decision to retain majority or minority stakes depends on sectoral specificities. • It also depends on the influence that private shareholders may exercise on the board. The shareholding state in Italy emerges following the partial privatizations of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the 1990s. As today, it is still debated whether the Italian state is using its controlling stakes in former SOEs to pursue policy objectives, or if it is acting passively as other financial shareholders. The limited contributions in this field of study find that states retaining a minority stake are unlikely to influence corporate strategies, while the opposite occurs when a majority stake is held. This paper suggests that minority stakes may also serve state interests even if the company's statute does not envisage the state to play an active role. The issue is explored through a case study of the partial privatizations of CDP, in which the state retains a majority stake, and Eni, in which the state retains a minority (albeit predominant) stake, and that operate respectively in the banking and energy sectors. Their different level of financialization unveils the diversified strategies adopted by the Italian state to preserve national interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To implement the goals of the dynamic development of the Uzbekistan's domestic economy declared by the country's leadership in the context of significant foreign policy and internal economic contradictions, it is necessary that both the goals and objectives of the socioeconomic policy of the Republic of Uzbekistan correspond to the current relations of appropriation and alienation of property both within the country and in relation to other economic systems. At the same time, it is necessary to proceed from the understanding of property relations as, first of all, permanently changing social relations. The transformation of property relations occurs not only and not so much under the influence of external factors, but also primarily as a result of the implementation of its immanent internal logic, emanating from the historical dynamics of development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Against the backdrop of privatization experienced by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in recent years, this study investigates how privatized firms change cash dividend payments. Using a difference-in-differences (DiD) research design, we find an increase in cash dividends following privatization. Additional analyses reveal two channels underlying the increase in dividend payouts – that is, reduced insider tunnelling and agency problems associated with cash holding, and improved information environment after privatization. Our findings enrich the literature on privatization by providing new insights into the underlying mechanisms explaining the increased cash dividends from the agency theory and information environment perspectives. • China has deepened the privatization of its SOEs in recent years. • The privatization process allows a difference-in-differences research design. • We find that privatized firms increase cash dividends following the privatization. • Reduced insider tunnelling and free cash flow problem explain the increase. • Enhanced information environment post privatization also explains the increase. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the extensive privatization achievements over the last decades, government ownership of publicly traded companies remains pervasive around the world. Consistent with past evidence of structural change in the beta coefficient during financial crises, the more recent economic recession of 2014 to 2016 in Brazil presents an opportunity to demonstrate the disadvantages of allocating investment in companies that are publicly traded, but are controlled by the government. Constructing a portfolio of publicly traded State Owned Enterprises, we find that the financial crisis produced a significant increase in risk exposure, results that were much more pronounced when compared with a portfolio of privatized companies. The results also indicate that, in addition to a market factor, the poor performance can be explained by controllership. We believe this study adds to the longstanding debate on whether state-owned firms perform worse than private firms, with higher volatility and lower returns, particularly, during a period of financial crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We show that the sale of state-owned firms in dictatorships can help political corporations to emerge and persist over time. Using new data, we characterize Pinochet's privatizations in Chile and find that some firms were sold underpriced to politically connected buyers. These newly private firms benefited financially from the Pinochet regime. Once democracy arrived, they formed connections with the new government, financed political campaigns, and were more likely to appear in the Panama Papers. These findings reveal how dictatorships can influence young democracies using privatization reforms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regulatory agencies were created in the 90's in the context of public utilities privatization processes, to control the new private operators. In recent years, these agencies were required to control the newly nationalized companies. This is the case of the National Regulatory Transport Commission (CNRT in Spanish), in charge of controlling the performance of new state railway companies. Difficulties arose with this control due to some legal uncertainties and to the companies' reluctance to cooperate. This situation worsens an already disorganized railway sector and negatively affects service quality and safety. A new interorganizational coordination and cooperation arrangement is necessary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using panel data estimation for limited dependent variables and sample selection models, we identify political, industry specific, firm specific and macroeconomic variables which influenced the decision to divest central public enterprises in India between 1991–2010. We find that higher partial privatization is driven by a more right-winged coalition, lower ideological spread in the coalition and lower ideological difference between the center and the state in which the public enterprise is located. We also find that after the government selects larger, more experienced and more profitable firms, it divests the relatively less experienced and less profitable firms to a larger extent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper discusses the contradictions of state policy in the sphere of public ownership. It is noted that in the Ukraine there is a movement towards liberalization of all areas of public life which, on the one hand, justifies itself in the context of deregulation of certain spheres of the economy but, on the other, assumes a threatening character with regards to the unwarranted privatization of public property, etc. The inconsistency of the dominant scientific point of view on minimizing the participation of the state as the owner (entrepreneur) is emphasized. It is proposed that a system of innovative enterprises be created that would be able to accelerate the renovation of production in Ukraine. A new approach to the creation of state-owned enterprises has been developed. The expected results of the activity of the newly created state-owned enterprises and the directions of their further transformation are determined. The proposals presented in the paper will ensure the growth of the production potential of the domestic economy, which will be key to the accelerated socio-economic development of Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contributes to the understanding of factors that may affect the effectiveness of administrative reforms based on the end of the state monopoly in the provision of public services. The focus is on the scope of measures to encourage the entry of new entrepreneurs. The study compares the sectors of electricity (power generation segment), telecommunications (public services) and oil (production and refining segments), precursors of regulatory reforms in Brazil. This is a descriptive research, which includes bibliographical and documentary research and content analysis of the guidelines, normative acts and main measures aimed at stimulating the entry of new entrepreneurs Analyzes were guided by the premise that such reforms were motivated by the failure of State investment. The results demonstrate that the increase in the supply of products and services is directly associated with the legal certainty offered for private investment. This legal certainty is greater when there is the privatization of state-owned enterprises - SOE and concession contracts with the new providers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Privatization of state owned enterprises (SOEs) has been a key plank of the neo-liberal counter-revolution against economic development since the 1980s. Privatization's promoters promised improved efficiency and improved fiscal balances, both supposedly contributing to higher economic growth. Privatization was also supposed to ensure improved consumer welfare through increased competition and lower prices. Empirical support for these claims is scant and often contradictory. Thus, in many cases, privatization has been worse as a solution to the ills it purported to overcome. The problems of SOEs are not necessarily due to public ownership per se. In any case, there are alternative governance, management and organization means to improve SOE performance without privatization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I examine effects of the privatization process as a whole in Turkey. I show that the privatization process begins before the firm is sold to private agents. I find that privatization causes the firm-level workforce to decline by 65 percent, profit-margin to increase by 18 percent, and no substantial changes in real sales. Based on the evidence presented, I conclude that the direct outcome of privatization is an income transfer from wage earners to profit earners.JEL Classification: L33, H42 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the organisational transformation of the Russian defence industry during the period of privatisation and radical market reforms. The study is based on the results of an original large-scale longitudinal survey of the directors (CEOs) of the industry. We find that over a decade of transition, 1996-2006, Russian defence industry managers were able largely to preserve the production potential of their enterprises and make them capable of operating under market conditions. Coupled with the restoration of government orders and the 2020 rearmament programme, these newly acquired market skills have contributed to the impressive revival of the Russian defence industry in the Putin era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the changing strategies of developmental states using Brazil's oil-based industrial policy as a case study. We analyse the relationship between the state, Petrobras and industrial elites in the context of Brazil's renewed emphasis on sector-specific industrial development strategy. Taking stock and re-examining the developmental state model, we suggest that developmental states are inherently political, particularly their bureaucracy and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and that money politics is intricately woven into state-guided high growth regimes. Given the difficulty of privatisation as a solution to SOE (mis)governance, the challenge for Brazil is to mediate extreme political interventions that have eroded Petrobras' autonomy in the past and to sustain institutional capacity to direct rents towards investment and innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkmenistan is in the process of privatising the state-owned enterprises that help to provide infrastructure for economic development. Build-operate-transfer (BOT) has become a popular mechanism in developing countries for infrastructural privatisation. A Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats (SWOT) analysis is provided whilst the factors for successful BOT implementation are discussed. To evaluate BOT application in Turkmenistan, a descriptive survey of stakeholders is conducted and the results are used to identify and rank the most significant factors affecting BOT implementation. Recommendations to address future challenges faced by both the private and public sectors are provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite China's effort to privatize many state-owned enterprises (SOEs) after 1978, SOEs remain a prevalent type of enterprise in contemporary China. There is a widespread belief that they are inefficient and only exist because they have captured the government. This belief, however, does not fully explain why SOEs have been privatized in some sectors but not in others. This Article provides an efficiency explanation of SOEs in China. Applying the law and economic theory on the ownership of enterprise to state ownership, this Article conceptualizes the efficiency of SOEs as a tradeoff between two social costs: ownership costs and regulatory costs. SOEs generally have high ownership costs and thus are not common in many developed countries. However, in developing countries with weak regulatory capacity and legal institutions, they may help reduce regulatory costs, including the social costs associated with the enactment, alteration, and enforcement of regulatory rules, and those costs resulting from the failure to regulate enterprises adequately. The magnitude of regulatory costs in a specific country and industry, in turn, is significantly influenced by the regulatory institutions within which the enterprises operate. An important implication is that refining regulatory regimes may reduce regulatory costs and - in part by facilitating privatization of SOEs - enhance social efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite predictions of their demise in the aftermath of the collapse of socialist economies in Eastern Europe, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are very much alive in the global economy. The relevance of listed SOEs--firms subject to government ownership, but with a portion of their shares traded on public stock markets--has persisted and even increased around the world, as policymakers have encouraged the partial floating of SOE shares either as a first step toward, or as an alternative to, privatization. In this Article, we evaluate the governance challenges associated with mixed ownership of enterprise, and examine a variety of national approaches to the governance of listed SOEs, with a view to framing a robust policy discussion in many countries where SOE reform is a topic of major significance. We describe the evolution and current status of the institutional framework applicable to listed SOEs in eight different jurisdictions which reflect a variety of economic, legal, and political environments: France, the United States, Norway, Colombia, Brazil, Japan, Singapore, and China. We leverage the lessons from this comparative analysis by critiquing the policy prescriptions of international agencies such as the OECD and framing our own policy suggestions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the scope of freedom of information laws in democratic countries has been reduced through the contracting out and privatization of public services, China's national open government regulations retain coverage for "enterprises and entities engaged in sectors closely related to the interests of the people". Our review of local implementation and court cases find that implementation and interpretation of these regulations is patchy. Outside these public-service sectors, we find a break between earlier policies for 'openness in factory affairs', which emphasized the worker's right to participate in company decisions, with more recent 'open enterprise information', which requires non-listed state-owned enterprise to provide public financial reports. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the history of South Africa’s oil-from-coal project, Sasol, the petro-chemical company central to apartheid South Africa’s response to oil sanctions. Contrary to popular perception, South African interest in synthetic fuel pre-dates anti-apartheid sanctions. Anglovaal, a private mining company, acquired rights to the German Fischer–Tropsch process for converting coal into liquid fuel in the 1930s, and its subsidiary, SATMAR, converted torbanite into petrol and was an important precursor to Sasol. Like Germany, South Africa possessed no indigenous source of oil, and dependence on imports came to be seen as a strategic and economic vulnerability. Afrikaner nationalist reluctance to commit moneys to Anglovaal to build an oil-from-coal plant led to Sasol’s establishment as a parastatal. Even so, this article argues, the project possessed enough ‘Smutsian features’ to attract criticism from Afrikaner nationalists.The low cost of black labour in the early apartheid era was important to the project’s initial financial viability, but the article argues that it was the state’s interventions to regulate the fuel market, discipline the oil multinationals and massively subsidise oil-from-coal which saved the project from obsolescence. Energetic management also mattered: with low oil prices preventing oil-from-coal expansion during the 1960s, Sasol leveraged state support to facilitate diversification into the wider petro-chemical industry. After Sharpeville, Sasol spearheaded South Africa’s increasingly isolationist oil strategy, while, at the same time, Sasol managers became increasingly defensive about their dependence on state support. Sasol’s privatisation in 1979 was, however, precipitated by the need to fund two massive new oil-from-coal plants in the aftermath of the oil shock and Iranian revolution to meet the apartheid state’s strategic priorities. Sasol’s new hybrid identity as a company with private shareholders enjoying public subsidies continues to be controversial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses perceptions of continuity and change as viewed from the shop floor of a privatized postsocialist factory. Neoliberal templates have reshaped the organization of production and resulted in a fragmentation of the workforce and new inequalities. These shifts, which have become main topic of everyday workplace conversation, have not generated critical commentary on wider encompassing neoliberal inequalities. Instead, critique has centred on the inequalities of "communism". Workers talk about radical upheavals and successive crises but also emphasize significant continuities of power that have bridged socialism and neoliberal capitalism. Thus, even pro-market, neoliberal practices and forms of power are often described as "communist", situated within an entrenched establishment that originated in the socialist era. Therefore, criticisms of neoliberal transformations are often framed in terms of an anticommunist rhetoric. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT Since 2002, government nationalizations and contractual breaches in general around the world have surged. South America has witnessed a wave of nationalizations of private enterprises, mostly foreign. Some analysts contend that this trend is shaped by the left-wing ideological orientation of the governments, whereas others argue that a more robust explanation is the combination of economic pressure and constraint factors. This article contributes to the debate by using a nuanced institutional analytical framework based on the concept of company versus government opportunism, applied to the recent nationalization of previously privatized companies. It examines Argentina, a country that in the last two decades has seen radical policy reversals, from sweeping privatization of state-owned enterprises in the 1990s to a renationalization effort with some of the same companies in the early 2000s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the urbanisation of capital in the context of a socialist economy undergoing profound market transition. It identifies the dynamics of state capital as a ‘missing link’ in understanding the variegated forces shaping Chinese cities through a case study of Beijing – China’s capital city. Contrary to the popular perception of the rolling back of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as a natural outcome of capital switching from a declining primary circuit to a booming secondary circuit, this empirical study of urban transformation in the Beijing metropolis identifies an intriguing trajectory of ‘capitalisation without privatisation’ whereby the commodification of the land and housing market has been accompanied by a growing share of capital assets under the ownership control of SOEs and a spatial concentration of state capital toward the city centre since the turn of the new century. The development experience centred on the capitalisation of SOEs is shown to be reflective of the new strategic vision to remake Beijing as a national hub of corporate control and the persistent syndrome of soft budget constraint characterising SOEs under a reformed management system that prioritises operational scale and asset appreciation. The new dynamics of state capital in Beijing is found to be associated with eviscerated domestic private investment and the spatial redistribution of rural–urban migrants towards the urban fringe. The case study has implications for ongoing inquiries into the urbanisation of capital in transitional urban China and points to the need to pay adequate attention to the growth and resilience of state capital in the Chinese ‘game’ of landed-property production and capital circulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Empirical studies show that ownership structures that separate control and cash flow rights create agency problems and are associated with reduced value for minority shareholders. Institutional investors recognise these inefficiencies and expect a discount on the share price of companies with control-enhancing mechanisms like multiple voting rights shares or pyramidal ownership structures.In the US, corporate pyramids are discouraged through the taxation of inter-company dividends, whereas multiple voting rights shares are allowed but have to be issued before the firm goes public. Therefore, controlling shareholders who want to entrench themselves in control by retaining multiple voting rights shares pay the costs of this inefficient capital structure when the firm initially goes public at a discounted price.Some European countries – including Spain, Portugal, Greece and, until very recently, Italy – have adopted a diametrically opposite solution. Multiple voting rights shares have been expressly prohibited by the legislator, but corporate pyramids are commonly used by listed companies and can be created following the IPO of the firm without approval from the shareholders. In this situation, if institutional investors expect that a pyramidal ownership structure will be created in the future, they will discount the price of the shares when the firm goes public. Therefore, if Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece are willing to privatise some of their state-owned companies and want to maximise the price of their stocks, they should create the conditions to assure the market that these companies will not be controlled through pyramids in the future.Because of strong opposition from national business elites which control the largest corporate groups, it is very difficult to adopt strict regulations aimed at prohibiting - or at least limiting - the use of pyramidal ownership structures in a relatively short period of time. In order to solve this Olson problem, I suggest that Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece should use regulatory dualism to create new markets with enhanced corporate governance rules that prevent shareholders' control through pyramids. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can a specialized public organization, of which the operational sector has been brutally fragmented and privatized, maintain its unity and publicness? The paper looks at how the British Transport Police (BTP) has adapted to the fragmentation and privatization of British Rail since 1993. The fact that the BTP has remained public and national is all the more surprising since a return to the pre-World War II configuration, with each Train Operating Company (TOC) having and running its own police, could be technically envisaged. The answer to the initial question is quite simple. The police organization under examination has intelligently reinvented its publicness, with the negotiated assent of its referring political and economic authorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brazil's South-South cooperation (SSC) has been accused of using a depoliticizing language of similarity and horizontality that hid structural asymmetries between very divergent realities. Focusing on a SSC project in health between Brazil and Mozambique, the Mozambican Pharmaceutical Ltd. (SMM), this article seeks to understand whether SSC can in fact re-politicize development. Drawing on a poststructuralist approach to discourse, I see re-politicization as challenging views of development in line with foreign aid (privatization in this context) and the enactment of initiatives in line with SSC principles (state-ownership). I explore the political negotiations and conflict around the implementation of the SMM and argue that while initially the language of horizontality masked structural differences between Brazil and Mozambique, it was later mobilized to challenge Mozambique's desire to privatize the SMM. A compromise between stakeholders allowed the SMM to be majority state-owned, in what I say represented some degree of structural transformation. My analysis shows that development principles are neither universal (a criticism long addressed at foreign aid) nor do they have a single effect. The implementation of SSC projects that aim to effect structural transformation on highly divergent contexts will be subject to contestation, negotiation and accommodation by stakeholders, and the strategic employment of principles. The article suggests that SSC would require a more frequent engagement between partners so that SSC norms become naturalized. More broadly, it echoes part of the SSC literature that calls for a focus on development encounters, political dynamics and local constructions of reality rather than generic policy statements or principles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contributes to the understanding of the role of European governments in fostering new global players in the utilities. We argue that the international growth of firms stems from their interaction with governments, which act not only as rule setters but also as goal-oriented strategists, through public policies and mechanisms ranging from firm ownership to more indirect intervention designed to promote internationalization. We claim that the outcome of the interaction significantly depends on the country's form of capitalism. The particular form of capitalism manifested in a country is deeply rooted in historical and cultural behavioural models and differs according to path-dependent institutional changes. Our conjectures are empirically supported by a comparative analysis of the international growth of previously inward-looking domestic incumbents in the European energy and telecommunications industries over the last 15 years. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An essay is presented on privatisation, the change of ownership rights from government-owned enterprises to private sector, which is considered controversial despite its success. It explores the criticisms of privatisation, theoretical arguments favoring state-owned enterprise, and the significance of fiscal constitution.

The global financial crisis that erupted in 2008 has had enormous implications for the composition of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector in many advanced economies around the world. The crisis resulted in the nationalization of financial institutions in a number of economies, but has also led to a number of countries pursuing policies of privatization to raise much needed revenue to tackle high levels of indebtedness. This article describes the changes to the composition of the Irish SOE sector since the onset of the economic crisis in 2008, as well as its impact on the stated plans for the future of the SOE sector. It addresses the question of privatization and the conditionality for the sale of state assets contained in the bailout agreement signed between the Irish government and the IMF/ECB/European Commission (the 'Troika'). It finds that Ireland has been afforded a degree of discretion with regard to the choice of assets to be sold and the application of proceeds. Revenue targets, however, have been dictated by the Troika. This contrasts with the agreements forged between the Troika and the governments of Greece and Portugal where there has been a far greater degree of conditionality attached to SOE divestments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Organizational eclecticism has characterized much of policy and administrative choices in public governance in the last three decades. This concluding article addresses this phenomenon and argues that roads have been taken, targets have been met, and many lessons have been learned in organizing and managing public sector governance, as the articles in this Symposium demonstrate. In the process, experiments have been conducted, some with success, while others with failure, leading to a proliferation of eclectic choices, many unsuited for organizational effectiveness but beneficial to powerful interest groups and politicians, all at the expense of alternative organizational choices and broad-based public interests. Three broad theoretical models/periods are examined, the proliferation of public sector organizational eclecticism is analyzed, and options are suggested concerning alternative organizational choices, resulting in the question: can we go home now? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the performance of the three largest Australian airports following their privatization. The airports represent cases of divestment of government business enterprises into privately-owned businesses each with differing ownership arrangements. The performances of the privatized airports are considered using financial data obtained from general purpose financial reports of the entities. There are significant implications for future divestment policies, including the value of divestment as a policy response in uncompetitive environments, the use of particular infrastructure investment models, and the nature of the linkage between ownership structure and financial performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts a reconstruction of the organisational and ownership transformations affecting the national road carriers in Poland (PKS), the Czech Republic (ČSAD) and Slovakia (SAD, NAD) after 1989. Despite a similar input state in the three countries studied, the transformations they pursued took disparate forms, ensuring marked differences in the situations the countries find themselves in today. The first part of the work, contained in this issue of Przegląd Geograficzny, describes the main trends as regards the privatizations of all the enterprises in Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. It then goes on to characterise in detail the processes of ownership transformation that Poland's national road carrier (PKS) has been through, with particular account taken of the last three years. A second part, to be published in Przegląd Geograficzny, 2013, 4, will in turn entail a reconstruction of the transformation processes involving the ČSAD, SAD and NAD enterprises. In Poland, the disintegration of the regional PKS enterprises resulted in the founding of about 40 new freight transport firms, the majority of which were closed-down rapidly (by about 1995). This left just 10 former freight companies as at the end of 2002. A majority of these were in hands of their staff (as so-called worker's companies), while only two of the firms were state-owned. Within the next few years, the number of active freight companies decreased yet further, to the point where there were just 6 as of late 2011 and early 2012. All of these were entirely privately-owned. Thus in Poland in the last several years there has been a clear withdrawal of the Treasury from its formerly dominant role as regards the PKS enterprises. In 2011, practically all the once-state-owned enterprises terminated. One was closed down, while the other two have been transformed into single-personality Treasury companies. By 2008, 68 enterprises had been commercialised, and by 2009 - 86. As of the end of 2011, the number of single-personality Treasury companies had decreased to 19. The reasons for this situation are varied, as some enterprises have been communalised, some privatized, and some closed down. Of the 19 single-personality Treasury companies in existence, four were in the process of liquidation in late 2011 and early 2012, in the regions of Silesia and Małopolska in particular. Since the privatization process proved rather unsuccessful, authorities at various (regional and county) levels began to take an interest in the communalisation of the PKS enterprises. The latter process started as late as in 2008, and initially only 85% of the stake was transfered to local authorities. However, a year later, all the communalised enterprises were transfered as a whole, and the process accelerated. Since 2010, the PKS enterprises have come under the ownership of both unions of gminas (local authorities) and urban authorities. In the case of the PKS passenger enterprises, the most common form of privatization (in regard to 41 firms in total) has involved leasing by workers. This form of privatization has proved very successful, as not a single firm of this profile has yet closed down. However, the process has slowed down or even coem to a halt now. Processes of privatization with the participation of an external investor have also been very much arrested. The privatizations that had occurred previously involved, not only Polish investors, but also foreign capital. Following an involvement in 14 companies, the process of privatization with the participation of the German affiliate of France's Veolia Environment has now terminated. Along with the takeovers, the investor has concentrated on a gradual consolidation of passenger companies - first into six regional companies, and then in 2010 into a single company of nationwide reach with its seat in the city of Toruń. Another important foreign investor has been the Israeli Egged Holding, which has invested directly, or indirectly - via its affiliate Mobilis. Apart from being involved in four urban companies, the investor has taken a majority stake in nine poviat-level PKS companies in the Mazowsze and Mazury regions. A competitor over the privatization of the Mazowsze PKS companies has been Souter Holding Poland (of Scottish origin), which has founded its own network of long-distance coach connections called PolskiBus.com. The latter has developed a network of connections that is very much modelled on Polski Express (a firm of British origin which ceased operating in Poland several years ago). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to evaluate the effectiveness of China's incremental approach to denationalization, share-issue privatization, wherein the government sells shares of state-owned enterprises to the public, while retaining an ownership position in the firm. The effectiveness of this approach to de-nationalization will be evaluated based on four widely-used measures of firm well-being and productivity—returns on assets, returns on sales, sales per employee, and profits per employee, based on data retrieved from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) Database and the Private Listed Companies Database. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite widespread privatizations over the last three decades, public enterprises, as production units under government control, are still present in several countries and sectors. While the academic and political debate on the costs and benefits of privatization is vast, a focus on the rationale for public enterprises, from the standpoint of Social Cost Benefit Analysis, is missing. This paper aims at filling this gap and provides a normative discussion on public enterprises in a general equilibrium setting. The conditions under which public provision may be beneficial and the metrics for evaluating polices and projects under (a)symmetric information and (non)benevolent governments are presented in three welfare propositions. The main policy message points to the overall quality of institutions as a necessary pre-condition for socially desirable public enterprises. A sound institutional environment provides policy-makers with the correct incentives to design and implement meaningful policies even if public administrators adopt sub-optimal plans. Institutions should constrain self-interested policy-makers from disrupting the key welfare signals for policy adoption as well as for project appraisal, while bias in management is a relatively less important concern. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In December 2011, the Romanian Government Emergency Ordinance (GEO) no.109 reformed the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises (SOE), in a context characterized by the financial difficulty of these entities, and under the pretext of concrete firm performance and privatization engagements assumed in front of the IMF and the EU. Taking into account the no man's land where Romanian SOEs have been operating for the past 22 years, characterized by inconsistent and summary regulations of state-owned enterprises, and also by the lack of political will for privatization in the context of many privatizations' failure, GEO no. 109/2011 represents a genuine reform, a turning point in regulating these entities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why did the transition from socialism to capitalism result in improved growth in some countries and significant economic decline in others? Scholars have advanced three main arguments: (1) successful countries rapidly implemented neoliberal policies; (2) failures were not due to policies but to poor institutional environments; and (3) policies were counterproductive because they damaged the state. We present a state-centered theory and empirically demonstrate for the first time one of several possible mechanisms linking neoliberal policies to poor economic performance: mass privatization programs, where implemented, created a massive fiscal shock for post-communist governments, thereby undermining the development of private-sector governance institutions and severely exacerbating the transformational recession. We performed cross-national panel regressions for a sample of 25 post-communist countries between 1990 and 2000 and found that mass privatization programs negatively affected economic growth, state capacity, and property rights protection. We further tested these findings with firm-level data from a representative survey of managers in 3,550 companies operating in 24 post-communist countries. Within countries that implemented mass-privatized programs, newly privatized firms were substantially less likely to engage in industrial restructuring but considerably more likely to use barter and accumulate tax arrears than their state-owned counterparts. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Summary: The wave of privatization in the 1980s and 1990s increased productivity of many previously state owned enterprises (SOEs). However, governments often do not have sufficient support to privatize SOEs. We provide evidence that threatening privatization and market competition (entry of new firms) can increase the productivity of SOEs, even though privatization and entry of new firms does not occur. We study productivity at Brazil’s state-owned oil company Petrobras. Petrobras’s total factor productivity increased sharply after it lost its legal monopoly, doubling in 6years. These large gains occurred despite the fact that Petrobras faced no immediate de facto competition. The threat of competition and privatization was sufficient to generate large productivity gains. These findings suggest that changing the competitive environment can be a powerful force for improving productivity at state-owned firms. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Tanzania has been undergoing privatization and structural reform since the 1980s. With the dissolution of the Tanzanian Tea Authority (TTA), the parastatal organization concerned with tea development, many smallholder farmers have become reliant on local estates, owned by transnational corporations, for purchasing tea, and providing inputs. Both smallholders and estate managers want smallholder tea production to increase, but a number of barriers prevent this from happening. This research is based on interviews with smallholders and estate managers. It analyzes the obstacles to sustainability and makes a number of suggestions for overcoming them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Privatisation has been advocated as the predominant way to solve the problems facing ailing public enterprises in developing countries. Despite this, the policy remains controversial. The available empirical evidence on the operational and financial performance of enterprises after privatisation has often painted a rosy picture. This paper reassesses the situation using a larger sample of enterprises and a comparative perspective between privatised utilities, non-utilities and private enterprises that have never been state owned. The results of our analysis point to there being differences in the performance across the three groups of enterprises and, in particular, to a deterioration in performance among privatised utilities. This suggests that the earlier optimism over the efficacy of privatisation may have been premature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an historical account of the public enterprise in Spain, focusing on the recovery of public enterprise in the 20th century, its consolidation following the Second World War and the large-scale privatizations in the last decade of the century. It shows that Spanish public business sector was among the smallest in Europe. At the same time, the public sector in Spain was very much manufacturinginclined due to the frailty of its public financial enterprises. For that reason, the scale of privatization was smaller in Spain than in the rest of Europe. However, Spain's privatizations were carried out more efficiently and more rapidly than in other European Union countries. Finally, the paper shows that in Spain the privatized companies preserved their command of the market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article summarizes the main phases of the long-term process of rise and fall of state-owned enterprise (SOE) in the Western world. It focuses first on the waves of nationalization that occurred in the last century, addressing the major motives that explained them. Next, moving from the changing environment that opened the way toward the rush to privatization of the last two decades, it dwells on the quantitative dimension of the de-nationalization phenomenon and offers some thoughts on its consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiyen Biotech Company (TBC) is an enterprise responsible for salt making and supply in Taiwan protected by the government under monopoly. However, its privatisation plan in 2003 posed great threat to its existence. A new business strategy is based on a Diamond Theory of innovation and reform, as well as a Kite Theory that emphasises the importance of sales channel was adapted to implement the new business strategy. The main purpose of this article is to show the importance of setting up a right strategy when a public enterprise face the reform to be a private one and how to carry out the strategy properly to make the reformed company with loss turn out to be profitable. By the example of TBC, it is shown that the successful reform of a state-owned company depends on a well-defined strategy made up of series of activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reform in China’s urban public sector has been so contentious that the nature, function, validity and viability of state firms require clarifications. First of a two-part critique, this essay assesses the outcomes and wider consequences of China’s largely free wheeling process of privatization as compared to the rationale claimed for its instigation. By identifying the ideological and political forces behind that process, the essay further seeks to explain the erosion of public policy capacities pivotal for social defence in market globalization, thereby demonstrating the need to reorient the reform. Losing the opportunity to reinvigorate a sizable and strong state sector capable of healthy interactions with other sectors is shown to be especially damaging in developing and transitional societies, which in turn negatively impacts both global economy and ecology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the partial privatization process of two of the most important domiciliary public enterprises in Cartagena and Barranquilla: a) Public Services Enterprise of Cartagena as the base for the "Waters of Cartagena" creation and, b) "Triple A" of Barranquilla that inherited the municipal public services enterprise after its liquidation process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is privatization in China leading to political change? This article presents original survey data from 1999 and 2005 to evaluate the Communist Party's strategy towards the private sector. The CCP is increasingly integrating itself with the private sector, both by co-opting entrepreneurs into the Party and encouraging current Party members to go into business. It has opened the political system to private entrepreneurs, but still screens which ones are allowed to play political roles. Because of their close personal and professional ties, and because of their shared interests in promoting economic growth, China's capitalists and communist officials share similar viewpoints on a range of political, economic and social issues. Rather than promote democratic governance, China's capitalists have a stake in preserving the political system that has allowed them to prosper, and they are among the Party's most important bases of support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will argue that the continued existence of state-owned enterprises (SOE) soft budget constraints, while adversely affecting SOE performance, reflects wider problems in the regulation of Chinese industry. As such, simple recourse to privatisation will not address the deep structural factors, such as over-politicisation and under-regulation of the private sector, which affect SOE performance. Section I of the paper will discuss the "direct" effects of soft budget constraints on SOE performance in China. Section II will address the "indirect effects" of soft budget constraints through their effects on the competitive environment vis-a-vis private sector firms. Section III will address the issue of privatisation and discuss the broader factors which affect both the extension of soft budget constraints and low SOE performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]