Recent cyberattacks have demonstrated that current approaches to the malware problem (e.g., detection) are inadequate. This is not surprising as virus detection is Turing undecidable. 1 Further, some recent malware implementations use NP problems to encrypt and hide the malware. 2 Two goals guide an alternative approach: (a) Program execution should hide computational steps in order to hinder “reverse engineering” efforts by malware hackers; (b) New computational models should be explored that make it more difficult to hijack the purpose of program execution. The methods explained here pertain to (a) implemented with a new computational model, called the active element machine (AEM). 3 An AEM is composed of computational primitives called active elements that simultaneously transmit and receive pulses to and from other active elements. Each pulse has an amplitude and a width, representing how long the pulse amplitude lasts as input to the active element receiving the pulse. If active element Ei simultaneously receives pulses with amplitudes summing to a value greater than Ei’s threshold and Ei’s refractory period has expired, then Ei fires. When Ei fires, it sends pulses to other active elements. If Ei fires at time t, a pulse reaches element Ek at time t+ τik where τik is the transmission time from Ei to Ek. The AEM language uses five commands – Element, Connection, Fire, Program and Meta – to write AEM programs, where time is explicitly specified and multiple commands may simultaneously execute. An Element command creates, at the time specified in the command, an active element with a threshold value, a refractory period and a most recent firing time. A Connection command sets, at the time specified in the command, a pulse amplitude, a pulse width and a transmission time from element Ei to element Ek. The Fire command fires an input element at a particular time. The Program command defines the execution of multiple commands with a single command. Element and Connection commands establish the AEM architecture and firing activity. The Meta command can change the AEM architecture during AEM program execution. This model uses quantum random input to generate random firing patterns that deterministically execute a universal Turing machine (UTM) program η. Random firing interpretations are constructed with dynamic level sets on boolean functions that compute η. The quantum randomness is an essential component for building the random firing patterns that are Turing incomputable. 4 It is assumed that the following are all kept perfectly secret: the state and tape of the UTM, represented by the active elements and connections; the quantum random bits determining how η is computed for each computational step; and the dynamic connections in the AEM. Formally, let f1j , f2j , . . . fmj represent the random firing pattern computing η during the jth computational step and assume an adversary can eavesdrop on f1j , f2j , . . . fmj . Let q denote the current state of the UTM, ak a UTM alphabet symbol and qk a UTM state. Perfect secrecy means that probabilities P (q = qk|f1j = b1 . . . fmj = bm) = P (q = qk) and P (Tk = ak|f1j = b1 . . . fmj = bm) = P (Tk = ak) for each bi ∈ {0, 1} and each Tk which is the contents of the kth tape square. If these secrecy conditions hold, then there doesn’t exist a “reverse engineer” Turing machine that can map the random firing patterns back to an unbounded sequence of UTM instructions. For an unbounded number of computational steps, define function g : N→ {0, 1} where g((j − 1)m+ r) = f(r+1)j and 0 ≤ r < m. Then g is incomputable. Proposed methods of hypercomputation currently have no physical realization. 5 The methods described here can be physically realized using an off-the-shelf quantum random generator device with a USB plug connected to a laptop computer executing a finite AEM program.