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The start of the twenty-first century saw many changes in the way war was being conducted. Alongside war at sea, in the air, and on land, there is now psychological warfare (referred to as psywar), which has proven to be an extremely powerful military dimension. The power of psychological warfare is a result of the revolution in information and communication in the first years of the current century: the Internet, instant global communications, smartphones, and social media. All these channels have become arenas for warfare and powerful influencers on leaders, militaries, and entire populations. Historically, democracies have been reticent about employing psychological warfare for a number of reasons, but in recent years, they have been unable to ignore its existence and have increasingly been making use of it. However, in contrast with other forms of warfare for which there are international ethical rules, there is no ethical regulation of psychological warfare. This article assesses the challenges and dilemmas facing democratic countries in their use of psychological warfare and for the first time offers proposals for ethical rules toward that end by way of an Israeli test case: the long-term use of psychological warfare by the Israel Defense Forces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the violent clashes between Hamas and Israel along the Gaza Fence (30 March 2018–27 December 2019) from a psychological operations (PSYOP) perspective. It shows how Hamas managed, through a skilful combination of mass riots, media manipulation, and quick adaptation to changing circumstances to subvert the strategic priorities of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), wear down Israeli morale, and erode Israel's sovereignty in its southern region – all this while deterring Israel from launching a large-scale military operation in Gaza. As such, the Gaza Fence clashes provide an example of a PSYOP-based strategy that can be applied to other border conflict zones, such as Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, and Islamist insurrections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is really no significant difference between the various forms of mass persuasion methods, though the terminology used may vary. Analyzing basic elements of political marketing and psychological operations (PSYOP)—beyond the basics of audience/message/channel—shows a similarity of techniques and procedures. An analysis of the PSYOP campaign of the Islamic organization Hamas against Israel in the past decade demonstrates that there is a striking similarity between political marketing and PSYOP (formerly known as “propaganda”). This is not mere theoretical hairsplitting; it is an important understanding that democracies should pay careful attention to when they contemplate their survival strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Observes the rise of psychological war in Iraq. Strategies used in a psychological warfare; Move by Iraqi insurgents to adopt psychological tactics in an attempt to rid Iraq of the U.S. presence; Impact of the psychological warfare on Iraqi population.

Democracies generally abstain from using psychological operations (PSYOP) as they perceive propaganda to be a totalitarian political tool. Whilst in (conventional) war they use it reluctantly, in small wars they hardly make use of it at all. The nature of small wars makes their handling more difficult for a democracy because it does not undergo the psychological process of mobilization. In contrast, the insurgents make vast use of PSYOP as they realize that the media can be easily exploited through the public's thirst for information. This essay outlines the weakness of democracies in their handling of the struggle over the hearts and minds of the public and proposes changes within democracies to employ effectively psychological warfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]