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Decision justification provides assurance and reduces negative post-decision emotions, while simultaneously expends decision costs (i.e., cognitive effort). The current paper investigated the function of justification and cognitive effort related to regret, specifically in the online shopping context in two studies. In Study 1, 112 participants reviewed vignettes in a 2 × 2 within-subjects design involving cognitive effort (high versus low) and justification of action (easy versus difficulty), and reported the regret level when their purchase decision yielded subpar consequences. As expected, high cognitive effort and easy justification reduced regret. However, the effect of justification on regret was moderated by cognitive effort. In Study 2, 178 participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 × 2 between-subjects design involving cognitive effort (high versus low) and decision justification (waste versus control). Participants followed a cover story and shopped for a laptop online; then they rated the regret level had they made an unplanned purchase. Results confirmed the hypothesis; regret was greater when justification was wasted. However, wasted justification only worsened regret when more cognitive effort was exerted. The current studies shed light on understanding an intricate dynamic between information processing and justification in relation to regret when shopping online. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within the domain of risky decision making, there are a number of predictive models which are consistent with the hypothesis that human minds are molded for specific behavioral patterns based on environmental cues. Two models are the priority heuristic and risk sensitive foraging. Using a modified version of the traditional risky choice gambles paradigm, a study was designed to tease apart specific predictions made by each of these two models. It was discovered that the best explanation for choice behavior was consistent with risk sensitive foraging. This was true for risky preferences in gambles. Also, decision time predictions from the priority heuristic were not supported. Collectively, this may show additional support for risk-sensitivity driving some human behaviors. It may also carve out the boundaries for the proper "ecology" of the priority heuristic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]