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Although previous work provides evidence that observers experience biases in visual processing when they view stimuli in perihand space, a few recent investigations have questioned the reliability ...

Inhibition of return (IOR) is thought to reflect a cognitive mechanism that biases attention from returning to previously engaged items. While models of cognitive aging have proposed deficits within select inhibitory domains, older adults have demonstrated preserved IOR functioning in previous studies. The present study investigated whether inhibition associated with objects shows the same age patterns as inhibition associated with locations. Young adults (18–22 years) and older adults (60–86 years) were tested in two experiments measuring location- and object-based IOR. Using a dynamic paradigm (Experiment 1), both age groups produced significant location-based IOR, but only young adults produced significant object-based IOR, consistent with previous findings. However, with a static paradigm (Experiment 2), young adults and older adults produced both location- and object-based IOR, indicating that object-based IOR is preserved in older adults under some conditions. The findings provide partial support for unique age-related inhibitory patterns associated with attention to objects and locations.

The Action-sentence Compatibility Effect (ACE) is a well-known demonstration of the role of motor activity in the comprehension of language. Participants are asked to make sensibility judgments on sentences by producing movements toward the body or away from the body. The ACE is the finding that movements are faster when the direction of the movement (e.g., toward) matches the direction of the action in the to-be-judged sentence (e.g., Art gave you the pen describes action toward you). We report on a pre-registered, multi-lab replication of one version of the ACE. The results show that none of the 18 labs involved in the study observed a reliable ACE, and that the meta-analytic estimate of the size of the ACE was essentially zero. ispartof: Psychonomic Bulletin & Review vol:29 issue:2 pages:613-626 ispartof: location:United States status: published

Psychological phenomena are embodied to the extent that bodily processes (whether perceptual, expressive, or action-oriented) contribute to them. A great deal of research, most of which has occurred in the past several decades, has revealed that embodied influences are seemingly ubiquitous and findings of this type have led to the suggestion that embodiment is foundational to the manner in which individuals think, feel, and act. In the present introductory chapter, phenomena of this type are initially reviewed in outlining the scope of enquiry. Subsequently, five major theoretical perspectives on embodiment are summarized as well as briefly compared and contrasted with each other. After a discussion of key questions and directions for research, the chapter introduces the content of the book, which consists of four sections related to Theoretical Foundations, Cognitive and Neuroscience Perspectives, Social and Personality Perspectives, and Current Issues and Future Directions. Although the book concentrates on the areas of cognitive and social psychology, it does so in broad terms, such that some of the chapters approach their content from ecological, philosophical, developmental, clinical, or evolutionary viewpoints. Thus, the volume is comprehensive and should appeal to multiple audiences.

During stress, attentional capture by threatening stimuli may be particularly adaptive. Individuals are more efficient at identifying threatening faces in a crowd than identifying nonthreatening faces (e.g., Öhman et al., Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 130(3): 466-478, 2001a, Öhman et al., Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80(3): 381-396, 2001b). However, under conditions of stress, when attention to threat may be most critical, cognitive processes are generally disrupted. The present study explored the attentional advantage of threatening stimuli under stressful conditions. We exposed participants to either high or low stress conditions during a visual search task displaying threatening and nonthreatening facial targets among distractors. Participants' accuracy, reaction times, and self-reported stress were measured. Stress introduced a speed-accuracy trade-off: participants in the high-stress condition were faster, but less accurate, than participants in the low-stress condition. Although both groups of participants showed relative performance advantages in detecting threatening compared with nonthreatening stimuli, this advantage was markedly larger for participants in the high-stress condition. This suggests that the established stress-mediated increase in the activity of the ventral neural network responsible for the reorienting of attention may have enhanced the ability to detect threatening stimuli or buffered the disruptive effects of stress on this process. Our findings highlight the potentially adaptive nature of stress disruption on attentional processes and align research on the anger superiority effect and automated attentional processes under stress.

Observers experience affordance-specific biases in visual processing for objects within the hands’ grasping space, but the mechanism that tunes visual cognition to facilitate action remains unknown. I investigated the hypothesis that altered vision near the hands is a result of experience-driven plasticity. Participants performed motion-detection and form-perception tasks—while their hands were either near the display, in atypical grasping postures, or positioned in their laps—both before and after learning novel grasp affordances. Participants showed enhanced temporal sensitivity for stimuli viewed near the backs of the hands after training to execute a power grasp using the backs of their hands (Experiment 1), but showed enhanced spatial sensitivity for stimuli viewed near the tips of their little fingers after training to use their little fingers to execute a precision grasp (Experiment 2). These results show that visual biases near the hands are plastic, facilitating processing of information relevant to learned grasp affordances.

Observers show biases in attention when viewing objects within versus outside of their hands' grasping space. While the hands' proximity to stimuli plays a key role in these effects, recent evidence suggests an observer's affordances for grasping actions also shape visual processing near the hands. The current study examined the relative contributions of proximity and affordances in introducing attentional biases in peripersonal space. Participants placed a single hand on a visual display and detected targets appearing near or far from the hand. Across conditions, the hand was either free, creating an affordance for a grasping action, or immobilized using an orthosis, interfering with the potential to grasp. Replicating previous findings, participants detected targets appearing near the hand more quickly than targets appearing far from the hand. Immobilizing the hands did not disrupt this effect, suggesting that proximity alone is sufficient to facilitate target detection in peripersonal space.

Observers experience biases in visual processing for objects within easy reach of their hands; these biases may assist them in evaluating items that are candidates for action. I investigated the hypothesis that hand postures that afford different types of actions differentially bias vision. Across three experiments, participants performed global-motion-detection and global-form-perception tasks while their hands were positioned (a) near the display in a posture affording a power grasp, (b) near the display in a posture affording a precision grasp, or (c) in their laps. Although the power-grasp posture facilitated performance on the motion-detection task, the precision-grasp posture instead facilitated performance on the form-perception task. These results suggest that the visual system weights processing on the basis of an observer’s current affordances for specific actions: Fast and forceful power grasps enhance temporal sensitivity, whereas detail-oriented precision grasps enhance spatial sensitivity.

People physically distance themselves from competitors and the disliked and cooperate less with those who are further away. We examine whether social interaction can also impact the space people perceive between themselves and others by measuring the influence of competitive dynamics on visual perception. In two experiments, participants played a ball toss game until they reached a target score. In Experiment 1, a confederate stood across the room from the participant and either a) played the same game competitively, b) played the same game cooperatively, or c) observed the participant without playing, while in Experiment 2, two participants played the same versions of the game with each other. After the game, participants provided an estimate of the distance between themselves and the other player. Participants in Experiment 1 who competed with the confederate consistently judged her to be more distant than participants who cooperated with the confederate or played alone. In Experiment 2, players who lost the competition perceived more distance between themselves and their opponents than did players who won, suggesting that the experience of losing a competition drives this perceptual distancing. These findings demonstrate the power of a socially distancing interaction to create perceptual distance between people.

Objects that serve as extensions of the body can produce a sensation of embodiment, feeling as if they are a part of us. We investigated the characteristics that drive an object's embodiment, examining whether cast-body shadows, a purely visual stimulus, are embodied. Tools are represented as an extension of the body when they enable observers to interact with distant targets, perceptually distorting space. We examined whether perceptual distortion would also result from exposure to cast-body shadows in two separate distance estimation perceptual matching tasks. If observers represent cast-body shadows as extensions of their bodies, then when these shadows extend toward a target, it should appear closer than when no shadow is present (Experiment 1). This effect should not occur when a non-cast-body shadow is cast toward a target (Experiment 2). We found perceptual distortions in both cast-body shadow and tool-use conditions, but not in our non-cast-body shadow condition. These results suggest that, although cast-body shadows do not enable interaction with objects or provide direct tactile feedback, observers nonetheless represent their shadows as if they were a part of them.

When people manipulate a moving object, such as writing with a pen or driving a car, they experience their actions as intimately related to the object’s motion, that is they perceive control. Here, we tested the hypothesis that observers would feel more control over a moving object if an unrelated task drew attention to a location to which the object subsequently moved. Participants steered an object within a narrow path and discriminated the color of a flash that appeared briefly close to the object. Across two experiments, participants provided higher ratings of perceived control when an object moved over a flash’s location than when an object moved away from a flash’s location. This result suggests that we use the location of spatial attention to determine the perception of control. If an object goes where we are attending, we feel like we made it go there.

Objects in peripersonal space are of great importance for interaction with the sensory world. A variety of research exploring sensory processing in peripersonal space has produced extensive evidence for altered vision near the hands. However, visual representations of the peripersonal space surrounding the feet remain unexplored. In a set of four experiments, we investigated whether observers experience biases in visual processing for objects near the feet that mirror the alterations associated with near-hand space. Participants performed attentional-cueing tasks in which they detected targets appearing (1) near or far from a single visible foot, (2) near one of two visible feet, (3) near or far from a nonfoot visual anchor, or (4) near or far from an occluded foot. We found a temporal cost associated with detecting targets appearing far from a visible foot, but no biases were associated with targets appearing near versus far from either a nonfoot visual anchor or an occluded foot. These results provide the first evidence suggesting that objects within stepping or kicking distance are processed differently from objects outside of peripersonal foot space.

Can directed actions unconsciously influence higher order cognitive processing? We investigated how movement interventions affected participants' ability to solve a classic insight problem. The participants attempted to solve Maier's two-string problem while occasionally taking exercise breaks during which they moved their arms either in a manner related to the problem's solution (swing group) or in a manner inconsistent with the solution (stretch group). Although most of the participants were unaware of the relationship between their arm movement exercises and the problem-solving task, the participants who moved their arms in a manner that suggested the problem's solution were more likely to solve the problem than were those who moved their arms in other ways. Consistent with embodied theories of cognition, these findings show that actions influence thought and, furthermore, that we can implicitly guide people toward insight by directing their actions.

Previous research shows that directed actions can unconsciously influence higher-order cognitive processing, helping learners to retain knowledge and guiding problem solvers to useful insights (e.g. Cook, S. W., Mitchell, Z., & Goldin-Meadow, S. (2008). Gesturing makes learning last. Cognition, 106, 1047-1058; Thomas, L. E., & Lleras, A. (2007). Moving eyes and moving thought: on the spatial compatibility between eye movements and cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 14, 663-668). We examined whether overt physical movement is necessary for these embodied effects on cognition, or whether covert shifts of attention are sufficient to influence cognition. We asked participants to try to solve Duncker's radiation problem while occasionally directing them, via an unrelated digit-tracking task, to shift their attention (while keeping their eyes fixed) in a pattern related to the problem's solution, to move their eyes in this pattern, or to keep their eyes and their attention fixed in the center of the display. Although they reported being unaware of any relationship between the digit-tracking task and the radiation problem, participants in both the eye-movement and attention-shift groups were more likely to solve the problem than were participants who maintained fixation. Our results show that by shifting attention in a pattern compatible with a problem's solution, we can aid participants' insight even in the absence of overt physical movements.

Grant and Spivey (2003) proposed that eye movement trajectories can influence spatial reasoning by way of an implicit eye-movement-to-cognition link. We tested this proposal and investigated the nature of this link by continuously monitoring eye movements and asking participants to perform a problem-solving task under free-viewing conditions while occasionally guiding their eye movements (via an unrelated tracking task), either in a pattern related to the problem's solution or in unrelated patterns. Although participants reported that they were not aware of any relationship between the tracking task and the problem, those who moved their eyes in a pattern related to the problem's solution were the most successful problem solvers. Our results support the existence of an implicit compatibility between spatial cognition and the eye movement patterns that people use to examine a scene.

People use facial appearance to predict social behavior, but can social context also influence face perception? Leveraging a link between competition and aggression, we investigated the effects of competitive interactions with confederates on participants’ performance in a face reconstruction task. Participants played a game either in competition or cooperation with confederates and were then asked to create facial portraits of these confederates by arranging their component features into their best estimate of an accurate configuration. Across 2 experiments, participants who played in a competitive context reconstructed faces in a more aggressive configuration—with higher width-to-height ratios—than did participants who played cooperatively or alone. This result demonstrates that the social perception of faces is not merely a feed-forward process, but instead that the social contexts in which people interact can shape memory for faces.

Building on a well-established link between elevation and social power, we demonstrate that—when perceptual information is limited—subtle visual cues can shape people’s representations of others and, in turn, alter strategic social behavior. A cue to elevation (unrelated to physical size) provided by the placement of web cameras in a video chat biased individuals’ perceptions of a partner’s height (Experiment 1) and shaped the extent to which they made decisions in their own self-interest: participants tended to coordinate their behavior in a manner that benefitted the preferences of a partner pictured from a low camera angle during a game of asymmetric coordination (Experiment 2). Our results suggest that people are vulnerable to the influence of a limited viewpoint when forming representations of others in a manner that shapes their strategic choices.

Inhibition of return (IOR) has long been viewed as a foraging facilitator in visual search. We investigated the contribution of IOR in a task that approximates natural foraging more closely than typical visual search tasks. Participants in a fully immersive virtual reality environment manually searched an array of leaves for a hidden piece of fruit, using a wand to select and examine each leaf location. Search was slower than in typical IOR paradigms, taking seconds instead of a few hundred milliseconds. Participants also made a speeded response when they detected a flashing leaf that either was or was not in a previously searched location. Responses were slower when the flashing leaf was in a previously searched location than when it was in an unvisited location. These results generalize IOR to an approximation of a naturalistic visual search setting and support the hypothesis that IOR can facilitate foraging. The experiment also constitutes the first use of a fully immersive virtual reality display in the study of IOR.

Models of spatial updating attempt to explain how representations of spatial relationships between the actor and objects in the environment change as the actor moves. In allocentric models, object locations are encoded in an external reference frame, and only the actor's position and orientation in that reference frame need to be updated. Thus, spatial updating should be independent of the number of objects in the environment (set size). In egocentric updating models, object locations are encoded relative to the actor, so the location of each object relative to the actor must be updated as the actor moves. Thus, spatial updating efficiency should depend on set size. We examined which model better accounts for human spatial updating by having people reconstruct the locations of varying numbers of virtual objects either from the original study position or from a changed viewing position. In consistency with the egocentric updating model, object localization following a viewpoint change was affected by the number of objects in the environment.

Directed actions can play a causal role in cognition, shaping thought processes. What drives this cross-talk between action and thought? I investigated the hypothesis that representations in spatial working memory mediate interactions between directed actions and problem solving. Participants attempted to solve an insight problem while occasionally either moving their eyes in a pattern embodying the problem's solution or maintaining fixation. They simultaneously held either a spatial or verbal stimulus in working memory. Participants who moved their eyes in a pattern that embodied the solution were more likely to solve the problem, but only while also performing a verbal working memory task. Embodied guidance of insight was eliminated when participants were instead engaged in a spatial working memory task while moving their eyes, implying that loading spatial working memory prevented movement representations from influencing problem solving. These results point to spatial working memory as a mechanism driving embodied guidance of insight, suggesting that actions do not automatically influence problem solving. Instead, cross-talk between action and higher order cognition requires representations in spatial working memory.

Previous research has shown that attention is prioritized for the space near the hand, leading to faster detection of visual targets appearing close to one's own hand. In the present study, we examined whether observers are also facilitated in detecting targets presented near another's hand by having participants perform a Posner cueing task while sitting next to a friend. Across blocks, either the participant or the friend placed a hand next to one of the target locations. Our results robustly showed that participants detected targets appearing near their own hands more quickly than targets appearing away from their hands, replicating previous work demonstrating that spatial attention is prioritized near one's own hand (Experiments 1–4). No such attentional bias effects were found for targets appearing near the friend's hand, suggesting that spatial attention is not automatically prioritized near another's hand (Experiments 1 and 2). However, participants were faster to detect targets near the friend's hand following a joint action task, suggesting a shared body representation plays an influential role in biasing attention to the space near another's hand (Experiment 4).

People perceive individual objects as being closer when they have the ability to interact with the objects than when they do not. We asked how interaction with multiple objects impacts representations of the environment. Participants studied multiple-object layouts, by manually exploring or simply observing each object, and then drew a scaled version of the environment (Exp. 1) or reconstructed a copy of the environment and its boundaries (Exp. 2) from memory. The participants who interacted with multiple objects remembered these objects as being closer together and reconstructed smaller environment boundaries than did the participants who looked without touching. These findings provide evidence that action-based perceptual distortions endure in memory over a moving observer’s multiple interactions, compressing not only representations between touched objects, but also untouched environmental boundaries.

Perhaps walking and chewing gum is effortless, but walking and tracking moving objects is not. Multiple object tracking is impaired by walking from one location to another, suggesting that updating location of the self puts demands on object tracking processes. Here, we quantified the cost of self-motion in terms of the tracking load. Participants in a virtual environment tracked a variable number of targets (1-5) among distractors while either staying in one place or moving along a path that was similar to the objects’ motion. At the end of each trial, participants decided whether a probed dot was a target or distractor. As in our previous work, self-motion significantly impaired performance in tracking multiple targets. Quantifying tracking capacity for each individual under move versus stay conditions further revealed that self-motion during tracking produced a cost to capacity of about 0.8 (±0.2) objects. Tracking your own motion is worth about one object, suggesting that updating the location of the self is similar, but perhaps slightly easier, than updating locations of objects.

When a visual target is displaced during a saccade, the perception of its displacement is suppressed. Its movement can usually only be detected if the displacement is quite large. This suppression can be eliminated by introducing a short blank period after the saccade and before the target reappears in a new location. This has been termed the blanking effect and has been attributed to the use of otherwise ignored extraretinal information. We examined whether similar effects occur with eyeblinks and other visual distractions. We found that suppression of displacement perception can also occur due to a blink (both immediately prior to the blink and during the blink), and that introducing a blank period after a blink reduces the displacement suppression in much the same way as after a saccade. The blanking effect does not occur when other visual distractions are used. This provides further support for the conclusion that the blanking effect arises from extraretinal signals about eye position.

Investigations of multiple-object tracking aim to further our understanding of how people perform common activities such as driving in traffic. However, tracking tasks in the laboratory have overlooked a crucial component of much real-world object tracking: self-motion. We investigated the hypothesis that keeping track of one's own movement impairs the ability to keep track of other moving objects. Participants attempted to track multiple targets while either moving around the tracking area or remaining in a fixed location. Participants' tracking performance was impaired when they moved to a new location during tracking, even when they were passively moved and when they did not see a shift in viewpoint. Self-motion impaired multiple-object tracking in both an immersive virtual environment and a real-world analog, but did not interfere with a difficult non-spatial tracking task. These results suggest that people use a common mechanism to track changes both to the location of moving objects around them and to keep track of their own location.

Inhibition of return facilitates visual search, biasing attention away from previously examined locations. Prior research has shown that, as a result of inhibitory tags associated with rejected distractor items, observers are slower to detect small probes presented at these tagged locations than they are to detect probes presented at locations that were unoccupied during visual search, but only when the search stimuli remain visible during the probe-detection task. Using an interrupted visual search task, in which search displays alternated with blank displays, we found that inhibitory tagging occurred in the absence of the search array when probes were presented during these blank displays. Furthermore, by manipulating participants’ attentional set, we showed that these inhibitory tags were associated only with items that the participants actively searched. Finally, by probing before the search was completed, we also showed that, early in search, processing at distractor locations was actually facilitated, and only as the search progressed did evidence for inhibitory tagging arise at those locations. These results suggest that the context of a visual search determines the presence or absence of inhibitory tagging, as well as demonstrating for the first time the temporal dynamics of location prioritization while search is ongoing.

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, Illinois Recent research has shown that saccadic eye movements interfere with dorsal-stream tasks such as judgments of object orientation, but not with ventral-stream tasks such as object recognition. Because saccade programming and execution also rely on the dorsal stream, it has been hypothesized that cognitive saccadic suppression occurs as a result of dual-task interference within the dorsal stream. Judging whether one number is larger or smaller than another (magnitude comparison) is a dorsal-stream task that relies especially on the right parietal cortex. In contrast, judging whether a number is odd or even (parity judgment) does not involve the dorsal stream. In the present study, one group of subjects judged whether two-digit numbers were greater than or less than 65, whereas another group judged whether two-digit numbers were odd or even. Subjects in both groups made these judgments while making no, short, or long saccades. Saccade distance had no effect on parity judgments, but reaction times to make magnitude comparison judgments increased with saccade distance when the eyes moved from right to left. Because the right parietal cortex is instrumental in generating leftward saccades, these results provide further evidence for the hypothesis that cognitive suppression during saccades occurs as a result of dual-task interference within the dorsal stream.

Observers use facial appearance to predict social behavior and individuals' personality traits. We examined the possibility that social contexts can also influence face perception. To investigate the relationship between competitive social contexts and perceived appearance, we leveraged a known link between aggression and a simple physiognomic cue: the facial width-to-height ratio (WHR). Faces with higher WHRs are perceived as being more aggressive (Carre, McCormick, & Mondloch, 2009) and individuals with naturally higher WHRs exhibit more aggressive behavior (Carre & McCormick, 2008). Participants played a simple skill game either in competition (N=30) or cooperation (N=30) with a confederate prior to reconstructing the facial appearance of their opponent/partner and a refereeing third party by arranging segmented facial features on a screen until they had produced a best likeness of the target individual. We anticipated that higher perceived aggression during competition would lead to higher reconstructed WHRs than cooperation. The results supported this prediction: participants' reconstructions had significantly higher WHRs (p Language: en

In the present research, we investigated whether eyeblinks interfere with cognitive processing. In Experiment 1, the participants performed a partial-report iconic memory task in which a letter array was presented for 106 msec, followed 50, 150, or 750 msec later by a tone that cued recall of one row of the array. At a cue delay of 50 msec between array offset and cue onset, letter report accuracy was lower when the participants blinked following array presentation than under no-blink conditions; the participants made more mislocation errors under blink conditions. This result suggests that blinking interferes with the binding of object identity and object position in iconic memory. Experiment 2 demonstrated that interference due to blinks was not due merely to changes in light intensity. Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrated that other motor responses did not interfere with iconic memory. We propose a new phenomenon,cognitive blink suppression, in which blinking inhibits cognitive processing. This phenomenon may be due to neural interference. Blinks reduce activation in area V1, which may interfere with the representation of information in iconic memory. nt]mis|This research was supported by NSF Grant BCS 01-32292.