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Large-scale societal issues such as public health crises highlight the need to communicate scientific information, which is often uncertain, accurately to the public and policy makers. The challenge is to communicate the inherent scientific uncertainty - especially about the underlying quality of the evidence - whilst supporting informed decision making. Little is known about the effects that such scientific uncertainty has on people’s judgments of the information. In three experimental studies (total N=6,489), we investigate the influence of scientific uncertainty about the quality of the evidence on people’s perceived trustworthiness of the information and decision making. We compare the provision of high, low, and ambiguous quality-of-evidence indicators against providing no such cues. Results show an asymmetric relationship: people react more strongly to cues of low quality of evidence than they do to high quality of evidence compared to no cue. While responses to a cue of high quality of evidence are not significantly different from no cue; a cue of low or uncertain quality-of-evidence information is accompanied by lower perceived trustworthiness and lower use of the information in decision making. Cues of uncertain quality of evidence have a similar effect to those of low quality. These effects do not change with the addition of a reason for the indicated quality level. Our findings shed light on the effects of the communication of scientific uncertainty on judgment and decision making, and provide insights for evidence-based communications and informed decision making for policy makers and the public.

Misinformation presents a significant societal problem. To measure individuals’ susceptibility to misinformation and study its predictors, researchers have used a broad variety of ad-hoc item sets, scales, question framings, and response modes. Because of this variety, it remains unknown whether results from different studies can be compared (e.g., in meta-analyses). In this preregistered study (US sample; N = 2,622), we compare five commonly used question framings (eliciting perceived headline accuracy, manipulativeness, reliability, trustworthiness, and whether a headline is real or fake) and three response modes (binary, 6-point and 7-point scales), using the psychometrically validated Misinformation Susceptibility Test (MIST). We test 1) whether different question framings and response modes yield similar responses for the same item set, 2) whether people’s confidence in their primary judgments is affected by question framings and response modes, and 3) which key psychological factors (myside bias, political partisanship, cognitive reflection, and numeracy skills) best predict misinformation susceptibility across assessment methods. Different response modes and question framings yield similar (but not identical) responses for both primary ratings and confidence judgments. We also find a similar nomological net across conditions, suggesting cross-study comparability. Finally, myside bias and political conservatism were strongly positively correlated with misinformation susceptibility, whereas numeracy skills and especially cognitive reflection were less important (although we note potential ceiling effects for numeracy). We thus find more support for an “integrative” account than a “classical reasoning” account of misinformation belief.

Practitioners, policymakers, and researchers alike have argued that the school environment can be both a risk and resilience factor for radicalization and extremism among youth, but little research has tested this directly. Against this background and using a cultural and community psychological approach, we developed a scale to measure resilience against radicalization and extremism in schools focusing on factors that can strengthen social cohesion. A total of 334 school pupils from mostly urban areas in Norway were recruited for this research, of which 233 passed an attention check and were retained for analyses. Participants completed a larger set of items that were derived from theory and the experiences of practitioners and were intended to measure resilience to radicalization and extremism. Exploratory factor analysis identified three dimensions: (1) the perception that the school treats pupils equally no matter their social backgrounds, (2) the perception of the school and its employees as attentive and proactive in meeting pupils’ anger resulting from social and political issues, and (3) the presence of mutual respect. In regression analyses, the equality dimension predicted lower extremist intentions and radicalization as well as four out of five extremism risk factors (i.e., lower anomie, symbolic and realistic threats, and relative deprivation). Mutual respect showed no significant effect, whereas school attentiveness positively predicted three risk factors as well as radicalism intentions and violent intentions, suggesting that such attentiveness may be a response to these issues. In sum, the findings indicate that resilience against extremism in schools may be nurtured especially by creating an egalitarian school environment. Our study provides the first scale assessing such resilience in schools, which can be further tested and developed in future research.

An emerging strategy in climate movements is to build solidarity with other social movements to mobilize climate action—but can this backfire? In a pre-registered experiment (N=541 Indian adults), we investigated the effect of Greta Thunberg's tweets expressing solidarity with the Indian farmers’ protest on Indians’ receptivity to her climate advocacy and their intentions to take collective climate action. Protest support moderated the effect of her tweets such that after reading her tweets, those who opposed the farmers’ protest found Thunberg to be less effective as a climate advocate compared to the control condition. Exposure to the tweets also lowered protest opposers’ collective climate action intentions. In contrast, those who supported the farmers’ protest became more receptive to her climate advocacy after reading her tweets. Pre-emptively clarifying Thunberg's motives using an image-prepare pre-bunk inoculated against the negative effects on her image– protest opposers who received the pre-bunk before reading Thunberg's tweets were as receptive to her as were protest opposers in the control condition. The results suggest that climate advocates’ intervention in other social movements can polarise the public's opinion about them and the public's pro-climate action intentions. This unintended effect may be mitigated by clarifying advocates’ motives before they intervene.

In a large-scale replication effort, Klein et al. (2018, https://doi.org/10.1177/2515245918810225) investigate the variation in replicability and effect size across many different samples and settings. The authors concluded that, for any given effect being studied, heterogeneity across samples and settings does not explain failures to replicate. In the current commentary, we argue that the heterogeneity observed indeed has implications for replication failures, as well as for statistical power and theory development. We argue that psychological scientific research questions should be contextualized—considering how historical, political, or cultural circumstances might affect study results. We discuss how a perspectivist approach to psychological science is a fruitful way for designing research that aims to explain effect size heterogeneity.

The adoption of sustainable lifestyles plays a key role in mitigating climate change. Previous research has found that social norms—beliefs about what most people do and approve of—profoundly impact individual engagement in pro-environmental behaviour. However, little is known about personal and contextual factors that moderate social norm interventions' effectiveness in motivating pro-environmental engagement. The present work conducted two quasi-experimental studies (N = 1501 and N = 237) on a sample of American adults to address this gap. The studies investigated how individual moral norms and personal costs associated with ''acting green'' influence the effectiveness of descriptive norm messages that ask individuals to make a pro-environmental pledge. We found that the strength of moral norms did not moderate the effect of social norms on making a pro-environmental pledge. Rather, our findings suggest that the mere activation of one's moral norms—regardless of how strong they are—can eliminate the effect of social descriptive cues on making a pro-environmental pledge. Finally, we found no evidence that social descriptive norm interventions better promote pro-environmental pledges that require relatively little time and effort for participants to formulate (i.e. low-cost pledges) than commitments that require more cognitive time and effort (i.e. high-cost pledges). Although we note that these findings are preliminary, they offer new insights on the interplay between social and moral norms and help set an agenda for future research on potential moderators of social norm interventions.

We present Harmony Square, a short, free-to-play online game in which players learn how political misinformation is produced and spread. We find that the game confers psychological resistance against manipulation techniques commonly used in political misinformation: players from around the world find social media content making use of these techniques significantly less reliable after playing, are more confident in their ability to spot such content, and less likely to report sharing it with others in their network.

The outbreak of the SARS-CoV-2 novel coronavirus (COVID-19) has been accompanied by a large amount of misleading and false information about the virus, especially on social media. In this article, we explore the coronavirus “infodemic” and how behavioral scientists may seek to address this problem. We detail the scope of the problem and discuss the negative influence that COVID-19 misinformation can have on the widespread adoption of health protective behaviors in the population. In response, we explore how insights from the behavioral sciences can be leveraged to manage an effective societal response to curb the spread of misinformation about the virus. In particular, we discuss the theory of psychological inoculation (or prebunking) as an efficient vehicle for conferring large-scale psychological resistance against fake news.

This study finds that the online “fake news” game, Bad News, can confer psychological resistance against common online misinformation strategies across different cultures. The intervention draws on the theory of psychological inoculation: Analogous to the process of medical immunization, we find that “prebunking,” or preemptively warning and exposing people to weakened doses of misinformation, can help cultivate “mental antibodies” against fake news.

Welfare science has built its foundations on veterinary medicine and thus measures of health. Since bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus) tend to mask symptoms of poor health, management in captivity would benefit from advanced understanding on the links between health and behavioural parameters, and few studies exist on the topic. In this study, four representative behavioural and health measures were chosen: health status (as qualified by veterinarians), percentage of daily food eaten, occurrences of new rake marks (proxy measure of social activity), and willingness to participate (WtP) in Positive Reinforcement Training sessions as qualitatively measured by their caretakers. These data were collected multiple times a day, every day over the course of a year from a multi-facility, large sample size (ndolphins = 51), allowing powerful analyses of the relationships between measures. First, it was found that dolphins with a higher WtP score also had a significantly better health status, ate a higher percentage of their daily food, and a lower occurrence of new rake marks. In addition, the WtP score was significantly lower up to 3 days before the weekly veterinary diagnosis of a decrease in health state; the percentage of daily food eaten and new rake mark measures did not show any significant change before such a diagnosis. These results suggest that WtP in training sessions is a potential behavioural measure of dolphin welfare, and an indicator of early changes in the dolphins’ health state. We therefore suggest measurement of WtP as a more practical and non-invasive tool to support veterinary care and general management. More work needs to be conducted to elucidate the influence of social behaviour on health, and to identify other potential welfare indicators, but this long-term study has shown that qualitative measures can be both practical and valid when assessing dolphin welfare.

In many magic tricks, magicians fool their audience by performing a mock action (a so-called “ruse”), which merely serves the purpose of providing a seemingly natural explanation for visible movements that are actually part of the secret move they want to hide from the audience. Here, we discuss a special magic ruse in which the action of secretly putting something somewhere is “explained away” by the mock action of fetching something from the same place, or vice versa . Interestingly, the psychological principles underlying the amazing potency and robustness of this technique seem to be very similar to the general perceptual principles underlying figure–ground perception and the assignment of border ownership. This analogy may be useful for exploring the possibility that this and similar magical effects involve immediate “unconscious inferences” about intentions more akin to perceptual processing than to explicit deliberations based on a reflective “theory” of mind.

Pellicano and Burr (2012) argue that a Bayesian framework can help us understand the perceptual peculiarities in autism. We agree, but we think that their assumption of uniformly flat or equivocal priors in autism is not empirically supported. Moreover, we argue that any full account has to take into consideration not only the nature of priors in autism, but also how these priors are constructed or learned. We argue that predictive coding provides a more constrained framework that very naturally explains how priors are constructed in autism leading to strong, but overfitted, and non-generalizable predictions.

The predictive coding model is increasingly and fruitfully used to explain a wide range of findings in perception. Here we discuss the potential of this model in explaining the mechanisms underlying aesthetic experiences. Traditionally art appreciation has been associated with concepts such as harmony, perceptual fluency, and the so-called good Gestalt. We observe that more often than not great artworks blatantly violate these characteristics. Using the concept of prediction error from the predictive coding approach, we attempt to resolve this contradiction. We argue that artists often destroy predictions that they have first carefully built up in their viewers, and thus highlight the importance of negative affect in aesthetic experience. However, the viewer often succeeds in recovering the predictable pattern, sometimes on a different level. The ensuing rewarding effect is derived from this transition from a state of uncertainty to a state of increased predictability. We illustrate our account with several example paintings and with a discussion of art movements and individual differences in preference. On a more fundamental level, our theorizing leads us to consider the affective implications of prediction confirmation and violation. We compare our proposal to other influential theories on aesthetics and explore its advantages and limitations.