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We report two experiments in which errors and interaction latencies were recorded during routinization of hierarchically structured computer-based tasks. Experiment 1 demonstrates that action selection is slowed at subtask transitions, especially when selecting lower frequency actions. This frequency effect is compounded by concurrent performance of a secondary, attentionally demanding, task. Experiment 2 replicates these results in a more complex task and further demonstrates that the effects are reduced by experience. Several other factors were also found to affect latencies, including the availability of an external disambiguation cue and the temporal distance over which task context needs to be internally maintained. The results support a 'dual-systems' account of action selection in which a 'routine' system, sensitive to frequency, context, and experience, is selectively modulated by an attentionally demanding 'nonroutine' system. Keywords: Contention Scheduling, Dual Systems framework, sequential action selection, Supervisory System, routine action DOI: 10.1037/a0017608

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2009.12.007 Byline: Michael S.C. Thomas (a), Mike Van Duuren (b), Harry R.M. Purser (a), Denis Mareschal (c), Daniel Ansari (d), Annette Karmiloff-Smith (a) Keywords: Williams syndrome; Language; Metaphor; Cognitive development; Categorization; Conceptual development Abstract: The domain of figurative language comprehension was used to probe the developmental relation between language and cognition in typically developing individuals and individuals with Williams syndrome. Extending the work of Vosniadou and Ortony, the emergence of nonliteral similarity and category knowledge was investigated in 117 typically developing children between 4 and 12years of age, 19 typically developing adults, 15 children with Williams syndrome between 5 and 12years of age, and 8 adults with Williams syndrome. Participants were required to complete similarity and categorization statements by selecting one of two words (e.g., either 'The sun is like ___' or 'The sun is the same kind of thing as ___') with word pairs formed from items that were literally, perceptually, or functionally similar to the target word or else anomalous (e.g., moon, orange, oven, or chair, respectively). Results indicated that individuals with Williams syndrome may access different, less abstract knowledge in figurative language comparisons despite the relatively strong verbal abilities found in this disorder. Author Affiliation: (a) Developmental Neurocognition Lab, School of Psychology, Birkbeck College, University of London, London WC1E 7HX, UK (b) Department of Psychology, University of Winchester, Winchester SO22 4NR, UK (c) Centre for Brain and Child Development, School of Psychology, Birkbeck College, University of London, London WC1E 7HX, UK (d) Department of Psychology, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 5C2 Article History: Received 1 July 2009; Revised 11 December 2009

In this response, we reiterate the importance of development (both ontogenetic and phylogenetic) in the understanding of a complex cognitive skill--analogical reasoning. Four key questions structure the response: Does relational priming exist, and is it sufficient for analogy? What do we mean by relations as transformations? Could all or any relations be represented as transformations? And what about the challenge of more complex analogies? In addressing these questions we bring together a number of supportive commentaries, strengthening our emergentist case for analogy (in particular with insights from comparative psychology), and review new supportive evidence. We also rebut those commentaries that ignore development at their peril. Along the way, we revisit the main assumptions underlying the analogy as relational priming (ARP) account of analogy, clarifying and elaborating as necessary.

The development of analogical reasoning has traditionally been understood in terms of theories of adult competence. This approach emphasizes structured representations and structure mapping. In contrast, we argue that by taking a developmental perspective, analogical reasoning can be viewed as the product of a substantially different cognitive ability--relational priming. To illustrate this, we present a computational (here connectionist) account where analogy arises gradually as a by-product of pattern completion in a recurrent network. Initial exposure to a situation primes a relation that can then be applied to a novel situation to make an analogy. Relations are represented as transformations between states. The network exhibits behaviors consistent with a broad range of key phenomena from the developmental literature, lending support to the appropriateness of this approach (using low-level cognitive mechanisms) for investigating a domain that has normally been the preserve of high-level models. Furthermore, we present an additional simulation that integrates the relational priming mechanism with deliberative controlled use of inhibition to demonstrate how the framework can be extended to complex analogical reasoning, such as the data from explicit mapping studies in the literature on adults. This account highlights how taking a developmental perspective constrains the theory construction and cognitive modeling processes in a way that differs substantially from that based purely on adult studies, and illustrates how a putative complex cognitive skill can emerge out of a simple mechanism. Keywords: Analogical reasoning; cognitive development; connectionism; relational priming; transformation similarity

In this response, we consider four main issues arising from the commentaries to the target article. These include further details of the theory of interactive specialization, the relationship between neuroconstructivism and selectionism, the implications of neuroconstructivism for the notion of representation, and the role of genetics in theories of development. We conclude by stressing the importance of multidisciplinary approaches in the future study of cognitive development and by identifying the directions in which neuroconstructivism can expand in the Twenty-first Century.

Neuroconstructivism: How the Brain Constructs Cognition proposes a unifying framework for the study of cognitive development that brings together (1) constructivism (which views development as the progressive elaboration of increasingly complex structures), (2) cognitive neuroscience (which aims to understand the neural mechanisms underlying behavior), and (3) computational modeling (which proposes formal and explicit specifications of information processing). The guiding principle of our approach is context dependence, within and (in contrast to Marr [1982]) between levels of organization. We propose that three mechanisms guide the emergence of representations: competition, cooperation, and chronotopy; which themselves allow for two central processes: proactivity and progressive specialization. We suggest that the main outcome of development is partial representations, distributed across distinct functional circuits. This framework is derived by examining development at the level of single neurons, brain systems, and whole organisms. We use the terms encellment, embrainment, and embodiment to describe the higher-level contextual influences that act at each of these levels of organization. To illustrate these mechanisms in operation we provide case studies in early visual perception, infant habituation, phonological development, and object representations in infancy. Three further case studies are concerned with interactions between levels of explanation: social development, atypical development and within that, developmental dyslexia. We conclude that cognitive development arises from a dynamic, contextual change in embodied neural structures leading to partial representations across multiple brain regions and timescales, in response to proactively specified physical and social environment. Keywords: brain; cognition; development; constructivism; embodiment

Two experiments investigated infants' ability to localize tactile sensations in peripersonal space. Infants aged 10 months (Experiment 1) and 6.5 months (Experiment 2) were presented with vibrotactile stimuli unpredictably to either hand while they adopted either a crossed- or uncrossed-hands posture. At 6.5 months, infants' responses were predominantly manual, whereas at 10 months, visual orienting behavior was more evident. Analyses of the direction of the responses indicated that (a) both age groups were able to locate tactile stimuli, (b) the ability to remap visual and manual responses to tactile stimuli across postural changes develops between 6.5 and 10 months of age, and (c) the 6.5-month-olds were biased to respond manually in the direction appropriate to the more familiar uncrossed-hands posture across both postures. The authors argue that there is an early visual influence on tactile spatial perception and suggest that the ability to remap visual and manual directional responses across changes in posture develops between 6.5 and 10 months, most likely because of the experience of crossing the midline gained during this period. Keywords: somatosensation, multisensory representation, peripersonal space, perceptual development, infancy

We present two experiments assessing whether the size of a transformation instantiating a relation between two states of the world (e.g., shrinks) is a performance factor affecting analogical reasoning. The first experiment finds evidence of transformation size as a significant factor in adolescent analogical problem solving while the second experiment finds a similar effect on adult analogical reasoning using a markedly different analogical completion paradigm. The results are interpreted as providing evidence for the more general framework that cognitive representations of relations are best understood as mental transformations.

To purchase or authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.00983.x Byline: Denis Mareschal (1), Seok Hui Tan (2) Abstract: One hundred 18-month-olds were tested using sequential touching and following 4 different priming contexts using sets of toys that could be simultaneously categorized at either the basic or global level. An exact expression of the expected mean sequence length for arbitrary categories was derived as a function of the number of touches made, and a finite mixture model analytic method was also used to explore individual variability in categorization. Toddlers could categorize flexibly and spontaneously selected the level of categorization as a function of the prior prime. Perceptual Variability emerged as a predictor of the level at which infants subsequently categorized. The infants were also able to classify objects as members of both basic- and global-level categories simultaneously. Author Affiliation: (1)Birkbeck University of London (2)National University of Singapore Article note: Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Denis Mareschal, School of Psychology, Birkbeck University of London, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX, U.K. Electronic mail may be sent to d.mareschal@bbk.ac.uk.

Disentangling bottom-up and top-down processing in adult category learning is notoriously difficult. Studying category learning in infancy provides a simple way of exploring category learning while minimizing the contribution of top-down information. Three- to 4-month-old infants presented with cat or dog images will form a perceptual category representation for eat that excludes dogs and for dog that includes cats. The authors argue that an inclusion relationship in the distribution of features in the images explains the asymmetry. Using computational modeling and behavioral testing, the authors show that the asymmetry can be reversed or removed by using stimulus images that reverse or remove the inclusion relationship. The findings suggest that categorization of nonhuman animal images by young infants is essentially a bottom-up process.

Three- to 4-month-old infants show asymmetric exclusivity in the acquisition of cat and dog perceptual categories. The cat perceptual category excludes dog exemplars, but the dog perceptual category does not exclude cat exemplars. We describe a connectionist autoencoder model of perceptual categorization that shows the same asymmetries as infants. The model predicts the presence of asymmetric retroactive interference when infants acquire cat and dog categories sequentially. A subsequent experiment conducted with 3- to 4-month-olds verifies the predicted pattern of looking time behaviors. We argue that bottom-up, associative learning systems with distributed representations are appropriate for modeling the operation of short-term visual memory in early perceptual category learning. Keywords: Asymmetric interference; Sequential category learning; Cat and dog categories

Research indicates that infants under one year of age are able to tell the difference between dogs and cats. Data were obtained using categorization tasks with cat and dog replicas for 7-month-old and 9-month-old infant subjects; categorization was based on feature distributions.

A mature science strives to provide causal explanations of observed phenomena rather than focusing on taxonomic descriptions of data. A field theory model is a step towards providing a truly scientific account of development. However, the model is under-constrained in that it ignores the boundary conditions defined by the physical constraints imposed by the infant's developing brain and body.

Young infants show unexplained asymmetries in the exclusivity of categories formed on the basis of visually presented stimuli. A connectionist model is described that shows similar exclusivity asymmetries when categorizing the same stimuli presented to infants. The asymmetries can be explained in terms of an associative learning mechanism, distributed internal representations, and the statistics of the feature distributions in the stimuli. The model was used to explore the robustness of this asymmetry. The model predicts that the asymmetry will persist when a category is acquired in the presence of mixed category exemplars. An experiment with 3-4-month-olds showed that asymmetric exclusivity persisted in the presence of mixed-exemplar familiarization, thereby confirming the model's prediction.

Connectionist models aiming to reveal the mechanisms of atypical development must in their undamaged form constitute plausible models of normal development and follow a developmental trajectory that matches empirical data. Constructivist models that adapt their structure to the learning task satisfy this demand. They are therefore more informative in the study of atypical development than the static models employed by Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith (T&K-S).

Norman presents intriguing arguments in support of a mapping between ecological and constructivist visual cognition, on the one hand, onto the dorsal ventral dual route processing hypothesis, on the other hand. Unfortunately, his account is incompatible with developmental data on the functional emergence of the dorsal and ventral routes. We argue that it is essential for theories of adult visual cognition to take constraints from development seriously.

Missing from Quartz & Sejnowski's (Q&S's) unique and valuable effort to relate cognitive development to neural constructivism is an examination of the global emergent properties of adding new neural circuits. Such emergent properties can be studied with computational models. Modeling with generative connectionist networks shows that synaptogenic mechanisms can account for progressive increases in children's representational power.