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The article discusses the future of the civil public bureaucratic structure of the British government as of September 2008. It discusses government trends since the election of the New Labour Party government in May 1997, attempts to identify significant contemporary and future social trends challenges, as well public attitudes toward those challenges, and proposes several policy options. The article discusses the concept of new public management (NPM), the delivery of public services, and the rhetoric of then-British prime minister Tony Blair. It also discusses the effectiveness of third sector organizations (TSOs), private sector organizations (PSOs), and non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs).

The article presents a response to a commentary by Peter Burnham about an article on depoliticisation in Great Britain. Burnham's commentary contains a number of perceptive observations that serve to advance further the debate on depoliticisation. He suggests that rather than conceptualising the post-war development of British governance as a simple transition from politicised to depoliticised methods, it is more productive to analyse statecraft in terms of the relationship between the two in any given period. One area of disagreement between Burnham and the authors of the article relates to the theoretical utility of the term dual polity.

Since 1 May 1997 the Labour government in the United Kingdom has implemented a number of public–private partnerships (PPPs) as a central tool of governance within their wider modernisation agenda. To date, the introduction of PPPs has largely been evaluated through conceptual lenses that emphasise either the administrative, managerial, financial or technical dimensions of this reform strategy. This article seeks to complement this wider literature by arguing that PPPs raise a host of political issues and tensions that have largely been overlooked. Five specific themes are set out in order to provide a framework or organising perspective. These are: efficiency; risk; complexity; accountability; and governance and the future of state projects. The main conclusion of the article is that PPPs represent a Faustian bargain in that forms of PPP may deliver efficiency gains and service improvements in some policy areas but these benefits may involve substantial political and democratic costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the mechanism of government in Great Britain. Creation of new forms of delegated governance in 1980 and 1990; Interrelationship between elected arenas and the wider area administration; Failure of the Labour government to institute reforms that clarify the rationale and structure of the state.

This article examines the role, powers and future of independent European agencies as an aspect of the current debate surrounding European governance. It argues that the design and implementation of independent agencies in the EU should not be seen as a construct of apolitical administrative engineering or integration but should be interpreted as a central component of political debates regarding the future constitutional structure of the EU vis-à-vis member states. In order to demonstrate the validity of this argument, the article reflects upon five themes (growth, co-ordination, accountability, depoliticization and power) which have arisen as central issues in relation to delegated governance at the national level. These themes are analysed in order to assess the main lessons that could usefully be considered during this critical period of constitutional reflection and design for the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature on autonomous public agencies often adopts a top‐down approach, focusing on the means with which those agencies can be steered and controlled. This article opens up the black box of the agencies and zooms in on their CEO's and their perceptions of hierarchical accountability. The article focuses on felt accountability, denoting the manager's (a) expectation to have to explain substantive decisions to a parent department perceived to be (b) legitimate and (c) to have the expertise to evaluate those decisions. We explore felt accountability of agency‐CEO's and its institutional antecedents with a survey in seven countries combining insights from public administration and psychology. Our bottom‐up perspective reveals close connections between de facto control practices rather than formal institutional characteristics and felt accountability of CEO's of agencies. We contend that felt accountability is a crucial cog aligning accountability holders' expectations and behaviors by CEO's. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]