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Contemporary urban planning dynamics are based on negotiation and contractual relations, creating fragmented planning processes. On the one hand, they trigger technocratic forms of governance, which require the ‘legal instrumentalisation’ of planning in a piecemeal approach ensuring legal certainty. On the other hand, these processes require flexibility to enable easy, fast and efficient forms of implementation due to the increasing involvement of private sector actors in urban development. This article unravels the influence of these conflicting dynamics on the fundamentals of urban planning practices by focusing on changing public accountability mechanisms created through contractual relationships between public and private sector agencies. Dutch urban regeneration has demonstrated changing governance principles and dynamics in the last three decades. Representing instrumental and institutional measures, we connect accountability mechanisms to these changes and argue that they ‘co-exist’ in multiple forms across different contexts. This article embeds this evolution in wider theoretical discussions on the changing relationships between public and private sector actors in urban governance relative to the changing role of the state, and it addresses questions on who can be held accountable, and to what extent, when public sector actors are increasingly retreating from regulatory practices while private sector actors play increasingly prominent roles.

The use of public–private partnerships (PPPs) for infrastructure provision has not always been based on their promise to deliver value for money (VfM). PPPs have also been applied to keep investments off governments’ annual accounts. This article links that motivation to particular modes of practice. It depicts the case of the Belgian region of Flanders. In this jurisdiction, a long-term PPP policy strategy, central coordination mechanism, and application of VfM assessment tools have remained absent. PPP has been used in an ad hoc way, which has granted government departments leeway in closing partnership deals. The result has been a fragmentation of both knowledge and practices. It will be challenging to realize reforms that include a more critical stance toward PPP and foster learning processes: Actors have become used to their ways of dealing with PPP and seek to pursue their own fragmented trajectories.

In 2004 Flanders, the northern region of Belgium launched a range of large public–private partnership (PPP) projects for a total value of 6 billion euros. Ten years later, PPP has become a well-embedded procurement method for long-term public infrastructure projects. This article makes a critical ‘round-up’ of PPP experience in Belgium based on the perspectives of infrastructure professionals who were asked to provide their views on performance-related issues in PPP projects. Two workshops were held to further enrich the input and ideas. Based on this empirical material this article formulates 10 lessons to improve PPP performance, which is deliberately broadly defined. It argues that the dominant ‘value for money’ evaluations, following strictly financial or commercial logics (in both the private and public sectors), need to be broadened. Given the large impact and cost of large infrastructure projects on society, broader societal and spatial contributions of PPPs are needed.

The value of public–private partnerships has typically been sought in financial and budgetary benefits. In both research and practice, important aspects of nonfinancial value have remained under the radar. This article discusses four “white raven” public–private partnerships that have shown rather atypical results in terms of their physical outcomes—design, contextual fit, and multifunctionality. We argue that despite the increasing role of private sector actors, public sector clients fulfill a key role in delivering value. A strong sense of ambition and vision, in combination with a solid coordination on the part of the client, helps deliver projects that go beyond mere financial perks and deliver true social value. These elements have largely been overlooked in previous research, which has often focused on financial, legal, political, and managerial capacities of government actors.

Public-private partnerships for infrastructure development are often conceived as puzzling governance tools. A peculiar case in Belgium has been the procurement of multiple similar projects to single private sector partners who design, build, finance and maintain infrastructure for a fixed period— bundled procurement. Under the umbrella of the Flemish Sports Infrastructure Program, several of these bundles were tendered, particularly in order to achieve economies of scale. However, bundled procurement came at a price. This article scrutinizes its tense relationship with local governments' interests and competitive tendering. It shows that competition was hampered to a certain extent, but an equally important role in this respect was played by high contractual demands. As for local interests, in some cases the voice of local governments was given too much weight during the procurement phase. Consequently, political interests intervened and uncertainty arose.

Most countries that have adopted the public-private partnership (PPP) model as a means of implementing infrastructure projects have launched dedicated supporting units to guide policy development and stimulate project implementation. This paper draws on the theoretical notion of PPP-enabling fields to carry out a comparative analysis of the roles and functions of PPP-supporting units across 19 European countries with varying PPP experiences. We distinguish four categories of national support of PPPs, from skeptical systems of zero support to full-fledged PPP systems. Furthermore, we take initial steps to analyze the possible link between national differences in institutionalized PPP support and the amount of implemented PPP projects. Finally, pathways for further research on PPP-supporting units are discussed.

Although public private partnership (PPP) in infrastructure development has gained foothold in Flanders (the northern part of Belgium) over time, dissimilar results are evident and the controversy around PPP remains. This paper investigates the contradictory achievements of the Flemish Sports Infrastructure Program. It shows that the form of governance as applied by the Flemish Government was inadequate and led to interferences of political, multi-actor, and technical complexities, which in turn compromised the performance of the Program. A mismatch is revealed between the complicated governance approach and the relatively straightforward infrastructures that were developed, hence the argument that a better sense of contingency is required in future PPP programs. Moreover, governments across the globe are recommended to think twice before embarking on PPP programs which include bundled procurement and mandating agreements: severe complexities are likely to emerge and convincing evidence on the merits of bundling and mandating has not yet been delivered.(2) (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are known as challenging contractual endeavors to public sector managers, and governments are developing standard contracts in order to ease the contracting process toward PPP deals. This study examines the learning process governments go through while managing the procurement trajectories of PPPs over time and revising the model contract they use, thereby gradually moving toward the formulation of a standard contract. It presents a case study of four consecutive road infrastructure projects in Belgium that looks into the contractual changes that were made over time and explains the reasons behind those changes. The results indicate a learning process that is characterized by an open attitude to learning of public sector actors, and a leading role of private sector actors-primarily financiers-in proposing or even requiring change. Contrary to theory-based expectations, the government continuously tested whether its model contract was in line with market practice, rather than increasingly limiting the room for negotiation as it gained experience.