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Although deviations from standard guidance for land application of biosolids occur in practice, their importance is largely unknown. A list of such deviations (plausible failure scenarios) were identified at a workshop of industry, regulators, and academic professionals. Next, a survey of similar professionals was conducted to rank the plausible failure scenarios according to their severity, frequency, incentive to ignore control measures, gaps in existing control processes, public concern, and overall concern. Survey participants rated inten-tional dumping (unpermitted disposal) as the most severe of the failure scenarios, lack of worker protection as the most frequent scenario, and application of Class A biosolids that have failed to meet treatment standards as the scenario for which incentives to ignore control measures are highest. Failure of public access restrictions to application sites was the scenario for which existing controls were judged the weakest; application of biosolids too close to wells was ranked highest for public concern and for overall concern. Two scenarios for which existing controls were considered weaker, site restriction violations and animal contact leading to human exposure, were also rated as frequently occurring. Both scenarios are related in that they (1) involve inappropriate access to a site before the required time has elapsed, and (2) could be addressed through similar biosolids management measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the aftermath of a release of microbiological agents, environmental sampling must be conducted to characterize the release sufficiently so that mathematical models can then be used to predict the subsequent dispersion and human health risks. Because both the dose-response and environmental transport of aerosolized microbiological agents are functions of the effective aerodynamic diameter of the particles, environmental assessments should consider not only the total amount of agents but also the size distributions of the aerosolized particles. However, typical surface sampling cannot readily distinguish among different size particles. This study evaluates different approaches to estimating risk from measurements of microorganisms deposited on surfaces after an aerosol release. For various combinations of sampling surfaces, size fractions, HVAC operating conditions, size distributions of release spores, uncertainties in surface measurements, and the accuracy of model predictions are tested in order to assess how much detail can realistically be identified from surface sampling results. The recommended modeling and sampling scheme is one choosing 3, 5, and 10 μm diameter particles as identification targets and taking samples from untracked floor, wall, and the HVAC filter. This scheme provides reasonably accurate, but somewhat conservative, estimates of risk across a range of different scenarios. Performance of the recommended sampling scheme is tested by using data from a large-scale field test as a case study. Sample sizes of 10-25 in each homogeneously mixed environmental compartment are sufficient to develop order of magnitude estimates of risk. Larger sample sizes have little benefit unless uncertainties in sample recoveries can be reduced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks, the use of Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) in bioterrorism attacks has emerged as a realistic concern. Thus, a contingency plan is needed to inform decision-makers about which response actions are appropriate and justified under which circumstances. This study considers the decisions: (1) to undertake prophylactic antibiotic treatment; (2) to vaccinate individuals; or (3) to decontaminate the building. While these response actions are clearly justified for highly exposed individuals, a very large number of individuals exposed to very small risks in areas outside of the immediate vicinity of the release are also likely. Our results indicate that there are non-negligible risk thresholds below which response actions produce more costs than benefits. For the base case, the thresholds range from a risk of 1 in 33 for decontamination by fumigation to 1 in 6,547 for antibiotic prophylaxis and 1 in 7,108 for vaccination. A one-way sensitivity analysis on uncertain variables indicates less than an order of magnitude change in these thresholds. Benefit-cost analysis is a useful tool for assessing tradeoffs among alternative decisions, but cannot be the sole criterion in responding to incidents because of inherent limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a study which assesses the risk of heterotrophic plate count (HPC) bacteria in potable water sources in Mexico. The study used 88 water samples collected from four drinking water sources including the oratorio water, the store bought water, indoor, and outdoor faucet water. It was found out that there was no statistically significant differences among the four water sources.