Search

In debates over the regulation of communication related to dual-use research, the risks that such communication creates must be weighed against against the value of scientific autonomy. The censorship of such communication seems justifiable in certain cases, given the potentially catastrophic applications of some dual-use research. This conclusion however, gives rise to another kind of danger: that regulators will use overly simplistic cost-benefit analysis to rationalize excessive regulation of scientific research. In response to this, we show how institutional design principles and normative frameworks from free speech theory can be used to help extend the argument for regulating dangerous dual-use research beyond overly simplistic cost-benefit reasoning, but without reverting to an implausibly absolutist view of scientific autonomy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drug‐resistant bacterial infections constitute a major threat to global public health. Several key bacteria that are becoming increasingly resistant are among those that are ubiquitously carried by human beings and usually cause no symptoms (i.e. individuals are asymptomatic carriers) until and/or unless a precipitating event leads to symptomatic infection (and thus disease). Carriers of drug‐resistant bacteria can also transmit resistant pathogens to others, thus putting the latter at risk of resistant infections. Accumulating evidence suggests that such transmission occurs not only in hospital settings but also in the general community, although considerably more data are needed to assess the extent of this problem. Asymptomatic carriage of drug‐resistant bacteria raises important ethical questions regarding the appropriate public health response, including the degree to which it would be justified to impose burdens on asymptomatic carriers (and others) in order to prevent transmission. In this paper, we (i) summarize current evidence regarding the carriage of key drug‐resistant bacteria, noting important knowledge gaps; and (ii) explore the particular implications of existing public health ethics frameworks for policy‐making regarding asymptomatic carriers. Inter alia, we argue that the relative burdens imposed by public health measures on healthy carriers (as opposed to sick individuals) warrant careful consideration and should be proportionate to the expected public health benefits in terms of risks averted. We conclude that more surveillance and research regarding community transmission will be needed in order to clarify relevant risks and design proportionate policies, although extensive community surveillance itself would also require careful ethical consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT This first part of this article critiques Sridhar Venkatapuram's conception of health as a capability. It argues that Venkatapuram relies on the problematic concept of dignity, implies that those who are unhealthy lack lives worthy of dignity (which seems politically incorrect), sets a low bar for health, appeals to metaphysically problematic thresholds, fails to draw clear connections between appealed-to capabilities and health, and downplays the importance/relevance of health functioning. It concludes by questioning whether justice entitlements should pertain to the capability for health versus health achievements, challenging Venkatapuram's claims about the strength of health entitlements, and demonstrating that the capabilities approach is unnecessary to address social determinants of health. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article advocates the development of a moderate pluralist theory of political philosophy that recognizes that utility, liberty and equality are legitimate, independent social values and that none should have absolute priority over the others. Inter alia, such a theory would provide a principled means for striking a balance, or making trade-offs, between these values in cases of conflict. Recent developments in public health ethics have made progress in thinking about how to make trade-offs between liberty and utility in particular. While public health ethicists often claim that the least restrictive alternative should be used to achieve the public health goal in question, I argue that a plausible but under-recognized idea is that the least restrictive alternative might sometimes involve improvement of global health via redistributive taxation—i.e., rather than coercive social distancing measures. I conclude by demonstrating that the proportionality principle leaves open the question of when exactly utility outweighs liberty or vice versa—and I argue that, rather than speaking about the morality of liberty-infringing public health interventions in categorical/binary terms, it would be more fruitful and realistic to think and speak about the degree to which a liberty-infringing public health intervention is morally appropriate. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper examines cumulative ethical and self-interested reasons why wealthy developed nations should be motivated to do more to improve health care in developing countries. Egalitarian and human rights reasons why wealthy nations should do more to improve global health are that doing so would (1) promote equality of opportunity, (2) improve the situation of the worst-off, (3) promote respect of the human right to have one’s most basic needs met, and (4) reduce undeserved inequalities in well-being. Utilitarian reasons for improving global health are that this would (5) promote the greater good of humankind, and (6) achieve enormous benefits while requiring only small sacrifices. Libertarian reasons are that this would (7) amend historical injustices and (8) meet the obligation to amend injustices that developed world countries have contributed to. Self-interested reasons why wealthy nations should do more to improve global health are that doing so would (9) reduce the threat of infectious diseases to developed countries, (10) promote developed countries’ economic interests, and (11) promote global security. All of these reasons count, and together they add up to make an overwhelmingly powerful case for change. Those opposed to wealthy government funding of developing world health improvement would most likely appeal, implicitly or explicitly, to the idea that coercive taxation for redistributive purposes would violate the right of an individual to keep his hard-earned income. The idea that this reason not to improve global health should outweigh the combination of rights and values embodied in the eleven reasons enumerated above, however, is implausibly extreme, morally repugnant and perhaps imprudent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thomas Pogge has proposed a supplement to the standard patent regime whereby innovating companies would be rewarded in proportion to the extent to which their innovations lead to reduction of the global burden of disease (GBD). This paper argues that an expansion of this proposal—whereby provision of already existing medicines are incentivised in a similar way—would provide a more comprehensive solution to the healthcare situation in developing countries. It then considers the practical challenges that the implementation of such a proposal (expanded or otherwise) would entail. Though these include difficulties associated with disease burden metric, I argue that the most serious difficulties are associated with the problem of causal attribution. A basic idea underlying Pogge's proposal is that the disease burden reduction attributable to particular interventions can be determined. Theoretically speaking, in cases involving multiple interacting causal factors, there may be no fact of the matter regarding the extent to which disease burden reduction should be attributed to one intervention as opposed to another; and (even if workable practical solutions to this theoretical challenge can be met) the data requirements for implementation would be daunting. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

After a history of neglect, bioethicists have recently turned their attention to the topic of infectious disease. In this paper we link bioethicists’ earlier neglect of infectious disease to their under-appreciation of the extent to which the problem of infectious disease is related to social factors and thus to questions of justice. We argue that a social causation of illness model – well-known to sociologists of medicine, but incompletely understood by bioethicists – will improve future bioethical analysis of issues related to infectious disease. By emphasising the relationships between social and economic structures of inequality and health, the social causation model provides a richer approach to ethical issues associated with infectious disease than the more commonly used biomedical model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bioethics apparently suffers from a misdistribution of research resources analogous to the‘10/90’ divide in medical research. Though infectious disease should be recognized as a topic of primary importance for bioethics, the general topic of infectious disease has received relatively little attention from the discipline of bioethics in comparison with things like abortion, euthanasia, genetics, cloning, stem cell research, and so on. The fact that the historical and potential future consequences of infectious diseases are almost unrivalled is one reason that the topic of infectious disease warrants more attention from bioethicists. The‘Black Death’ eliminated one third of the European population during the 14th Century; the 1918 flu killed between 20 and 100 million people; and, in the 20th Century smallpox killed perhaps three times more people than all the wars of that period. In the contemporary world, epidemics (of AIDS, multi-drug resistant tuberculosis, and newly emerging infectious diseases such as SARS) continue to have dramatic consequences. A second reason why the topic of infectious disease deserves further attention is that it raises difficult ethical questions of its own. While infected individuals can threaten the health of other individuals and society as a whole, for example, public health care measures such as surveillance, isolation, and quarantine can require the infringement of widely accepted basic human rights and liberties. An important and difficult ethical question asks how to strike a balance between the utilitarian aim of promoting public health, on the one hand, and libertarian aims of protecting privacy and freedom of movement, on the other, in contexts involving diseases that are– to varying degrees– contagious, deadly, or otherwise dangerous. Third, since their burden is most heavily shouldered by the poor (in developing countries), infectious diseases deeply involve issues of justice– which should be a central concern of ethics. I conclude by providing sociological and historical explanations of why the topic of infectious disease has not already received more attention from bioethicists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]