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Studies of public support for war highlight the importance of context. Most people do not simply support or oppose the use of force but instead assess its merits depending on various aspects of the situation. One such aspect is the extent of international backing – whether from individual states or supranational organizations – for military action. This backing may be active, notably through the contribution of troops, or more a passive matter of endorsement or authorization of action. In this article, a survey experiment embedded in a major internet survey of British foreign policy attitudes (N = 2,205) is used to explore how international backing affects public support for military action. Britain’s military potential and recent history make it an obvious case study here. Both active and endorsement backing prove to have separate and significant positive effects on support. Importantly, the absolute number of troops involved matters far less than the proportion of total troop numbers to be contributed. And the perceived strength of the enemy predicts support only when the British are to contribute a large proportion of total forces. Predispositional variables are used to investigate the sources of the experimental effects but with little success: the impact of international backing proves remarkably consistent across the sample. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article reports on an audience costs experiment embedded into a survey of the British public ( N = 2235). We extend previous research into audience costs in three main directions. First, we provide clear and direct evidence that they exist for a second-order democratic power, the United Kingdom. Second, we show that the extent of audience costs varies, and at times substantially, along with features of the crisis situation that have not been examined empirically in this context before. In particular, the type of crisis strongly influences public reactions both to bluffing in general and to the wisdom or otherwise of escalating crises before backing down. While audience costs do appear to exist for a UK Prime Minister, he or she cannot inflate them by moving up the escalation chain. Rather, a limited use of force tends to mitigate these costs among the British public because it appears to them a more consistent strategy. Third, we show that public disapproval of a failed bluffing strategy is stronger among the more politically engaged, increasing the likelihood that audience costs will be paid at the ballot box. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The simple 5‐point Likert format is ubiquitous in British public opinion research. Yet recent thinking on survey response questions the validity of even the simplest measures. Respondents seek satisficing strategies to cope with the cognitive demands of answering, and the Likert midpoint provides such a strategy. This suggests that 4‐point scales might be more appropriate. Evidence is presented on who chooses the midpoint, and what they do when denied it. Omitting the midpoint may impair validity, because some respondents opt for it when they have no basis for choosing between agreement and disagreement. Yet omission may improve validity, because the midpoint is also used as a safe haven by a ‘silent minority’, taking refuge in that option rather than confessing to an unpopular viewpoint. The implication is that the midpoint should be offered on obscure topics, where many respondents will have no basis for choice, but omitted on controversial topics, where social desirability is uppermost in respondents’ minds. Applying these principles to the 2001 BES demonstrates that varying format by topic thus is not only advisable but also straightforward in practical terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]