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This article explores people?s preferences for different containment strategies and policy programmes for managing COVID-19 risks. Using a survey experiment administered to an online sample of 1?562 Italian respondents in April 2020, we test whether and to what extent individual preferences are influenced by different framings of equivalent scenarios on gains and losses attached to alternative policy measures aimed at containing the health and economic costs of the pandemic. We find that subjects tend to be more risk-averse or risk-seeking depending on whether they are confronted with a positive (gain) or a negative (loss) description of the consequences of the proposed policy initiatives. The results yield relevant implications for our understanding of citizens? support for national and EU-wide responses to the coronavirus pandemic and the role of framing in contexts of crisis.

Research demonstrates the multi-dimensional nature of American identity arguing that the normative content of American identity relates to political ideologies in the United States, but the sense of belonging to the nation does not. This paper replicates that analysis and extends it to the German and British cases. Exploratory structural equation modeling attests to cross-cultural validity of measures of the sense of belonging and norms of uncritical loyalty and engagement for positive change. In the 2010s, we find partisanship and ideology in all three nations explains levels of belonging and the two content dimensions. Interestingly, those identifying with major parties of the left and right in all three countries have a higher sense of belonging and uncritical loyalty than their moderate counterparts. The relationship between partisanship, ideology, and national identity seems to wax and wane over time, presumably because elite political discourse linking party or ideology to identity varies from one political moment to the next.

This special issue focuses on EuroPolis, a unique experiment in ‘deliberative democracy’ at the European level convened in Brussels soon before the 2009 European Parliamentary Elections. A European wide random sample of the 27 member countries at the time was gathered to deliberate about two key issues--climate change and immigration as well as its voting intentions. The articles in the special issue focus on this Deliberative Poll, both quantitatively and qualitatively to assess what it tells us about ambitious versions of a ‘European wide public sphere.’ Can the citizens of Europe deliberate together across all the barriers of language and nationality? Can there be a credible process of European wide ‘public will formation’ about substantive policy issues and about voting?

This article analyzes a period usually neglected in empirical studies of public opinion and European integration: the formative years between the early 1950s and the late 1960s. The analysis is based on one country – Italy – in which the European process was a source of deep political cleavage in the formative phase. The study of the sources and dynamics of support in these years sheds a different light on the determinants of support. More specifically, a pooled multivariate logistic analysis of six surveys conducted between 1952 and 1970 shows two things. First, it shows that public support in Italy was driven mostly by considerations that were affective and political rather than economic and utilitarian. Second, it explains under which conditions the political factors behind support (and opposition) for European integration in the 1950s and 1960s changed over time, mostly in reactions to international events and to developments in European institutionalization. The article points to the bottom-up nature of change in public support for European integration; changes in public opinion affected party positions, rather than vice versa.

Measuring support for or opposition to the international use of force is not an easy matter. As earlier research (e.g., Mueller, 1973; Larson, 1996a; Everts and Isernia 2001; Feaver and Gelpi, 2004) has shown, people are particularly sensitive to the circumstances under and purposes for which the use of force is either envisaged or actually taking place. Hypothetical cases as well as questions about the use of force before the decision to use this instrument has actually been taken may be especially misleading us with respect to what can be expected in a concrete and specific historical case. Timing is also a relevant element in view of the ‘rally around the flag’ effect, or the tendency of people to support the use of military force, despite hesitations, once their government has taken a decision to do so. This is a well-known phenomenon that deserves to be mentioned in this connection (Mueller, 1973).

Ever since public opinion became a powerful force in politics (and, probably, even before that), a vexing question for scholars as well as policymakers has been to determine and interpret to what degree and under what conditions the public is prepared to support the use of military force.

The US policy of ‘rebalancing to Asia’ is likely to have major implications for transatlantic relations as well as for the role of rising powers, such as China. US public opinion and leaders are largely aware of this eastward shift in attention and this awareness can be considered, albeit in a somewhat indirect way, an indicator of support for the policy. On the other side of the Atlantic, however, Europeans seem to be less aware of the fact that the Far East is becoming the main chessboard of international relations in a multipolar global order. Nevertheless, when objectively informed about China, people on both sides of the Atlantic are less in favour of a shift in interests toward Asia and their negative perceptions of China are significantly correlated to a hesitancy in supporting a rebalancing policy. Moreover, if people perceive Beijing as a threat, especially an economic threat, they are even less likely to support a shift of interests to the Far East, the only exception being American elites, who tend to increase their support for the rebalancing strategy in the presence of a Chinese economic threat.

To understand the present state of public opinion in an Atlantic context, it is necessary to take a more long-term historical perspective. The interest in the role of public opinion in foreign policy has grown steadily since the end of World War II. In Chapter 1 we began our analysis by offering an overview of the interaction between the research program on this topic and the political events that prompted this growing interest over the years.

Measuring support for, or opposition to, the international use of force is not an easy matter. As earlier research (Mueller, 1973; Larson, 1996a; Everts and Isernia 2001; Feaver and Gelpi, 2004) has shown, people are particularly sensitive to the circumstances under, and purposes for, which the use of force is either envisaged or actually taking place. Hypothetical cases as well as questions about the use of force before the decision to use this instrument has actually been taken may be especially misleading with respect to what can be expected in concrete and specific historical cases. Timing is also a relevant element in view of the ‘rally around the flag’ effect, or the tendency of people to support the use of military force, despite hesitations, once their government has taken a decision to do so (Mueller 1973; Brody, 1991; 2000).

It is perhaps inevitable that proponents of each of the various views on the causes and nature of the alleged transatlantic divide will look for — and sometimes find — arguments and data from public opinion research results that tend to confirm their own differing hypotheses. At the same time, the core issue of where and why American and European publics differ on questions of war and peace and the use of military force in particular — as has been shown in Chapter Three — has not yet been adequately addressed. Continuing the analysis, we now want to supplement more conventional presentations of results of surveys on this issue by digging a bit deeper into the nature and structure of the transatlantic divide by looking primarily at general attitudes, or the level of political ideology, and then systematically comparing the relative explanatory power of these different dimensions of the Atlantic community in accounting for support for the use of force in hypothetical and real situations.

Interest in the role of public opinion in foreign policy has grown steadily since the end of the Second World War. We distinguish at least three different waves of research on this topic and examine two main components of the present policy debate: the need for an Atlantic community and agreement on the means to reach common goals. As to the first issue, we explore the extent to which Atlanticism—defined as the willingness to cooperate among European partners and the US on problems perceived as common—is still high in the 2000s. We find considerable variation between European countries and the US. The left–right cleavage is still relevant in explaining attitudes toward collaboration across the Atlantic both in the US and in several European countries. As to the means, we look at the issue of support for the use of military force in Europe and the United States. On the basis of the available data, support for the use of force is much higher, across the board, in the US than in Europe. On the other...

A number of social sciences studies have built a "familialistic-parochial-localistic" paradigm since the early 1960s in order to characterise the Italian political culture. Such a paradigm was criticised in the last decade. This article wants to test it empirically on the basis of available opinion polls. It appears that the feeling of national identity is weak if we consider it only under its "civic" aspect (i.e. the satisfaction vis-à-vis the political system) ; once we include the idea of being part of a cultural community, then such a feeling is clearly quite more significant and Italy appears as a more "normal" nation than it usually seems., Un certain nombre de travaux de sciences sociales ont tôt mis en évidence un paradigme "familaliste-paroissial-localiste" pour caractériser la culture politique italienne. Ce paradigme a été soumis à la critique dans les années 90. Cet article se propose de le tester empiriquement sur la base des sondages disponibles. Il en ressort que le sentiment d'identité nationale italien n'est faible que si l'on le considère sous son aspect strictement civique ; si l'on inclut l'idée de faire partie d'une communauté culturelle, alors celui-ci se révèle nettement plus consistant, et l'Italie apparaît comme une nation moins "anormale" qu'il n'y paraît., Isernia Pierangelo, Pérés Hubert. Changement et continuité dans la culture politique italienne. In: Pôle Sud, n°19, 2003. L'Italie du politique, sous la direction de Christophe Roux . pp. 131-153.

The American Presidential election in November 2004 has heightened interest in the impact of public opinion on foreign policy. One of the more specific questions is what the consequences of the re-election of President Bush will or could be in this connection. Nowhere is this truer than on both sides of the Atlantic given the differences that have roiled the US-European relationship in recent years.

1. Introduction Philip Everts Part I. Determinants and Correlates of Support for the Use of Force 2. The Impact of Basic Motivation on Foreign Policy Opinions Concerning the Use of Force: a Three Dimensional Framework William O. Chittick and Annette Freyberg-Inan 3. German Public Opinion and the Use of Force in the Early Nineties Zoltan Juhasz 4. Italian Public Opinion and the International Use of Force Pierangelo Isernia 5. Risky Missions: Dutch Policy Opinion on Peacekeeping in the Balkans Jan van der Meulen and Marijke de Konink Part II. Public Opinion and Policy-Making on the Use of Force 6. Ireland: Neutrality and the International Use of Force Karin Gilland 7. Moving Away from War: Israelis' Security Beliefs in the Post-Oslo era Tamar Hermann 8. The French and the Use of Force: Public Perceptions and their Impact on the Policy-Making Process Natalie La Balme 9. The Myth of the Reactive Public: American Public Attitudes on Military Fatalities in the Post-Cold War Period Steven Kull and Clay Ramsay 10. War Without Bloodshed? Public Opinion and the Conflict over Kosovo Philip Everts 11. Conclusions Pierangelo Isernia

The aggregate changes in public opinion attitudes toward foreign policy issues in three West European countries during the cold war decades (1954-1990) are analyzed. The stability hypothesis is addressed from different angles to ascertain the amount of change in public opinion attitudes toward foreign policy issues in France, Germany, and Italy. Results reveal a low level of volatility in public opinion that corresponds with the findings for the American public. On the other hand, French, German, and Italian public opinion shows a somewhat higher level of fluctuation than in the United States. Attitudes toward NATO, the United States, and the Soviet Union closely reflect the evolution of world politics and therefore represent a reasonable reaction to international events and crises.

Chapter 1 Old or New Ball Game? Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World Part 2 Part I: The Media and Foreign Policy Chapter 3 Declarations of Independence: The Growth of Media Power after the Cold War Chapter 4 Media and Public Sphere without Borders? News Coverage and Power from Kurdistan to Kosovo Chapter 5 New Issues and the Media: American and German News Coverage of the Global Warming Debate Chapter 6 Government's Little Helper: U.S. Press Coverage of Foreign Policy Crises,1946-1999 Chapter 7 Toward General Theories of the Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy Part 8 Part II: Public and Elite Attitudes after the Cold War Chapter 9 Elite Misperceptions of U.S. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Chapter 10 To Intervene or Not to Intervene in Bosnia: That Was the Question for the United States and Europe Chapter 11 Internationalism at Bay? A Contextual Analysis of Americans' Post-Cold War Foreign Policy Attitudes Chapter 12 NATO and European Security after the Cold War: Will European Citizens Support a Common Security Policy? Chapter 13 Public Opinion after the Cold War: A Paradigm Shift Chapter 14 Public Opinion and Decisionmaking in Russia: The Impact of NATO Expansion and Airstrikes on Serbia Chapter 15 Public Attitudes after the Cold War Part 16 Part III: The Public Opinion-Foreign Policy Linkage Chapter 17 Who Leads and Who Follows? U.S. Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy Chapter 18 Public Opinion and European Integration: Permissive Consensus or Premature Politicization? Chapter 19 Constraint, Catalyst or Political Tool? The French Public and Foreign Policy Chapter 20 Where Angels Fear to Tread: Italian Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Chapter 21 Toward a Comparative Analysis of the Public Opinion-Foreign Policy Connection