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Misunderstandings in dyadic interactions often persist despite our best efforts, particularly between native and non-native speakers, resembling a broken duet that refuses to harmonise. This paper delves into the computational mechanisms underpinning these misunderstandings through the lens of the broken Lorenz system -- a continuous dynamical model. By manipulating a specific parameter regime, we induce bistability within the Lorenz equations, thereby confining trajectories to distinct attractors based on initial conditions. This mirrors the persistence of divergent interpretations that often result in misunderstandings. Our simulations reveal that differing prior beliefs between interlocutors result in misaligned generative models, leading to stable yet divergent states of understanding when exposed to the same percept. Specifically, native speakers equipped with precise (i.e., overconfident) priors expect inputs to align closely with their internal models, thus struggling with unexpected variations. Conversely, non-native speakers with imprecise (i.e., less confident) priors exhibit a greater capacity to adjust and accommodate unforeseen inputs. Our results underscore the important role of generative models in facilitating mutual understanding (i.e., establishing a shared narrative) and highlight the necessity of accounting for multistable dynamics in dyadic interactions., Comment: 24 pages, 6 figures

Despite being recognized as neurobiologically plausible, active inference faces difficulties when employed to simulate intelligent behaviour in complex environments due to its computational cost and the difficulty of specifying an appropriate target distribution for the agent. This paper introduces two solutions that work in concert to address these limitations. First, we present a novel planning algorithm for finite temporal horizons with drastically lower computational complexity. Second, inspired by Z-learning from control theory literature, we simplify the process of setting an appropriate target distribution for new and existing active inference planning schemes. Our first approach leverages the dynamic programming algorithm, known for its computational efficiency, to minimize the cost function used in planning through the Bellman-optimality principle. Accordingly, our algorithm recursively assesses the expected free energy of actions in the reverse temporal order. This improves computational efficiency by orders of magnitude and allows precise model learning and planning, even under uncertain conditions. Our method simplifies the planning process and shows meaningful behaviour even when specifying only the agent's final goal state. The proposed solutions make defining a target distribution from a goal state straightforward compared to the more complicated task of defining a temporally informed target distribution. The effectiveness of these methods is tested and demonstrated through simulations in standard grid-world tasks. These advances create new opportunities for various applications., Comment: 23 pages, 7 figures. Project repo: https://github.com/aswinpaul/dpefe_2023

Bistable perception follows from observing a static, ambiguous, (visual) stimulus with two possible interpretations. Here, we present an active (Bayesian) inference account of bistable perception and posit that perceptual transitions between different interpretations (i.e., inferences) of the same stimulus ensue from specific eye movements that shift the focus to a different visual feature. Formally, these inferences are a consequence of precision control that determines how confident beliefs are and change the frequency with which one can perceive - and alternate between - two distinct percepts. We hypothesised that there are multiple, but distinct, ways in which precision modulation can interact to give rise to a similar frequency of bistable perception. We validated this using numerical simulations of the Necker's cube paradigm and demonstrate the multiple routes that underwrite the frequency of perceptual alternation. Our results provide an (enactive) computational account of the intricate precision balance underwriting bistable perception. Importantly, these precision parameters can be considered the computational homologues of particular neurotransmitters - i.e., acetylcholine, noradrenaline, dopamine - that have been previously implicated in controlling bistable perception, providing a computational link between the neurochemistry and perception.

Computational models of visual attention in artificial intelligence and robotics have been inspired by the concept of a saliency map. These models account for the mutual information between the (current) visual information and its estimated causes. However, they fail to consider the circular causality between perception and action. In other words, they do not consider where to sample next, given current beliefs. Here, we reclaim salience as an active inference process that relies on two basic principles: uncertainty minimisation and rhythmic scheduling. For this, we make a distinction between attention and salience. Briefly, we associate attention with precision control, i.e., the confidence with which beliefs can be updated given sampled sensory data, and salience with uncertainty minimisation that underwrites the selection of future sensory data. Using this, we propose a new account of attention based on rhythmic precision-modulation and discuss its potential in robotics, providing numerical experiments that showcase advantages of precision-modulation for state and noise estimation, system identification and action selection for informative path planning.

This paper provides a concise description of the free energy principle, starting from a formulation of random dynamical systems in terms of a Langevin equation and ending with a Bayesian mechanics that can be read as a physics of sentience. It rehearses the key steps using standard results from statistical physics. These steps entail (i) establishing a particular partition of states based upon conditional independencies that inherit from sparsely coupled dynamics, (ii) unpacking the implications of this partition in terms of Bayesian inference and (iii) describing the paths of particular states with a variational principle of least action. Teleologically, the free energy principle offers a normative account of self-organisation in terms of optimal Bayesian design and decision-making, in the sense of maximising marginal likelihood or Bayesian model evidence. In summary, starting from a description of the world in terms of random dynamical systems, we end up with a description of self-organisation as sentient behaviour that can be interpreted as self-evidencing; namely, self-assembly, autopoiesis or active inference., Comment: 44 pages, 9 Figures; 64 pages including graphical abstract, highlights and references

Under the Bayesian brain hypothesis, behavioural variations can be attributed to different priors over generative model parameters. This provides a formal explanation for why individuals exhibit inconsistent behavioural preferences when confronted with similar choices. For example, greedy preferences are a consequence of confident (or precise) beliefs over certain outcomes. Here, we offer an alternative account of behavioural variability using R\'enyi divergences and their associated variational bounds. R\'enyi bounds are analogous to the variational free energy (or evidence lower bound) and can be derived under the same assumptions. Importantly, these bounds provide a formal way to establish behavioural differences through an $\alpha$ parameter, given fixed priors. This rests on changes in $\alpha$ that alter the bound (on a continuous scale), inducing different posterior estimates and consequent variations in behaviour. Thus, it looks as if individuals have different priors, and have reached different conclusions. More specifically, $\alpha \to 0^{+}$ optimisation leads to mass-covering variational estimates and increased variability in choice behaviour. Furthermore, $\alpha \to + \infty$ optimisation leads to mass-seeking variational posteriors and greedy preferences. We exemplify this formulation through simulations of the multi-armed bandit task. We note that these $\alpha$ parameterisations may be especially relevant, i.e., shape preferences, when the true posterior is not in the same family of distributions as the assumed (simpler) approximate density, which may be the case in many real-world scenarios. The ensuing departure from vanilla variational inference provides a potentially useful explanation for differences in behavioural preferences of biological (or artificial) agents under the assumption that the brain performs variational Bayesian inference., Comment: 23 pages, 5 figures

Biological agents have meaningful interactions with their environment despite the absence of immediate reward signals. In such instances, the agent can learn preferred modes of behaviour that lead to predictable states -- necessary for survival. In this paper, we pursue the notion that this learnt behaviour can be a consequence of reward-free preference learning that ensures an appropriate trade-off between exploration and preference satisfaction. For this, we introduce a model-based Bayesian agent equipped with a preference learning mechanism (pepper) using conjugate priors. These conjugate priors are used to augment the expected free energy planner for learning preferences over states (or outcomes) across time. Importantly, our approach enables the agent to learn preferences that encourage adaptive behaviour at test time. We illustrate this in the OpenAI Gym FrozenLake and the 3D mini-world environments -- with and without volatility. Given a constant environment, these agents learn confident (i.e., precise) preferences and act to satisfy them. Conversely, in a volatile setting, perpetual preference uncertainty maintains exploratory behaviour. Our experiments suggest that learnable (reward-free) preferences entail a trade-off between exploration and preference satisfaction. Pepper offers a straightforward framework suitable for designing adaptive agents when reward functions cannot be predefined as in real environments., Comment: 23 pages, 15 figures

Active inference is a probabilistic framework for modelling the behaviour of biological and artificial agents, which derives from the principle of minimising free energy. In recent years, this framework has successfully been applied to a variety of situations where the goal was to maximise reward, offering comparable and sometimes superior performance to alternative approaches. In this paper, we clarify the connection between reward maximisation and active inference by demonstrating how and when active inference agents perform actions that are optimal for maximising reward. Precisely, we show the conditions under which active inference produces the optimal solution to the Bellman equation--a formulation that underlies several approaches to model-based reinforcement learning and control. On partially observed Markov decision processes, the standard active inference scheme can produce Bellman optimal actions for planning horizons of 1, but not beyond. In contrast, a recently developed recursive active inference scheme (sophisticated inference) can produce Bellman optimal actions on any finite temporal horizon. We append the analysis with a discussion of the broader relationship between active inference and reinforcement learning., Comment: 18 pages, 3 figures (main text); 37 pages including references and appendix

Active inference is a Bayesian framework for understanding biological intelligence. The underlying theory brings together perception and action under one single imperative: minimizing free energy. However, despite its theoretical utility in explaining intelligence, computational implementations have been restricted to low-dimensional and idealized situations. In this paper, we present a neural architecture for building deep active inference agents operating in complex, continuous state-spaces using multiple forms of Monte-Carlo (MC) sampling. For this, we introduce a number of techniques, novel to active inference. These include: i) selecting free-energy-optimal policies via MC tree search, ii) approximating this optimal policy distribution via a feed-forward `habitual' network, iii) predicting future parameter belief updates using MC dropouts and, finally, iv) optimizing state transition precision (a high-end form of attention). Our approach enables agents to learn environmental dynamics efficiently, while maintaining task performance, in relation to reward-based counterparts. We illustrate this in a new toy environment, based on the dSprites data-set, and demonstrate that active inference agents automatically create disentangled representations that are apt for modeling state transitions. In a more complex Animal-AI environment, our agents (using the same neural architecture) are able to simulate future state transitions and actions (i.e., plan), to evince reward-directed navigation - despite temporary suspension of visual input. These results show that deep active inference - equipped with MC methods - provides a flexible framework to develop biologically-inspired intelligent agents, with applications in both machine learning and cognitive science., Comment: To appear in NeurIPS 2020

Active inference is a normative principle underwriting perception, action, planning, decision-making and learning in biological or artificial agents. From its inception, its associated process theory has grown to incorporate complex generative models, enabling simulation of a wide range of complex behaviours. Due to successive developments in active inference, it is often difficult to see how its underlying principle relates to process theories and practical implementation. In this paper, we try to bridge this gap by providing a complete mathematical synthesis of active inference on discrete state-space models. This technical summary provides an overview of the theory, derives neuronal dynamics from first principles and relates this dynamics to biological processes. Furthermore, this paper provides a fundamental building block needed to understand active inference for mixed generative models; allowing continuous sensations to inform discrete representations. This paper may be used as follows: to guide research towards outstanding challenges, a practical guide on how to implement active inference to simulate experimental behaviour, or a pointer towards various in-silico neurophysiological responses that may be used to make empirical predictions., Comment: 36 pages, 5 figures