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International audience; It is often assumed that conspiratorial thinking shares important affinities with the Manichean views of populism, and its profound distrust of elites and experts. Such connection between conspiracy theory and populism should be explored further, however, in order to shed light on the different ways in which they may be articulated in populist politics. Based on a qualitative case study of the populist radical left and radical right in France, this paper examines the interplay between conspiracy theory and populism during the Covid-19 crisis. We find that both populist parties have channelled the Covid-19 pandemic into their existing ideological framework to mobilize the anxieties and grievances produced by the crisis. However, we see variation in the interpretation of the health crisis through the lenses of the ‘thin’ ideology of populism. More importantly, we find that populist actors may also vary significantly in their use of conspiracy theories, reflecting different ideological legacies and political strategies.

International audience; The 2017 French presidential and legislative elections constituted a crisis point for a mainstream Right which, since the mid-1980s, had proved remarkably adept at exploiting the political opportunity structure of the French political system to balance the centripetal forces of Silent Revolution value change and the ‘liberal consensus’ with the centrifugal pull of the Silent Counter-Revolutionary Front National (FN) on the populist radical right. This chapter will analyse how, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the conservative Gaullists and their centre-right liberal coalition partners constituted competing but stable bloc components within France’s two-round majoritarian electoral system, while pursuing weak accommodative strategies vis-à-vis the FN. The absence of an effective centre-located competitor ensured that the Gaullists’ increasing encroachment upon the centre-right’s support, culminating in the formation of the UMP in 2002, did not threaten the bloc’s stability. Conversely, from 2007 onwards, a more conservative mainstream Right faced challenges from both the populist radical right, reviving Silent Counter Revolution values which were again salient in the wake of the economic crisis, and renewed centrist formations largely accepting of progressive Silent Revolution cultural values. The chapter demonstrates that significant, simultaneous electoral challenge from the centrist and populist radical right compromised the Right bloc’s integrity, and recast the French party system, pulling liberal Republicans wing towards cooperation with the centrist government, and leaving conservative-authoritarian Republicans wing to drift towards the Radical Right.

International audience; While arguing that socio-economic issues are secondary to the populist radical right ideology, authors such as Mudde (2007) argue also that “for the populist radical right the economy should always be at the service of the nation” and that these parties “defend a nativist economic program based upon economic nationalism and welfare chauvinism” (p.137). In this paper, we argue that the economic supply of RRPP is essentially a fight for the well-being of the national community, which mixes ‘economic populism’ and ‘economic sovereigntism’. Economic populism refers to the idea that the ‘true’ people’s economic well-being has been ignored or betrayed by the ‘corrupt’ elite and that it should be re-established. Economic sovereigntism is seen as a means of restoring the people’s well-being and the nation’s prosperity. Sovereigntism claims that the nation-state should re-assert its sovereign authority and exclusive control over laws and international interactions, while rejecting supranational influence. We conduct a qualitative comparative analysis of two established West-European populist radical right parties, the French Front national (FN) and the Swiss people’s party (SVP). Adopting a most different systems approach, we propose a fine-grained analysis of those two parties’ electoral manifestos and economic strategies. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for the broader understanding of RRPP supply in political economy.

International audience; The French Front national (FN) is a prominent example of the West European radical right ‘movement party’, traditionally operating across the electoral arena and the far right milieu. Looking at changes that have occurred in both the party and social movement since the early 2000s, this chapter examines the current context for radical right mobilization in France. It suggests that the FN’s contentious frames have achieved greater resonance in mainstream politics, media and society, as a result of the mainstreaming of the FN as well as of the radicalization of the mainstream. The current FN retains its profile as ‘movement party’, increasingly bridging the gap between far right and mainstream politics, and exploiting the resources and initiatives provided by the broader ‘reactionary’ movement within which it functions. While producing new organizational and discursive opportunities for the FN, the diversity of actors and positions within the movement impedes significantly its ability to create a more unitary political force in France, however.

This article sets out to explore the socio-economic positions of Western European radical right-wing parties, with a specific focus on how those parties’ social and economic policies relate to their nationalist agenda. The current literature on the political economy of the radical right highlights diverging ideological formulas. While some radical right parties show a neo-liberal pro-market orientation, others have endorsed protectionist and redistributive policies, moving further to the left of the economic axis. There is little research however into factors that shape radical right economic policy preferences and the reasons behind radical right parties’ commonalities and diversities in socio-economic stances. To address these issues, this paper looks comparatively at the current French Front National (FN) and Swiss People’s Party (SVP). The FN and SVP represent two prominent cases of institutionalized radical right parties which are often seen as assuming divergent positions in their respective party systems, and to be located at the opposite ends of the economic axis. Looking at the socio-economic positions of those two parties, this paper argues that the political economy of the RR is primarily characterised by ‘economic nationalism’, which is a multifaceted phenomenon that places the defence of the interests of the nation and of economic ‘sovereignty’ at its core in reaction to processes of economic globalization and European integration. Taking economic nationalism as a social mechanism (Bunge 1997) i.e. a process containing both structure and agency, this paper tries and proposes an alternative supply-side approach of RR economic program looking at the agency-based dimensions and the broader discursive opportunity structure in which those parties operate and compete. We focus in particular on the dominant national political economy culture in France and Switzerland, and how the national political economies of those two countries have adjusted to global economic challenges and, over the past decade, to the unfolding of the financial crisis. We ask therefore: what are the discursive political opportunities provided to RR economic nationalist mobilization in Western European countries? How do RR parties use those opportunities in relation to their nationalist ideology? We present our two cases and highlight the main features of the national economic legacy of France and Switzerland. We then look comparatively at the supply of economic policies by the FN and SVP, and to which extent these may be seen as a product of the national economic culture, party competition and party internal features.

International audience; This chapter examines the transformation of the French National Front (Front National, FN) since the early 2000s and asks whether Marine Le Pen’s strategy of ‘de-demonization’ is taking the party up to the mainstream. The first section looks at changes, which have occurred across the FN’s main aspects as radical, niche and anti-establishment party, and its extremist reputation. It finds that, despite the recalibration of its salience profile and moderation of its tone, the FN has not yet shifted from niche to mainstream, and that it retains its distinctive status as radical right-wing populist party. Reflecting on this persistence, the second section explores the main goals and strategies of de-demonization, considering also its public impact and the broader political and institutional context in which the FN operates. The chapter concludes that de-demonization is primarily a short-term vote-maximizing strategy, which seeks to address important institutional and party system challenges to create new competitive opportunities. It replicates previous attempts by the FN to profile itself as a credible party of government while simultaneously preserving its radical right-wing populist potential for voter mobilization.

International audience; The European Elections of 2014 were characterized by the rise of populist parties. Using cross-national data from the “Comparative Electoral Dynamics in the European Union in 2014” survey, this paper looks at what motivates voters to vote for both left and right-wing populists, and the relation between populist voting and EU integration across contributor and recipient EU member states. We find that supporters of populist parties on the left and right demonstrate higher levels of mistrust towards political institutions in both groups of countries, while diverging in terms of their economic and sociocultural attitudes. Left populist supporters in receiving countries tend to be more skeptical regarding EU integration than the populist left in contributing countries. In the latter, euroscepticism has a marginal effect on support for left wing populist parties while it shows a strong impact on right wing populist voting, in relation to cultural conservatism, anti-globalization and economic protectionism.; Les élections européennes de mai 2014 ont été marquées par la poussée des partis populistes. À partir des données comparatives issues de l’enquête « Comparative Electoral Dynamics in the European Union in 2014 », cet article examine les motivations du vote en faveur des partis populistes de gauche et de droite, et de leur rapport avec le projet d’intégration européenne dans les États membres contributeurs et bénéficiaires de l’UE. Nous trouvons des niveaux plus élevés de défiance politico-institutionnelle chez les supporters des partis populistes de gauche et de droite dans les deux groupes de pays, avec cependant des attitudes économiques et culturelles divergentes. Les supporters des populismes de gauche dans les pays bénéficiaires se révèlent plus eurosceptiques que leurs homologues des pays contributeurs. Dans les pays contributeurs, l’euro- scepticisme a un effet marginal sur le populisme de gauche mais il joue un rôle central dans la mobilisation par les partis populistes de droite, en lien avec le conservatisme culturel, l’opposition à la globalisation et le protectionnisme économique.

This paper examines the FN in the current French party system. It looks at the extent to which 'de-demonization' has changed the party's strategic and programmatic profile. We ask whether these changes have affected the status of the party across three main aspects as political outsider, niche and radical party, and consider the internal and external stimuli for party modernization. We conclude that, despite the moderation of its rhetoric and the softer packaging of its policies, the FN has not yet shed its populist radical right profile, and that de-demonization is primarily a vote-maximizing strategy. De-demonization is increasingly putting the cordon sanitaire under pressure however, creating new competitive opportunities for the FN.

This paper examines the FN in the current French party system. It looks at the extent to which 'de-demonization' has changed the party's strategic and programmatic profile. We ask whether these changes have affected the status of the party across three main aspects as political outsider, niche and radical party, and consider the internal and external stimuli for party modernization. We conclude that, despite the moderation of its rhetoric and the softer packaging of its policies, the FN has not yet shed its populist radical right profile, and that de-demonization is primarily a vote-maximizing strategy. De-demonization is increasingly putting the cordon sanitaire under pressure however, creating new competitive opportunities for the FN.

This paper examines the FN in the current French party system. It looks at the extent to which 'de-demonization' has changed the party's strategic and programmatic profile. We ask whether these changes have affected the status of the party across three main aspects as political outsider, niche and radical party, and consider the internal and external stimuli for party modernization. We conclude that, despite the moderation of its rhetoric and the softer packaging of its policies, the FN has not yet shed its populist radical right profile, and that de-demonization is primarily a vote-maximizing strategy. De-demonization is increasingly putting the cordon sanitaire under pressure however, creating new competitive opportunities for the FN.

Building on the analysis of party communication in the 2007 presidential campaign in France, this paper explores two correlated aspects of change in patterns of partisan competition in the right pole of French politics. Looking at the strategic responses by the UMP to the rise of the FN in 2002, we examine first the process of profound ideological revision under Sarkozy's leadership. The emphasis is on the reformulation of two archaeological repertoires of the French conservative New Right –namely anti-egalitarianism and cultural differentialism– and how this ‘winning formula' was successfully articulated with strong populist and anti-establishment appeals. In the second section, this distinctive trajectory is contrasted with the transformation and adaptation of the FN to the new party system configuration that emerged from Le Pen's Pyrrhic victory of 2002. The focus is on the de-radicalisation of the party's programmatic appeal in 2007 and a significant re-interpretation of its traditional ethnicised mythology of national identity. Implications for the characterisation of the radical Right phenomenon in France are discussed in the conclusion.