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Copyright of Journal of Entrepreneurship, Management & Innovation is the property of Wyzsza Szkola Biznesu-National Louis University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Human reasoning is often biased by intuitive heuristics. A central question is whether the bias results from a failure to detect that the intuitions conflict with traditional normative considerations or from a failure to discard the tempting intuitions. The present study addressed this unresolved debate by using people's decision confidence as a nonverbal index of conflict detection. Participants were asked to indicate how confident they were after solving classic base-rate (Experiment 1) and conjunction fallacy (Experiment 2) problems in which a cued intuitive response could be inconsistent or consistent with the traditional correct response. Results indicated that reasoners showed a clear confidence decrease when they gave an intuitive response that conflicted with the normative response. Contrary to popular belief, this establishes that people seem to acknowledge that their intuitive answers are not fully warranted. Experiment 3 established that younger reasoners did not yet show the confidence decrease, which points to the role of improved bias awareness in our reasoning development. Implications for the long standing debate on human rationality are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study examined the effectiveness of a tutoring technique that has been used to identify and address participants' misunderstandings in Wason's selection task. In particular, the study investigated whether the technique would lead to improvements in performance when the task was presented in a deadline format (a condition in which time restrictions are imposed). In Experiment 1, the effects of tutoring on performance were compared in free time (conditions in which no time restrictions are imposed) and deadline task formats. In Experiment 2, improvements in performance were studied in deadline task formats, in which the tutoring and test phases were separated by an interval of 1 day. The results suggested that tutoring improved performance on the selection task under deadline and in free time conditions. Additionally, the study showed that participants made errors because they had misinterpreted the task. With tutoring, they were able to modify their initial misunderstandings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract. Errors may be made on Wason's selection task because either (a) the rule to be tested is misunderstood, or (b) reasoning from that rule is inaccurate, or both. We report two experiments using the experimental paradigm introduced by Gebauer and Laming in which subjects are given six problems in succession. We use the subset of cards selected by each subject as (a) an indication of how the rule is understood and, when that selection is consistent throughout all six problems (so that we can infer a consistent understanding of the rule), as (b) a basis for evaluating the accuracy of the subject's reasoning according to three independent criteria. Experiment 1 adds an exactly parallel contextual version of the task to permit comparison between performances (by the same subjects) on the two versions. Experiment 2 repeats Exp. 1, but with negatives inserted in the conditional rule. Most subjects make a consistent selection of cards throughout all six problems, but typically appear to misunderstand the rule. This is so in both abstract and contextual tasks and replicates the finding by Gebauer and Laming. Most misunderstandings consisted of either (a) reading the simple conditional rule as a bi-conditional or (b) substituting "top/underneath" for "one side/other side". In Exp. 1 subjects seldom misevaluated the rule they appeared to be testing, but such "errors" of evaluation were common in Exp. 2. Negatives confuse the subjects and should not be used in any conditional application that matters. In Exp. 2 (but not 1) there was a significant correlation between interpretations of the two tasks. We provide an explanation of "matching bias" (it results from the confluence of the two common misunderstandings above) and comment on "mental models" which are, at present, unable to accommodate the variety of results we present here. We also relate our... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]