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This article argues that there is a difference in what constitutes the sources of recognition prior to countries' membership in the Euro-Atlantic community represented by NATO and after countries become its members. While prior to membership, countries are recognized for their compliance with NATO standards and policies, upon membership countries get the opportunity to promote specific interests legitimately and may seek recognition via non-compliance with NATO mainstream. The paper explores this dynamic of recognition on the issue of Kosovo independence where Slovakia went from supporting NATO in its effort to protect civilians in Kosovo in the late 1990s to non-recognition of Kosovo in defiance of the majority of NATO member states less than a decade later. The crucial point proposed here is that there was a shift in how recognition by NATO worked prior to Slovakia's membership and upon membership in these frameworks. While prior to membership recognition was achieved by compliance and identification with NATO standpoints, policies and actions, upon membership, recognition is achieved by differentiation from these patterns. More generally, the study shows that NATO membership is a powerful source of conditionality in relation to future members and a powerful source of legitimacy in relation to current members' actions, While this has been discussed in the literature, the point here is that recognition in its various forms is an important driving force in these conditionality processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a discussion of the book "Unrecognized States: The Struggle for Sovereignty in the Modern International System," by Nina Caspersen. Topics include the notion of sovereignty in relation to unrecognized states, the relevance of the notion of weak states, and the role of formal independence declarations in assessing de facto states. Also addressed are the roles of major powers in recognizing states, the effects of recognition on political legitimacy, and the influence of the recognition of Kosovo on other unrecognized states.

When Kosovo declared independence, in February 2008, it was stated that the move was not an act of self-determination. Instead, the key states that supported the decision insisted that the case for statehood arose from a unique set of circumstances. Kosovo was not a precedent; it was asui generiscase in international politics. This essay considers the arguments underpinning this claim to exclusivity and argues that, taken either individually or collectively, the main justifications used to support Kosovo's ‘unique’ statehood—such as the abuse of human rights—in fact have serious consequences for other separatist conflicts elsewhere. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article discusses the meaning of self-determination in its historical and contemporary contexts and examines the different options available for the accommodation of contested self-determination claims. Among these, the creation of a new state, arguably, is the most radical of options and one that has significant regional and global implications beyond the territory to which it is applied. Detailing these implications in relation to the case of Kosovo, we make a broader argument that, even if secession is one mechanism to resolve self-determination disputes, this does not do away with the need to continue exploring settlements short of secession as alternatives to changing established international boundaries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In instances of international negotiations over state recognition, the way the violence sustained by a given group is categorised becomes a critical factor in the international community's decision to support independence or not. This essay argues that the recognition of Kosovo in February 2008 was made possible by the use of justifications based on Kosovo Albanians' collective status as victims of ethnic cleansing. The essay bridges the gap between two bodies of literature that have not been used in conjunction up to now, namely normative theories of ‘remedial’ secession and works on the logic of mass violence against ethnically defined groups. It finds that the international community has used the ‘remedial argument’ for Kosovo's recognition because it allowed it to minimise the risk of further unilateral declarations of independence in a volatile region. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper assesses state recognition, the practice historically employed to regulate membership in international society, since the United States–led recognition of Kosovo and the Russian-led recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Its main goal is to succinctly examine the question of whether these two controversial episodes have signaled change in the existing norms of recognition of new states. The paper argues that there is not enough evidence for the claims of some observers and governments that unilateral secession is, as such, becoming legitimate internationally. The leading recognizing powers took great care in all three cases to reject the applicability of their decision to other situations of unilateral secession, and they have since approached those other situations as if no acknowledgment of the three territories had taken place. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that the deeply contested nature of these cases has introduced confusion and uncertainty into the practice and that this has had, and will have, important implications elsewhere in the world, in terms of both re-invigorated claims of statehood and the potential for unilateral recognition decisions by powerful outsiders. In fact, it is extremely unlikely that Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2008 would have ever occurred without the prior US-led recognition of Kosovo in February 2008. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]