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In 1959, Neal Miller made the bold claim that the Stimulus-Response, Behaviorist models of that era were describing the way in which stimuli lead to the entry of contents into consciousness (entry, for short). Today, researchers have begun to investigate the link between external stimuli and involuntary entry, using paradigms such as the reflexive imagery task (RIT), the focus of our review. The RIT has revealed that stimuli can elicit insuppressible entry of high-level cognitions. Knowledge of the boundary conditions of the RIT effect illuminates the limitations of involuntary processes and the role of consciousness in the regulation of behavior. We review the boundary conditions of this paradigm as well as its systematic effects. Systematic effects are unlikely to be due to experimental demand. While reviewing each effect, we consider its theoretical implications. In addition, throughout our review, we discuss future directions for the study of insuppressible entry using the RIT. Last, we discuss a theoretical development (passive frame theory) that stems from the RIT and illuminates how involuntary entry and encapsulation, though at times disadvantageous for the actor, are essential for adaptive action selection during the course of ontogeny.

The Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT) reveals that the activation of sets can result in involuntary cognitions that are triggered by external stimuli. In the basic RIT, subjects are presented with an image of an object (e.g., CAT) and instructed to not think of the name of the object. Involuntary subvocalizations of the name (the RIT effect) arise on roughly 80% of the trials. We conducted an electroencephalography (EEG) study to explore the neural correlates of the RIT effect. Subjects were presented with one object at a time in one condition and two objects simultaneously in another condition. Five regions were defined by electrode sites: frontal (F3-F4), parietal (P3-P4), temporal (T3-T4), right hemisphere (F4-P4), and left hemisphere (F3-P3). We focused on the alpha (8-13 Hz), beta (13-30 Hz), delta (0.01-4 Hz), and theta (4-8 Hz) frequencies.

In 1959, Neal Miller made the bold claim that the Stimulus-Response, Behaviorist models of that era were describing the way in which stimuli lead to the entry of contents into consciousness ("entry," for short). Today, researchers have begun to investigate the link between external stimuli and involuntary entry, using paradigms such as the reflexive imagery task (RIT), the focus of our review. The RIT has revealed that stimuli can elicit insuppressible entry of high-level cognitions. Knowledge of the boundary conditions of the RIT effect illuminates the limitations of involuntary processes and the role of consciousness in the regulation of behavior. We review the boundary conditions of this paradigm as well as its systematic effects. Systematic effects are unlikely to be due to experimental demand. While reviewing each effect, we consider its theoretical implications. In addition, throughout our review, we discuss future directions for the study of insuppressible entry using the RIT. Last, we discuss a theoretical development (passive frame theory) that stems from the RIT and illuminates how involuntary entry and encapsulation, though at times disadvantageous for the actor, are essential for adaptive action selection during the course of ontogeny. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

High-level cognitions can be triggered into consciousness through the presentation of external stimuli and the activation of certain action sets. These activations arise in a manner that is involuntary, systematic and nontrivial. For example, in the Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT), subjects are presented with visual objects and instructed to not think of the names of the objects. Involuntary subvocalizations arise on roughly 80% of the trials. We review the findings from this paradigm, discuss neural findings that are relevant to the RIT, and present new data that further corroborate the reliability and robustness of the RIT, a paradigm that could be coupled with neuroimaging technologies. We developed an RIT variant in which two, non-focal objects are presented simultaneously. In previous RITs, visual objects were presented only one at a time, in the center of the screen, and subjects were instructed to focus on the center of the screen, where these objects were presented. Replicating the RIT effect, involuntary subvocalizations still occurred on a high proportion of trials (M = 0.78). An RIT effect arose for both objects on a considerable proportion of the trials (M = 0.35). These findings were replicated in a second experiment having a different sample of subjects. Our findings are relevant to many subfields of neuroscience (e.g., the study of high-level mental processes, attention, imagery and action control). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Percepts, urges, and even high-level cognitions often enter the conscious field involuntarily. The Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT) was designed to investigate experimentally the nature of such entry into consciousness. In the most basic version of the task, participants are instructed not to subvocalize the names of visual objects. Involuntary subvocalizations arise on the majority of the trials. Can these effects be influenced by priming? In our experiment, participants were exposed to an auditory prime 300 ms before being presented with the RIT stimuli. For example, participants heard the word "FOOD" before seeing two RIT stimuli (e.g., line drawings of BANANA and CAT, with the former being the target of the prime). The short span between prime and target allowed us to assess whether the RIT effect is strategic or automatic. Before each trial, participants were instructed to disregard what they hear, and not to think of the name of any of the objects. On an average of 83% of the trials, the participants thought (involuntarily) of the name of the object associated with the prime. This is the first study to use a priming technique within the context of the RIT. The theoretical implications of these involuntary effects are discussed. • The Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT) triggers high-level, involuntary imagery. • In the task, participants are presented with images that they must ignore. • In some variants of the task, more than one image is presented on each trial. • Can priming influence which image is failed to be ignored? • On many trials, participants failed to ignore the primed image. • We discuss the theoretical implications of this finding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The reflexive imagery task (RIT) has been used to investigate stimulus-elicited involuntary mental processes. The task has been successful in eliciting involuntary perceptual experiences, urges, and even higher-order cognitions, but it has never been used to elicit autobiographical memories, even though in everyday life these memories are often activated involuntarily by external stimuli. These memories are different in interesting ways from the kinds of mental representations that have been activated involuntarily in the RIT. The memories have properties which might make them insusceptible to such a form of external influence. Perhaps substantive effects will not arise because the mental representations associated with autobiographical memories are complex, poly-sensory, and rich in terms of content. To investigate this matter, we developed a variant of the RIT in which participants were presented with external stimuli (line drawings of everyday objects) and instructed not to recall any autobiographical memories. We investigated whether the nature of the involuntary memories was influenced by the nature of the stimulus. In two experiments, the involuntary memories were associated to the stimulus on a majority of the trials (∼80%). We discuss theoretical implications of this finding and of identifying the conditions in which such involuntary effects will not arise. The boundary conditions of the RIT effect illuminate the limits of unconscious processing and also the role of conscious processing in nervous function. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Percepts and action-related urges often enter consciousness insuppressibly. The Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT) was developed to investigate how high-level cognitions ( e.g. , subvocalizations), too, can enter consciousness in this manner. Limitations of the paradigm include ( a ) that no data have confirmed subjects’ introspections about the involuntary subvocalizations, and ( b ) that, in everyday life, adaptive responses to involuntary cognitions often depend on the nature of the other contents in consciousness. To address a and b , we developed an RIT in which subjects were presented with visual objects and instructed to not think of the object names. If a subvocalization did arise, however, subjects responded motorically only if the subvocalization rhymed with a word held in memory and if there was a visual “go” cue. Subjects successfully (on 0.83 of the trials) emitted this complex, “multi-determined” response, which provides evidence for the occurrence of the involuntary subvocalizations and illuminates the function of consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• The Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT) triggers high-level, involuntary imagery. • The effect involves verbal imagery, which is an easily elicited form of imagery. • Can the RIT effect arise for tasks requiring high-level, symbol manipulation? • Effects arose from an RIT involving mental rotation and visuospatial imagery. • The effects require high-level processes associated with frontal cortex. The Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT) was developed to investigate the entry into consciousness of involuntary imagery. Subjects are presented with objects and instructed to not think of the names of the objects. Involuntary subvocalizations arise on many trials. RIT effects reveal the capacities of involuntary processing. These cognitions do not require symbol manipulation. Can mental rotation and visuospatial imagery, too, arise in this involuntary manner? In the mental rotation task, subjects were first taught to mentally rotate two-dimensional objects. Subjects were then instructed to not mentally rotate objects. In the chess task, subjects were taught how to move in their minds objects in specified ways, much as one could imagine how chess pieces move on a chessboard. Subjects were then instructed to not have such visuospatial imagery. For both tasks, involuntary imagery occurred on a substantial proportion of trials, revealing that symbol manipulation can be influenced involuntarily through external control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Percepts and urges often enter consciousness involuntarily. The Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT) reveals how high-level cognitions, too, can enter consciousness involuntarily. In the task, the eliciting stimuli are visual (e.g., picture of a cat), and the involuntary imagery is verbal (e.g., the subvocalization “cat”). The generalizability of the RIT effect has been questioned because verbal imagery is an easily elicited form of imagery. Do such effects arise for other kinds of imagery? It is known that imagery is more elicitable in some senses (e.g., vision) than in other senses (e.g., olfaction). We found such differences in an RIT in which food items were presented as orthographic stimuli or as drawings. Although subjects were instructed to suppress mental imagery, involuntary imagery still arose: Olfactory (effect in ∼40% of trials), taste (∼54%), touch (∼60%), and visual/auditory (∼79%). Of theoretical import, effects were comparable when the eliciting stimuli were orthographs or visual objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A recurring idea in psychology is that one is conscious only of the "outputs" of mental operations, but not of the operations themselves. Often, such "entry into consciousness" occurs involuntarily. To investigate involuntary entry, some experimentalists have used the reflexive imagery task (RIT). The RIT has revealed that, under certain conditions, external stimuli (e.g., line drawings) can elicit involuntary entry of high-level cognitions. In the basic version of the task, participants are presented with visual objects and instructed not to subvocalize (i.e., say in one's head) the names of these objects. Participants cannot suppress these subvocalizations on a majority of the trials. It has been proposed that, if RIT effects resemble a reflex, then perhaps they will habituate as reflexes do. In the "habituation" variant of the RIT, the same stimulus object (e.g., CAT) is presented on ten consecutive trials (ten "instantiations"), in order to induce habituation (i.e., a weakened RIT effect). It remains unknown whether such habituation effects arise for stimulus-elicited processes that depend, not on subvocalization, but on more complex processes, such as mental arithmetic. To illuminate this issue, we conducted a conceptual replication of the "habituation" RIT that involves, on each trial, the participant trying not to add two numbers (e.g., 14 and 2). We assessed whether the habituation effects were stimulus-specific or set-specific. Understanding the boundary conditions of the RIT effect and its habituation illuminates the limits of unconscious processes and the role of conscious processing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Laboratory tasks have revealed that mental representations (e.g., mental imagery) can enter consciousness in a manner that is involuntary, reliable, and insuppressible. These effects illuminate the capacities of involuntary processes as well as the function of voluntary, conscious processing. The Reflexive Imagery Task was developed a decade ago to investigate these involuntary effects systematically. Can refreshing yield such involuntary effects? Refreshing is the reactivating in mind of a mental representation that was activated moments ago. It is associated with mental rehearsal and executive function. We investigated whether a mental representation (subvocalization of an object name) can arise in consciousness involuntarily after a delayed interval, when the relevant stimulus is no longer present, and in response to a cue. In Experiment 1, participants were instructed not to refresh a previously presented (6 s before) stimulus in response to a cue. Involuntary refreshing occurred on a substantive proportion (0.56) of the trials. Experiment 2 replicated and extended this finding (proportion of the trials = 0.53) with a refreshing task that was more challenging than that of Experiment 1. Our findings suggest that mental representations arising from processes such as refreshing can occur involuntarily. We discuss the theoretical implications of this conclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In ironic processing , one is more likely to think about something (e.g., white bears) when instructed to not think about that thing. Entry into consciousness of such content may be automatic, reflecting the ‘encapsulated’ nature of the generation of conscious contents . Based on this research, the Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT) reveals that, following the activation of action sets, conscious contents can arise involuntarily and systematically in response to external stimuli. In the most basic version of this paradigm, participants are presented with visual objects and instructed to not think of the names of the objects, which is challenging. Here, we addressed one criticism of the RIT—that the effect arises only for automatic processes (e.g., forms of cued-memory retrieval) and not for more complex processes (e.g., symbol manipulation). Participants were first trained to perform a word-manipulation task similar to the game of Pig Latin (e.g., “CAR” becomes “AR-CAY”). Such a task involves complex symbol manipulations that are associated with processes in frontal cortex. After training, participants were instructed to not transform stimulus words in this way. The RIT effect still arose under these conditions. This striking finding is relevant to theories of cognitive control, psychopathology, and conscious/unconscious processing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reflexes are often insuppressible, predictable, and susceptible to external control. In contrast, conscious thoughts have been regarded as whimsical, ‘offline,’ and shielded from external control. Recent advances suggest that conscious thoughts are more reflex-like and susceptible to external control than previously thought. In one paradigm, high-level conscious thoughts (subvocalizations) are triggered by external control, as a function of external stimuli and experimenter-induced action sets. It has been hypothesized that these conscious contents are activated involuntarily and in a reflex-like manner. If such is the case, then these activations should possess a well-known property of the reflex: habituation. Accordingly, we found that involuntary high-level cognitions (subvocalizations) habituated (i.e., were less likely to arise) after repeated stimulation. As in the case of the habituation of a reflex, this novel effect was stimulus-specific. We discuss the implications of this finding for theories about consciousness and about psychopathological phenomena involving undesired, involuntary cognitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In laboratory tasks, involuntary cognitions of various kinds (e.g., mental imagery) have been elicited by external stimuli. These effects reveal, among other things, the capacities of involuntary processes. In most cases, these cognitions do not require, for their generation, executive functions such as a shift in selective attention. In Experiment 1, subjects were presented with a clock of 12 words in the stead of numbers and were instructed to focus on the center of the screen and to not count the number of letters of a word at a certain location. Involuntary counting of the critical word occurred on 39% of the trials. This effect requires an involuntary shift of attention. Experiment 2, involving Chinese ideographs, concerned the effect of stimulus fidelity and processing fluency. Native English speakers and a separate group of subjects who could read Chinese ideographs were presented with an array similar to that of Experiment 1 and instructed to not read any of the words. Some words were easy to read (e.g., regular Chinese words and English words), and some words were more difficult to read (e.g., Chinese "loan" words and English pseudowords). For the subjects who could read Chinese ideographs, more involuntary reading occurred for regular ideographs than for loan words. For the Native English speakers, comparable effects were found with the English stimuli. Together, these studies reveal that attentional phenomena of this kind can be influenced involuntarily and systematically through external control. • The Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT) triggers high-level, involuntary imagery. • The effect involves verbal imagery, which is an easily elicited form of imagery. • Can the RIT effect arise for tasks requiring high-level, attentional shifts? • Systematic, reliable effects arose from an RIT involving attentional shifts. • Shifts occurred as a function of set and of processing fluency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]