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Policy agendas are often cast in semantic constructions that portray them as universally desirable outcomes. These semantic constructions protect and reinforce the power of dominant coalitions and make it hard to pursue alternatives. The semantic space is entirely occupied by the dominant concepts. At the same time, within the dominant coalition, ideational conflict is muted by decontesting concepts. Drawing on political theory, I show the presence of this double act of reducing the semantic space and decontesting concepts with the case of 'better regulation'. Then I briefly extend the argument to other terms such as policy coherence, agile governance, smart cities and social value judgements. The critical discussion of the implications of dominant language brings in transparency, allows other coalitions to articulate their vision in a discursive level-playing-field, and offers citizens the possibility to discuss what is really 'better' and 'for whom'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Two foundations of regulatory choice, precaution and innovation, co-exist in the political system of the European Union (EU). At the conceptual level the two foundations are complementary, and are both endorsed by the EU institutions, albeit in different ways and with different legal status. In the real-life of EU policymaking processes, however, precaution and innovation often become the terrain of polarised views anchored to technocratic or populist positions that erode trust in EU governance. We propose a way forward to this state of play. Instead of seeing the two foundations as opposite, we explore their dyadic relationship. We show that a conversation between the two is possible via an original reformulation of precaution and innovation. The reconciliation of precaution and innovation, we argue, is effective only in a context of social trust about the reconciled definitions. We propose the analytical and normative framework of nonviolence as seal of social trust. Nonviolence can assist the EU and its citizens in the path towards innovation that is socially responsible, future-proof and accountable. It can enhance precaution as internalised commitment of decision-makers as well as scientific and social communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has produced four waves of regulatory management indicators. By contrast, the European Union has never adopted a common system of indicators, although it is much more integrated and less heterogeneous than the OECD. This cannot be explained by the different propensity for performance measurement: the European Union has agreed on policy metrics in economic and social policy areas, and regulation is a fundamental tool for this organization. Although structural variables matter, to answer questions about adoption (Yes/No), timing (when) and content of indicators (what type of indicators) we need the additional aid of policy learning and empirical observations on organizational processes. We find that the OECD process was one of self-directed learning fuelled by high socialization, internal validation of knowledge, favorable attitudes and posture of the secretariat, and mutually constitutive roles of delegates and staff. For the European Union we find the reverse. These findings contribute to the literature on policy learning, regulation, and global performance measurement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Donald Schön's assertion that becoming an effective professional requires more than technical rationality underpins the pedagogy of Masters in Public Administration (MPA) programmes. This article explores how public administrators can be taught to think reflectively and reflexively about the limits of control in the context of decision making and regulatory policy appraisal. It reports on an in-class pedagogical experiment on illusions of control used to generate a real-life experience of the cognitive and emotional dimensions of control. By doing so, the article introduces the concept of 'regulatory humility' and contributes to the literature on experiments as pedagogical tools, and to debates on teaching methods in public administration and political science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on recent literature on regulatory constitutionalism, this article examines the EU regulatory state in comparative perspective, using the US regulatory state as contrast case. We find that whilst most observers were preoccupied with high-level constitutional politics and the Treaty of Lisbon, a quiet constitutional change was under way in the EU, triggered by mundane procedural requirements concerning rulemaking. We compare change first by first explaining the factors behind the institutionalization of rulemaking requirements; and then by discussing the constitutional effects of regulatory change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role of expertise in European public policy has become the object of a passionate debate. On the one hand, it has been argued that knowledge, in various guises, can foster learning, enlightenment, problem-solving attitudes, and policy change. On the other, the public policy of the European Union (EU) is in the firing line because of its technocratic bias. However, what is meant by technocracy in the case of the EU? How can political scientists be fascinated by the positive input of knowledge, and, at the same time, horrified by technocratic policy-making? The aim of this article is to tackle this puzzle by suggesting a conceptual framework. Concepts such as technocracy, epistemic communities, and bureaucratic politics refer to different modes of the politics of expertise. Empirically, they should be contrasted with the logic of politicization. Case studies discussed in this article suggest that the power of expertise is being counterbalanced by politicization. The conclusion is that the main challenge is neither to preserve an unattainable depoliticized Union nor to assume that politicization will tame technocracy, but to make expertise more accountable in an increasingly politicized environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While several studies have documented how evidence-based policy instruments affect public policy, less research has focused on what causes changes over time in the analyses mandated by the instruments, especially in Britain. Thus, we take the analytical content of a pivotal regulatory reform instrument (impact assessment) as a dependent variable, draw on learning as a conceptual framework, and explain the dynamics of learning processes across departments, policy sectors, and time. Empirically, our study draws on a sample of 517 impact assessments produced in Britain (2005-2011). Experience and capacity in different departments matter in learning processes. Guidelines also matter, but moderately so. Departments specialize in their core policy sectors when performing regulatory analysis, but some have greater analytical capacity overall. Peripheral departments invest more in impact assessment than core executive departments. The presence of a regulatory oversight body enhances the learning process. Elections have different effects, depending on the context in which they are contested. These findings contribute to the literature on regulation, policy learning, and policy instruments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]