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We examine constituency changes induced by redistricting and ask 3 questions. What explains the amount of instability and uncertainty induced by redistricting? Does uncertainty affect legislators' career choices (e.g., seek reelection or retire? How do these changes affect election outcomes? We show that members of Congress (MCs) affiliated with the party in opposition to the party that engineers a partisan gerrymander will see their district change more than that of other MCs. Thus, redistricting-induced instability and uncertainty are tied to the strategic actions of mapmakers. We also show that MCs targeted by one-sided partisan gerrymanders will reconsider their career in the House. Thus, career decisions are tied to redistricting-induced instability and uncertainty. Finally we show that constituency changes due to redistricting affect the likelihood that a legislator is reelected. Thus, election outcomes are tied to redistricting-induced instability and uncertainty. These findings have important implications for representation: through redistricting strategic actors can foster instability and sever representational ties that many theorists would consider paramount for the operation of a democratic republic. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can inconsistency in legislators' voting records be explained by the uncertainty they have about their constituency? Why does a two-dimensional model of roll-call voting explain the votes of some legislators better than others? In this paper, we present an uncertainty-based theory of legislative voting and inconsistency. We test this theory by examining whether U.S. senators' uncertainty about their constituency leads to higher levels of inconsistent voting in Congress. Specifically we compare southern senators who faced a large influx of black voters in the 1960s and 1970s with southern senators from more stable constituencies. We also examine other factors that can cause legislator uncertainty, such as legislators' backgrounds. Our results suggest that what some call "maverick" behavior by legislators can be better characterized as best responses by incumbents to a changing environment. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some of the scholarly conventional wisdom regarding voter turnout and participation, especially in the U.S. South, has been that race and ethnic background can be important predictors of turnout. However, the disproportional effect of felon and ex-felon disfranchisement laws on racial/ethnic minorities in some states suggests that the effects of race on aggregate voter turnout will be underestimated unless these laws are also considered. This electoral institution-the disfranchisement of felons and ex-felons-is an important omitted variable in models of state-level aggregate voter turnout, which might result in biased inferences pertaining to minority citizens' level of participation, especially in recent elections. Looking at statewide elections in the U.S. South from 1984-2000, we hypothesize that this electoral institution helps explain lower levels of voter turnout in states with high rates of felon disfranchisement. We also demonstrate, once felon disfranchisement is controlled for, that southern states with high minority populations will have higher levels of turnout in recent elections where minority voter mobilization has been on the rise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can ideological inconsistency in legislators' voting records be explained by the uncertainty they have about their constituents? Why does a two-dimensional model of roll-call voting explain the votes of some legislators better than others? We present an uncertainty-based theory of legislative search and ideologically inconsistent voting. We test this theory by examining whether U.S. senators' levels of uncertainty about their constituents leads to higher levels of inconsistent voting in Congress. Specifically we compare senators who faced large shifts in the racial makeup of their electorate due to enfranchisement with senators from more stable constituencies. We also examine other factors related to legislator uncertainty, such as legislators' backgrounds. We find that uncertainty due to black enfranchisement and uncertainty due to legislators' backgrounds both lead to higher ideological inconsistency among U.S. senators. Our results suggest that what some call "maverick" behavior by elected officials can be better characterized as best responses to a changing environment. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the claim that MPs from linguistic minority groups are more likely to get elected from ridings where that group comprises a large share of the electorate. More generally, we ask: what factors lead to the election of MPs of French descent outside Quebec and MPs of non-French descent in Quebec? We find that the linguistic make-up of a riding is a consistent predictor of the winning MP's ethno-linguistic background. This effect is consistent both within and outside Quebec, and holds true even after controlling for other correlates of electoral success, such as incumbency. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are legislators who present inconsistent voting records truly mavericks or are they simply responding to uncertainty they have over the preferences of their own constituencies? We investigate the impact of these uncertainty-causing and uncertainty-reducing factors on the (in)consistency of senators’ voting records for the period 1915-2004. We theorize and show that uncertainty about constituents’ preferences explains inconsistent voting behavior by legislators nationally. We also show that for southern senators, the interplay between party and the influx of black voters presents a particularly interesting case of legislator response to a changing environment. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]