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The extensive estimates of party policy preferences produced by the CMP (Comparative Manifesto Project, now MARPOR) have proved robust and valid over a wide variety of research applications. But all estimates carry some error. We demonstrate that one of the two existing assessments of non-systematic error in the CMP data strongly overstates their reliability while the other understates it, leaving much potential for mis-estimation. We develop a new method which extends classical test theory and directly estimates overall data reliability; reliabilities and standard errors of measurement for each party system; and standard errors of measurement for each data-point. These should facilitate use of the CMP policy scores which are usually the only ones available for extended party and policy research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In practice, democracies privilege plurality parties. Theories of the democratic process challenge the democratic credentials of this practice. Abstract social choice theory wonders whether an electoral majority even exists. A more optimistic line of argument, prominent in research on collective representation, assumes that the policy position of the median voter embodies the majority electoral preference. The conflict between what democracies actually do and what two leading theories of the democratic process say calls for a comparative inquiry into electoral majoritarianism. For each of a dozen countries, the authors ask whether any political party commands a predominant majoritarian position among voters—that is, is a Condorcet winner—and, if so, which party it is. They find that a Condorcet winning party exists in all 12 countries and that the plurality party can lay more claim to representing the popular majority than the left—right median party. These findings have important implications for the study of democratic representation, which the authors consider in their conclusions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The extent and ways in which popular preferences influence government policy are absolutely central to our understanding of modern democracy. Paul Warwick's discussion of these in the European Journal of Political Research in 2010 puts itself at the heart of the debate with its critique of the median mandate theory of McDonald and Budge, proposing an alternative 'bilateralist' concept of representation. This article questions whether this concept has much to add to our theoretical understanding of representational processes. However, Warwick's further conceptual points deserve serious consideration. These concern the time horizons within which representative processes work, and the status of the median position given multi-motivated voting. At the evidential level, Warwick argues that survey-based measures of voter and party left-right positions fail to produce the correspondence between median and government policy positions that median mandate theory would have us expect. However, survey-based measures of median voter and party placements obscure important cross-national variation. Using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (), as Warwick does, this article shows that survey respondents norm their own and their country's party positions to their national context. The consequence is to make the political centre in all nations appear similar. Allowing for the relevant cross-national differences brings the relationship between the median voter and government position back in line with expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Operationalized as a simulation and checked against 1,737 policy shifts in twenty-four post-war democracies, this theory of party position-taking offers both an explanation and specific postdictions of party behaviour, synthesizing some previous approaches and linking up with mandate theories of political representation. These wider implications are considered at the beginning and the end of the article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Public policy is supposed under democracy to be necessarily linked to popular preferences through elections. Election outcomes are however shaped not only by the votes cast but also by the party-policy options on offer and the rules by which votes are aggregated into seats. A crucial question is whether rules exert their influence through the party system they help shape or whether public policy is directly affected by them. We examine these points here over the post-war period with evidence on policy preferences at electoral and governmental levels in 21 countries. Under single member constituency systems (SMD), election rules and party systems have independent and equal effects on short run representation, while under PR it is the party systems which produce (limited) distortion. Over time however SMD itself emerges as the main source of representational bias in the countries where it operates, with little bias under PR from either election or party systems. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Political parties in the United States are usually regarded as too weak and decentralized, too much the prey of office-seeking politicians and special interests, to function effectively as programmatic, policy-effecting agents within the separation of powers. This has been taken as a serious flaw in the U.S. version of representative democracy, prompting cycles of proposed reform; criticisms of the existing set-up as a capitalistic sham; or alternative justifications of the system as pluralist rather than strictly party democracy. Our research challenges these assumptions by demonstrating the existence of strong links between postwar (1948-1985) election platforms and governmental outputs. Platforms' sentences, coded into one of 54 subject categories, are used as indicators of programmatic emphases and are related to corresponding federal expenditure shares. Resulting regression models demonstrate the full applicability of party mandate theory to the United States, and they operationalize its U.S. variants concretely. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses various reports published within the issue, including one on the relationships of political parties in industrialized parliamentary democracies and another on postwar developments in representative government countries.

In the Context of a general policy-based theory of how parties behave in democratic governments, a specific hypothesis on party factional behaviour is proposed and tested for the post-war period in 20 democracies. The hypothesis is that reshuffles (replacements and transfers of individual between ministries) are more frequent where Prime Ministers have more freedom of action and decline where they have less freedom. As Prime Ministerial power is greatest in single-party governments, these are expected to produce more reshuffles - an expectation strongly confirmed by the evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]