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Clean energy is an important source to mitigate the pressure of resources shortage and environmental effects. While multiattribute reverse auction is frequently adopted for the procurement efficiency of clean energy devices, the associated winner determination problem is explicitly studied for a utility company/buyer to select the most appropriate supplier in the clean energy market. Considering the buyer's loss-averse behavior with incomplete information and suppliers' conflicting attributes in different types evaluated by multiple experts, we incorporate an I U L O W A f (induced uncertain linguistic ordered weighted averaging) operator and a revised TODIM (an acronym in Portuguese of Interactive and Multi-attribute Decision Making) measure that is consistent with prospect theory into the "benefits, opportunities, costs and risks" (BOCR) framework to develop a novel BOCR-uRTODIM solution method for multi-attribute decision making. Numerical experiments illustrate the effectiveness and robustness of the proposed method by comparing it with some known methods. An interesting result indicates that the risk aversion degree of the buyer increases as the variance of suppliers' attributes expands. The BOCR-uRTODIM could be a useful tool for utility companies to avoid losses and for associated suppliers to improve their attributes for a win in the clean energy industry. • Reverse auction for the clear energy device procurement is studied. • Utility companies' loss-averse behavior and incomplete information are considered. • Prospect theory is integrated into analytic hierarchy process for decision making. • A novel, effective, and robust method is proposed for determining the winner. • Managerial insights are drawn for utility companies in the clean energy industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Project procurement has two important attributes: cost uncertainty and failure risk. Due to the incomplete feature of such attributes, a novel mechanism incorporating contingent payments and cost sharing contracts is proposed for the buyer. Constructing models of bid decisions for risk averse and risk neutral suppliers, respectively, closed-form solutions of optimal bid prices are derived. By investigating the properties of bid prices in a first-score sealed-bid reverse auction, we find that when the degree of risk aversion or the variance of unpredictable cost is sufficiently small, bid prices of risk averse suppliers could be lower than those of risk neutral suppliers. Yet risk averse suppliers always bid higher than risk neutral suppliers in a second-score sealed-bid reverse auction. An interesting result verified by numerical experiments is that the classical revenue equivalence theorem no longer holds for the proposed mechanism if suppliers involve risk averse behavior. In this case, the buyer's best choice is to adopt a first-score sealed-bid reverse auction. We also provide decision support for the buyer to achieve optimal expected profit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]