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Reverse supply chain (RSC) management can be implemented to ameliorate environmental and economic goals simultaneously. In 2020, the devastating influences generated by the COVID-19 global pandemic had established high uncertainty in the manufacturers' capacity, which can hinder the fulfillment of such goals. To address such a problem, in this research, we analyze a two-echelon RSC, including a re-manufacturer who, despite facing the remanufacturing capacity uncertainty, remanufactures eligible obsolete products, then re-enters the marketplace, and a collector who accumulates eligible obsolete products from consumers. We survey centralized and decentralized decisions, and also a condition where the collector, as a Stackelberg game leader, offers a put option contract as a risk-sharing approach and decides on both option and exercise prices; in return, the re-manufacturer determines the order quantity. Contrary to previous studies in which the value of option contracts has been analyzed under demand disruptions, this paper aims to address the performance of a put option contract to mitigate the remanufacturing capacity uncertainty in an RSC. Our results demonstrate that by offering the put option contract and determining the option price as nearly low as the marginal refund cost, not only can the collector motivate the re-manufacturer to augment its order quantity but both parties also attain a win–win profit-sharing outcome. Besides, the customized put option contract can achieve Pareto-improving channel coordination in the condition of remanufacturing capacity uncertainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses coordination and competition problem in two reverse supply chains each having its own exclusive retailer and manufacturer. The chains have various collecting channel structures so that one of them uses the advantages of dual channels, where the consumer can return their e-waste through direct or traditional channels, while its competitor collects obsolete products only through its traditional channel. The willingness to return in each channel is a function of self- and cross-discounts of the competitors. Four decision scenarios are investigated; the first and second chain respectively select, Decentralised-Decentralised, Centralised-Centralised, Centralised-Decentralised or Decentralised-Centralised scenario. The closed-form optimal solution of each channel is derived based on the Stackelberg game when the second chain acts as a leader. The most economical scenario is determined by using a Non-Zero-Sum game when each chain plays as a single player in the game. To coordinate the members' decisions and to convince unsatisfied members, two coordination contracts are offered. Numerical investigations reveal that direct channel suggests more discount and obtains more share of market. The results show that Centralised-Centralised scenario is the best decision from the SCs' perspective which proposing contracts are able to persuade members to change their strategy to a global decision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates a two-echelon reverse supply chain (RSC) consisting of a single remanufacturer and a single collector. The collector by offering a reward persuades consumers to take back their used products. Only items that meet the minimum quality level are accepted to be refurbished. There are two sources of uncertainties in the investigated RSC: (1) uncertainty in quality of returned products, (2) uncertainty in remanufacturing capacity. Under these circumstances, the amount of offered reward to consumers is a key problem. To optimize the whole RSC, the collector should determine the reward amount by considering the possibility of idle/overload capacity of the remanufacturing process. In the investigated RSC, the quality of returned products follows a uniform distribution and remanufacturing capacity follows a normal distribution. A customized revenue sharing mechanism is developed to share the risk of uncertainties between two members, fairly. The results indicate that, when remanufacturing capacity is limited, the suggested revenue sharing contract is able to share risks between participants and creates a win-win situation. In addition the suggested scheme is able to achieve channel coordination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due to the increasing number of end-of-life (EOL) products and their related environmental concerns, much attention has been paid to reverse logistics. In this paper, we consider a two-echelon reverse supply chain (RSC) with one manufacturer and one retailer who try to improve sustainable consumption by increasing customers’ willingness to return used products through offering a discount or a direct fee in exchange for bringing back EOL products. Afterward, the model is extended to consider a closed loop supply chain (CLSC). Quantity discounts and increasing fee contracts are proposed to coordinate supply chains. Then, government role in improving coordinated supply chains through donating different incentives (tax exemption and subsidy) to supply chain members are analyzed. Results show that total channel profit in the coordinated case is improved. Also, in the proposed models, each member has enough motives to participate in the plan. In addition, results demonstrate that government-sponsored incentives to the manufacturer are preferred to the retailer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Cooperation of a food trading company and a peri-urban located recycling plant • Proposing a contract in a real food supply chain in order to reduce waste amounts • Recycling food waste by renting peri-urban located recycling facilities • Developing a quantity flexibility contract with standard and expedited lead times Optimization techniques in reverse logistics and closed-loop supply chains (CLSC) may effectively address food waste problem in urban areas. Motivated by recent advances in collecting/recycling food wastes through recycling supply chains, this study contributes to optimizing such a recycling channel in urban areas. We examine if renting waste-recycling facilities by a food trading company located in urban areas, where production/recycling processes are prohibited, is able to mitigate the problem. This paper examines a three-tier CLSC, including a trading company located in urban areas, a production plant located in peri-urban zones, and a food-waste-collector, in which food-waste is collected from restaurants/chain-stores for recycling purposes. The trading company rents waste-recycling facilities from the production plant in the peri-urban zones to carry out the relevant processes. To coordinate the channel, a novel Quantity Flexibility (QF) contract is developed. Results, based on a real case study in the meat products supply chain, show that profitability of the supply chain is increased using the proposed QF contract significantly (e.g., 30 percent increase in the food-waste-collector's expected profit). The findings from our developed models can help food supply chain managers to find cost-effective solutions for cooperating with other supply chain members. Our results show a Pareto-improvement outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]