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One major success indicator of any welfare programme is accuracy of targeting of the benefits to the intended population. Using data from 2009–2010 and 2011–2012, this paper assesses targeting in terms of participation of the poorer households in Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act in the Indian state of West Bengal and compares it with rest of the country. Although implementation of the programme in the state has been poor, the targeting performance is found to be fair in comparison to other parts. The findings lay emphasis on improvement in other dimensions of the programme to realise the optimal benefits. © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary This study investigates the consequences of poor implementation in public workfare programs, focusing on the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) in India. Using nationally representative data, we test empirically for a discouraged worker effect arising from either of two mechanisms: administrative rationing of jobs among those who seek work and delays in wage payments. We find strong evidence at the household and district levels that administrative rationing discourages subsequent demand for work. Delayed wage payments seem to matter significantly during rainfall shocks. We find further that rationing is strongly associated with indicators of implementation ability such as staff capacity. Politics appears to play only a limited role. The findings suggest that assessments of the relevance of public programs over their lifecycle need to factor in implementation quality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rationing and its implication on accuracy of targeting of benefits to the intended beneficiaries in an anti-poverty programme is an essential component of its evaluation. Taking nationally representative data for 2009–2010 and 2011–2012, this paper evaluates the performance of the Rural Employment Guarantee Act in India in terms of targeting of benefits to the poorer households. It attempts to find if households, which did not get work after demanding are poorer than the ones, who got work and then explores, if the non-poor households got work for higher number of days under the programme in comparison to the poorer ones. Findings from the regressions, which control for the potential sample selection bias show that the poorer households in terms of monthly consumption expenditure have lesser probability of getting work in both the years, though traces of improvement in targeting is observed in 2011–2012. Poorer households are also found to be significantly associated with lower days of work in 2009–2010 compared to the relatively better-off ones. The results lay emphasis on the need to reduce rationing and generate awareness on the basic entitlements of the programme along with higher accountability and vigilance for better targeting. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Using survey data from the Cooch Behar district of West Bengal, the paper documents the impact of the rural employment guarantee scheme in reducing rural out-migration. Using regression framework and case studies, it finds no significant impact of household participation in the programme on migration decision. However, extent of participation in terms of number of days of work and earnings has a significant negative impact on short-term migration but not on longer duration ones. The findings lay emphasis on effective implementation in terms of asset creation, reduction in rationing of works and tackling delayed payments to enjoy its potential benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Summary The paper investigates prevalence of political clientelism in allocation of benefits under the rural employment guarantee program, currently implemented in India. Using survey data collected from some villages of West Bengal, it is found that households, which are politically active and supporters of the local ruling political party, are more likely to receive the benefits in terms of participation, number of days of work and earnings from the program. Qualitative evidence corroborates the findings. The study shows predominance of political favoritism under the program and lays emphasis on reducing rationing and enhancing awareness of the entitlements to curb this practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]