Search

The central premise of ontological security theory is that states are ready to compromise their physical security and other important material gains in order to protect their ontological security. While the existing studies have primarily focused on how states defend or maintain their ontological security, little attention has been paid to critical situations that make states ontologically insecure in the first place. Drawing on the work of Anthony Giddens, I conceptualise critical situations in world politics as radical disjunctions that challenge the ability of collective actors to ‘go on’ by bringing into the realm of discursive consciousness four fundamental questions related to existence, finitude, relations and autobiography. The argument is illustrated in a case study of ontological insecurity produced in Serbia by the secession of Kosovo. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the aftermath of the Ukrainian Revolution, Ukraine's autonomous region of Crimea declared independence and filed an application to subsequently join the Russian Federation. In seeking to justify these acts, both the Crimean authorities and the Russian Federation referred to international law, including the International Court of Justice's Advisory Opinion on Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence. In this Advisory Opinion, the Court indeed found that the principle of territorial integrity merely applies in the relationship between States and concluded that general international law does not contain a prohibition on unilateral declarations of independence. These findings and the interpretation of the Advisory Opinion as put forward by the Crimean and Russian authorities, however, raise pertinent questions. This article therefore aims to shed light on the scope of the principle of territorial integrity of States and its implications for the legality of and perceived legal neutrality concerning unilateral secession under international law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes an explanation for the Kosovo secession from Serbia/Yugoslavia. This is achieved by disaggregating the 'reality' of the state through the process tracing method, which compares the cases of the Tito and Milosevic triangles of accommodation practices. The focus is on the games of survival practiced at the middle levels ofpolitical life, around the local state policy implementer and the consequences of his removal. This paper examines not only why, but how the secession of Kosovo occurred when it did. It shows that the strength of authoritarianism or the regime-oppression capability is not what held the Serbia and Kosovo together; rather, it was the policies of accommodations which one leader did better than the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Taiwan model of conflict transformation and the Kosovo model of conflict settlement have specific features, and are useful for analyzing the Georgian and Russian policies toward Abkhazia and South Ossetia. There is a similarity between the Georgian strategy of engagement and the Taiwan model, with its declared readiness to interact with the other party regardless of any setbacks arising over the issue of status. Unlike the Taiwan model, however, the Georgian strategy includes no concrete view on how to involve the authorities controlling the breakaway territories or, in particular, how to have a positive impact on their relations with the outside world. A comparison between the Kosovo model and Russian policies toward these two entities demonstrates that, in deciding to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow largely drew on the moral and legal arguments put forward for the recognition of Kosovo. Russia has established political oversight over these entities, to a certain extent mirroring the Western policy of supervised independence for Kosovo. But Russia is still unable to adopt a conflict resolution policy toward Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Georgia that is based on regional integration prospects, in contrast to Western policies toward the Balkans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assesses state recognition, the practice historically employed to regulate membership in international society, since the United States–led recognition of Kosovo and the Russian-led recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Its main goal is to succinctly examine the question of whether these two controversial episodes have signaled change in the existing norms of recognition of new states. The paper argues that there is not enough evidence for the claims of some observers and governments that unilateral secession is, as such, becoming legitimate internationally. The leading recognizing powers took great care in all three cases to reject the applicability of their decision to other situations of unilateral secession, and they have since approached those other situations as if no acknowledgment of the three territories had taken place. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that the deeply contested nature of these cases has introduced confusion and uncertainty into the practice and that this has had, and will have, important implications elsewhere in the world, in terms of both re-invigorated claims of statehood and the potential for unilateral recognition decisions by powerful outsiders. In fact, it is extremely unlikely that Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2008 would have ever occurred without the prior US-led recognition of Kosovo in February 2008. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses advisory opinion referred to the International Court of Justice (ICC) by the United Nations General Assembly regarding 2008 Kosovo declaration of independence. It reflects on ICC's ruling that there is no explicit prohibition of unilateral declaration of independence in international law and examines secession and self-determination in international law.

In international law, the right of peoples to self-determination as applied to remedial secession is anything but clear. The International Court of Justice had an opportunity to clarify this area of law in its recent advisory opinion concerning the unilateral declaration of independence made by Kosovo. Much to the disappointment of international commentators, the Court expressly declined to adjudicate whether Kosovo had, by its declaration, attained state status. Instead, the Court declared that international law does not prohibit unilateral declarations of independence. This Note argues that the proper method for the United Nations to articulate international law of secession is via resolution of the General Assembly combined with application of that resolution by the International Court of Justice. This is the method the United Nations used when it articulated another form of the right to self-determination, the right to be free from colonization. The method's success in this latter area demonstrates its viability for the right to secession, a similarly situated right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For 60 years, the international community has limited the right of territories to gain independence without the permission of the 'parent state.' Such limits were, however, challenged when Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia, in February 2008. As a result, Belgrade referred the matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). On 22 July 2010, it came back with its long-awaited decision. Taking a narrow view of the question, the majority argued that, in general, declarations of independence, as mere statements, do not violate international law unless stated otherwise by the Security Council. Thus, Kosovo's declaration of independence cannot be considered as being wholly 'unique' - as those states that supported its statehood have claimed. On the key questions of whether Kosovo's secession is legal, or if it is even a state, they chose to avoid controversy. On these points, the international community is no clearer now than it was before the case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]