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Nowadays, with the advancement of wireless technologies, global mobility networks offer roaming services for mobile users. Since in global mobility networks the communication channel is public, adversaries can launch different security attacks to breach the security and privacy of data and mobile users. Hence, an authentication and key agreement scheme can be used to provide secure roaming services. It is well known that the conventional authentication schemes are not suitable for global mobility networks, because the authentication server of each network has the credentials of its registered users and thus cannot verify the authenticity of the other mobile users. Hence, for providing secure roaming services, another type of authentication called roaming authentication is required. Hitherto, a large number of authentication protocols have been proposed for global mobility networks. However, most of them have been proved to be insecure against various attacks. This paper proposes a secure and efficient authentication and key agreement scheme for global mobility networks. The proposed scheme is based on the elliptic curve cryptosystem. The correctness of the proposed scheme is verified using Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic. In addition, the security of the proposed scheme is proved using ProVerif. Detailed analyses demonstrate that the proposed scheme not only withstands various security attacks but also improves the efficiency by reducing the computational costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nowadays with widespread employment of the Internet, servers provide various services for legal users. The vital issue in client/server connections is authentication protocols that make the communication channel safe and secure against famous attacks. Recently, Kumari et al. and Chaudhry et al. proposed two authentication and key agreement protocols and illustrated that their proposed protocols are secure against various security attacks. However, in this paper we demonstrate that both protocols are vulnerable to off-line password guessing attacks. Moreover, we show that Kumari et al.'s protocol does not provide the property of user anonymity. In order to overcome these weaknesses, we propose a lightweight authentication and key agreement protocol. The correctness of the proposed protocol is proved using BAN logic. Security analysis demonstrates that the proposed protocol resists various security attacks and provides user anonymity. Furthermore, performance analysis confirms that the computation cost of the proposed protocol is acceptable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The session initiation protocol (SIP) is a powerful and superior signaling protocol for the voice over internet protocol (VoIP). Authentication is an important security requirement for SIP. Hitherto, many authentication schemes have been proposed to enhance the security of SIP. Recently, Irshad et al. proposed an improved authentication scheme concerning SIP, in which they claimed that their scheme is secure against various security attacks. However, in this paper, we conclude that Irshad et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to user impersonation attacks. Furthermore, a novel authentication and key agreement scheme is proposed for SIP using elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC). Security and performance analyses demonstrate that the proposed scheme is secure against security attacks of various types and has low computation cost compared to previously proposed schemes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]