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Paper Proposal for the 45th Annual ISA Convention, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, March 17-20, 2004: European Security after September 11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq Heinz Gärtner Traditional security thinking dominated the Cold War. Reliance on military capabilities was the primary strategy adopted to achieve greater security. In the new post-1989 world, and in particular post- 9/11, a broader and more complex concept of security has emerged. With the end of the Cold War, attention was thus given to building more sophisticated and integrated security concepts and developing frameworks designed to embrace a more comprehensive construct for security. The dramatic shift in threat perceptions brought about by the fall of communism have been confirmed by a wide variety of post-September 11 development: Wars between competing political ideologies and inter-state conflicts are no longer seen as the prime dangers to international security. The real security risks in the near future seem to come not from strong and stable governments but from failed and collapsed states. This paper examines both the impact of the developments before and after September 11 on both NATO and European Security, in particular on the concept of collective and territorial defense. By far the greatest proportions of the operational efforts of NATO and the European Union (EU) have already shifted away from collective defense. Crisis management is the paradigm that forms the cornerstone of the post-Cold War security system. Since the end of the East-West conflict NATO underwent a significant transformation process that has been speeded up by the terror attacks of September 11. Founded as a collective defense organization at the onset of the Cold War, NATO has revised its strategic concept to respond to the broader spectrum of the threats. The invocation of its Art. 5 security commitments for a war that took place not on NATO-territory changed the meaning of this article together with Art. 6 that prescribes this area. With NATO enlargement, a greater role for Moscow, NATO’s small military role in Afghanistan and Iraq, NATO seemed likely to lose military significance in international significance. NATO was at risk of becoming totally irrelevant in a world in which terrorism has become the principal strategic threat. So it had to give up more and more the old NATO, a collective security organization designed to protect Western Europe against Soviet invasion. At the Prague summit the heads of governments approved the formation of a Rapid-Response force of around 20,000 troops that would be deployable within 30 days wherever they are needed. In the framework of the Prague Capabilities Commitment individual countries will also have to commit themselves to provide specific equipment and expertise within set deadlines. In the case of Iraq Germany, France and Belgium blocked the start of NATO military planning to protect Turkey against the threat of an Iraqi missile attack. Subsequently, Turkey has requested consultations under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, that states that NATO’s members will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any NATO country is threatened. With the post-cold war era NATO’s traditional role as a collective defense organization was coming to a close. NATO together with its PfP could become a military toolbox of allied forces. The European Union launched a 60,000-strong Rapid Reaction Force in 2001, is supposed to be up and running by 2003, but is struggling amid budget restrictions and affected by post-September 11 events, the war in Afghanistan and the pending war against Iraq. After the end of the East-West Conflict European deficiencies of military capabilities became more and more visible, however. One important reason lies in the legacy of the Cold War. During this period the European armies prepared for a confrontation with the major threat from the East in a collective effort to defend their territories. The conflicts and challenges after the end of the military bipolarity do not require massive, heavy-metal European armies, not suited for transport and projections to distant places, but rapid reaction forces with flexible structure and light weapons, deployable over great distances, equipped with modern communication assets to coordinate their actions, surveillance and reconnaissance facilities. A draft report of the Presidium the European Convention provided recommendations and the wording of new articles for the Treaty of The Convention. The report recognizes that the concept of security is very broad, by nature indivisible, and one that goes beyond the purely military aspects covering not only the security of States but also the security of citizens. On the basis of this broad concept of security, the common foreign and security policy and the European Security and Defense Policy. It allows the Union military options over and above the civil instruments of crisis prevention and management. Within this broad concept of security, disarmament occupies an essential place. In the area of crisis management there is the danger of duplication of NATO and EU capabilities and missions. Division of labor and role specialization could avoid it on the one hand, and cooperation in certain areas such as common command structure for crisis management on the other. There must be appropriate division of labour. The wars in Kazoo, Afghanistan and Iraq showed that the overwhelming U.S. contribution is war-fighting capability - what is by comparison a limited European contribution. In this the gap between the military capabilities of the U.S. and the rest of the world is huge and is growing. However, a capability to act does not only imply war fighting. Europeans are more designed for peacekeeping, humanitarian action, disaster relief and post-conflict reconstruction rather than the rapid deployment of larger forces over long distances. The United States will need to continue to project forces in high-intensity conflict. There should be some risk- and responsibility sharing, however. European states should keep a minimum level of participation in all phases of an operation. As Europeans should keep and develop some war fighting capability U.S.-troops also should participate at least at a minimal level in lower end peace support operations. They should not be reduced to war fighting alone but demonstrate that they are able to do humanitarian and rescue and peacekeeping operations. Hence, despite the transatlantic differences, there is clearly consensus among some of the EU Member States and the United States on the need to develop force planning and strategies for ‘ad-hoc’ coalitions of the willing that can have access to NATO and EU economic, military and human assets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Against the backdrop of the specific claim that the events of September 11th have transformed and/or is largely driving politics and policy within the major immigration-receiving countries this paper poses two related questions. First, has European public opinion objectively become more illiberal on immigration-related questions since September 11, 2001? Specifically, is it significantly less receptive to new immigration and/or less accommodating towards settled immigrants than previously? Second and more subjectively, are Europe's political elites under unusual pressure to align public policy with the preferences of an increasingly illiberal electorate? Are the parameters of immigration policy making in Europe in the post-September 11th era more circumscribed by public opinion than previously? In addressing these questions this paper pushes as far back as possible in the respective national public opinion records, with special attention paid to the pattern of British, French, and Spanish public attitudes before and after September 11. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International relations between the U.S. and Europe and their manner of representation and reinstitution through the media has drawn much attention in the turbulent period following the terrorists attacks of September 11 and the following military attack of Iraq. The American-led military operation in Iraq came into being in a concrete symbolic universe of war and diplomacy, sovereignty and coalition, friend and foe, power and universal values. The current paper asks about how American media, in particular the New York Times, represented international relationship between the U.S. and Europe in the period between the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001, leading up to the current war in Iraq, and up until the U.S. official declaration on end of combat operations in Iraq in May 2003. The paper also asks how this representation has changed over time. Data includes 1390 New York Times articles published between September 11, 2001 (attack on the World Trade Center in New York) and May 12, 2003 (End of combat operations in Iraq as announced by the occupying forces). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an integrated multi-level, multi-actor model for a ‘new European peace and security system’ (NEPSS), initially as a basis for: [1] Reconceptualizing security to include: [a] Environmental and economic, [b] Human rights and humanitarian, as well as [c] Political and military dimensions. And then for: [2] Preventing, or otherwise responding to, Yugoslav-type, ‘identity-based’ conflicts and their related ‘civilizational’ acts of terrorism, in post-Cold War and post-9/11 Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Big events in world politics provide students of international relations and comparative politics with the closest thing to a natural experiment. September 11th is no exception. For a political analysis of terrorism material capabilities and objective factors are typically besides the point. What matters are the political importance of processes that shape how groups and governments conceive of the use of violence, how publics perceive and interpret insecurity, and how threats are constructed politically. Such conceptions, interpretations and processes of threat construction occur largely within polities rather than between them. And domestic politics differ across countries in ways that deserve careful analysis by those interested in the international politics of counter-terrorism. The attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon is like a strong beam of light which gets filtered by distinct national lenses that create different political responses even in democratic, capitalist states closely allied with the United States such as Germany and Japan. September 11 supports the view of both proponents and critics of globalization. Operating within, across and alongside states, the AlQaeda network is a close approximation of the novel condition of world politics that globalization theory, with its insistence on converging practices, has illuminated. Sharp differences in counter-terrorism policies, the focus of this paper, underlines the importance of states whose policies are retaining striking differences. And distinctive national responses are embedded in different regional contexts, illustrated here by Europe and Southeast Asia. This diversity in national approaches in a plural world underlines the difficulty that U.S. diplomacy is likely to face in a prolonged war on terrorism conceived of as a clash between good and evil. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thanks to the international media’s 24/7 coverage of the story and the constant ‘heightened’ state of security alerts, it feels as if terrorism actually began on Sept.11, 2001, but a second’s reflection, should remind us that terrorism has been a near-permanent feature of our lives for several decades. Europe, in particular, long before the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, has been one of the regions of the world most afflicted by terrorism. Hundreds of indigenous, subnational violent political organizations have directly challenged the majority of European states with their lethal activities. Their religious contemporaries - Al-Qaeda and the like â€" naturally differ considerably in their operational perspective, strategic ambition and apparent willingness to use large-scale indiscriminate violence. But like any terrorists of any generation, they ultimately seek to force events to conform to their vision rather than to rationally convince their audience of their agenda. This paper will analyse the parallels â€" and differences â€" between pre-and-post 9/11 terrorism and will argue that despite the hype today’s terrorist challenge is not an unprecedented one; in fact it has much in common with episodes in the not so distant past and that there are several lessons which can be drawn from Europe’s pre-9/11 counter-terrorism experiences that would help Western governments cope better with post-9/11 violent Islamic radicalism. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

No area seems to divide the Atlantic alliance more than the Middle East. Despite the famous Le Monde headline in the aftermath of September 11 that ‘we are all Americans,’ transatlantic solidarity soon dissipated as Americans and Europeans continued to diverge on a number of key Middle East questions, most notably Iraq. Although some promising policy convergence emerged, particularly in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) arena, divergence remains the dominating trend in US-European Mideast policy, with Europe posing an increasing challenge?at least politically?to US dominance in the region. US-European divergence today is more prominent and damaging than has historically been the case because of the altered international environment and open question of global governance. But given that the US and Europe ultimately share common values and goals and view the instability emanating from the Middle East as the most critical security challenge of the 21st century, why is divergence so prominent? This paper will draw on the case of the Middle East to explore this question. The paper will consider arguments based on structural power, domestic politics, economic factors, and identity/role based models, arguing that identity politics and US-European perceptions of global roles is a necessary variable in understanding the nature of transatlantic division in the Middle East. This helps explain why the US-European division over Iraq was less about the problem of Iraq or weapons of mass destruction than about the role of American power in the region. The paper will conclude by offering prescriptions for how to manage transatlantic divergence given the common stakes in Middle East stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Part 1: The paper discusses the transformation of liberalism after September 11 and the development of practices of liberalism inside European societies. It proposes an alternative view to the vision of unilateralism or of Empire that most analysts are exploring. It aims to show the role of the different transnational networks of security professionals, their impact on politicians and the consequences of the shift of technologies of surveillance regarding civil liberties by proposing to combine Agamben and Foucault works with the notion of Ban Opticon. Part 2: The paper will analyze the changing relationship between new security challenges and the way new technologies transform the practice of war. The history and emerging relationship between practices of security and the principles of the democratic public sphere will also be explored. An analysis will be developed of the means and methods of threat assessment and the vulnerability of critical infrastructures, most notably the specific cases of telecommunication networks, water systems, nuclear plants, cyberspace and knowledge-based experts networks, the commercial privatisation of technologies of surveillance and control. To explore the security policies and warfare strategies that result from the security environment of a globalised world, which make Western, societies ‘risk societies’. Part 3: The tragic terrorist attacks of September 11 seem to have made all political actors aware that each home security policy is ensured at the global level, or that it was not ensured at all. The natural democratic solidarity against terrorism becomes a rhetoric common place. Not a question. Why and how the question of democracy have been bent to new times rather than questioned? Our main objective in this paper is to underline how the question of terrorism going beyond the national borders which requires mutual assistance and mutual co-operation is a symbolic, political and identity issue. The core of our intention will be thus to show how the antiterrorist fight in Europe is initially dominated by the problems of the recognition of each other Member State as an inter pares member of this whole Europe of democracies. Under this angle, the co-operation understood as a hyperbolic discourse of always more, never enough, structured on the official history of an initial deficit of the European security is then the point of conversion of the national characteristics into a common identity. In other words, the progressive installation of ad hoc European institutions envisaged according to the principle of coordination of the police and legal efforts produced a network of exchanges which ensures the circulation of significance and strong collective identity representations. Even if the fight against terrorism and by extension against organized crime is carried out by a large number of police, intelligence and judicial actors, they all are involved in the same global (re)definition of the European identity. In fact, it is because there is a complex web of different national cultures, practices in order to fight against terrorism, that according each other around a single discourse is a real political opportunity. But does this political identity construction is really stable? The different national positions after the 9.11 events seem to have turned the historical European collective identity process upside down and the democratic solidarity is everything but an embattled narrative between an us and them distinction process. In other words, by dismounting these official processes of historicization which make of the European co-operation a reality born of the dialogue around a necessary solidarity of the European States vis-à-vis to the terrorist threat, and to deal with the different discourses after the 9.11 attacks, it is rather a question of showing how the co-operation is a requirement for a political and diplomatic legibility between countries and actors of Europe. A Europe which offers the insurance of a collective common and reassuring identity: the democracy for everyone. Regarding the democratic European and national discourses after 9.11, we will answer to the question of the (re)definition of the democratic European identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This report carries out an assessment of the European measures and practices implemented within the scope of the Schengen borders regime after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States. In particular we look at: · the re-introduction of border checks on the basis of Art. 2.2 of the Schengen Convention, along with the plan to put protestors under surveillance and deny entry to suspected troublemakers; and · the policies on intrusive surveillance through the use of biometric technologies and databases , as well as the controv ersial EU/US bilateral relations on the transfer of Passenger Name Record information (PNR). We also evaluate to what extent security has taken precedence in the European agenda and how it undermines, among others, the fundamental right of free movement of persons within the EU (which is enshrined in the EC Treaty), and leads to a quasi-permanent ?state of exception? or ?emergency? within the European borders. The human rights considerations as well as the main human targets of these security policies also need special scrutiny. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anti-Americanism is a phenomenon that has received increasing attention in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks and more recently with the invasion of Iraq. However, despite its wide use, anti-Americanism is used often as a polemic term, and then often inconsistently. We attempt to provide a clearer and more consistent definition of anti-Americanism. Then, using newly released Eurobarometer data from the fall of 2002 and the spring of 2003, we observe the prevalence of anti-American attitudes among the peoples of Europe, and what leads to these attitudes. We find that ideology, nationalism, attachment to a supranational Europe, the security concerns of Europeans, and U.S. behavior on the international stage are all strong predictors of anti-American attitudes. We then draw inferences about the effects of anti-Americanism. We find that anti-Americanism leads to an erosion of support for NATO and increased support for a defense arrangement led by the European Union, with no noticeable effect for support of defense led by national governments. Furthermore, anti-Americanism is increasing in Europe, which implies this trend of decreasing popular support for NATO and increasing support for an EU-led defense will continue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 much analysis has focused on US security strategy and its increasing proneness to use armed force, while less attention has been devoted to comparative studies of different European approaches to this issue. European reactions to the war on terror, however, do present us with a puzzle. Given the efforts to enhance integration in European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) since 1998, the emergence of a common threat in the form of global Islamic terrorism could have been expected to provide an ideal opportunity for Europe to ‘speak with one voice’ in security policy. Why, then, have the military campaigns launched in the name of the fight against terrorism proved so divisive among Europeans? This paper argues that an explanation can be provided by an analysis of the distinct strategic cultures of European states. The paper proposes a theoretical framework for the comparative study of strategic cultures and applies it to three European case studies â€" Britain, Germany and Poland. Drawing on a wide range of primary sources, including parliamentary debates and interviews with policy-makers, it is shown how responses to the war on terror are shaped in distinct ways by contending norms and beliefs about the use of force. The paper makes an important theoretical contribution to comparative foreign policy analysis by proposing new ways of operationalising strategic culture, while empirically bridging the analytical divide between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The security environment of the Atlantic community has changed dramatically since the end of the east west conflict. The main security challenges are no longer the threat of major wars waged by hostile states, but security risks posed by non-state actors. The 9-11 attacks have shed light on these developments. On the level of the political discourse, these changes have been integrated into a rhetoric of new risks. Today no foreign policy maker in the Atlantic community speaks about security without mentioning terrorism, organized crime or failing states.Despite this common discourse on security risks, strategic debates within the Atlantic com-munity of how to address these risks are often less developed. This is especially true for risks emerging in the European neighborhood. For different reasons the so-called, post-Soviet space is almost absent from strategic thinking. This neglect of the problems in the former So-viet republics are dangerous as developments in this area are affecting directly or indirectly the Atlantic community. The region is of particular importance and at least three sets of rea-sons can be mentioned why this area has to be taken into account: Firstly, the problem of weak statehood combined with separatist conflicts in some states is a source for regional insecurity. The risks of organized crime, the trafficking of people, weap-ons and drugs directly affects the European Union. Secondly, because of the region?s geo-graphical position the West has geo-strategic interests. The Black Sea region for example serves as a corridor for energy pipelines between the Caspian region and the European Union; it is a flank to the notorious Middle East and after the next round of EU enlargement will have a common border with the European Union. Thirdly, some of the countries in the post-Soviet space belong to Europe and others are at least traditionally orientated towards Europe. There-fore, western values have to be fostered in the region and the countries have to be integrated into the Euro-Atlantic order. The lack of strategic debate in the Atlantic community with regard to the post-Soviet space is partly due to a missing historical consciousness in the West. In strategic thinking, the iron curtain of the Cold War remains effective. Yet these experiences of the east-west conflicts conceal the historical bonds, which for centuries connected these regions. Implicitly the re-gion is often still seen as a zone of primary Russian interest. But the lack of strategic debate is also due to general problems, which are related to security risks. Contrary to the traditional threat of hostile states, the nature of the new security risks are far more ambivalent. Consequently, the significance of specific risks is disputed as well as a risk's relative significance. Even though in theory everyone agrees to the statement that pro-active policy is needed to address risks before they get virulent, in practice this is hardly the case. If the nature of risks is already disputed, the strategies of how to address the risks are even more disputed. As a result, policy makers tend to ignore the risks or tackle them only on a low-key level until the situation deteriorates.To participate in the efforts of developing a common transatlantic risk policy towards the post-Soviet space this papers presents the cases of Moldova (and Georgia). It explains how the typical problems of the post-soviet space lead to weak statehood and to specific security risks. It also describes the existing rudiments of risk policies by the European Union and the United States. The paper starts with observations of how the European Union and the United States perceive the security and the underlying causes.With the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) the European Union has demonstrated in recent years more commitment towards the region... ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the end of the Cold war, the Atlantic order seems to be in a fundamental transition with an unclear destination. Especially 9/11 and the Iraq war crisis discovered one of the major challenges the United States are confronted with at the beginning of the 21st century: Europe. The process of European integration not only transformed internal European affairs between sovereign states, but also created a common European foreign policy. Most notably in this context is neorealism which argues, that the ESDP is an attempt to limit US-power in Europe and to balance American hegemony globally in the long run. Following this assumption, the dominant position of the United States in Europe will be at risk. But how will the U.S. respond to this challenge? From a neo-realistic point of view, the United States are expected to develop “anti-balancing” measures to remain the central power within the Western order maintaining the unipolar moment. But is anti-balancing inevitable? What about alternative responses? I will argue that the possibilities of the United States to respond the European challenge are discursively enabled and simultaneously constrained by dominant narratives about the meaning and consequences of the ESDP (what is the ESDP, what desires it in the future, how should the U.S. react). I assume, that these narratives fundamentally differ within the expert discourse on US-foreign policy and consequently a “spectrum of possibilities” emerges. The ambition of this paper is to illustrate the contingency of foreign policy by identifying different narratives and the “spectrum of possibilities” about how to respond the European challenge. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, empirical work (Dogan 1994) suggested that "nationalism" was in decline in the West. However, the 9/11 attack in the U.S. and subsequent attacks in Europe and elsewhere may have increased nationalism, patriotism, and national pride as well as an antipathy to outsiders. While pride may not always imply prejudice, this paper investigates the claim that often it does. It identifies the types of patriotism found within Europe and the United States, and the consequences of each type of pride for salient minority populations. Evaluating data from 21 countries from the 1995 and 2003 ISSP National Identity Survey, it finds that pride in country is a multidimensional phenomenon and only certain types of it are associated with antipathy towards ethnic minorities or distinctive outgroups, including immigrants. Chauvinists and those most proud of their country's cultural heritage are more likely to define membership in the political community in an ethnically exclusive manner and to express prejudicial views of immigrants to the country. Those, however, who express strong pride in the state, its institutions, and its social policies, are more open to immigrants and are less likely to endorse ethnically exclusive criteria for membership in the political community. Thus, pride in the state, as opposed to pride in the ethno-cultural nation, especially among titular groups, can ameliorate prejudicial attitudes about non-titular groups and immigrants. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The alternative globalization movement has been undergoing profound changes since the Seattle protests in 1999. The September 11, 2001 attacks clearly influenced the movement?s dynamics. In the United States, organized labor withdrew from the coalition and globally American foreign policy, war and peace gained prominence on activists? agenda. At the same time, the decline in the number of globalization demonstrations in the United States did not signal the disappearance of the movement. Rather the movement has shifted strategies to ones that garner less media attention, with many groups focusing on lobbying and grassroots education. Europe has continued to experience large-scale demonstrations with protesters focusing on alternatives to economic globalization and voicing critiques of U. S. foreign policy. Countries in the Global South saw the persistence of local protests focusing on structural adjustment policies that had first emerged during the 1980s. Additionally, both in the Global South and in Europe large social forums have been bringing together large numbers of activists, NGOs and academics to establish networks and explore policy alternatives to the dominant neoliberal agenda. This paper traces the evolution of the alternative globalization movement and investigates the reasons behind these clear regional differences in contention. In particular, it focuses on the influence of local political opportunities structures and historical legacies in shaping the different patterns of contestation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the current social scenario of relation between the people from Muslim community and non-Muslim community in Europe. It also discusses the role of Muslim communities in social culture of Europe and analyzes the probability of the violent clashes with other communities after the terrorist's attacks in the U.S. on September 11, 2001. It also explores the issue of immigration as a need for European countries due to their increasing pension liabilities.

Utilizing data from our surveys of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in 1992-93 and 2003-04, this paper offers an attitudinal portrait of the degree to which MEPs have successfully navigated the contradictions posed by the increasing securitization of immigration after September 11th. We specifically asked to what degree MEPs: view immigration as a salient and multi-dimensional security threat; support greater rights for immigrants; and prefer an EU over a national policy making venue to regulate immigration policy. Our analysis of the data yielded mixed results. On the one hand, a majority of contemporary MEPs concluded that immigration was “very important,” favored increasing economic immigration and rejected the suggestion that immigration poses a cultural threat. On the other hand, and contrary to our expectations, MEP support for the extension of immigrant rights declined from 1993 to 2004 and, most surprising, MEPs were less inclined in 2004 than in 1993 to look to Europe in order to resolve immigration-related dilemmas. Although a robust majority agreed that a European immigration policy is more urgent after September 11th, it is fair to conclude on the basis of the totality of the data that MEPs in 2004, as in 1993, were not especially inclined to view immigration through the prism of national or European security. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on some of the new programs and priorities adopted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) since the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C. on September 11, 2001. It notes that the U.S. almost immediately placed its primary foreign policy focus on responding to the global threat of terrorism after the said attacks. It mentions the creation of an Action Against Terrorism Unit by the OSCE within the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna, Austria in December 2001.

This work aims to consider and to discuss the role of the new systemic conditions after 9/11 within the context of the NATO-Russia relations. As Russia’s relations with NATO were very critical during the 1990s because of many structural problems, the signature of the Founding Act in 1997 was crucially important as the turning point to improve this problematic relationship; however the Kosovo affair seemed to have negatively affected this process. After 9/11, the systemic variables became more advantegeous with the emergence of new actors and problems both for Russia, seeking to reestablish its own priorities in world affairs, and for the expanded NATO with its new role designed by the US and the Europeans. Within the context of the new systemic realities, we can ask the following questions: is it possible to consider the model of security communities within the final stage of the NATO-Russia relations after the Rome Declaration (with the establishment of NATO-Russia Council, Russia’s entry into the NATO’s political committee (19+1))? Are Russia and NATO on the way to compose a new type of security community of strategic character, by determining the common points of cooperation on security affairs? Could this community seem to impose its own priorities according to the conditions of cooperation between NATO, especially the US, and Russia on the new international order? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notions of “protection”, “homeland defense” and the “vulnerability of critical infrastructures” largely predate September 11, both in US military doctrine and in Europe, at least in France and the United Kingdom. The communication will discuss how pro ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dealing with post 9/11 international environment EU has not only to re-adjust its security policy but to build an effective network of cooperation with other international security actors, notably North Atlantic Alliance as a core institution of transatlantic security system.The EU-NATO interaction lies far beyond parallel NATO membership of most of the EU states. There are two coexisting security institutions in Europe, both undergoing through a deep structural transformation: NATO building up to its traditional collective defense clause a new soft-security dimension and EU developing its soft-security tools launching capabilities of a bigger scale. The nature and functions of these two actors remaining different, their aims become closer and their new capabilities are being shape to achieve the same goal: providing Europe and its neighborhood with security and peace. Therefore, the arising question is: what ?modus vivendi? would EU and NATO find and how would it correspond to their ?modus operandi?? How the declared level of cooperation will correspond to the practical interaction? And is it possible to envisage the division of labor between these two institutions or are they competing one against each other now and in future?Answering these questions implies accomplishing the following tasks:1.Analyzing conceptual and declared level of cooperation2.Envisaging means of EU-NATO cooperation: institutional and military ones, as well as financial aspects, their limits and level of interdependence and focusing on concrete projects in place. Particular attention in this context is to be paid to NATO Response Force ( NRF) and EU Battle Groups. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]