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In this paper we shall walk a well-trodden but still only partially explored path, along which we shall attempt to establish a basis for the study of the Parmenides poem’s unity by way of a comparison with 20th-century physics. In particular, we shall investigate the hypothesis that Parmenides’ sphere-shaped τὸ ἐόν, as described in B8.42-49, could be understood as a hyperspherical unlimited whole cosmologically bounded by the διάκοσμος described by the complex sphere system in fragment B12.

This article focuses on the Platonic version of the doctrine of oikeiosis set forth by Piso in Cicero’s De finibus, Book V. The article aims to show that: 1) Cicero’s account, while clearly having Stoic features, is also consistent with the eudaemonistic character of Socrates’ and Plato’s ethics; 2) the replacement of oikeiosis with “assimilation to god”, attested in a passage of the Anonymous Commentary on Plato’s Theaetetus, derives from the intent to remove Epicurean egoistic connotations from Plato’s ethics; according to the Anonymous, the Stoic oikeiosis alone would not suffice to attain this purpose.

Perché rileggere la Physica di Aristotele oggi? E perché rileggere, in particolare, il suo libro iniziale? Attraverso una full immersion nel testo e nella lettura critica degli ultimi settant’anni, l’autore cerca di dar risposta a questa domanda. Il punto di partenza è Omero e la cultura greca delle origini. Una tappa intermedia obbligata è la riflessione sulla testualità aristotelica. I testi di Aristotele pervenutici sono opere acroamatiche: ossia appunti per una performance didattica orale. Se questo è vero, Aristotele non è l’inventore del moderno trattato specialistico. Ma neppure inaugura in Grecia un modello ‘dipartimentale’ dei saperi. La Physica di Aristotele non è una scienza specialistica: è la tappa iniziale di un vasto progetto di ricerca dedicato alle scienze della vita. Secondo la tradizione ionica, la physis è infatti propria degli organismi che si muovono da sé: ossia i viventi. La vita è autopoiesi, intrinsecità materia e movimento. Se questo è vero, è necessario ripensare a fondo l’idea di materia in Aristotele. Ma anche l’idea di logos. Ciò che oggi appare sorprendente – ma non lo era allora – è che la riflessione sul vivente si intrecci costantemente, in Aristotele, con la riflessione sul linguaggio. Nella filosofia greca, due sono le vie di accesso alla conoscenza: i sensi e il logos. Dopo la parentesi parmenidea – e, in misura minore, platonica – che imponeva un divorzio, Aristotele propone un rinnovato punto di incontro fra le due vie. Entrambe si configurano infatti come forme di apertura al mondo. Ma mentre i sensi sono l’apertura di noi verso il mondo, il logos è l’apertura del mondo verso di noi, umani e non umani. In ogni animale dotato di sensazione è infatti ‘insita un’innata potenza discriminativa’ che è alla base dell’esercizio del logos. Se così stanno le cose, Aristotele non è il paladino dello specismo né dell’antropocentrismo. Ama la vita in tutte le sue forme; e indica all’uomo, come imperativo etico, la felicità, che si realizza comprendendosi nella physis.

El artículo pretende profundizar los vínculos entre ley (νόµος) y sabiduría (φρόνησις) en Aristóteles, mostrando que la “ley” o, mejor, la “buena” ley, está llamada a asumir un poder “curativo”, fundamental tanto para el individuo como para la comunidad. Tras cruzar las acepciones de ambos términos, νόµος y φρόνησις, y un breve repaso de los demás términos con los que los griegos denominaban a la propia ley, se analizan las articulaciones de la noción de sabiduría y se examina su relación con la justicia y la equidad, intercediendo también con la cuestión de la flexibilidad (con sus implicaciones epistemológicas y ético-políticas) y el cuidado (ἐπιµέλεια)

In its literal meaning, the term ἔκστασις (ekstasis) indicates a displacement, ‘being out of immobility’,andultimatelybeingoutsideoneself.To some extent, this term takes on a mystical connotation in late Antiquity, notablyin book VI.9.11.24 of Plotinus’Enneads, whereekstasisis described as a non-ordinary way of seeing. The notion of ecstasy,often inseparablefrom the concept of vision,would keep its mystical role, though altered in some ways, over the centuries, conceptualizing a specific kind of knowledge, which goes beyond the subject-object opposition,addressing the epistemological issues of perceiving and knowing the divine,and often challenging the nature of the self. This issue offers some attempts to track theconstant reshaping and migrationof the notions of ecstasy and intellectual or spiritual vision over the history of Western thought, unearthing their structural and constant persistence, from the Middle Ages to the contemporary ages, recurrently in many different non-ultimately-dialectical metaphysical systems. The papers in this volume providesome illustrative examples of the tangled history ofthe divergent meanings that the notions of ecstasy and vision have taken on, and their considerable reassessments and adaptations to constantly evolving conceptual frameworks, often redefining further notions such as those of rapture, prophecy, sleep, dream, and death

The aim of this study is twofold: to elaborate on Aristotle’s nexus of memory, “mental speech”, and phantasia in relation to sensation pursuing the implications of such view, i.e., the relevance of the individual’s experience and the consequent individualization of memory and its content (section 1), and to look at a selection of Euripides’ tragedies (namely, Trojan Women, Iphigenia in Aulis, and Medea) where this nexus is made explicit in the characters’ utterances and exploited for the creation of pathos (section 2). I will show that Euripides uses the tragic characters’ awareness of past happy experiences (i.e., their personal memory) to deepen the sense of loss and misery that accompany their fall into misfortune; and he does this in a nontechnical way that anticipates the Aristotelian linking of memory and imagination., Medicina nei secoli: Journal of history of medicine and medical humanities, Vol. 34 No. 1 (2022)

This paper aims to cross some of the linguistic and conceptual crossroads of the rich notion of καιρός, examined in its connection with the topic of appearance. After identifying a first fundamental distinction between the “spatial dimension” and the “temporal dimension” of the καιρός, we focus on the intertwining between καιρός, speed and slowness; on the multiple connections between καιρός, good and just measure, on the responsibility of appearance and on the need to grasp the καιρός for the realization of a good and happy life., Thaumàzein | Rivista di Filosofia, V. 10 N. 1 (2022): Kairos e Apparenza / Kairos and Appearance

This paper aims to show the primacy of theoretical sciences and virtues in the Aristotelian Corpus. As Aristotle says, definitions are more exhaustive and precise in the theoretical rather than in the practical writings. In order to show this, I compare the definition of theoretical and practical sciences in Metaph. E 1 and Eth. Nic. VI, 2 and the definition of ‘soul’ in De an. B 1 and Eth. Nic. A 13 and Z 2. I then consider the nature of theoretical pleasures in Eth. Nic. X, 7, and show, by comparison with Part. an I, 5, that these pleasures can be identified with those offered by the study of nature. Thus, one can live a satisfying life and be a good citizen of the polis without being a theoretical scientist. But only through theoretical thought and action can one exceed the limits of a finite life, becoming a citizen of the universe.