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Artificial intelligence advances have led to robots endowed with increasingly sophisticated social abilities. These machines speak to our innate desire to perceive social cues in the environment, as well as the promise of robots enhancing our daily lives. However, a strong mismatch still exists between our expectations and the reality of social robots. We argue that careful delineation of the neurocognitive mechanisms supporting human-robot interaction will enable us to gather insights critical for optimising social encounters between humans and robots. To achieve this, the field must incorporate human neuroscience tools including mobile neuroimaging to explore long-term, embodied human-robot interaction in situ. New analytical neuroimaging approaches will enable characterisation of social cognition representations on a finer scale using sensitive and appropriate categorical comparisons (human, animal, tool, or object). The future of social robotics is undeniably exciting, and insights from human neuroscience research will bring us closer to interacting and collaborating with socially sophisticated robots., (Copyright © 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.)

Intention prediction often plays a crucial role in successful social interaction. Previous studies have attempted to understand this skill by focusing on the role of movement kinematics in isolation. However, this approach is limited as the same kinematics typically map to multiple action possibilities (affordances) and as a result, individual's also employ contextual information to predict others' intentions. In this study we present preliminary findings from a qualitative study aimed at investigating intention prediction in naturalistic contexts. Participants viewed an individual reaching for a cup with one of two object-directed intentions: to drink OR to clear the table. A third non-object-directed intention was also included where the observed individual placed their hand on the table next to the cup. For each intention the contextual information was varied by changing the environmental scene between (1) cups full of juice, (2) almost empty cups, and (3) half-empty cups. The findings reveal that participants perceived the cup's functional (most salient) affordance - drink - for the intention so far as the movement kinematics specified an object-directed intention (drink or clear) with a context that clearly afforded it (full and half-full cups). However, participants were also sensitive to the kinematic differences between the object-directed intentions when the context made the functional affordance seem improbable (almost empty cups).

The process of understanding the minds of other people, such as their emotions and intentions, is mimicked when individuals try to understand an artificial mind. The assumption is that anthropomorphism, attributing human‐like characteristics to non‐human agents and objects, is an analogue to theory‐of‐mind, the ability to infer mental states of other people. Here, we test to what extent these two constructs formally overlap. Specifically, using a multi‐method approach, we test if and how anthropomorphism is related to theory‐of‐mind using brain (Experiment 1) and behavioural (Experiment 2) measures. In a first exploratory experiment, we examine the relationship between dispositional anthropomorphism and activity within the theory‐of‐mind brain network (n = 108). Results from a Bayesian regression analysis showed no consistent relationship between dispositional anthropomorphism and activity in regions of the theory‐of‐mind network. In a follow‐up, pre‐registered experiment, we explored the relationship between theory‐of‐mind and situational and dispositional anthropomorphism in more depth. Participants (n = 311) watched a short movie while simultaneously completing situational anthropomorphism and theory‐of‐mind ratings, as well as measures of dispositional anthropomorphism and general theory‐of‐mind. Only situational anthropomorphism predicted the ability to understand and predict the behaviour of the film's characters. No relationship between situational or dispositional anthropomorphism and general theory‐of‐mind was observed. Together, these results suggest that while the constructs of anthropomorphism and theory‐of‐mind might overlap in certain situations, they remain separate and possibly unrelated at the personality level. These findings point to a possible dissociation between brain and behavioural measures when considering the relationship between theory‐of‐mind and anthropomorphism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To what extent can humans form social relationships with robots? In the present study, we combined functional neuroimaging with a robot socializing intervention to probe the flexibility of empathy, a core component of social relationships, towards robots. Twenty-six individuals underwent identical fMRI sessions before and after being issued a social robot to take home and interact with over the course of a week. While undergoing fMRI, participants observed videos of a human actor or a robot experiencing pain or pleasure in response to electrical stimulation. Repetition suppression of activity in the pain network, a collection of brain regions associated with empathy and emotional responding, was measured to test whether socializing with a social robot leads to greater overlap in neural mechanisms when observing human and robotic agents experiencing pain or pleasure. In contrast to our hypothesis, functional region-of-interest analyses revealed no change in neural overlap for agents after the socializing intervention. Similarly, no increase in activation when observing a robot experiencing pain emerged post-socializing. Whole-brain analysis showed that, before the socializing intervention, superior parietal and early visual regions are sensitive to novel agents, while after socializing, medial temporal regions show agent sensitivity. A region of the inferior parietal lobule was sensitive to novel emotions, but only during the pre-socializing scan session. Together, these findings suggest that a short socialization intervention with a social robot does not lead to discernible differences in empathy towards the robot, as measured by behavioural or brain responses. We discuss the extent to which long-term socialization with robots might shape social cognitive processes and ultimately our relationships with these machines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Understanding the mechanisms and consequences of attributing socialness to artificial agents has important implications for how we can use technology to lead more productive and fulfilling lives. Here, we integrate recent findings on the factors that shape behavioral and brain mechanisms that support social interactions between humans and artificial agents. We review how visual features of an agent, as well as knowledge factors within the human observer, shape attributions across dimensions of socialness. We explore how anthropomorphism and dehumanization further influence how we perceive and interact with artificial agents. Based on these findings, we argue that the cognitive reconstruction within the human observer is likely to be far more crucial in shaping our interactions with artificial agents than previously thought, while the artificial agent's visual features are possibly of lesser importance. We combine these findings to provide an integrative theoretical account based on the “like me” hypothesis, and discuss the key role played by the Theory‐of‐Mind network, especially the temporal parietal junction, in the shift from mechanistic to social attributions. We conclude by highlighting outstanding questions on the impact of long‐term interactions with artificial agents on the behavioral and brain mechanisms of attributing socialness to these agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to interpret and engage with the social world, individuals must understand how they relate to others. Self--other understanding forms the backbone of social cognition and is a central concept explored by research into basic processes such as action perception and empathy, as well as research on more sophisticated social behaviours such as cooperation and intergroup interaction. This theme issue integrates the latest research into self--other understanding from evolutionary biology, anthropology, psychology, neuroscience and psychiatry. By gathering perspectives from a diverse range of disciplines, the contributions showcase ways in which research in these areas both informs and is informed by approaches spanning the biological and social sciences, thus deepening our understanding of how we relate to others in a social world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mirror neuron system has dominated understanding of observational learning from a cognitive neuroscience perspective. Our review highlights the value of observational learning frameworks that integrate a more diverse and distributed set of cognitive and brain systems, including those implicated in sensorimotor transformations, as well as in more general processes such as executive control, reward, and social cognition. We argue that understanding how observational learning occurs in the real world will require neuroscientific frameworks that consider how visuomotor processes interface with more general aspects of cognition, as well as how learning context and action complexity shape mechanisms supporting learning from watching others. Understanding how the human brain translates visual information into skilled motor performance has been assisted and constrained by the discovery of mirror neurons. Emerging evidence highlights how observational motor learning involves a far more diffuse network of brain regions and cognitive processes, which are shaped by the context and complexity of the motor task to be learned. A greater emphasis on combining functional decomposition and functional integration approaches should facilitate paradigms and discoveries that move us closer toward understanding how we learn from watching others in complex, real-world scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]