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Scientific and lay theories about personality as a stable entity reflect how people think about people, including themselves. The idea of immutable core attributes in others has been related to essentialist thinking in social cognition research, and to the belief in a “true self” in research on identity and well-being. Here items examining individual self-essentialism were used to examine to what extent said beliefs relate to well-being, cognitive styles, and self-construal. Study 1 found a three-factor structure comprised of beliefs about the self as an entity, about the biological origin of self attributes, and about the relevance of self attributes for predicting behavior. Greater self-essentialism scores were associated with greater life satisfaction, meaning in life, happiness, preference for consistency, and need for cognitive closure in two samples. Study 2 replicated findings for preference for consistency and need for cognitive closure, and revealed a relationship between greater self-essentialism and individualism. Individualism and collectivism separately moderated the well-being outcomes of self-essentialism; self-essentialism predicted greater well-being at low levels of individualism and high levels of collectivism. Study 2 additionally found a relationship between greater self-essentialism and people-essentialism. Implications for cultural fit and construct understanding are discussed.

[No abstract available] Funding Agencies|Flinders University; RU, Radboud Universiteit; NIU, Northern Illinois University; University of Nottingham; Universität zu Köln; Charité – Universitätsmedizin Berlin; SLU, Saint Louis University; TU/e, Technische Universiteit Eindhoven; University of Leeds; IUPUI, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis; UiT, Universitetet i Tromsø; EUR, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam; UvT, Universiteit van Tilburg; University of Oxford; UNIL, Université de Lausanne; SEBM, Society for Experimental Biology and Medicine; NYU, New York University; UiT, Universitetet i Tromsø; RWTH Aachen University; KU Leuven; Universität Bielefeld; University of Louisiana at Lafayette; UA, University of Arkansas; Genentech Foundation for Biomedical Sciences; University of Bristol; UV, University of Virginia; City of Mobile; Université de Fribourg; Universiteit Gent; Yale University; VT, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University; DIBS, Duke Institute for Brain Sciences, Duke University; UCB UK; University of Leeds; BIBS, Brown Institute for Brain Science; UU, Universiteit Utrecht; Keele University; HRD, Division of Human Resource Development; WVU, West Virginia University; King’s College London; NTU, Nottingham Trent University; Rijksuniversiteit Groningen; KACST, King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology; University of Edinburgh; UCONN, University of Connecticut; University of Kent; University of Cambridge; UNLV, University of Nevada, Las Vegas; Universiteit Leiden; UBC, University of British Columbia; HGS, Human Genome Sciences; AV CR, Akademie Ved Ceské Republiky; IUPUI, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis; UK, University of Kentucky; University of Texas at Austin; DRS, Dahlem Research School, Freie Universität Berlin; Bangor University; RAND Corporation; University of Glasgow; University of Chester; CONICET, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Massey University; UC, University of California; NIH, National Institutes of Health; UFSC, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina; OU, Open University; Electroencephalography and Clinical Neuroscience Society; UNAB, Universidad Autónoma de Bucaramanga; KACST, King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology; SU, Stanford University; CSIR, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research; FSU, Florida State University; UW, University of Wisconsin-Madison; LUMC, Leids Universitair Medisch Centrum; CERSI, Center of Excellence in Regulatory Science and Innovation; DePaul University; Baylor University; SU, Sahlgrenska Universitetssjukhuset; NINDS, National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke

This study investigated whether age-related sensitivity to self-relevance may benefit perspective taking, despite generally poorer perspective-taking capacity in older adults. In one perceptual matching task and two visual perspective-taking paradigms, we examined age differences in sensitivity to avatars representing self and other. In the matching task, older (60–83 years) and younger (18–20 years) adults were similarly biased toward the self- versus other-associated avatar. In the perspective-taking tasks, participants viewed these avatars within a virtual room. Task-relevant perspectives were either the same (i.e., congruent) or different (i.e., incongruent). In the 3PP–3PP task, both avatars were present, and participants adopted the perspective of one or the other. As in the matching task, young and old were similarly biased toward the self-associated avatar. However, age differences emerged in the 1PP–3PP task, which presented only one avatar per trial (varying between self and other), and participants responded based on their own first-person perspective or the avatar's. In summary, age modulated the ability to take perspectives primarily when participants’ own first-person perspective was task relevant. Relative to younger adults, older adults prioritized the self (vs. other) avatar more during initial perspective computation and the first-person (vs. third-person) perspective more when selecting between incongruent perspectives.

Drawing on previous evidence for affective generalization in face perception, the current research investigated the effects of facial similarity on automatic evaluations of unknown individuals who resemble a known person of positive or negative valence. Using 50% morphs that combined a known face of positive or negative valence with an unknown face of neutral valence, the morphed faces elicited the same automatic evaluations as the known faces they resembled. Automatic evaluations of known faces were indistinguishable from responses to perceptually similar unknown faces, suggesting that resemblance effects on automatic evaluations involve an assimilation of unknown faces to existing representations of known faces. Moreover, valence-congruent resemblance effects emerged for both positive and negative targets, suggesting that similarity-based activation of evaluative knowledge can override the affective positivity resulting from the higher fluency of processing familiar faces. Implications for research on face perception, transference, and processing fluency are discussed.

This study examined the extent to which visual perspective-taking performance is modulated by trait-level empathy. Participants completed a third-person visual perspective-taking task in which they judged the perspectives of two simultaneously presented avatars, designated "Self" and "Other." Depending on the trial, these avatars either held the same view (i.e., congruent) or a different view (i.e., incongruent). Analyses focused on the relationship between empathy and two perspective-taking phenomena: Selection between competing perspectives (i.e., perspective-congruence effects) and prioritization of the Self avatar's perspective. Empathy was related to improved overall performance on this task and a reduced cost of selecting between conflicting perspectives (i.e., smaller perspective-congruence effects). This effect was asymmetric, with empathy (i.e., empathic concern) levels predicting reduced interference from a conflicting perspective, especially when adopting the Self (vs. Other) avatar's perspective. Taken together, these results highlight the importance of the self-other distinction and mental flexibility components of empathy.

In keeping with the special issue theme of “Remembering the Future,” this article provides a selective review of research on how memory for social information (i.e., social category representation) influences future processing and behavior. Specifically, the authors focus on how categorization and stereotyping affect how we perceive others and ourselves. The first part of the article reviews research on how individuals perceive others. The authors review research on the determinants and outcomes of social categorization and stereotype activation, concluding with the influence of ingroup/outgroup categorization on face processing. The second part of the article reviews research on how individuals perceive themselves. The authors argue that stereotype threat—concerns about being judged or behaving in ways that confirm negative group stereotypes, leading to poor performance—is the result of both self-categorization and stereotype activation. Overall, the article highlights the complex relationship between memory for social category information and future social perception and behavior.

Two studies examined the relations between regulatory focus and collective action. In Study 1, undergraduate women expressed stronger action intentions when they were primed to consider prevention (ought-self) self-discrepancies than promotion (ideal-self) self-discrepancies, suggesting that collective action is more likely to occur when individuals are prevention- rather than promotion-focused. In Study 2, however, prevention-focused women expressed stronger action intentions in response to security framing, whereas promotion-focused women expressed stronger action intentions in response to achievement framing. This suggests that the relative disinterest in collective action among promotion-focused individuals can be overcome with the appropriate promotion-focused framing. Implications for analyses of both collective action and regulatory focus are discussed.

Self-relevant information is associated with facilitation of perceptual and memory processes. In 2 experiments, participants verified the number of dots within a virtual room that were visible to a given perspective, corresponding to participants' own first-person perspectives or the third-person perspectives for self- and other-associated avatars. Perspectives were either congruent or incongruent with respect to the number of dots visible to each. In Experiment 1, we examined perspective taking for self- and other-associated avatars relative to one another; both avatars appeared simultaneously in the virtual room, and participants made judgments based on the prompted avatar's perspective. In Experiment 2, we examined perspective taking for each avatar relative to the first-person perspective; only 1 avatar was visible in the virtual room (Self or Other, varying by trial), and participants made judgments based on their first-person view or the avatar's perspective. Experiment 2 also included a replication of the third-person paradigm used in Experiment 1. Results from Experiment 1 (replicated in Experiment 2) demonstrated an advantage for judgments of the Self (vs. Other) avatar's perspective; both avatars elicited reliable interference effects of similar magnitude. Results from Experiment 2 further demonstrated that participants prioritized the first-person (vs. third-person) perspective, and that the presence of the Self (vs. Other) avatar improved performance for the first- and third-person perspectives when those perspectives were congruent. Taken together, these findings suggest that self-relevant perspectives are prioritized when they are actively engaged and when they can be subsumed within the first-person view. Such prioritization appears to occur by strategic means.

We employed the retrieval-practice paradigm to test the hypothesis that stereotypes are organized in a meaningful, valence-based way that promotes evaluative coherence. Replicating previous research, we demonstrated that the rehearsal of traits known to describe a target person produced enhanced recall of those practiced traits and reduced recall of other known but non-practiced traits, relative to baseline. However, both the availability of a group label that united the traits within a stereotype and the evaluative consistency of the practiced and non-practiced traits moderated the nature of these effects: although recall of non-practiced stereotypic traits that were evaluatively inconsistent with the practiced traits showed the typical pattern of inhibition, recall of non-practiced stereotypic traits that were evaluatively consistent with the practiced traits was facilitated relative to baseline. We conclude by discussing how the modular representation implied by these findings is functional, potentially fostering the momentary experience of evaluative consistency in person perception.

The current research examined the influence of ingroup/outgroup categorization on brain event-related potentials measured during perceptual processing of own- and other-race faces. White participants performed a sequential matching task with upright and inverted faces belonging either to their own race (White) or to another race (Black) and affiliated with either their own university or another university by a preceding visual prime. Results demonstrated that the right-lateralized N170 component evoked by test faces was modulated by race and by social category: the N170 to own-race faces showed a larger inversion effect (i.e., latency delay for inverted faces) when the faces were categorized as other-university rather than own-university members; the N170 to other-race faces showed no modulation of its inversion effect by university affiliation. These results suggest that neural correlates of structural face encoding (as evidenced by the N170 inversion effects) can be modulated by both visual (racial) and nonvisual (social) ingroup/outgroup status.

The authors investigated the relation between attributions of responsibility and reactions to affirmative action. Participants read one of four fictitious editorials about visible minority under-employment in which responsibility for causing the underemployment problem and responsibility for solving it were manipulated. Results indicated that ratings and endorsement of affirmative action programs, and perceptions that affirmative action promotes relevant values, were highest when visible minorities were depicted as responsible for either the cause of the problem or its solution, but not both. That is, reactions to affirmative action were influenced by the interplay of attributions of responsibility for causing the problem and attributions of responsibility for providing a solution. The results of this experiment suggest that the framing of beneficiaries of affirmative action in terms of responsibility for causing and solving the problem of their disadvantage is an important determinant of reactions to affirmative action programs.

The personal/group discrimination discrepancy (PGDD) refers to the tendency to report more discrimination against one's group than oneself. We demonstrated that the magnitude of both personal and group discrimination judgements depended on group experience and cue availability in the judgement context. For men, who have relatively little experience with gender discrimination, the addition of contextual cues that highlighted workplace discrimination produced lower estimates of both personal and group discrimination. For women, who are familiar with discrimination in general and workplace discrimination in particular, contextual cues produced higher estimates of group discrimination, but lower estimates of personal discrimination. We contend that these differences reflect realistic assessments by participants of their group's experiences with discrimination. Implications for conceptualizing the PGDD are discussed. R4sum4

The personal/group discrimination discrepancy (PGDD) refers to the tendency of disadvantaged group members to report higher levels of discrimination against their group in general than against themselves personally as members of that group. In two studies, the authors examined the cognitive mechanisms that underlie the PGDD. In Experiment 1, the authors demonstrated that the PGDD emerges from a divergence in the comparison standards on which personal and group judgments are made and that specifying that the same standards be used for both types of judgments eliminates or reduces the PGDD. In Experiment 2, the authors demonstrated that the magnitude of the PGDD was a function of the degree of informational complexity in the comparison targets. Implications for conceptualizations of the PGDD are discussed.

Consistent with the authors' suggestions for research on extensions beyond the self (e.g., to joint attention and group-related processes), we offer the hypothesis that the Self-Attention Network may facilitate attention to any person who is construed as similar to the self along key dimensions. On the basis of existing literature and our recent findings, we focus on the dimensions of personal relevance and valence. Further research on how these dimensions mediate attention to self and others has the potential to unify separate lines of research on the neural representation of self and others (i.e., social cognition).

We investigated the impact of ingroup/outgroup categorization on the encoding of same-race and other-race faces presented in inter-racial and intra-racial contexts (Experiments 1 and 2, respectively). White participants performed a same/different matching task on pairs of upright and inverted faces that were either same-race (White) or other-race (Black), and labeled as being from the same university or a different university. In Experiment 1, the same- and other-race faces were intermixed. For other-race faces, participants demonstrated greater configural processing following same- than other-university labeling. Same-race faces showed strong configural coding irrespective of the university labeling. In Experiment 2, faces were blocked by race. Participants demonstrated greater configural processing of same- than other-university faces, but now for both same- and other-race faces. These results demonstrate that other-race face processing is sensitive to non-racial ingroup/outgroup status regardless of racial context, but that the sensitivity of same-race face processing to the same cues depends on the racial context in which targets are encountered. © 2011 Elsevier Inc.

A fundamental question in social cognition is whether people categorize others on the basis of the social groups to which they belong. Integrating ideas from related work on face processing, the current research explored the emergence and boundary conditions of person categorization. Using speeded responses to facial stimuli as a marker of category activation, the authors showed in 3 experiments that person categorization: (a) occurs only under active-encoding conditions and (b) does not extend to applicable but task-irrelevant categorical dimensions, but (c) is sensitive to overlap in the perceptual features that support multiple categorical construals. The authors consider the implications of these findings for models of social-cognitive functioning and the component processes that support person perception.

Members of disadvantaged groups often report that they are less vulnerable to discrimination than is the average member of their group. In two experiments, we examined how the framing of self-ingroup comparisons moderates this phenomenon. In Experiment 1, participants estimated the relative likelihood that either they, compared to the average member of their ingroup, would experience discrimination or that the average member of their ingroup, compared to themselves, would experience discrimination. In Experiment 2, a direct manipulation of self-ingroup similarity was added to this framing manipulation. Across the experiments, the results demonstrated that conditions highlighting differences between the individual and the group led participants to perceive themselves as much less vulnerable to discrimination than their group, relative to conditions highlighting similarities between the individual and the group.