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Copyright © 2022 The Authors. The election of the far-right populist Jair Bolsonaro in the 2018 Brazilian Presidential election was a major turning point in the history of the country and arguably part of a worldwide trend toward a form of ‘authoritarian populism’. The present study was conducted to explore psychological factors that may contribute to the appeal of a polarizing figure such as Bolsonaro, in particular, to determine whether measures of various ‘Moral Foundations’ or ‘Social Dominance Orientation’ (SDO) could best predict voting behaviour in the 2018 election. Given the cultural and economic context in Brazil, measures of religiosity and personal relative deprivation were included as additional potential explanatory variables. An online survey of 325 people from Brazil found that Bolsonaro voters scored higher on the ‘binding’ (Loyalty, Authority, Purity/Sanctity) and lower on the ‘individualizing’ (Care, Fairness) Moral Foundations than voters for the candidate of the left, Fernando Haddad. Moreover, Bolsonaro voters scored higher than Haddad voters on SDO and religiosity. When the various social, moral and religious measures were considered simultaneously in a binary logistic regression, it was endorsement of right-wing authoritarian ideologies (SDO and the Authority Moral Foundation), rather than lack of endorsement of individualizing Moral Foundations that best distinguished Bolsonaro voters.

Objectives. The aim was to study the association between moral foundations and Russians’ foreign policy attitudes. Background. There is a growing interest in the factors that determine attitudes towards other peoples and countries, but the foreign policy attitudes of citizens that determine their support of the respective state’s foreign policy remain insufficiently researched. This study examines the foreign policy attitudes in the context of the Moral foundations theory. We assume that militant internationalism is related to binding moral foundations (“Loyalty”, “Respect”, “Purity”) and nationalism, while cooperative internationalism probably is based on the individualizing moral foundations (“Care” and “Justice”). Study design. Correlation design was used, followed by structural linear modeling and analysis of mediation effects. Participants. 214 university students (average age 25.18, 20% men). Measurements. A blank survey was conducted using Moral Foundations Questionnaire by J. Graham et al., the questionnaire developed on the basis of Foreign Policy Attitudes Scales by T. Gravelle et al., and Civil Identity Scale from the International Social Survey. Results. The results of structural equation modeling have confirmed the indirect relation between binding moral foundations and militant internationalism mediated by the nationalism and the direct association between cooperative internationalism and individualizing moral foundations. We also revealed that individualizing moral foundations were inversely associated to nationalism and the related militant internationalism. Conclusions. Russians’ foreign policy attitudes are related with the characteristics of the moral sphere and nationalism: Binding moral foundations indirectly (through nationalism) support militant internationalism, while individualizing moral foundations support cooperative internationalism.

This research will explore the moral foundations of Islamophobic attitudes. Non-Muslim participants will complete the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011) to report their own moral beliefs, and will then complete the scale again as they think a Muslim person would answer. This will be followed by measures of Islamophobia (Imhoff & Recker, 2012), blatant dehumanization (Kteily et al., 2015), and moral emotions (Haidt et al., 2003). It is predicted that perceived moral differences between the self and a Muslim outgroup will predict Islamophobic attitudes and dehumanization. Although exploratory, it is hypothesized that differences on certain moral foundations will predict specific subtypes of Islamophobic attitudes and morality-based emotional reactions.

We examined the relationship between moral foundations, empathic traits, and moral identity using an online survey via Mechanical Turk. In order to determine how moral foundations contribute to empathic traits and moral identity, we performed classical correlation analysis as well as Bayesian correlation analysis, Bayesian ANCOVA, and Bayesian regression analysis. Results showed that individualizing foundations (harm/care, fairness/reciprocity) and binding foundations (ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, purity/sanctity) had various different relationships with empathic traits. In addition, the individualizing versus binding foundations showed somewhat reverse relationships with internalization and symbolization of moral identity. This suggests that moral foundations can contribute to further understanding of empathic traits and moral identity and how they relate to moral behavior in reality. We discuss the implications of these results for moral educators when starting to teach students about moral issues. Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12144-021-02372-5.

The third study examining attributions about a politician's moral values.

There is a difference in endorsement of moral foundations between individuals from the political right and left. This difference is used for studying attitudinal and behavioral differences between political poles in varying issues, such as climate change. However, most of this literature consists of correlational studies and experimental uses of moral foundations are limited. Moral foundations are also used to create framed messages, a technique called moral reframing. Some studies morally frame climate change messages in terms of individualizing vs. binding foundations or care vs. sanctity foundation to investigate the effectiveness of morally framed messages on conservatives and liberals. However, most of these studies are not pre-registered, and have small sample sizes. In addition, they are conducted on WEIRD samples. In this study, we aim to eliminate these methodological limitations and replicate an effect of moral foundations based frames on an under-represented sample. We will apply the procedure of Feinberg & Willer (2013; Study 3). Participants will receive either care or sanctity framed text or a control text. Then, they will indicate how much they felt five emotions including disgust, and fill out a scale about environmental attitudes. Afterward, we will give participants some additional measures in contrast to the original experiment (Feinberg & Willer, 2013): Moral Foundations Questionnaire as a manipulation check, an actual donation question as an indicator of environmental behavior, and a Psychological Distance Scale and Comprehensive Thinking Scale as potential moderators.

This study tests whether the race of police officers and victims matters for partisan differences in attitudes towards police and police violence, and if moral foundations mediates these relationships.

What mitigates prejudice against migrants in situations of uncertainty? Addressing this question, we explored how individuals with greater COVID-19 concern perceive migrants as a greater threat and show prejudice against them, indirectly through the mechanism of need for cognitive closure and binding moral foundations.This study was conducted in two European countries: Malta and Italy. Six hundred and seventy-six individuals participated in this quantitative study (Malta: N = 204; Italy N = 472). Results from this study showed that the need for cognitive closure and binding moral foundations mediate the relationship between COVID-19 concern and prejudice against migrants in both countries. When testing the three binding moral foundations (loyalty, authority, and purity), the authority foundation seems to be the most consistent predictor.The implications of the findings contribute to theories about how situational uncertainty caused by COVID-19, together with the need for epistemic certainty and binding morality, contribute to increased prejudiced attitudes against migrants.

The importance of mental health is becoming clearer everyday with 1 in 5 people in Canada and the U.S. experiencing mental illness at some point in their lifetime (CMHA, 2021). The stigma associated with mental health is just as prevalent now as it was fifty years ago, and prevents many barriers, one of the most harmful being the same one feels about accessing the resources they need. (Knaak et al., 2017; Rüsch et al., 2005). Political orientation is just one of the factors that have been attributed to this stigma, with widely varying stigmatizing views depending on an individual’s place on the left-right political spectrum, thought to be connected by an individual’s underlying moral values. This study aims to explore the possible relationship between political orientation, mental health attitudes, and moral foundations using a prediction correlational design. We hope to use this knowledge to add to the existing literature surround mental health stigma, as well as further our understanding of how moral values may underlie stigma and how we can utilize techniques like moral reframing (Feinberg & Willer, 2019) to decrease stigmatization of mental health more successfully.

Setelah Indonesia memasuki era reformasi, aktivisme semakin marak dilakukan oleh berbagai kalangan. Diantara jenis-jenis aktivisme yang berlangsung di Indonesia adalah Aktivisme Digital. Pada penelitian ini, dikaitkan antara perilaku Aktivisme Digital dengan Moral Foundations. Tujuan penelitian ini untuk mengetahui adakah korelasi antara Lima Moral Foundations dengan aktivisme digital pada Mahasiswa di Indonesia. Partisipan pada peqnelitian ini berjumlah 159 orang dengan distribusi partisipan dengan jenis kelamin laki- laki sebanyak 66 orang dan partisipan perempuan sebanyak 92 orang, sedangkan 1 partisipan lainnya memilih untuk tidak menjawab jenis kelaminnya. Rata-rata usia pada penelitian ini adalah 21.11 tahun, dengan simpangan baku 1.8 tahun. Moral Foundations diukur menggunakan skala Moral Foundations Questionnaire yang dikembangkan oleh Graham et al., sedangkan aktivisme digital diukur menggunakan skala Online activism yang disusun oleh Dookhoo. Hasil berdasarkan korelasi Spearman, terdapat korelasi positif pada uji korelasi dimensi moral Fairness, Ingroup, Authority dan Purity pada Skala Moral Foundation Questionnaire, dimensi Harm yang gugur pada saat uji reliabilitas dan validitas.

Does the basic trait Honesty-Humility predict the type of moral concerns people express in language? We explore whether Honesty-Humility relates to the expression of five moral concerns in language—namely, care/harm, justice/fairness, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation—as conceptualized by the Moral Foundations Theory. Using Natural Language Processing, we screened 17,217 (un)ethical justifications—i.e., reasons for behaving (un)ethically—for the presence of the five moral concerns (N = 901). We found that Honesty-Humility related positively to justice/fairness concerns, but it did not relate to care/harm, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation concerns. Our findings thus suggest that justice/fairness concerns might serve as one of the mechanisms relating Honesty-Humility to anti- and prosocial behavior.

This research is the first to examine the effects of moral versus practical pro-attitudinal advocacy in the context of self-persuasion. We validate a novel advocacy paradigm aimed at uncovering why moral advocacy leads to polarization and proselytization. We investigate four distinct possibilities: (1) expression of moral foundational values (harm, fairness, loyalty, authority, purity), (2) reliance on moral systems (deontology and consequentialism), (3) expression of moral outrage, (4) increased confidence in one’s advocacy attempt. In Study 1 (N = 255) we find differences between moral and practical advocacy on the five moral foundations, deontology, and moral outrage. In Study 2 (N = 218) we replicate these differences, but find that only the expression of moral foundations is consequential in predicting attitude polarization. In Study 3 (N = 115) we replicate the effect of moral foundations on proselytization. Our findings suggest that practical compared to moral advocacy may attenuate polarization and proselytization. This carries implications for how advocacy can be re-framed in ways which minimize social conflict.

We use network psychometrics to map a subsection of moral belief systems predicted by moral foundations theory (MFT). This approach conceptualizes moral systems as networks, with moral beliefs represented as nodes connected by direct relations. As such, it advances a novel test of MFT’s claim that liberals and conservatives have different systems of foundational moral values, which we test in three large datasets ( NSample1= 854; NSample2= 679; NSample3= 2,572), from two countries (the United States and New Zealand). Results supported our first hypothesis that liberals’ moral systems show more segregation between individualizing and binding foundations than conservatives. Results showed only weak support for our second hypothesis, that this pattern would be more typical of higher educated than less educated liberals/conservatives. Findings support a systems approach to MFT and show the value of modeling moral belief systems as networks.

Sacred values are moral foundations that may make public and political debates among groups hard to resolve. A taboo trade-off framework offers the opportunity of measuring the inviolability and the "sacralization" of moral foundations. In this study, moral foundations in a taboo trade-off framework were assessed in a convenience sample of Italians (N = 224) using a new measure to assess sacred values, the Omission as a Compromise on Moral Foundations scale (OC-MF). The OC-MF measures the willingness of individuals to omit moral foundations in exchange for money. It was predicted that Italian center and left-wing participants would be less willing to compromise individualizing moral foundations as opposed to binding ones, and that center and right-wing participants would be less willing to compromise on binding moral foundations than left-wing participants. Confirmatory Factor Analyses demonstrated the two-factor structure of the OC-MF: individualizing and binding. As predicted, Repeated Measures Anova showed that political orientation was related with differential adoptions of moral foundations as sacred values, with center and left-wing participants refusing to compromise more on individualizing than on binding moral foundations. Moreover, left-wing participants were more willing to compromise on binding moral foundations than center and right-wing participants. The OC-MF shows the hypothesized differences between Italian political groups and offers a new understanding of moral reasoning. These findings provide opportunities for improving ideological debates concerning sacred values.

We present a survey of Brazilians on their adoption of a set of ethical rules, the moral foundations. The aim of the study is to characterize the profiles of a sample of adults in terms of their reliance on moral foundations, under the assumption that each moral foundation represents an ethical code, considering social variables such as gender, schooling level, and religion. Ethical rules consist in associations of evaluative assessments with systems of practices concerning social relationships, while ethical codes are those rules legitimated by communities' conventions. We administered an adapted version of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire to 936 adults in public places. Results from cluster analysis revealed the existence of two broad response patterns that we interpreted as ethical codes, a liberal ethic that prioritizes the individual, associated with higher educational levels, and a pluralistic code that values both individual and group relations, linked to lower schooling. Brazil's history of inequity and authoritarian relationships explains apparent contradictions in the individualizing pattern, the modernization of the pluralistic code, and their ideological conflict. The discussion focuses on possible interpretations of the identified codes, commenting on the specificity of the study and limitations of usual survey strategies. Resumen El estudio presenta una encuesta con brasileños sobre la adopción de un conjunto de reglas éticas, los fundamentos morales. El objetivo del estudio fue caracterizar los perfiles de una muestra de adultos en cuanto a su dependencia de fundamentos morales, bajo el supuesto de que cada fundamento moral representa un código ético, teniendo en cuenta variables sociales como género, nivel de escolaridad y religión. Las reglas éticas son asociaciones de evaluaciones valorativas con sistemas de prácticas concernientes a las relaciones sociales, mientras que los códigos éticos son reglas legitimadas por las comunidades mediante convenciones. Se administró una versión adaptada del Cuestionario de Fundamentos Morales a 936 adultos en lugares públicos. Los resultados del análisis de conglomerados revelaron la existencia de dos patrones de respuesta amplios que interpretamos como códigos éticos, una ética liberal que prioriza al individuo, asociada a niveles educativos superiores, y un código pluralista que valora las relaciones tanto individuales como grupales, vinculada a la escolaridad inferior. La historia de desigualdad y relaciones autoritarias de Brasil explica las aparentes contradicciones en el patrón individualizador, la modernización del código pluralista y su conflicto ideológico. La discusión se centra en las posibles interpretaciones de los códigos identificados, comentando la especificidad del estudio y las limitaciones de las estrategias habituales de encuesta. Resumo Apresentamos uma enquete feita com brasileiros sobre a adoção de um conjunto de normas éticas, os fundamentos morais. O objetivo do estudo é caracterizar o perfil de uma amostra de adultos quanto à dependência de fundamentos morais, partindo do pressuposto de que cada fundamento moral representa um código ético, levando em consideração variáveis sociais como gênero, escolaridade e religião. As regras éticas consistem em associações de avaliações avaliativas com sistemas de práticas relativas às relações sociais, enquanto os códigos éticos são essas regras legitimadas pelas comunidades por meio de convenções. Administramos uma versão adaptada do Questionário de Fundamentos Morais a 936 adultos em locais públicos. Os resultados da análise de cluster revelaram a existência de dois padrões de resposta amplos que interpretamos como códigos éticos, uma ética liberal que prioriza o indivíduo, associada a níveis de escolaridade mais elevados, e um código pluralista que valoriza as relações individuais e grupais, vinculadas a baixos níveis de escolaridade. A história da desigualdade e das relações autoritárias no Brasil explica as aparentes contradições no padrão individualizante, a modernização do código pluralista e seu conflito ideológico. A discussão centra-se nas possíveis interpretações dos códigos identificados, comentando sobre a especificidade do estudo e as limitações das estratégias habituais de inquérito.

Theories of moralization argue that moral relevance varies due to inter-individual differences, domain differences, or a mix of both. Predictors associated with these sources of variation have been studied in isolation to assess their unique contribution to moralization. Across three studies (N-Study1 = 376; N-Study2a = 621; N-Study2b = 589), assessing attitudes towards new big data technologies, we found that moralization is best explained by theories focusing on inter-individual variation (similar to 29%) and intra-individual variation across technology domains (similar to 49%), and less by theories focusing on differences between technology domains (similar to 6%). We simultaneously examined 15 inter-individual and 16 intra-individual predictors that potentially explain this variation. Predictors directly relevant to the technologies (e.g., justice concerns), cognitive styles (e.g., faith in intuition), and emotional reactions (e.g., anger) best explain variation in moral relevance. Accordingly, scholars should simultaneously adopt and adapt moralization theories related to inter-individual and intra-individual differences across domains rather than in isolation.

Objective Search for socio-psychological antecedents for the individual’s belief in conspiracy theories of the origin of the pandemic Revealing the dynamics of Internet users’ attitudes to the coronavirus pandemic in March-early June 2020 Background As part of the study of the psychological mechanisms of the impact of the pandemic on the individual and society, an increasingly urgent task is to clarify the socio-psychological prerequisites of belief in conspiracy theories of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the relationship between attitudes towards the pandemic and the involvement of the individual in the use of social media Study design The paper presents the results of two online surveys conducted in March-April and May-June 2020 to study the dynamics of Russians’ belief in conspiracy theories of the origin of the CO-VID-19, taking into account involvement in social media and gender differences Participants The first study involved 668 people (78 2% women) aged 17 to 80 years (M=30;SD=12 7);the second survey involved 986 people (56 9% — men) aged 18 to 76 years (M=36 63;SD=10 2) The survey geography covered various regions of Russia Measurements The basic tool in both studies was developed by T A Nestik questionnaire “Attitude towards the epidemiological threat” The first study additionally measured the social axioms (SAS), moral foundations (MFQ), belief in the justice of the world and trust in social institutions The second study additionally measured involvement in social media communications Results The 1st study found a connection between conspiracy beliefs and belief in a just world, low self-efficacy, moral foundations of ingroup/loyalty and authority/respect, low institutional trust, and social cynicism In the 2nd study, it was shown that, compared to March-April, the level of belief of social media users in conspiracy theories of the origin of the pandemic, the severity of distrust in the health care system and skepticism about vaccinations significantly increased;both the fear of infection and the controllability of the threat have become less, but fears of a recurrence of epidemics have increased It is shown that involvement in social media increases anxiety about the consequences of the coronavirus crisis, which in turn intensifies the search for conspiracy explanations of pandemic Conclusions Low social trust and the experience of an uncontrollable threat increase the susceptibility of social media users to belief in conspiracy theories of the origin of the pandemic © 2020 Moscow State University of Psychology and Education All right reserved

How can firms mitigate the impact of moral violations on consumer evaluations? This question has pervaded the business ethics literature. Though prior research has identified decoupling as a moral reasoning strategy where consumers separate moral judgments from evaluations (avoiding moral compromise and dissonance), it is unclear what motivates individuals to decouple. It is the objective of this research to explore regulatory focus theory (i.e., a framework examining consumer mindsets as prevention or promotion orientated) as a motivating factor for moral decoupling. Three experiments are undertaken. Study one demonstrates that with a prevention mindset (e.g., analytical thinking) as opposed to promotion mindset (e.g., feeling-based thinking), moral decoupling can be achieved. Specifically, those in a prevention mindset report more favorable evaluations when information about a violation explicitly lowers (vs. does not lower) consequences of moral violations. However, when the violation is related to the business functionality of the brand, those in a prevention (vs. promotion) mindset report less favorable evaluations, except when consequences are lowered. This indicates an inability to decouple (studies 2–3), and results in negative emotions (study 3). The research shows that inability to decouple for those in a prevention mindset leads to negative emotions, lowering evaluations. These results contribute to the moral reasoning literature by linking regulatory focus to decoupling strategies. Further, the research bridges literature on norm activation, moral foundation, regulatory focus, and moral decoupling to reconcile theoretical differences in judgment styles. Implications for businesses and brands are discussed.

One of the most controversial elements of political tolerance concerns support for hate speech. We argue that there are two factors that can reduce tolerance for hate speech: 1) moral foundations and 2) party cues. U.S. citizens’ tolerance of hate speech will be reduced when it is framed as a violation of a specific moral foundation, opposed by a political party, or when the morality violation is utilized by party elites. Using two survey experiments, we manipulated the target of hate speech (i.e. Muslims or the American flag), whether the speech violated a moral foundation (i.e. harm or loyalty), and which political party supported or opposed the hate speech in question. For flag burning, moral frames and party cues on their own reduced U.S. citizens’ tolerance relative to a non-political control, while moral frames and party cues were successful in reducing tolerance of anti-Muslim speech compared to a free speech appeal. Partisans were generally responsive to cues from the in-party. We also found instances of moral repackaging, where morally incongruent appeals from the in-party reduced tolerance of flag burning among Democrats. Among Republicans, harm morality decreased tolerance of anti-Muslim speech when invoked by the in-party, but increased tolerance when used by the out-party – an indication of the power of party cues to repackage moral arguments and to trigger backlash. These results provide a better understanding of what factors can affect tolerance for hate speech, providing political leaders and social justice advocates with a roadmap to alleviate this problem.

Why do people have anti-immigrant attitudes? We proposed that individuals’ need for cognitive closure—an epistemic motivation associated with an aversion to change in established environments—is predictive of a dislike of immigrants through increased binding to powerful groups. In four studies, collected in both Italy (Study 1) and the United States (Studies 2–4), we found that there were effects of need for cognitive closure on anti-immigrant attitudes, as well as indirect effects through binding. These results were significant controlling for participants’ political orientation (Studies 2–4), when either dispositional measure (Studies 1–3) or an experimental induction (Study 4) of need for cognitive closure was used, and when both general attitudes toward immigrants (Studies 1, 2, 4) and attitudes toward immigrants’ economic impact (Studies 3 and 4) were assessed.

Liberals and conservatives are known to differ in the extent to which they prioritize moral concerns about harm, justice, and particularly, in-group loyalty. Accordingly, here we evaluate ideological differences in the context of an important societal issue: sexual harassment. In a national US sample (N = 1000) participants were asked how big of a problem sexual harassment is in the United States and, following random assignment to one of two conditions, whether they think a prominent liberal (Harvey Weinstein, n = 500) or conservative (Bill O'Reilly, n = 500) should go to jail following sexual harassment accusations. Main results reveal two clear findings; 1) conservatives are generally less concerned about sexual harassment in society and 2) while the probability of condemning Weinstein or O'Reilly was about equal among liberals, conservatives were significantly and substantially more likely to condemn the out-group (Weinstein) than they were to condemn their own in-group (O'Reilly). These findings uncover an important ideological asymmetry in judgments about sexual harassment.

What explains the content and structure of human morality? The theory of Morality-as-Cooperation (MAC) argues that morality is a collection of biological and cultural solutions to the problems of cooperation recurrent in human social life. Using evolutionary biology and nonzerosum game theory, MAC identifies an initial list of seven distinct types of cooperation (helping kin, helping group, reciprocating, hawkish signalling, dove-ish signalling, dividing disputed resources, and recognising prior possession), and predicts that each will be considered morally relevant, and each will give rise to a distinct moral domain. Here we test MAC’s predictions by developing a new self-report measure of moral values, the Morality-as-Cooperation Questionnaire (MAC-Q; Study 1: N=1,392) and comparing its psychometric properties to those of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Study 2: N=1,042; Study 3: N=469; Study 4: N=137). The results support MAC’s seven-factor model of morality (encompassing family values, group loyalty, reciprocity, heroism, deference, fairness and property rights). The results do not support MFT’s five-factor model. Thus the MAC-Q emerges as the best available map of morality; and MAC emerges as the best available compass to guide further exploration of the moral landscape.

People often justify their moral opinions by referring to larger moral concerns (e. g., “It is unfair if homosexuals are not allowed to marry!” vs. “Letting homosexuals marry is against our traditions!”). Is there a general agreement about what concerns apply to different moral opinions? We used surveys in the United States and the United Kingdom to measure the perceived applicability of eight concerns (harm, violence, fairness, liberty, authority, ingroup, purity, and governmental overreach) to a wide range of moral opinions. Within countries, argument applicability scores were largely similar whether they were calculated among women or men, among young or old, among liberals or conservatives, or among people with or without higher education. Thus, the applicability of a given moral concern to a specific opinion can be viewed as an objective quality of the opinion, largely independent of the population in which it is measured. Finally, we used similar surveys in Israel and Brazil to establish that this independence of populations also extended to populations in different countries. However, the extent to which this holds across cultures beyond those included in the current study is still an open question.

Prior work has suggested that existential threats in the form of terror attacks may shift liberals’ reliance on moral foundations to more resemble those of conservatives. We therefore hypothesized that endorsement of these moral foundations would have increased when the COVID-19 epidemic became a salient threat. To examine this hypothesis we conducted a longitudinal study with 237 American participants across the liberal-conservative spectrum, in which their endorsement of various moral foundations were measured before and after the advent of the pandemic. We did not find evidence of any systematic change in the endorsement of any moral foundation, neither in general nor specifically among liberals or specifically among those who perceived the greatest threat from COVID-19. We conclude that the threat from the pandemic does not seem to have had any substantial effect on the moral foundations that people rely on. We discuss how this finding relates to other longitudinal studies of the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on measures related to conservatism.

The objective of this study is to explore and to verify the utility of the five moral foundations (care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity) to differentiate between two understudied groups, namely, young offenders who use violence against their parents or dating partners, as well as to predict the extent to which these young people justify violence and perceive themselves as aggressive. Although both types of violence imply, by definition, harming someone (low care) and adopting a position of authority (high authority), we hypothesize a very different role for at least these two moral foundations. Our results support this idea and show a much lower regard for the five moral foundations, including care and authority, in the child-to-parent violence group (CPV; N = 65) than in the dating violence group (DV; N = 69). Additionally, the authority foundation was able to increase the effectiveness of correctly classifying the participants in one group or the other by 29%. Finally, care and authority, along with fairness, served to predict justification of violence and self-perceived aggressiveness. The moral foundations approach provides preliminary evidence to better understand two specific types of youth violence and extract preventive educational and treatment strategies.

In the present research, we examined whether emotional responses determine price fairness perceptions and resulting behaviours. The relationships among negative emotional response, price fairness perception, self- protective behaviour, and negative word-of- mouth were hypothesized and empirically investigated. Furthermore, the moderating role of moral foundation was addressed and tested. Results indicated that there is a strong relationship between negative emotions and price fairness perceptions. While the latter had no significant effect on self-protective behaviour, it had a noticeable one on negative word-of-mouth. There was also a significant positive relationship between the two types of behaviours, where self- protective behaviour positively influenced negative word-of-mouth. Furthermore, the relationship between price fairness and negative word-of-mouth was significantly greater among respondents who scored higher on the moral foundation scale. Such results indicate that behaviour of those with a higher moral foundation appears to rely more on price fairness, while the behaviour of the second group (respondents with lower moral foundation scores) is determined primarily by emotional response. Our research contributes to the knowledge of consumer behaviour by providing an insight into different customer reactions regarding what they perceive to be unfair prices.

Moral foundations research suggests that liberals care about moral values related to individual rights such as harm and fairness, while conservatives care about those foundations in addition to caring more about group rights such as loyalty, authority, and purity. However, the question remains about how conservatives and liberals differ in relation to group-level moral principles. We used two versions of the moral foundations questionnaire with the target group being either abstract or specific ingroups or outgroups. Across three studies, we observed that liberals showed more endorsement of Individualizing foundations (Harm and Fairness foundations) with an outgroup target, while conservatives showed more endorsement of Binding foundations (Loyalty, Authority, and Purity foundations) with an ingroup target. This general pattern was found when the framed, target-group was abstract (i.e., ‘ingroups’ and ‘outgroups’ in Study 1) and when target groups were specified about a general British-ingroup and an immigrant-outgroup (Studies 2 and 3). In Studies 2 and 3, both Individualizing-Ingroup Preference and Binding-Ingroup Preference scores predicted more Attitude Bias and more Negative Attitude Bias toward immigrants (Studies 2 and 3), more Implicit Bias (Study 3), and more Perceived Threat from immigrants (Studies 2 and 3). We also demonstrated that increasing liberalism was associated with less Attitude Bias and less Negative Bias toward immigrants (Studies 2 and 3), less Implicit Bias (Study 3), and less Perceived Threat from immigrants (Studies 2 and 3). Outgroup-individualizing foundations and Ingroup-Binding foundations showed different patterns of mediation of these effects.

Objective The present research examines the link between moral foundations (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt, 2007) and prosociality. Adopting a person × situation interaction perspective, we suggest that individualizers (whose morality is driven by considerations of harm and justice) act in accordance with their moral values particularly in situations that contain cues of neediness. Method In Study 1, we measured participants' visual attention toward varying degrees of suffering (within-participants). In Studies 2 and 3 participants were exposed to strong need or not (between-participants) and their moral regard and prosocial intent was assessed. Results In the face of visual cues of suffering (Study 1) or the presence of strong need (Studies 2 and 3), individualizers reacted with increased attention toward suffering, greater moral responsibility, and stronger prosocial intent. Individuals high on the binding foundations (whose morality is driven by ingroup loyalty, authority, and purity), however, avoided suffering irrespective of its degree (Study 1), did not oblige themselves with moral responsibility (Study 2), and reported reduced prosocial intent in reaction to need (Study 3). Conclusion An interactionist account of foundation-based prosociality demonstrates that individualizers are likely to help when helping might be perceived as futile, however this potential needs to be activated.

Yılmaz, Onurcan (Dogus Author) Moral foundations theory (MFT), while inspiring much empirical work, has been the target of both methodological and theoretical criticism. One important criticism of MFT is that, in its attempt to explain variability in political ideology, it only repackages the core motives (resistance to change and opposition to equality) and does not actually provide additional explanatory potential. Indeed, some previous studies show that moral foundations do not explain variability in ideology beyond other relevant variables, and that the relation between moral foundations and political orientation is mediated by other ideological variables. In the present research, we examined whether moral foundations can explain variability beyond the core motives in samples from Turkey and the United States. Contrary to some previous findings, we found that moral foundations explain unique variance in general, social, and economic conservatism. These findings suggest that the moral foundations proposed by MFT cannot be reduced to other variables that have been used in the literature to measure ideological proclivities.

The present study had three goals: to construct a relevant questionnaire of economic attitudes, to examine the role of socio-demographic variables in explaining the economic attitudes as measured by that questionnaire, and to check whether moral foundations, as a psychological construct, can contribute to understanding the economic attitudes beyond socio-demographic variables. The results indicated that the economic attitudes were better explained by two factors instead of one: the Role of the State in the Economy (ROSE) and the Problems with the Current Economic System (PCES). Both socio- demographic variables and moral foundations explained significant amounts of the variance in the results on the two subscales. Regarding the ROSE subscale, socio- demographic variables explained 25 percent, while moral foundations explained the additional 21 percent of the variance, resulting in this model explaining 46 percent of the variance in the ROSE results. Regarding the PCES subscale, the socio- demographic variables explained 20 percent of the variance, and moral foundations added another 10 percent resulting in 30 percent of the variance on PCES results being explained by this model. The results speak in favor of including the psychological variables in the studies of economic attitudes and behaviors, and indicate that economic concerns are not only economic in their nature, but also moral.

Based on the view of morality proposed by the Moral Foundations Theory, this paper investigates whether voting intention is associated with moral foundation endorsement in not perfectly bipolar electoral contexts. Three studies carried out in Italy from 2010 to 2013, showed that controlling for ideological orientation, moral foundation endorsement is associated with voting intention. In Study 1 and 3, in fictitious and real national elections, intention to vote for right-wing political groups rather than for left-wing rivals was associated with Sanctity, confirming previous results obtained in the U.S. Furthermore, as a function of the specific competing political groups in each of the examined contexts other moral foundations predicted voting intention. In Study 1, Care and Authority predicted voting intention for the major political groups rather than for an autonomist party that aimed at decreasing central government’s fiscal power in favor of fiscal regional autonomy. In Study 3, Loyalty predicted the intention to vote for the major parliamentarian parties rather than for a movement that aimed at capturing disaffection towards traditional politics. In Study 2, at real regional elections, Loyalty predicted voting intention for the incumbent right-wing governor rather than for the challengers and Fairness predicted voting intention for left-wing extra-parliamentarian political groups rather than for the major left-wing party. Thus multiple moral concerns can be associated with voting intention. In fragmented and unstable electoral contexts, at each election the context of the competing political groups may elicit specific moral concerns that can contribute to affect voting intention beyond ideological orientation.

In the present research, we examined whether individual differences in basic moral concerns might be related to a greater endorsement of conspiracy theories. Building on the notion that conspiracy theories often deal with super-individual relevant events in which a group perspective is central, we proposed that individual differences in moral concerns pertaining to group- and community-concerns (i.e., binding moral foundations) rather than to individual well-being (i.e., individualising moral foundations) would be positively associated with conspiracy beliefs. We further hypothesised that such relations would be totally mediated by beliefs in a dangerous world and by embracing moral absolutism. We found support for these predictions in two community samples (Ns: 319; 514). Theoretical implications were discussed.

Claims of universality for Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) require extensive cross-cultural validation. The present study aims to (1) develop Turkish versions of three instruments used to research MFT (MFQ, MFQL, MSQ); (2) assess the psychometric properties of the Turkish instruments; (3) test the assumptions of the theory against findings from the instruments in Turkish culture. Three independently translated versions of the MFQ were administered to three samples totaling 1432 respondents. Results were consistent across samples. Internal reliability was satisfactory. CFA indicated a best fit for a 5-factor solution despite low fit indices and high error coefficients. EFA yielded a 3-factor solution, which did not replicate the 2-factor individualizing and binding factors found in U.S. samples. CFA and EFA with the MSQ produced 2-factor solutions which also did not align with the individualizing-binding dichotomy. Meaningful relations between the moral foundations and scores on political orientation and religiosity supported the validity of the measures in Turkish culture. Middle East Technical UniversityMiddle East Technical University [BAP-07-03-2014-015] Findings related to Sample 3 were funded by Middle East Technical University (grant number: BAP-07-03-2014-015).