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The study of moral judgements often centres on moral dilemmas in which options consistent with deontological perspectives (that is, emphasizing rules, individual rights and duties) are in conflict with options consistent with utilitarian judgements (that is, following the greater good based on consequences). Greene et al. (2009) showed that psychological and situational factors (for example, the intent of the agent or the presence of physical contact between the agent and the victim) can play an important role in moral dilemma judgements (for example, the trolley problem). Our knowledge is limited concerning both the universality of these effects outside the United States and the impact of culture on the situational and psychological factors affecting moral judgements. Thus, we empirically tested the universality of the effects of intent and personal force on moral dilemma judgements by replicating the experiments of Greene et al. in 45 countries from all inhabited continents. We found that personal force and its interaction with intention exert influence on moral judgements in the US and Western cultural clusters, replicating and expanding the original findings. Moreover, the personal force effect was present in all cultural clusters, suggesting it is culturally universal. The evidence for the cultural universality of the interaction effect was inconclusive in the Eastern and Southern cultural clusters (depending on exclusion criteria). We found no strong association between collectivism/individualism and moral dilemma judgements. Including participants from 45 countries, Bago et al. find that the situational factors that affect moral reasoning are shared across countries, with diminished observed cultural variation., Comunidad de Madrid [2016-T1/SOC-1395, 2020-5A/SOC-19723]; AEI [PSI2017-85159-P]; UE/FEDER; National Science Centre, Poland [2017/01/X/HS6/01332, 2015/19/D/HS6/00641, 2019/35/B/HS6/00528]; Aarhus University Research Foundation (AUFF) [AUFF-E-2019-9-4]; ANR [ANR-17-EURE-0010]; ANR Labex IAST; Australian Research Council [DP180102384]; CAPES [88887.364180/2019-00]; Carlsberg Foundation [CF16-0444]; Independent Research Fund Denmark [7024-00057B]; Germany's Excellence Strategy [EXC 2126/1-390838866]; FONDECYT, CONICYT [11190980]; German Research Foundation [FOR-2150, LA 3566/1-2]; JSPS [18K03010]; JSPS KAKENHI [16H03079, 17H00875, 18K12015, 20H04581, 17H06342, 20K03479, 20KK0054, 20J21976]; Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) [31530032]; Key Technological Projects of Guangdong Province [2018B030335001]; National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship [DGE-1839285]; Polish National Science Center; DFG Beethoven [2016/23/G/HS6/01775]; Portuguese National Foundation for Science and Technology [SFRH/BD/126304/2016, UID/PSI/03125/2019]; PRIN 2017 (Italian Ministry of Education and Research) [20178293XT]; PSA 006 BRA 008 Data Collection in Support of PSADM 001 Measurement Invariance Project; Foundation for Polish Science (START); National Science Centre [2020/36/T/HS6/00256, 2019/33/N/HS6/00054]; Slovak Research and Development Agency [APVV-18-0140, APVV-17-0418, PRIMUS/20/HUM/009, APVV-17-0596]; Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada [950-224884]; Swedish Research Council [2016-06793]; Project of Philosophy and Social Science Research in Colleges and Universities in Jiangsu Province [2020SJA0017], M.A. Vadillo was supported by 2016-T1/SOC-1395 and 2020-5A/SOC-19723 from Comunidad de Madrid, PSI2017-85159-P from AEI and UE/FEDER. M.P.-C. was supported by 2017/01/X/HS6/01332 from the National Science Centre, Poland. P.M. was supported by Aarhus University Research Foundation (AUFF), starting grant: AUFF-E-2019-9-4. B. Bago was supported by ANR grant ANR-17-EURE-0010 (Investissements d'Avenir programme) and ANR Labex IAST. R.M.R. was supported by the Australian Research Council (DP180102384). N.B.D. was supported by CAPES grant no. 88887.364180/2019-00. C.S., K.A.. and I. Zettler were supported by the Carlsberg Foundation (CF16-0444) and the Independent Research Fund Denmark (7024-00057B). J.L. was supported by EXC 2126/1-390838866 under Germany's Excellence Strategy. K.B. was supported by the following grants from the National Science Centre, Poland: (1) while working on the data collection, no. 2015/19/D/HS6/00641, (2) while working on the final version of the paper, no. 2019/35/B/HS6/00528. A.W. was supported by FONDECYT 11190980, CONICYT. A. Fleischmann was supported by the German Research Foundation (research unit grant FOR-2150, LA 3566/1-2). H.Y. was supported by JSPS grant 18K03010. Y.Y. was supported by JSPS KAKENHI (16H03079, 17H00875, 18K12015 and 20H04581). K.Q. was supported by JSPS KAKENHI (17H06342, 20K03479 and 20KK0054). A. Ikeda was supported by JSPS KAKENHI (20J21976). K.M.K. was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) grant no. 31530032 and Key Technological Projects of Guangdong Province grant no. 2018B030335001. J.B.C. was supported by National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship grant no. DGE-1839285. M. Parzuchowski, K. Rybus and N.M.S. were supported by Polish National Science Center and DFG Beethoven grant 2016/23/G/HS6/01775. A.C.S. was supported by Portuguese National Foundation for Science and Technology grant no. SFRH/BD/126304/2016. L. Boncinelli was supported by PRIN 2017 grant no. 20178293XT (Italian Ministry of Education and Research). M.F.F.R. was supported by PSA 006 BRA 008 Data Collection in Support of PSADM 001 Measurement Invariance Project. M. Misiak was supported by a scholarship from the Foundation for Polish Science (START) and by a scholarship from the National Science Centre (2020/36/T/HS6/00256). P.B. was supported by Slovak Research and Development Agency project no. APVV-18-0140. M.A. was supported by Slovak Research and Development Agency project no. APVV-17-0418 and project PRIMUS/20/HUM/009. A. Findor and M.H. were supported by the Slovak Research and Development Agency under contract no. APVV-17-0596. T.G. was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (no. 950-224884). P.P. was supported by the Swedish Research Council (2016-06793). Y.L. was supported by The Project of Philosophy and Social Science Research in Colleges and Universities in Jiangsu Province (grant no. 2020SJA0017). M. Kowal was supported by a scholarship from the National Science Centre (2019/33/N/HS6/00054). P.A. was supported by UID/PSI/03125/2019 from the Portuguese National Foundation for Science and Technology. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish or preparation of the manuscript.

Previous research has shown that political attitudes are highly heritable, but the proximal physiological mechanisms that shape ideology remain largely unknown. Based on work suggesting possible ideological differences in genes related to low-level sensory processing, we predicted that taste (i.e., gustatory) sensitivity would be associated with political ideology. In 4 studies (combined N = 1,639) we test this hypothesis and find robust support for this association. In Studies 1-3, we find that sensitivity to the chemicals PROP and PTC-2 well established measures of taste sensitivity-are associated with greater political conservatism. In Study 4, we find that fungiform papilla density, a proxy for taste bud density, also predicts greater conservatism, and that this association is partially statistically mediated by disgust sensitivity. This work suggests that low-level physiological differences in sensory processing may shape an individual's political attitudes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Perceived intent is a pivotal factor in moral judgement: intentional moral violations are considered more morally wrong than accidental ones. However, a body of recent research argues that intent is less important for moral judgements of impure acts – that it, those acts that are condemned because they elicit disgust. But the literature supporting this claim is limited in multiple ways. We conducted a new test of the hypothesis that condemnation of purity violations operates independently from intent. In Study 1, participants judged the wrongness of moral violations that were either intentional or unintentional and were either harmful (e.g., stealing) or impure (e.g., public defecation). Results revealed a large effect of intent on moral wrongness ratings that did not vary across harmful and disgusting scenarios. In Study 2, a registered report, participants judged the wrongness of disgust-eliciting moral violations that were either mundane and dyadic (e.g., serving contaminated food) or abnormal and self-directed (e.g., consuming urine). Results revealed a large effect of intent on moral wrongness judgements that did not vary across mundane and abnormal scenarios. Findings challenge the claim that moral judgements about purity violations rely upon unique psychological mechanisms that are insensitive to information about the wrongdoer's mental state.

Data availability statement: The data associated with this research are available via the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/bax8r/). Copyright © The Author(s) 2022. Previous work has reported a relation between pathogen-avoidance motivations and prejudice toward various social groups, including gay men and lesbian women. It is currently unknown whether this association is present across cultures, or specific to North America. Analyses of survey data from adult heterosexuals (N = 11,200) from 31 countries showed a small relation between pathogen disgust sensitivity (an individual-difference measure of pathogen-avoidance motivations) and measures of antigay attitudes. Analyses also showed that pathogen disgust sensitivity relates not only to antipathy toward gay men and lesbians, but also to negativity toward other groups, in particular those associated with violations of traditional sexual norms (e.g., prostitutes). These results suggest that the association between pathogen-avoidance motivations and antigay attitudes is relatively stable across cultures and is a manifestation of a more general relation between pathogen-avoidance motivations and prejudice towards groups associated with sexual norm violations. J.R.C. acknowledges funding from the French National Research Agency (ANR) under Grant ANR-17-EURE-0010 (Investissements d’Avenir program). J.M.T. was supported by Horizon 2020 European Research Council Grant StG-2015 680002-HBIS.

Correction to: Nature Human Behaviour https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-022-01319-5, published online 14 April 2022.

A large literature demonstrates that moral convictions guide many of our thoughts, behaviors, and social interactions. Yet, we know little about how these moral convictions come to exist. In the present research we explore moralization—the process by which something that was morally neutral takes on moral properties—examining what factors facilitate and deter it. In 3 longitudinal studies participants were presented with morally evocative stimuli about why eating meat should be viewed as a moral issue. Study 1 tracked students over a semester as they took a university course that highlighted the suffering animals endure because of human meat consumption. In Studies 2 and 3 participants took part in a mini-course we developed which presented evocative videos aimed at inducing moralization. In all 3 studies, we assessed participants’ beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and cognitions at multiple time points to track moral changes and potential factors responsible for such changes. A variety of factors, both cognitive and affective, predicted participants’ moralization or lack thereof. Model testing further pointed to two primary conduits of moralization: the experience of moral emotions (e.g., disgust, guilt) felt when contemplating the issue, and moral piggybacking (connecting the issue at hand with one’s existing fundamental moral principles). Moreover, we found individual differences, such as how much one holds their morality as central to their identity, also predicted the moralization process. We discuss the broad theoretical and applied implications of our results. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)

There is widespread agreement among scientists that genetically modified foods are safe to consume1,2 and have the potential to provide substantial benefits to humankind3. However, many people still harbour concerns about them or oppose their use4,5. In a nationally representative sample of US adults, we find that as extremity of opposition to and concern about genetically modified foods increases, objective knowledge about science and genetics decreases, but perceived understanding of genetically modified foods increases. Extreme opponents know the least, but think they know the most. Moreover, the relationship between self-assessed and objective knowledge shifts from positive to negative at high levels of opposition. Similar results were obtained in a parallel study with representative samples from the United States, France and Germany, and in a study testing attitudes about a medical application of genetic engineering technology (gene therapy). This pattern did not emerge, however, for attitudes and beliefs about climate change.

We conducted preregistered replications of 28 classic and contemporary published findings, with protocols that were peer reviewed in advance, to examine variation in effect magnitudes across samples and settings. Each protocol was administered to approximately half of 125 samples that comprised 15,305 participants from 36 countries and territories. Using the conventional criterion of statistical significance (p < .05), we found that 15 (54%) of the replications provided evidence of a statistically significant effect in the same direction as the original finding. With a strict significance criterion (p < .0001), 14 (50%) of the replications still provided such evidence, a reflection of the extremely highpowered design. Seven (25%) of the replications yielded effect sizes larger than the original ones, and 21 (75%) yielded effect sizes smaller than the original ones. The median comparable Cohen’s ds were 0.60 for the original findings and 0.15 for the replications. The effect sizes were small (< 0.20) in 16 of the replications (57%), and 9 effects (32%) were in the direction opposite the direction of the original effect. Across settings, the Q statistic indicated significant heterogeneity in 11 (39%) of the replication effects, and most of those were among the findings with the largest overall effect sizes; only 1 effect that was near zero in the aggregate showed significant heterogeneity according to this measure. Only 1 effect had a tau value greater than .20, an indication of moderate heterogeneity. Eight others had tau values near or slightly above .10, an indication of slight heterogeneity. Moderation tests indicated that very little heterogeneity was attributable to the order in which the tasks were performed or whether the tasks were administered in lab versus online. Exploratory comparisons revealed little heterogeneity between Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) cultures and less WEIRD cultures (i.e., cultures with relatively high and low WEIRDness scores, respectively). Cumulatively, variability in the observed effect sizes was attributable more to the effect being studied than to the sample or setting in which it was studied. UCR::Vicerrectoría de Investigación::Unidades de Investigación::Ciencias Sociales::Instituto de Investigaciones Psicológicas (IIP)

The emotion of disgust has been linked to more conservative social attitudes and to self-placement on the left–right political spectrum. This relationship seems to be robust and general: It has been observed by multiple labs, using diverse methods and measures, in a variety of countries and cultures. However, why disgust should be associated with social and political attitudes is still an open question. We first review the evidence for a link between disgust and political attitudes and then outline competing accounts of why there should be a relationship between the two in the first place.

Previous evidence linking disease threat and social attitudes suggests that a highly salient society-wide pathogen threat should lead to more negative attitudes toward gay men and lesbians. Using a sample of 248,922 Americans recruited via the Project Implicit website, we tested whether implicit attitudes toward gay men and lesbians shifted as a result of the 2014 Ebola virus outbreak. Regression discontinuity analyses, but not t-tests, showed evidence of a small shift in implicit (but not explicit) attitudes at the height of public concern over Ebola. These results could be interpreted as providing partial support for the effects of naturally occurring pathogen threats on social attitudes. Alternatively, given the large size of our sample, the mixed evidence and small effects may reflect a boundary condition for the operation of the behavioral immune system.

Two recent experiments found evidence for what we term the social category label (SCL) effect-that the relationship between right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and prejudice against gay men and lesbians can be reduced or even eliminated when the target group is labeled "gay men and lesbians" rather than "homosexuals" (Rios, 2013). Although this appears a promising approach to reduce self-reported sexual prejudice, with both theoretical implications for the meaning of RWA itself and practical implications for question wording for assessing these attitudes, there are several reasons to further examine these findings, including (a) inconsistencies with extant evidence, (b) small sample sizes in the original 2 experiments, and (c) concerns with the RWA measures used in the 2 experiments. We tested the SCL hypothesis with a nationally representative sample (Study 1) and close and conceptual replications of Rios' (2013) 2 studies (Studies 2-5) using multiple measures of RWA and prejudice. Across 23 tests of the SCL hypothesis, we obtained 1 statistically significant and 1 marginally significant effect consistent with the hypothesis, 2 significant effects opposite the hypothesis, and 19 nonsignificant effects. A meta-analysis of evidence reported here and in Rios (2013) indicates that RWA strongly predicts antigay prejudice, with no significant variation by label. This confirms the typically robust association between RWA and antigay prejudice and confirms that the SCL effect is not robust. We discuss potential limitations of these studies, theoretical, methodological, and practical implications for our failures to replicate the original SCL studies, and future directions for examining social category label effects. (PsycINFO Database Record

Multiple recent studies report that measures of pathogen avoidance (e.g., disgust sensitivity) correlate with political ideology. This relationship has been interpreted as suggesting that certain political views (specifically, those views that are categorized as socially conservative) function to mitigate the pathogen threats posed either by intergroup interactions or by departures from traditional societal norms, which sometimes evolve culturally for anti-pathogen functions. We propose and test the alternative hypothesis that pathogen avoidance relates to conservatism indirectly via sexual strategies (e.g., relatively monogamous versus relatively promiscuous). Specifically, we argue that individuals who are more invested in avoiding pathogens follow a more monogamous mating strategy to mitigate against pathogens transmitted during sexual contact, and individuals following a more monogamous mating strategy adopt socially conservative political ideologies to support their reproductive interests. Results from three studies ( N 's=819, 238, and 248) using multiple measures of pathogen avoidance, sexual strategies, and ideology support this account, with sexual strategies fully mediating the relationship between measures of pathogen avoidance and conservatism in each study.

Liberals and conservatives both express prejudice toward ideologically dissimilar others (Brandt et al., 2014). Previous work on ideological prejudice did not take advantage of evidence showing that ideology is multidimensional, with social and economic ideologies representing related but separable belief systems. In 5 studies (total N = 4912), we test 3 competing hypotheses of a multidimensional account of ideological prejudice. The dimension-specific symmetry hypothesis predicts that social and economic ideologies differentially predict prejudice against targets who are perceived to vary on the social and economic political dimensions, respectively. The social primacy hypothesis predicts that such ideological worldview conflict is experienced more strongly along the social than economic dimension. The social-specific asymmetry hypothesis predicts that social conservatives will be more prejudiced than social liberals, with no specific hypotheses for the economic dimension. Using multiple target groups, multiple prejudice measures (e.g., global evaluations, behavior), and multiple social and economic ideology measures (self-placement, issue positions), we found relatively consistent support for the dimension-specific symmetry and social primacy hypotheses, and no support for the social-specific asymmetry hypothesis. These results suggest that worldview conflict and negative intergroup attitudes and behaviors are dimension-specific, but that the social dimension appears to inspire more political conflict than the economic dimension. (PsycINFO Database Record

Individual differences in disgust sensitivity have been linked to social attitudes and ideology, but the generalizability of this effect and the nature of the political issues implicated remain unclear. In two studies using large Dutch samples, we find that disgust sensitivity predicts political attitudes for issues in several domains related to physical/spiritual purity and pathogen risk. Sensitivity to disgust was significantly associated with attitudes for a general ‘physical and spiritual purity’ factor, as well as specific issue factors regarding sex and sexual minorities, immigration, and foreign outgroups. Additionally, disgust sensitivity was associated with greater likelihood of voting for the socially conservative “Freedom Party” (Partij Voor de Vrijheid). These results suggest that the tendency to experience disgust influences a specific subset of social and political attitudes across cultures. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Previous research has linked disgust sensitivity to negative attitudes toward gays and lesbians. We extend this existing research by examining the extent to which disgust sensitivity predicts attitudes more generally toward groups that threaten or uphold traditional sexual morality. In a sample of American adults (N = 236), disgust sensitivity (and particularly contamination disgust) predicted negative attitudes toward groups that threaten traditional sexual morality (e.g., pro-choice activists), and positive attitudes toward groups that uphold traditional sexual morality (e.g., Evangelical Christians). Further, disgust sensitivity was a weaker predictor of attitudes toward left-aligned and right-aligned groups whose objectives are unrelated to traditional sexual morality (e.g., gun-control/gun-rights activists). Together, these findings are consistent with a sexual conservatism account for understanding the relationship between disgust sensitivity and intergroup attitudes.Keywords: Disgust sensitivity, Prejudice, Intergroup attitudes, Sex

In 4 experiments, we investigate how the “fit” of an item with a set of similar items affects choice. We find that people have a notion of a set that “fits” together—one where all items are the same, or all items differ, on salient attributes. One consequence of this notion is that in addition to preferences over the set’s individual items, choice reflects set-fit. This leads to predictable shifts in preferences, sometimes even resulting in people choosing normatively inferior options over superior ones.Keywords: sets, choice, gestalt, preferences

STCO criticize our analytic strategy onmultiple fronts. First, they object to ourmodeling of error covariances between endogenous ideology variables in path analyses. Failing to model error covariances assumes that conservatism measures are completely uncorrelated, except to the extent to which they are related to model predictors. As STCO demonstrate, models of this assumption fit the data poorly. The fit of such models is irrelevant to the theory being tested in our article or STCO's response, though—it merely demonstrates that, say, social conservatism correlates with agreement with the Republican Party. Second, after previously objecting to usingmeasures that blend economic and social conservatism (Terrizzi, Shook, & McDaniel, 2013), STCO curiously criticize us for not blending our diverse conservatism measures into a single latent variable. STCO's proposalwill be difficult to evaluate empirically if it can neither be tested by treating social and economic conservatism separately nor by averaging across social and economic conservatism. Finally, STCO object to our use of the routine practice of interpreting model fit statistics for theory testing; this criticism is especially peculiar given STCO later employee these same fit statistics in their analyses. On the whole, STCO's statistical critiques do not warrant change to our conclusions. Nevertheless, to satisfy STCO's concerns regarding path models, we reanalyzed every relationship reported in our paper using the simplest mediation model possible. Using SPSS's PROCESS macro, we tested direct and indirect effects of pathogen avoidance on conservatism, mediated by sexual strategies. Across every measure in all three studies, we observe no direct relationship between pathogen avoidance and conservatism, though pathogen avoidance does consistently relate to conservatism indirectly via sexual strategies (see Table 1 for effects for “social” conservatism variables). Since publishing our paper, we have included the TDDS and the item “Howwould you describe your political orientation when it comes to social issues” in two studies (N's = 347 and 490) using Mechanical Turk participants, the same group sampled in our manuscript and in STCO's commentary. In both data sets, we observe an indirect relationship of pathogen disgust on social conservatism via sexual disgust, but no direct relationship between pathogen disgust and social conservatism (see Table 1). In sum, across five large samples, we find that sexual disgust fully mediates any relationship between pathogen disgust and social conservatism. Even so, do thesemeasures offer a fair test of the theories we and STCO describe?

Do people sometimes seek to atone for their transgressions by harming themselves physically? The current results suggest that they do. People who wrote about a past guilt-inducing event inflicted more intense electric shocks on themselves than did those who wrote about feeling sad or about a neutral event. Moreover, the stronger the shocks that guilty participants administered to themselves, the more their feelings of guilt were alleviated. We discuss how this method of atonement relates to other methods examined in previous research.

This crowdsourced project introduces a collaborative approach to improving the reproducibility of scientific research, in which findings are replicated in qualified independent laboratories before (rather than after) they are published. Our goal is to establish a non-adversarial replication process with highly informative final results. To illustrate the Pre-Publication Independent Replication (PPIR) approach, 25 research groups conducted replications of all ten moral judgment effects which the last author and his collaborators had 'in the pipeline' as of August 2014. Six findings replicated according to all replication criteria, one finding replicated but with a significantly smaller effect size than the original, one finding replicated consistently in the original culture but not outside of it, and two findings failed to find support. In total, 40% of the original findings failed at least one major replication criterion. Potential ways to implement and incentivize pre-publication independent replication on a large scale are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)

People who are more avoidant of pathogens are more politically conservative, as are nations with greater parasite stress. In the current research, we test two prominent hypotheses that have been proposed as explanations for the relationship between pathogens and politics. The first, which is an intragroup, traditional norms account, holds that these relationships are based on motivations to adhere to local norms, which are sometimes shaped by cultural evolution to have pathogen neutralizing properties. The second, which is an intergroup, outgroup-avoidance account, holds that relationships between pathogen avoidance and ideology are based on motivations to avoid contact with outgroups (who might pose greater infectious disease threats than ingroup members). Results from a study surveying 11,501 participants across 30 nations are more consistent with the traditional norms account than with the outgroup-avoidance account. National parasite stress relates to traditionalism (an aspect of conservatism especially related to adherence to group norms) but not to social dominance orientation (an aspect of conservatism especially related to endorsements of intergroup barriers and negativity toward ethnic and racial outgroups). Further, individual differences in pathogen-avoidance motives (i.e., disgust sensitivity) relate more strongly to traditionalism than to social dominance orientation within the 30 nations.

In two large samples (combined N = 31,045), we found a positive relationship between disgust sensitivity and political conservatism. This relationship held when controlling for a number of demographic variables as well as the “Big Five” personality traits. Disgust sensitivity was also associated with more conservative voting in the 2008 U.S. presidential election. In Study 2, we replicated the disgust sensitivity–conservatism relationship in an international sample of respondents from 121 different countries. Across both samples, contamination disgust, which reflects a heightened concern with interpersonally transmitted disease and pathogens, was most strongly associated with conservatism.

When making decisions, people sometimes deviate from normative standards. While such deviations may appear to be alarmingly common, examining individual differences may reveal a more nuanced picture. Specifically, the personality factor of need for cognition (i.e., the extent to which people engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive activities; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) may moderate decision makers’ susceptibility to bias, as could personality factors associated with being a leader. As part of a large-scale assessment of high-level leaders, participants completed a battery of decision-making competence and personality scales. Leaders who scored higher on need for cognition performed better on two of four components of a decision-making competence measure: framing and honoring sunk costs. In addition, the leader sample performed better than published controls. Thus, both individual differences in need for cognition and leadership experience moderate susceptibility to decision biases. Implications for broader theories of individual differences and bias are discussed.

We test a metacognitive account of why larger choice sets often lead to greater regret, proposing that people apply the lay theory that “a quick choice is a bad choice” when evaluating how well they have chosen. Because people often operate under time pressure, larger sets are likely to entail a more cursory selection process than smaller sets, generating a feeling of having rushed the evaluation of the alternatives and heightened regret. Four studies show that choice-set size does not influence participants' regret when they believe that they had enough time to choose, that the subjective feeling of being rushed accounts for greater regret when choosing from larger sets, and that changing people's lay theories about choosing quickly eliminates regret.

Many numerical judgments are made by adjusting from a salient anchor value. This research examines the effect of high-certainty emotions—emotions associated with feelings of confidence about what is happening, what will happen, and how to respond—on the adjustment process. The authors examined whether such emotions would induce people to engage in adjustment more confidently and thoroughly, leading to greater adjustment. In two studies, the authors found that people feeling anger (Study 1) and disgust (Study 2)—emotions associated with appraisals of certainty—adjusted more from self-generated anchors than did people feeling fear (Study 1) and sadness (Study 2)—emotions associated with appraisals of uncertainty. Study 2 found that this effect does not occur for experimenter-provided anchors, from which adjustment tends to be less consistently observed.

The uniquely human emotion of disgust is intimately connected to morality in many, perhaps all, cultures (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999b). We report two studies suggesting that a predisposition to feel disgust (“disgust sensitivity”) is associated with more conservative political attitudes, especially for issues related to the moral dimension of purity. In the first study, we document a positive correlation between disgust sensitivity and self-reported conservatism in a broad sample of US adults. In Study 2 we show that while disgust sensitivity is associated with more conservative attitudes on a range of political issues, this relationship is strongest for purity-related issues—specifically, abortion and gay marriage.

For a policy to succeed, it must not only be effective in changing behavior but must also be accepted by stakeholders. Here, we report seven sets of studies demonstrating strong framing effects on the acceptance of equivalent policies. Policies targeting desirable voluntary behavior are preferred when they are framed as advantaging those who act desirably (rather than disadvantaging those who do not). Conversely, policies targeting obligations are preferred when they are framed as disadvantaging those who fail to act desirably (rather than advantaging those who do). These differences in policy acceptance do not result from common causes of framing effects, such as a misunderstanding of outcomes or insufficient deliberation about the implications. Rather, the framing effects we document follow from beliefs about when punishment is and is not appropriate. We conclude with a field experiment demonstrating framing effects in a setting where policy acceptance directly affects respondents’ outcomes. Data, as supplemental material, are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2539 . This paper was accepted by Yuval Rottenstreich, judgment and decision making.

We argue that recognizing current ideological diversity in social psychology and promoting tolerance of minority views is just as important as increasing the number of non-liberal researchers. Increasing tolerance will allow individuals in the minority to express dissenting views, which will improve psychological science by reducing bias. We present four recommendations for increasing tolerance.

It has been suggested that people attend to others’ actions in the service of forming impressions of their underlying dispositions. If so, it follows that in considering others’ morally relevant actions, social perceivers should be responsive to accompanying cues that help illuminate actors’ underlying moral character. This article examines one relevant cue that can characterize any decision process: the speed with which the decision is made. Two experiments show that actors who make an immoral decision quickly (vs. slowly) are evaluated more negatively. In contrast, actors who arrive at a moral decision quickly (vs. slowly) receive particularly positive moral character evaluations. Quick decisions carry this signal value because they are assumed to reflect certainty in the decision (Experiments 1 and 2), which in turn signals that more unambiguous motives drove the behavior (Experiment 2), which in turn explains the more polarized moral character evaluations. Implications for moral psychology and the law are discussed.Keywords: decision speed, motives, moral judgment, moral character, certainty

Dominant theories of moral blame require an individual to have caused or intended harm. However, the current four studies demonstrate cases where no harm is caused or intended, yet individuals are nonetheless deemed worthy of blame. Specifically, individuals are judged to be blameworthy when they engage in actions that enable them to benefit from another’s misfortune (e.g., betting that a company’s stock will decline or that a natural disaster will occur). Evidence is presented suggesting that perceptions of the actor’s wicked desires are responsible for this phenomenon. It is argued that these results are consistent with a growing literature demonstrating that moral judgments are often the product of evaluations of character in addition to evaluations of acts.

A lack of political diversity in psychology is said to lead to a number of pernicious outcomes, including biased research and active discrimination against conservatives. We surveyed a large number (combined N = 800) of social and personality psychologists and discovered several interesting facts. First, although only 6% described themselves as conservative “overall,” there was more diversity of political opinion on economic issues and foreign policy. Second, respondents significantly underestimated the proportion of conservatives among their colleagues. Third, conservatives fear negative consequences of revealing their political beliefs to their colleagues. Finally, they are right to do so: In decisions ranging from paper reviews to hiring, many social and personality psychologists said that they would discriminate against openly conservative colleagues. The more liberal respondents were, the more they said they would discriminate.

This is a commentary discussing our recent article on political diversity in social/personality psychology (http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2002636). It is intended primarily for academic psychologists, and will appear in the Fall 2012 issue of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology's "Dialogue" newsletter.

An induction of disgust can lead to more negative attitudes toward an entire social group: Participants who were exposed to a noxious ambient odor reported less warmth toward gay men. This effect of disgust was equally strong for political liberals and conservatives, and was specific to attitudes toward gay men-there was only a weak effect of disgust on people's warmth toward lesbians, and no consistent effect on attitudes toward African Americans, the elderly, or a range of political issues.

Despite the wealth of recent work implicating disgust as an emotion central to human morality, the nature of the causal relationship between disgust and moral judgment remains unclear. We distinguish between three related claims regarding this relationship, and argue that the most interesting claim (that disgust is a moralizing emotion) is the one with the least empirical support.

We address two questions regarding the relationship between political ideology and responses to threatening or aversive stimuli. The first concerns the reason for the connection between disgust and specific political and moral attitudes; the second concerns the observation that some responses to threat (i.e., neuroticism/anxiety) are associated with a more left-wing political orientation.

How do people balance intuition and reason when making decisions? We report 6 studies that indicate that people are cued by the features of the decision problem to follow intuition or reason when making their choice. That is, when features of the choice resemble features commonly associated with rational processing, people tend to decide on the basis of reason; when features of the choice match those associated with intuitive processing, people tend to decide on the basis of intuition. Choices that are seen as objectively evaluable (Study 1A), sequential (Studies 1B and 3), complex (Study 2), or precise (Study 4) elicit a preference for choosing rationally. This framework accurately predicts people's choices in variants of both the ratio-bias (Study 3) and ambiguity-aversion paradigms (Study 4). Discussion focuses on the relationship between the task cuing account, other decision-making models, and dual-process accounts of cognition.

Two studies demonstrate that a dispositional proneness to disgust ("disgust sensitivity") is associated with intuitive disapproval of gay people. Study 1 was based on previous research showing that people are more likely to describe a behavior as intentional when they see it as morally wrong (see Knobe, 2006, for a review). As predicted, the more disgust sensitive participants were, the more likely they were to describe an agent whose behavior had the side effect of causing gay men to kiss in public as having intentionally encouraged gay men to kiss publicly-even though most participants did not explicitly think it wrong to encourage gay men to kiss in public. No such effect occurred when subjects were asked about heterosexual kissing. Study 2 used the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2006) as a dependent measure. The more disgust sensitive participants were, the more they showed unfavorable automatic associations with gay people as opposed to heterosexuals. Two studies demonstrate that a dispositional proneness to disgust ("disgust sensitivity") is associated with intuitive disapproval of gay people. Study 1 was based on previous research showing that people are more likely to describe a behavior as intentional when they see it as morally wrong (see Knobe, 2006, for a review). As predicted, the more disgust sensitive participants were, the more likely they were to describe an agent whose behavior had the side effect of causing gay men to kiss in public as having intentionally encouraged gay men to kiss publicly-even though most participants did not explicitly think it wrong to encourage gay men to kiss in public. No such effect occurred when subjects were asked about heterosexual kissing. Study 2 used the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2006) as a dependent measure. The more disgust sensitive participants were, the more they showed unfavorable automatic associations with gay people as opposed to heterosexuals.