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In this paper, we assume that the domestic public firm competes in the market with a foreign private firm that cares about consumer surplus and the domestic government imposes tariffs on foreign firm. We aim to analyze the influence of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) level of foreign firm on privatization and tariff policy. It shows that if the government implements a privatization policy for the domestic public firm, the optimal degree of privatization decreases in the CSR level of foreign firm. Under the optimal privatization policy, if the product differentiation is relatively small, the equilibrium tariff increases in the CSR level; if the product differentiation is relatively large, the equilibrium tariff decreases in the CSR level; if the product differentiation is moderate, the relationship between the equilibrium tariff and CSR level is an inverted U‐shape. We further consider the policy implications under sequential moves of firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyze the firms' strategic choice of financing mode in both Cournot and Bertrand competition with pollution externalities. We show that, if the environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) firm does not abate, loan commitment financing will be used for ongoing dirty production, and the optimal interest rate is decreasing in the firm's ECSR concerns. However, when the ECSR firm voluntarily chooses a one‐shot abatement‐technology investment, the optimal choice is spot‐market financing. Compared with the case without abatement investment, the firm's finance for the green investment yields higher net consumer surplus and welfare unless the market size is sufficiently small. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we formulate a mixed oligopoly model with many public firms and the consumer's cognition of the CSR activity of private firms. We show that the privatization wave will be beneficial for incumbent firms while harming consumers; more importantly, from the perspective of social welfare, consumer cognition on CSR will suppress any privatization wave, while whether the degree of "Cheap‐Talk" CSR suppresses or boosts the privatization wave depends on the degree of "Cheap‐Talk" CSR and the number of incumbent public firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the impacts of downstream CSR on upstream tacit collusion. Considering an infinitely repeated game with trigger strategy punishment, we find that how consumer‐oriented CSR affects the stability of upstream collusion basically hinges on the downstream competition modes. Specifically, CSR behavior facilitates (hinders) upstream collusion under downstream quantity (price) competition. For given degree of CSR and product substitutability, upstream collusion is always less stable under downstream price competition. In addition, higher degree of product substitutability obstructs collusion, regardless of downstream competition mode. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop a dynamic model to investigate the effects of environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) on a monopolist's investments in green product and process innovation. We find that ECSR increases the steady‐state investments of green product and process innovation only when the weight a firm gives to pollution is large, while ECSR does not affect the complementarity (substitutability) relationship between green product and process innovation in the long run. To achieve a socially optimal investment in green product innovation, the government should urge the firm to pay more attention to the environment than to the consumer surplus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we consider that the public firm competes with a private firm caring about consumer surplus in vertically differentiated market. We explore the privatization policy, and the relationship between the optimal degree of privatization and the CSR degree of private firm. We find that if the public firm produces low-quality products, the government should adopt a policy of privatization, and the optimal degree of privatization is decreasing (increasing) in the CSR degree of private firm, if the cost difference of quality is sufficiently small (large). However, if the public firm produces high-quality products and the cost difference of quality is sufficiently large (small), the government should (not) adopt a policy of privatization. The government's privatization policy is related to the difference in quality and cost of the products produced by firms. We further analyze the endogenous selection of product quality between public firm and private firm and find that if the quality gap between high-quality products and low-quality products is sufficiently large, both firms will choose to produce high-quality products. If the product quality gap is of medium-intensity, the public firm chooses to produce low-quality products, and the private firm chooses to produce high-quality products. However, if the product quality gap is sufficiently small, there is no Nash equilibrium. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the welfare implications of corporate social responsibility ( CSR) in international markets under imperfect competition. Based on a stylized model of an import-competing duopolistic market, we show the feasibility of moving toward tariff reductions when both domestic and foreign firms launch CSR initiatives in that their payoffs include not only individual profits, but also the benefits of consumers. For the case where the foreign exporter unilaterally adopts the consumer-oriented CSR as a strategy, there is a rent-shifting effect because the foreign firm's payoff increases whereas the domestic firm's profit decreases. In response, the importing country's government raises its tariff on the foreign product. If, instead, the domestic firm adopts the CSR strategy unilaterally, the rent-shifting effect disappears and both the competing firms' payoffs increase. We further identify the conditions under which the CSR initiatives of the firms constitute the dominant strategy, leading to a Pareto efficient outcome at which the firms' payoffs, consumer surplus, and social welfare are at their maximum levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]