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Abstract Interpersonal relationships can be fragile. The mere perception of opportunistic behavior can lead to a breakdown in cooperation. Once damaged, the question then arises as to whether and how [...]

Important decisions are often determined by group vote. Institutional provisions may stipulate who has the authority to determine the group's agenda. According to cooperative game theory, this privilege gives the leader a great deal of power to control the outcome. In a series of experiments, the authors demonstrate the influence of norms on coalitions and decisions. Subjects were assigned to groups with two agenda setters, two issues, and concentric indifference curves. Three theories were tested: coalitional rationality, group fairness, and coalitional integrity. The pattern of coalition formation, coalition dissolution, and decisions was consistent only with coalitional integrity. The integrity norm (members will not join a coalition requiring them to vote against the interests of prior coalition members) generates friction in coalition dynamics. Clearly, when formulating an agenda, leaders must consider a potential partner's coalitional history. Theories of group decision making must be sensitive to social constraints as well as self-interest.

The measurement equivalence of the revised Job Diagnostic Survey (JDS) was studied across samples from five worker populations. Samples included workers at a printing plant, engineers, nurses, and nurses' aides, dairy employees, and part-time workers. Data were analyzed according to Joreskog's model for simultaneous factor analysis in several populations (SIFASP), revealing the five factors contained in Hackman and Oldham's theory of job characteristics. A sixth factor also appeared that apparently resulted from the two different formats used on the instrument. When the data from each group were analyzed separately by principal axes factor analysis three-, four-, and five-factor solutions appeared. TO explain these inconsistencies, a Monte carlo simulation was conducted. Matrices representing the a priori JDS factor loadings and a hypothetical, lengthened JDS with twice the number of items per factor were used in the simulation with three sample sizes (Ns = 75, 150, and 900). Results suggested that for scales like the JDS, which has only a few items per factor, sample sizes larger than those typically recommended are needed to consistently recover the true underlying structure. The simulation results support our conclusions that the SIFASP solution is preferable to the principal axes solution and that the JDS provides measurement equivalence across worker populations. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

Reflecting on his wartime government service, Walter Lippmann (1922) developed a theory of policy formulation and error. Introducing the constructs of stereotype, mental model, blind spots, and the process of manufacturing consent, his theory prescribed interdisciplinary social science as a tool for enhancing policy making in business and government. Lippmann used his influence with the Rockefeller foundations, business leaders, Harvard and the University of Chicago to gain support for this program. Citation analysis of references to 'stereotype' and Lippmann reveals the rapid spread of the concept across the social sciences and in public discourse paralleled by obliteration by incorporation of the wider theory in behavioral science. 'Stereotype' is increasingly invoked in anthropology, economics, and sociology though Lippmann and his wider theory ceased being cited decades ago. In psychology, citations are increasing but content analysis revealed blind spots and misconceptions about the theory and prescription. Studies of heuristics, biases, and organizational decision substantiate Lippmann's theory of judgment and choice. But his model for social science failed to consider the bounded rationality and blind spots of its practitioners. Policy formulation today is supported by research from narrow disciplinary silos not interdisciplinary science that reflects an awareness of history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conventional history of the predominant, research-based model of business education (RBM) traces its origins to programs initiated by the Ford Foundation after World War II. This paper maps the elite network responsible for developing behavioral science and the Ford Foundation agenda. Archival records of the actions taken by central nodes in the network permit identification of the original vision statement for the model. Analysis also permits tracking progress toward realizing that vision over several decades. Behavioral science was married to business education from the earliest stages of development. The RBM was a fundamental promise made by advocates for social science funding. Appraisals of the model and recommendations for reform must address its full history, not the partial, distorted view that is the conventional account. Implications of this more complete history for business education and for behavioral theory are considered. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]