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The study of group processes has benefited from longstanding programs of theory-driven research on status and power. The present work constructs a bridge between two formal theories of status and power: Status Characteristics Theory and Network Exchange Theory. Two theoretical models, one for "status value" and one for "status influence," illuminate the underlying mechanisms whereby status differences between individuals lead to power differences in negotiated exchange. The two models generate precise hypotheses that are tested against new and previously published data. The results generally support both models, indicating that status characteristics create power in negotiated exchange relations in contrasting ways. We conclude with a discussion of the broader theoretical and empirical implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some sociologists argue that sociological theory does not grow and the reason why it does not grow is that the discipline lacks a core of highly developed, almost universally accepted, paradigms; even worse, because it is reflexive, its criteria of problem and theory choice are so noncognitive that there are no paradigms, hence no progress, in its future. We do not question that sociology lacks a core of almost universally accepted paradigms, nor that highly developed paradigms may be a sufficient condition of theory growth, but we question both that universal acceptance of them is necessary and that sociology has nothing like them. We argue that theoretical research programs—sets of strategies, sets of interrelated theories embodying these strategies, and empirical models interpreting these theories—are sufficient for theoretical growth. An examination of three theoretical research programs in this article shows that they perform some of the same functions for theory growth as, in Kuhn, are performed by paradigms. Sociology may lack a universally accepted core, but there are theoretical research programs in sociology, and therefore already there is theory growth if it is looked for in the right place. Nor is there any warrant for the view that because its criteria of problem and theory choice are inescapably noncognitive, there are no paradigms, hence no progress, in sociology's future. If that were true, not only would sociology lack paradigms, but also theoretical research programs. We conclude from our study that sociology need not wait on the emergence of a universally accepted core. It is sufficient for the growth of theory that it develops further its existing theoretical research programs and that it encourages the creation of new programs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article refers to the theoretical aspects in mathematical sociology. Mathematical and sociology consider theory as a list of hypothetical statements. A variety of geometries have been used to make abstract objects and events in a physical theory. Both classical social and classical physical theory stand opposite one another. The contrast between the two is more if the focus in more on the end product of theory work. A social theory has to include general hypothesis about people and their actions and relationships if theory would have been a list of hypothesis.

In sociology, work in formal theory is more extensive and intensive today than at any time in the past, but remains invisible to some, including S. Zhao [(1996) "The Beginning of the End or the End of the Beginning: The Theory Construction Movement Revisited," Sociological Forum, Vol 11, No. 2, pp. 305-318]. I trace the growth of formal theory in sociology focusing on theoretical research programs and show that, whereas formal theory came after the books on theory construction, it was not based on them. Elementary Theory's research program provides an example of that discontinuity. Some misunderstandings concerning formal theory can be traced to the Maryland Theory Conference of 1990 and a critique of selected ideas of that Conference is offered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article responds to Charles W. Smith's commentary on a review of the book, A Critique of Sociological Reasoning. No author can be expected to be pleased with an unfavorable review of his work. It is clear that Smith is not pleased with my review. Sociology is a field noted for its variety of viewpoints. Thus I see no reason to challenge Smith's assertion that his book has been repeatedly praised for its clarity and lucidity. However, my critical comments were more fundamental than clarity and lucidity. Theory needs to carefully distinguish between matters of concept usage, which are issues of the form and relation of concepts, and matters of fact once these concepts are formed. For example. Smith asserts, There are similarly little graduations of punishment since the objective of punishment is to reassert the authority of cultural norms, not to rehabilitate the offender. I see no way to interpret this statement as anything but an empirical generalization about the way that norms are enforced everywhere, and the universal objective of the punishment. Thus there either are or are not graduations of punishment for norm violations. My sources say there are. I understand this to be a matter of fact though subject to somewhat different facts depending upon the conceptual framework involved. Instead of taking the opportunity to clarify his position on the relations of conceptual formulations to information from the world. Smith spends most of his reply attacking some positions he believes I endorse. I see no value in extending further my reply.

This article proposes a theory to explain how actors in social exchange networks reach agreements on division of resources. Social exchange theory grew. from the application of the economic theory of exchange to social relationships. Sociology focuses on a problematic area for economic theory, the exchange of valued objects in, relatively small groups, where actors seek to settle on one optimal outcome out of a range of possibilities. Central to theoretical development today is a class of networks in which subtle power differences occur. This phenomenon is known as weak power. In these weak power networks, some positions may have advantages over others in acquiring resources through exchange. However, unlike the advantages in strong power networks, advantages in weak power networks are not progressive. Over a series of exchanges, a strong power advantage eventually results in one, exchange partner receiving nearly all available resources. Weak power is limited in range and magnitude. This necessitates theoretical refinement because adequate assessment of power differences between positions in weak power structures requires more, precise predictions of exchange rates at equilibrium.