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The method of E-state structuralism provides dynamic models for the evolution and development of networks in small groups. Our interest lies in the kind of social networks that these models produce. We ask the question of whether such models produce "interesting" structure from a network point-of-view, in particular, from the perspective of Holland and Leinhardt who argue that any network that can be modeled adequately using only properties of nodes and dyads has no social structure. We show that E-state structuralism models are models of social structure in this technical sense because they assume a bystander mechanism in the creation of ties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay summarizes an inquiry that explores relations between the structure of stratified systems and the processes of vertical mobility. The inquiry considers economic stratification (the distribution of wealth) and is directed to determining whether the structural properties of stratification systems are sufficient to generate basic patterns in vertical mobility observed in empirical research, especially, the rank-distance effect. In particular, the question is whether these patterns can be generated even if movement is constrained by nothing more than the size of the population over which wealth is distributed and the total amount of wealth to be distributed. Our results show that the rank-distance effect emerges even under these minimal assumptions and, further, that rates and distances of vertical mobility are closely related to changes in these boundary parameters of a stratified system. The basic theory developed to relate structure and mobility provides results that are highly consistent with many empirical observations. It also challenges existing claims concerning the nature of the mechanisms determining the relative status immobility of most people in large scale systems. The theory implies that the way in which system structure constrains opportunity for movement is, by itself, sufficient to produce this result and others commonly observed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Frequently applications of game theory assume, but do not show, that games are contained in social structures. The new analysis offered here uncovers games embedded in structures by attributing strategies to some positions and deriving the pay-off matrices for others. As structures vary so do the games embedded in them. All strong power structures contain prisoners' dilemma games for at least some range of pay-offs while some contain a chain of prisoners' dilemma games linked by defections. As a result, the development of interpersonal power in strong power structures is produced by free-riding of those low in power. Examples of other types of structures are given and other games are found that do not contain defection chains. Issues of dynamics including rates of change of power and coalition formation as a condition of countervailing power are addressed. New experiments offer support for central formulations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A program of research on the formal representation and analysis of institutional structures is taken a step further by integrating it with recent developments in the formal representation of hierarchical levels of inclusion or part-whole relations. We begin by reviewing a cybernetic conception of action and show how this relates to the construction of production system models of institutional structures. Thereafter, we treat the inclusion hierarchy to show how the production rule constitutes the conceptual unit integrating social knowledge and social action upon which are built two hierarchies, involving institutional entities and social networks, respectively. We indicate some of the detailed forms of control involved in these hierarchies and then show how a form of functional analysis can be undertaken on this basis. Finally, we provide a lengthy discussion of the promise and problems of this mode of structural analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper unifies two strands of theoretical method in sociology. On the one hand, the structuralist or network program of research involves the fundamental rule that basic data and analytic procedures of sociology must focus on social relations. This leads to theories about structural stability or change, for example, although the network approach generally has been stronger on technique than on explanatory theory. An interest in theoretical explanation is the basis of the second theoretical method, which is drawn from the expectation states theoretical research program: namely, the idea of a dynamic co-causal process involving an unobservable relational construct termed an expectation state and an observable form of social behavior. The paper outlines the basic ideas of each of these two theoretical methods. It then proposes a new theoretical method which synthesizes the two and whose function is to provide a procedure for constructing explanatory models of social structural stability and change. This new method is termed "E-state structuralism." An extended example is provided of how the method is used to construct a theory, first presenting the theory in axiomatic form and then empirically testing it. The subject matter of the theory is the over-time transformation in the structure of dominance relations among a small group of animals. The paper concludes with a review of how the generic method was exemplified in the particular theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article responds to Barry Markovsky's critique of the paper "Games and Structures" written by the present authors and appeared in a previous issue of "Rationality and Society." The author relates that their paper introduces a new method, strategic analysis which attributes parametric rationality to some positions in order to derive games for others. Most strikingly, when high power positions are parametrically rational, low power positions play a virtual prisoners dilemma (P/D) game. The game is virtual because low power positions are not directly connected to each other. Nevertheless, the structure plus the parametric rationality of the high power position links activity such that low power players' cooperation and defection are related in a P/D pay-off matrix. The paper includes a general proof that all strong power structures contain P/D games for at least some range of settlements. Examples of other kinds of structures are given and it is shown that they do not contain P/D games. As shown in the paper, because defection is Pareto suboptimal, when peripheral players defect, they gain less with the benefit going to the high power positions with which they are exchanging. That benefit is the power exercise.