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This paper presents a general theory of how the interaction of state agents within a number of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) leads to a convergence in member state interests over time. The theory is based on the notion that, all else being equal, IGOs that facilitate more interaction between state agents from various states are conducive to greater member state interest convergence over time because there are more opportunities for agents from one or more member states to persuade agents from other member states to accept new ideas that affect how they, and ultimately key decision-makers, define their states' interests. I argue that such persuasion does not necessarily have to involve a shift in state identities, but can also involve a diffusion of ideas about cause-and-effect relationships. Also, by focusing on IGOs as structures within which state agents interact, I argue against a narrow focus on socialization as the induction of new members into community norms. I present three hypotheses regarding which institutional attributes are conducive to member state interest convergence. However, due to current data limitations, only one of the hypotheses is tested in this paper. The test of whether joint membership in IGOs with six or fewer members is conducive to member state interest convergence provides preliminary support for that hypothesis. The paper concludes with a discussion of the larger project, including a brief description of the data that is currently being coded for testing of the other hypotheses. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a general theory of how the interaction of state agents within a number of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) leads to a convergence in member state interests over time. The theory is based on the notion that, all else being equal, IGOs that facilitate more interaction between state agents from various states are conducive to greater member state interest convergence over time because there are more opportunities for agents from one or more member states to persuade agents from other member states to accept new ideas that affect how they, and ultimately key decision-makers, define their states' interests. I argue that such persuasion does not necessarily have to involve a shift in state identities, but can also involve a diffusion of ideas about cause-and-effect relationships. Also, by focusing on IGOs as structures within which state agents interact, I argue against a narrow focus on socialization as the induction of new members into community norms. I present three hypotheses regarding which institutional attributes are conducive to member state interest convergence. However, due to current data limitations, only one of the hypotheses is tested in this paper. The test of whether joint membership in IGOs with six or fewer members is conducive to member state interest convergence provides preliminary support for that hypothesis. The paper concludes with a discussion of the larger project, including a brief description of the data that is currently being coded for testing of the other hypotheses. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]