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Phenomenological sociology was founded at the beginning of 1930s by Alfred Schutz. His mundane phenomenology sought to combine impulses drawn from Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and Weber's action theory. It was made famous at the turn of 1960s and 1970s by Garfinkel's ethnomethodology and Berger & Luckmann's social constructionism. This paper deals with the notable accomplishments of Schutz and his followers and then proceeds to a shared shortcoming, which is that the phenomenological approach is unable to understand meaning in any other way but as actors's knowledge. Therefore, phenomenological sociologists are forced to describe the actor's interpretations of meaning as transparent to the actor him/herself, even if they sometimes make heroic attempts to escape the limitations of the phenomenological conception. The limitation is apparent in Husserl's and Schutz's definition of meaning as a 'reflective intentional act', Garfinkel's use of the term 'accounting' to refer to a signifying effect, and the way Berger and Luckmann describe their social theory as 'sociology of knowledge'. Today, similar confusions are present in Michael Polanyi's 'tacit knowledge'and in Giddens' structuration theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The field of sociology can be described as a triangle, the apexes of which are represented by the structure of social organisation (Spencer's theory of the division of labour), the structure of cultural codes (Saussure's theory of language and semiology) and social action (Weber's methodological individualism). This becomes a three-dimensional discursive space when underneath it we place, as the fourth apex, nature. Consequently we have a triangular pyramid standing on its head (nature): its four plans are represented by the field of sociology (the structure of social organisation, the structure of cultural codes, action), structuralist social anthropology (the structure of social organisation, the structure of cultural codes, nature), cultural anthropology (the structure of cultural codes, action, nature) and historical materialism (the structure of social organisation, action, nature). This turned-over tetrahedron is described in the paper as the discursive space of sociology, a space that has taken shape with the attempts at a theoretical synthesis of sociology during the 1980s (Alexander, Bourdieu, Collins, Giddens, Habermas). As in the case of the discursive conditions for all forms of knowledge, the discursive space of sociology is a rhetorical closure which determines who are classical writers and how these classical writers are to be read and understood. At the same time it serves as the basis for the positivity of sociological knowledge. It is suggested that this space will emerge to reorganise the uncertainty produced by the collapse of the Parsonian orthodoxy which was primarily concerned to examine society from the perspective of the structure of social organisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the idea of modern society which Marx presented in his critique of political economy. According to Marx, modern society is born in the mode of capitalism but will only be actualized in its full wealth when capitalism is thrown over in favor of communism. The problem with Marx's conceptual strategy, however, is that he only discusses man as human species, in this way identifying the human individual with the species being Accordingly, he assumes that all social antagonisms will come to an end if the capital relation is broken and a transfer into communism takes place. In this way, his conception of a modern, non-capitalist society remains an abstract, aesthetically descriptive vision. On the basis of Marx's later works. although overstepping its limits, it is, however, possible to present an experimental construction of a modern, non-capitalist, dual society, where the social synthesis is no longer dominated by the principle of self-valorization of capital, but a 'democratic discussion of needs'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]