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The first part of the article notes the sudden and conspicuous interest for the problem of identity at the turn of the 21st century. It presents Modern and postmodern conceptualizations of collective identity of social theorists. In the second part, the text draws on the legacy of philosophical speculation of the same period. The article aims to show that many of the dilemmas faced by latter-day humanities in their efforts to articulate their thinking of identity as well as difference still have a relevant ?pre-game? in the structural and dialectical interrelatedness thematized by philosophers of classical German idealism and the ?philosophers of difference.? The text concludes that such ?metaphysical? reflection comprises an unavoidable element, which can only be ignored by social theory at its own peril, even if it is not bound by the reflection?s findings.

This paper aims to question anew the popular and supposedly self-evident affirmation of education, in its modern incarnation as in its historical notion. The ‘‘naive’’ questions suggest that we have recently taken for granted that education ought to be for the masses, that it ought to be upbringing, and that it is better than ignorance. Drawing on the tradition that calls such an understanding of education into question, the author shows that the hidden costs of disregarding such reflection end up, camouflaged and smuggled, taxing the current debates regarding generally accepted education strategies. The characteristic feeling of the currently accepted model of education being in chronic crisis is less a testament to an absence of alternative approaches than to a lack of thorough self-reflection.

Analyzing its relationship to reason, tradition, social organization and other key moments of disagreement, the article exposes how the early post-revolutionary Conservatism criticizing the Enlightenment and, at the same time, articulate their own learning. Special attention is given to Burke's and Maistre's visions of violations of the Enlightenment philosophy on the historical and political mission that they believed their nations and humanity should meet. It is concluded that in this formative period, in relation to the eighteenth-century Enlightenment and the French Revolution, for which the former is held responsible, conservatism formed its own doctrine, Its counter-enlightenment and anti-modernist motives therefore remain distinctive marks of Conservativism to this day.

This text gives a critical account of various, often conflicting interpretations of slash fiction - stories based on characters from popular TV show, The Star Trek, written (and read) by fans. What makes slash fiction, a subgenre of fan fiction, specific is a homoeroticization of characters that in the original narratives are either explicitly or implicitly heterosexual. Whether such “homoerotic pairing” has any foundation in the original Star Trek narrative, remains an open question. Answers to this question vary greatly. An affirmative answer, however, begs a further question: whether these narratives are “homosexual representations” in a strict gay/lesbian sense? The authors propose that slash represents a non-hegemonic narrative which transgresses borders (of the medium, genre, gender, sexuality etc.) set up in the original narrative - queering, reexamining thus both sex and gender. [Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. 43007 i br. 41004]

U ovom članku nastojaćemo da ostvarimo sistematičan uvid u odnos između svakodnevnih praksi i javnog prostora. Kroz analizu radova dvojice uticajnih teoretičara iz ove oblasti, Fukoa i Lefevra, pokušaćemo da pružimo teorijsko obrazloženje intuiciji da (javni) prostor predstavlja jedan od osnovnih konstitutivnih elementa slobodnog delanja. U prvom delu članka, analiziraćemo Fukoov pojam heterotopije kako bismo ukazali na mogućnost one „prostorno posredovane“ samorefleksije koja veoma nalikuje na filozofsku askezu iz takozvane kasne faze njegovog dela. Potom ćemo razmotriti u kojoj meri Lefevrovo stanovište da javni prostor predstavlja hegelijansku konkretnu apstrakciju – koja sobom povlači dijalektičku analizu i praćenje složenih istorijskih protivrečnosti – dopunjuje i produbljuje vizuru koju uspostavlja Fuko svojim pojmom heterotopija. U tom smislu, biće pokazano da, uprkos svim razlikama u teorijskim polazištima, oba autora brane ideju jednog javnog prostora u kojem se brišu doznačavanja – kako bi se „otvorio prostor“ slobodnom delatniku. In this paper we will try to offer a systematic insight into the relation of everyday practices and public space. By examining the work of two of the most influential authors in this field, Foucault and Lefebvre, we will try to provide a theoretical explanation of intuition that (public) space represents one of the key constitutive elements of free action. In the first part of the paper, we will consider Foucault’s notion of heterotopia in the interest of pointing towards a “spatially intermediated” self-reflection which, to a great degree, resembles the philosophical askesis form his so called letter work. Afterwards, we will consider in which sense Lefebvre’s position that public space represents a Hegelian concrete abstraction - which entails dialectical analysis and tracking of complex historical contradictions - complements and deepens perspective that Foucault puts before us in his heterotopias. In that vein, it will be shown that both authors, despite the difference in their theoretical starting points, defend the idea of such a public space in which all signifiers are removed in the interest of „opening space” for the free agent

The author, first of all, undertakes to perceive and analyze the role that the metaphor of 'root' plays, as well as the discourse connected with it - 'rooted', 'root out' and so on - in order to examine the functioning of botanical metaphors in modern political theory. Ideological duality is here shown as, in equal measure but in different ways, fixed to the idea of the root of human existence or of the well ordered society - and an image of a tree in blossom, if it has grown out of this condition - in which it is a privileged possession, giving the right to 'radical' actions. The difference is found where one group advocates unconditional nurturing of the given root and the other one urgent necessity of replacing it with new one. As a conclusion, it is suggested that the abandoning of the floral metaphor could not only open up space for reasonable dispute about the questions that it was believed to answer, but also that this kind of retreat from the fascination with root could really be - radical.

This paper tries to extricate philosophical education from the restrictions of social and school systems and to commend some independent and subversive views. This is to be accomplished through a conceptual dissection of the term 'education'. On the one hand, there is education seen as transmitter of the tradition, where to be educated is seen as being able to fit into an established community. There is also another education to which the authority of tradition is a permanent target of resistance, always trying to undermine any educational uniformity. This second history of education, genuinely philosophical, is radically opposed to the history of institutionalized mass-education. However, intention of this paper is not to proclaim this as an 'alternative' model, or to build it up as a new mythology. On the contrary, it is being written as a history of continuous subversion. Viewed from this vantage point, autonomous philosophical education is not a subsystem of a social system. This education has itself as a measurement, and always resists the wider community (the environment) that has accidentally befallen it. Its honor is exactly in this attitude of resistance, in being watchful against any conscription and integration. Understood in this manner, philosophical education is not a useful 'implemented' function of society, but is rather its dysfunction.

Parallel analysis of children's literature on one hand, and the crime genre on the other, positing children's and serious construction of the world and ego, outlining homology of their narrative and reconstructing social construct that follows, assumes that light could be thrown at certain particularity that is a parasite on a host whom it would like to legitimate. Juxtaposition of the two worlds, or, often, the world whiten the world visualizes the image, an inward tension and perversion of the world for which the attraction of secret service with an aspiration to public action makes it particular. The established analogy directs the attention at two points that mark particularity of the world of secrets: the protocol of the concealment and secret action and to the motives for shifting, compounding and acquiring the identity that follows.

In this paper the author is attempting to establish the relationship - or the lack of it - of the Critical Theory to the "Jewish question" and justification of perceiving signs of Jewish religious heritage in the thought of the representatives of this movement. The holocaust marked out by the name of "Auschwitz", is here tested as a point where the nature of this relationship has been decided. In this encounter with the cardinal challenge for the contemporary social theory, the particularity of the Frankfurt School reaction is here revealed through Adorno installing Auschwitz as unexpected but lawful emblem of the ending of the course that modern history has assumed. The critique of this "fascination" with Auschwitz, as well as certain theoretical pacification and measured positioning of the holocaust into discontinued plane of "unfinished" and continuation and closure of the valued project, are given through communicative-theoretical pre-orientation of J?rgen Habermas?s Critical Theory and of his followers. Finally, through the work of Detlev Claussen, it is suggested that in the youngest generation of Adorno?s students there are signs of revision to once already revised Critical Theory and a kind of defractured and differentiated return to the initial understanding of the decisiveness of the holocaust experience. This shift in the attitude of the Critical Theory thinkers to the provocation of holocaust is not, however, particularly reflected towards the status of Jews and their tradition, but more to the age old questioning and explanatory patterns for which they served as a "model". The question of validity of the enlightenment project, the nature of occidental rationalism, (non)existence of historical theology and understanding of the identity and emancipation - describe the circle of problems around which the disagreement is concentrated in the social critical theory.

U tekstu se polazi od pitanja zbog čega se zamišljaju drugi svetovi. Pored motiva za zamišljanje, pažnja se posvećuje samom procesu zamišljanja, resursima i asocijativnim sklopovima koji su dostupni zamišljanju u izgradnji svetova koji se od našeg razlikuju. „Druge svetove“ određujemo i kao utopiju i kao prostor fantazije, rukovodeći se hipotezom da taj prostor nikada nije u potpunosti slobodan. Poseban naglasak stavljamo na prostor i vreme utopije, kao i na dimenziju novog. Tekst je podeljen u četiri celine, od kojih se prva bavi motivom za fantaziju; druga razmatra moć mašte i ograničenja zamišljanja; treća u svom središtu ima „cenu“ fantazije, potiranje složenosti postojećeg sveta. U četvrtom se delu razmatra značaj utopijskog mišljenja za društvenu teoriju. The main question of this article is why imagine other worlds. In addition to shedding light on the motivation, we also examine the imaginative processes, their resources and the associative arrangements available to imagination in the construction of new worlds. We see ‘other worlds’ as both utopian and as fantastic spaces, following the hypothesis that the space of fantasy is never entirely free. We place particular emphasis on the space and time of utopia, and on the aspect of the novelty. The paper is divided into four parts. The first takes into account the path to the other world, or the methodical problem of imagination. The second wants to portray the other world, or the limitations to imagining something entirely different and new. The third part inquires about the cost of utopian thinking: what is lost in the process, what is sacrificed to its flattening gestures? Finally, despite all these limitations, in the fourth part we consider the significance of utopian thought for social theory. Le point de départ de ce texte sont les raisons qui incitent l’homme à imaginer d’autres mondes. En plus de ces raisons, l’attention est portée au processus même de l’imagination, aux ressources et aux réseaux des associations d’idées accessibles à l’imagination dans la construction des mondes qui diffèrent du notre. Nous définissons les „autres mondes“ à la fois comme une utopie et comme un espace de fantaisie, partant de l’hypothèse que cet espace n’est jamais complètement libre. Un accent particulier est mis sur l’espace et le temps de l’utopie, ainsi que sur la dimension du nouveau. Le texte est divisé en quatre parties, dont la première traite les raisons d’imaginer; la deuxième analyse le pouvoir de l’imagination et les limites de cette dernière; la troisième est consacrée au „prix“ de l’imagination, à savoir l’annulation de la complexité du monde existant. Dans la quatrième est examinée l’importance de la pensée utopique pour la théorie sociale.

This article stems from the impression of being condemned to late and moralizing reactions in regard to advances in the life sciences. We suggest a return to a speculative and theoretical approach in posing the question(s) of the limit of possible thinking of the enhanced human. This return allows for the possibility to show, not just inductively, but “clearly and distinctly,” the specific justifications and lines of reasoning of anthropocentric prejudice or species narcissism. It also enables us to move freely and precisely along the limits of thinking the human/non-human. In this way, we hope to put forward a few markers or guideposts that would further the debate about notions of human enhancement.

This paper tries to extricate philosophical education from the restrictions of social and school systems and to commend some independent and subversive views. This is to be accomplished through a conceptual dissection of the term ?education?. On the one hand, there is education seen as transmitter of the tradition, where to be educated is seen as being able to fit into an established community. There is also another education to which the authority of tradition is a permanent target of resistance, always trying to undermine any educational uniformity. This second history of education, genuinely philosophical, is radically opposed to the history of institutionalized mass-education. However, intention of this paper is not to proclaim this as an "alternative" model, or to build it up as a new mythology. On the contrary, it is being written as a history of continuous subversion. Viewed from this vantage point, autonomous philosophical education is not a subsystem of a social system. This education has itself as a measurement, and always resists the wider community (the environment) that has accidentally befallen it. Its honor is exactly in this attitude of resistance, in being watchful against any conscription and integration. Understood in this manner, philosophical education is not a useful "implemented" function of society, but is rather its dysfunction.