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of a dismal future state in which all human activities are viewed continuously and reient]essly by an all-seeing eye. The basic weakness in this picture is precisely this assumption of the existence of robot-like creatures who, alone, could perform such a function, plus the fact that millions of them would be required to keep the population under complete control. The concentration camp material supports this criticism. Many of the flaws in the efficiency of the concentration camp system were due to the venality of the SS personnel, some of them appeared because of the persistence of humane considerations, and vanity often played into the hands of the inmates. There is another important factor that contributes to the impossibility of instituting perfect social controls that is demonstrated by the concentration camp experience. This also pertains to the human rather than the material aspects of organization. To achieve their ends, the concentration camp personnel had to employ the services of their prisoners. Need for special skills made some of the jailors dependent upon some of the prisoners, a fact that gave these unforeseen opportunities to counteract administrative measures to the advantage of large numbers of inmates. Work requirements, for example, employment outside of the camps, often put prisoners in a position to thwart the controls imposed upon them. The ingenuity of the strategems used by concentration inmates makes for some of the brighter pictures in the otherwise monotonously gruesome record. Any ruling personnel is similarly dependent upon its subject population in one way or another and this dependence insures that control can never be complete. This fact should be of interest to students of bureaucracy, especially to those who draw a lugubrious picture of the consequences of the extension of bureaucratic control in our society. These analysts seem to have overlooked the corrective factors present in any organization by virtue of the fact that what is organized are human beings and not robots. In conclusion we might point out that all of the special topics of the sociology of the concentration camp system can be focused upon one basic issue, namely, the problem of survival in concentration camps. The material abundantly shows that only in rare instances was survival a purely individual achievement. In most cases survival was due to the operation of social factors some of which I have mentioned in the preceding discussion. If evidence is needed in support of a truism, this material clearly sustains the basis upon which sociology itself is founded, namely, the fact that for man, society is a means of survival for the individuals in whom it is manifest, and also, that richness of individual life depends upon the richness of the human relations available and the variety and complexity of social arrangements.

This paper is concerned with the aspects of social life implied in the terms community and welfare. Community is considered to be a spatially contingent interactional system in which there may emerge many kinds of products, one of which is welfare. Welfare is a rather ambiguous term variously employed, but, in general, it seems to describe a community condition that conforms to our value system, such as a presence of health, happiness, prosperity, social control and good housing, and the absence of undesirable conditions such as illness, poverty, vice, delinquency and crime, child neglect, ignorance, and unemployment. As responsibility for public welfare becomes increasingly a governmental concern and as "private" philanthropy becomes more and more a semi-public bureaucratic activity, there will be increasing demands for a public accounting. The handwriting is on the wall in the form of Congressional investigations of groups collecting funds for veterans, in the shape of attempts of medical associations to bring order into the community arena where a multitude of fund-raisers are fiercely contending for the various organs and parts of the human corpus, and in the restlessness of city and county governments that have to support an ever increasing welfare load in spite of a booming economy. Such accounting will require demonstrable ways to show the need for and accomplishments of social welfare action. And if this purpose is to be achieved, adequate and reliable definitions of welfare, and indices and measurements of it must be developed. The solution of this problem would be accelerated if there were good answers to some theoretical questions such as: Is welfare a basic or crucial element in community life; or to put it another way, is welfare one of the factors that must be included and its effects considered if variations between communities are to be explained? Is welfare a relatively independent factor or is it systematically related to other variables such as urbanism, rurality, wealth, etc.? If it is related to other community elements, then which ones and to what degree do these relationships exist? What is the anatomy of welfare in terms of measurable characteristics, and what are the best indices of its presence or absence? If the last question can be answered satisfactorily, a basis for an operational definition of welfare will have been laid upon which measures of the degree of welfare present, and the amount of progress toward a state of welfare, may be constructed.

T n HE measuring of attitudes has been and is one of the most persistent endeavors of social scientists, particularly psychologists, social-psychologists, and sociologists. Presumably, attitudes are measured because it is assumed that if these anticipatory sets or predispositions to action can be ascertained, the behavior which they determine may be predicted. However, few empirical studies have been made where the relationship has been tested by quantification of overt behavior by means of a scale and the correlation of scores on the behavior scale with scores on a scale measuring attitudes related to the overt behavior. The problem of the relationship between attitudes and behavior also has relevance for the theory of ecology. The socio-cultural position in ecology-that volition and purpose must be considered as important and integral aspects of spatial adaptation and not merely "inconsequential and adventitious features of the competitive process' assumes that attitudes and behavior are related. Firey, for example, in his study of Boston,2 demonstrates the relevance of values and attitudes by inference from such empirical data as economic and ecological indices. Hawley, however, leaning more toward the orthodox ecological position, questions the accuracy of these conclusions when he states, "Firey's reasoning confuses motive with an external limiting factor."3 The present study attempts to determine the relationship between attitudes and behavior in ecological mobility. Methodologically it seeks to minimize problems of inferential reasoning and to diminish the spread between data and interpretation by applying both attitude and behavior scales to the same individuals and then correlating the scores. In order to determine possible effects of external limiting factors on the attitude-action relationship the scales were applied to nine different populations inhabiting three different cities in different regions of the United States and eight different areas within the cities. If external limiting factors do affect the relationship between attitudes and behavior in mobility behavior, the correlation between attitudes and behavior should be affected by changing external limiting factors. Attitude-behavior studies have produced mixed results. Research in race relations does not encourage the belief that attitudes and behavior are closely related.4 On the other hand, good results have been achieved by some surveys of public opinion in predicting voting behavior from a premeasurement of voting attitudes.5 It has been suggested that the explanation of why attitudes seem to be able to predict behavior in the latter cases, but not in the former, may be attributable to differences between the situations in which attitude tests are given and the situations in which attitudes are translated into action. The problem here would seem to be to determine if mobility is a type of activity wherein a high correlation between attitudes and behavior may be expected. The hypothesis to be tested may be stated in the following form: Attitudes and behavior are not related in mobility behavior. *Presented at the annual meeting of the Ohio Valley Sociological Society, March 20, 1954. Much of the data on which this paper is based is from a study of urban decentralization in Columbus, Houston, and Seattle. The research was supported by a grant from the Highway Research Board, National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D. C. 1 Cf. Walter Firey, Land Use in Central Boston (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947), p. 13. 2 Op. cit. 3 Amos H. Hawley, Human Ecology: A Theory of Community Structure (New York: The Ronald Press, 1950), p. 286. 4 Cf. Richard T. La Piere, "Attitudes vs. Actions," Social Forces, 13 (December, 1934) pp. 230-37; also cf. Melvin Seeman, Prejudice and Personality: A Study in the Social Psychology of Attitudes. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1947, p. 136. 5 Cf. Paul F. Lazarsfeld, The People's Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948).

Scientists who seek a general theory of community are handicapped by lack of comparability of community studies and by the great complexity of their subject matter. This study attempts to deal with the first problem by applying a single mathematical model to quantitative variables operationally defined and to data gathered at one period of time from 88 community systems. It seeks to reduce complexity by a search for a few factors or fundamental unities in terms of which variations between community systems can be explained. Factor analysis extracted, from the great complexity presented by 82 variables, seven orthogonal factors that account for most of the variations in the systems analyzed. ONE fundamental difficulty with community theory is the great complexity of the phenomena which it seeks to describe. Physical scientists have faced and solved problems of complexity. Chemists, for example, have achieved tremendous control of the material world by discovering that the vast multitude of objects can be described in terms of less than a hundred elements. Is it possible to achieve the same kind of scientific parsimony in community analysis? Do the vast number of possible community variables form independent clusters or functional unities of highly interrelated components? If so, how many are there, what is their nature, and what is the relationship between clusters? This research sought to simplify the complex structure of community interrelationships and variables and to determine if they could be reduced to a relatively small number of factors that would explain all the others and account for differences between community systems. There is no dearth of theories as to the relationships between community components, but these have developed over a long period of time, and grown by the contributions of diverse investigators using different

TEBER'S essay,' The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, has *T continued to interest social scientists in the last decades, probably because it touches on some fundamental problems concerning the economic, religious, and political life of Western societies, and probably because it established so clearly a relationship between religion and other aspects of our cultural pattern. The thesis that Protestantism, and especially the English version of Calvinism, Puritanism, was the parent of modern capitalism has been much discussed. Writers on religion and capitalism following Weber have been much indebted to him in their analyses.2 Weber's thesis has been supported by the authority of such writers as Troeltsch, SchulzeGaevernitz, and Cunningham.3 It has been criticized by Tawney4 and Brentano.5 Furthermore, its subject matter places it in the very center of focus of those problems which are the main concern of intellectual interest today, namely, the relationship of ideas and