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Latin American women play a key role in the international cocaine business as couriers or mules. Beginning from theoretical perspectives that explain the relationship between criminality and gender, we analyze why women without a criminal background become criminals, how they become involved in trafficking, their positions and functions in the criminal organization, and the risks and benefits of their participation. Qualitative fieldwork was carried out based on in-depth interviews with fifty-one female inmates and twenty members of prison staff from nine Spanish prisons. A thematic analysis has been carried out based on this data. The results reveal that the prevalent profile among Latin women traffickers is that of heads of household. There is a relationship between their social and geographical contexts of origin and cocaine trafficking, which determines their criminal behavior. They occupy the most exposed and lowest-paid positions in the criminal structure. We found through their discourses, how they are recruited, how they transport cocaine and the money they obtain. We conclude that cocaine trafficking is a resource that women use to escape situations of exclusion and that allows them to avoid other options, such as prostitution and migration. Despite the risks of trafficking, the economic benefits they obtain from it leads them to commit the crime. Keywords: Latin American women inmates, Mules, Criminal behavior, Drug trafficking, Introduction and Background Women's criminology is an underdeveloped field compared to male criminology (Campbell 2008). Starting in the 1970s and taking place mainly in the 1980s, new approaches on female [...]

This article seeks to build on prior research and knowledge about young female drug sellers' social power by answering the following research question: What are the behavioral manifestations of young female drug sellers' social power as these young women move through their native environments and social institutions? How do these behavioral manifestations influence their perception of the professionals with whom these young women interact in treatment and alternative education programs? The results indicate that young women develop requisite skills for surviving on the streets of their neighborhoods and that some bring these skills into the social institutions they enter for education or treatment. Moreover, the transfer of street-based skills into social institutions influences how young women respond to staff in these social institutions. Keywords drug selling, female adolescents, identity, power

The issue of the social supply of illicit drugs is an important one because it delineates a separate category of 'dealing, 'whereby friends supply or facilitate supply to other friends. Supply of this nature has been argued to be sufficiently different to 'dealing proper' to justify a different criminal justice approach in relation to it. This has been argued to be particularly true regarding social supply among young people who use substances such as cannabis. This research involved interviews with 192 cannabis users in six (three rural, three urban) locations in England. Most were exclusively cannabis users. Nearly half (45%) had been involved in some form of supply, and 78% reported sharing their cannabis with others. Nearly all supply events were between friends within a close age range. The findings suggest that there is little contact by young cannabis users to the wider drug market and that it may be better to understand this activity as taking place in an 'arena of transaction' rather than seeing it as an extension of the normally conceived drug market. We argue that there is sufficient difference within this arena of transaction from the wider drug market for most activity there to be dealt with less punitively by the criminal justice system.

We present analyses based on selected findings from a NIDA-funded project entitled, 'An Exploratory Study of Ecstasy Distribution' (2003-2006). We conducted in-depth interviews with 120 men and women in the San Francisco Bay area who had sold five or more doses five or more times in the six months prior to the interview. The research focused on the motivations and circumstances surrounding the decision to initiate sales, sales settings, the characteristics of both sellers and buyers and their relationships. It also focused on negotiated order and social identities. We describe the ways in which a sample of educated, housed, and employed Ecstasy dealers' attitudes and practices compared with more marginalized groups from other drug market studies. These findings suggest attention to social class, that is, the social characteristics of sellers and the availability of types of sales settings (public vs. private) is critical to developing a sociological understanding of drug markets.

Research on drug trafficking has not been able to discern the exact nature of illegal drug markets and the relationship between their individual and group participants. This article delineates the role of Mexican immigrants and Mexican-American participants involved in the stratified drug market of South Texas. This article synthesizes ethnographic materials drawn from two previous National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) studies in order identify the different types of drug distribution behaviors that occur within the groups, the differentiated roles of individuals, the organizational framework, and most significantly, the processes that link market participants to others outside of the drug market. This illegal behavior can be interpreted as an adaptive mechanism that is a direct response to the marginal economic status imposed by macro socio-economical background factors. As well, we conclude that the specific foreground factors of the opportunities offered by the context, culture, and proximity of the U.S./Mexico border and invitational edges explain this behavior. There are both parallels and particular differences between the South Texas case and the structuring and functioning of informal legal and illegal markets that are characteristic of other economically disadvantaged communities.

This paper analyzes illicit drug markets in New Orleans before and after Hurricane Katrina and access to drug markets following evacuation at many locations and in Houston. Among New Orleans arrestees pre-Katrina, rates of crack and heroin use and market participation was comparable to New York and higher than in other southern cities. Both cities have vigorous outdoor drug markets. Over 100 New Orleans evacuees provide rich accounts describing the illicit markets in New Orleans and elsewhere. The flooding of New Orleans disrupted the city's flourishing drug markets, both during and immediately after the storm. Drug supplies, though limited, were never completely unavailable. Subjects reported that alcohol or drugs were not being used in the Houston Astrodome, and it was a supportive environment. Outside the Astrodome, they were often approached by or could easily locate middlemen and drug sellers. Evacuees could typically access illegal drug markets wherever they went. This paper analyzes the impact of a major disaster upon users of illegal drugs and the illegal drug markets in New Orleans and among the diaspora of New Orleans evacuees following Hurricane Katrina. This analysis includes data from criminal justice sources that specify what the drug markets were like before this disaster occurred. This analysis also includes some comparison cities where no disaster occurred, but which help inform the similarities and differences in drug markets in other cities. The data presented also include an initial analysis of ethnographic interview data from over 100 New Orleans Evacuees recruited in New Orleans and Houston.

Based on ethnographic observation of the changes in drug markets and violence in New York City over the past 20 years, this paper compares and contrasts three distinct types of drug markets and the types of systemic violence that are characteristic of each and argues that knowing which kinds of markets and contexts are associated with what kinds of violence can be valuable for policy makers and professionals. Further, evolving drug markets and different forms of violence associated with particular market types are, in part, responses to law enforcement interventions intended to eliminate drug markets. Police interventions after the character of drug markets--either for better or for worse--as they adapt, and these interventions can produce markedly different outcomes with regard to violence and crime. Comparatively brief interventions of limited scope can effectively control violence and reconfigure markets by 'training' them to act in ways less likely to produce violence and social disorder.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Tajikistan has experienced an extraordinary and devastating expansion of opiate trafficking and consumption. While heroin was virtually unknown in the country up to the mid-1990s and opium was produced and consumed locally only to a modest degree, in less than a decade Tajikistan has become a key transit country for Afghan opiates bound north- and westwards, at the same time as it has witnessed a rapid growth of domestic heroin use. Tajikistan now rivals Afghanistan for the unenviable title of the country most dependent on the illicit drug industry, with the opiate industry adding at least 30% to the recorded gross domestic product. The opiate trade is so important economically that it corrupts the whole political system. This article therefore argues that since the mid-1990s Tajikistan has become a narco-state, in which leaders of the most powerful trafficking groups occupy high-ranking government positions and misuse state structures for their own illicit businesses.

This article examines research on upper level drug traffickers in the U.S., the UK, Canada, and the Netherlands. Included is an analysis and critique of typologies of drug traffickers and theoretical models of organized crime as they apply to upper level drug networks. Studies of higher level drug trafficking indicate that drug market represent informal and loosely organized associations of relatively small syndicates or crews of independent drug entrepreneurs. They compete for market share and deal primarily or exclusively with trusted associates chosen from ethnic, kinship, and friendship networks. Most dealers are highly cautious, eschew the use of violence, typically make huge profits, attempt to maintain a low profile, rationalize their conduct as business activity, and operate within geographically niche markets.

Three models--hierarchies, markets, and networks--are used to explore the organization of drug distribution and the place of ethnicity/race in that. These models are well established as conceptual approaches to the coordination of social life. Each of them is employed in the analysis of drug distribution, though not always clearly. This paper aims to elucidate their key features as they bear on questions of ethnicity/race. In doing so, it problematizes the way that ethnicity/race is employed in research and policy circles and challenges naive assumptions about ethnic sameness and ethnicity/race as bases for organizing drug distribution. Ethnicity may be a useful resource for criminal and legitimate enterprises but both comparisons between the two and details of what is specifically ethnic are generally lacking. Some avenues for future research and simple principles to guide such research are proposed.

The article is based on ethnographic research in Frankfurt am Main/Germany with young male migrants who are involved in drug dealing. The aim is to give an account of the mechanisms, values, and self-constructions that influence the dealers, e.g., in their choice of substances dealt, their display of violence, how they neutralize contradicting values, etc. Moreover, changes in the studied milieu that have occurred over time will be examined. Most interesting seems the fact that the subjects' cultural background has a greater impact on their business than economic rationality, the 'seductions of crime' or the 'search of respect.' Their distinct concept of purity and impurity, honor and dishonor, and their morality regarding the choice of substances seem particularly interesting and influence their behavior in the market.

Armed conflict strengthens the capacity of insurgent movements while weakening that of the state and the involvement of the drug industry in crimes creates an economic function of war where vested interests work towards the continuation of armed conflict. The link between narcotics and conflict is supported by studies of nine major narcotics-producing areas and strategies need to be worked out to resolve armed conflict arising out of the production and trafficking of illicit drugs.

Drug entrepreneurs are frequently portrayed as being violent, secretive, and only willing to work with trusted 'equals.' However, these images often contrast with the social reality of drug dealing and dealers, which is more mundane, consensual, and public than imagined. Moreover, Colombian drug traffickers are either pushed to perform in accordance with such perceptions or simply to exploit their violent or secretive reputations. In addition to the actual use of violence, secrecy, and trust, drug entrepreneurs often use these resources strategically as a form of manipulation to either defend themselves, to gain power, or to construct their social or ethnic identities. While these resources serve as essential tools for business performance, they also constitute obstacles for success. The time is past for guns and killings and massacres. We have to be cunning like the business people, there's more money in it and it's better for our children and grandchildren. Marie Puzo, The Godfather

The Golden Triangle region of Southeast Asia is responsible for 60% of the world's heroin supply. Production of the illegal drug affects many aspects of society, yet many governments still need to implement effective drug policies to reduce the social effects of the heroin trade.

Strategies mix - but do not match - when the war on street drugs is pursued in tandem with present immigration policy. So long as street drugs remain illegal, the high profit margins induce smugglers to enter the United State illegally. Once here, a number remain as illegal aliens. Legal immigrants and illegal aliens, together, constitute a pool that lends itself to labor-intensive agriculture. It appears that commercial-scale cannabis growing has moved to the United States to take advantage of this new, rural, undereducated, labor force. How else do the facts add up?, The rise in the number of illegal aliens in the US can be partially attributed to the proliferation of illegal drugs sold in the said country. This immigration problem can be solved by legalizing street drugs. Legalization would significantly decrease the profits earned by illegal aliens from the drug traffic. It would also control the exploitation of immigrant farm labor in the country.