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The article deals with Philo's elaboration of the Stoic doctrine regarding the proper emotions (εὐπάθειαι): joy (Χαρά), caution or watchfulness (εὐλάβεια), and wishing (βοὐλησις) concerning the twofold state of the human mind: an individual (within the inner soul's structure) and the universal (relating to the world). In these two states of mind, one's disposition toward God's Logos is revealed. Philo puts the Stoic doctrine within the framework of Jewish theology, which considered man an essential link connecting created and uncreated nature. Philo avoids Stoics' monism and considers the problem of the selfdetermination of an individual mind in the light of the relationship between man's mind and God's Logos as two distinct essences. Philo finds the proper model of the inner man's world (microcosm) in the eupatheiai, which is perfectly correlated with the structure of the universe guided by God's Logos. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brad Inwood's source book on later Stoicism is a valuable resource for understanding this often overlooked period of Stoic philosophy. Inwood argues that the transition to later Stoicism occurred in 155 BCE, as the Stoics responded to criticism from skeptics and Epicureans. He explores the views of Antipater, who represents a turning point in Stoicism, and discusses the blend of conservatism and innovation during this time. Inwood also defends Posidonius as an orthodox Stoic, providing a nuanced account of his contributions to physics, metaphysics, and ethics. While the book lacks interpretive controversy and engagement with scholarly debates, it serves as an essential reference for understanding the development of Stoic philosophy. [Extracted from the article]

In her 2014 monograph, philosopher Neera Badhwar develops a neo-Aristotelian account of well-being according to which well-being consists in happiness in an objectively worthwhile life. An objectively worthwhile life is a life that is virtuous, but virtue is not enough for well-being: a person also must find pleasure and purpose in what the ancients called "external goods," that is, goods "external to the soul" like wealth, health, and friendships. Badhwar argues that these goods contribute to well-being directly, and she rejects the Stoic view that they are valuable only as the instruments and material of virtue. In this paper, I defend the Stoic view she rejects and make the case that if one claims that virtue is primary in well-being, as Neo-Aristotelians like Badhwar do, then one should adopt the Stoic view that well-being consists only in virtuous activity. While Badhwar and others dismiss that view as implausible, I defend its plausibility by arguing that its critics misunderstand it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I return here, for certain points, to the distinction between λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and λόγος προφορικός often rendered by the opposition between inner and outer speech. If, as an important testimony of Sextus Empiricus shows, the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος is, for the Stoics, related to the μετάβασις which allows one to grasp the logical connections pertaining to a given situation, is it appropriate to translate ἐνδιάθετος by ‘inner’ and προφορικός by ‘outer’? I examine Porphyry’s testimony in the De abstinentia, as well as a passage of Galen, in which he passes on to us an extract from Chrysippus’ treatise On the Soul. I depart from Jean-Baptiste Gourinat’s rhetorical interpretation of the ἐνδιάθετος λόγος by stressing that the dominant part of the soul located in the heart is the seat of a fundamental operation that operates the transmutation of thought into language. Finally, I take into account an occurrence, never before examined in this debate, of the adjective ἐνδιάθετος in the grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the second half of the second century BC, a single personality became ascendant in the Roman Republic. Scipio Aemilianus assumed the mantle of the first man in Rome from 146 BC until his death in 129 BC. Modern biographers of this leading statesman have drawn different conclusions about the influence of Greek ethics on the life of Scipio, either that he possessed a Hellenistic way of thinking or that he was a traditional Roman aristocrat. Much debate turns on historiography and the question of the usability of sources like Cicero for the history of the second century BC. This article focusses on de Officiis Books 1–2 and the issue of Cicero's debt to the writing of the Stoic philosopher Panaetius of Rhodes, Scipio's friend and tutor. I argue that sufficient evidence exists in the references to Scipio in Off. 1–2 to demonstrate that Panaetius had characterised Scipio as influenced by the Stoic way of living and explicitly as a Roman example of the virtue of greatness of soul. This argument is supported by corroborating evidence from Polybius, Scipio's friend and confidant, who also wrote about him in his Histories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Stoics identified the phantasia with the impression (typos) in the soul, or the impressing process (typōsis). Alexander of Aphrodisias engages directly with this account at De anima 68.10–21, and argues against the applicability of the impression in a theory of perception in Mantissa 10, especially 133.25–134.23. I analyse Alexander's polemic account at De anima 68.10–21, I demonstrate that it differs from Chrysippus' criticism of Cleanthes (contrary to some commentators), and I show how it fits in the context of his argument. From this analysis it will emerge how Alexander uses Stoic ideas to form his Aristotelian account. Then, I show that Alexander, by taking 'typos' metaphorically, not only prefers the term 'enkataleimma' over 'typos' in his theory of phantasia, but he keeps the 'typos' terminology only to remain faithful to Aristotle's use (contrary to some commentators). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has long been thought that Augustine holds that corporeal objects cannot act upon incorporeal souls. However, precisely how and why Augustine imposes limitations upon the causal powers of corporeal objects remains obscure. In this paper, the author clarifies Augustine's views about the causal and dependence relations between body and soul. He argues that, contrary to what is often thought, Augustine allows that corporeal objects do act upon souls and merely rules out that corporeal objects exercise a particular kind of causal power (that of efficient or sustaining causes). He clarifies how Augustine conceives of the kind of causal influence exercised by souls and bodies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the paper we try to analyse the link between the questionability and tranquillity. To name it: we are considering if asking questions is connected with a tranquil state of mind-soul, or rather a restless one. The research has a theoretical framework which, first, presents many philosophical and religious concepts of peaceful mind (among others, Scepticism, Stoicism, Buddhism, Epicureanism, Cynicism) and, second, introduces some chosen ideas of understanding what is questionability (J. Tischner's and E. Coreth's views). The conclusions of this paper is that there exists a fundamental connection between those concepts, in particular, trouble mind and questioning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From his soul-dividing model (through a comparison with music 443d) Plato presents in the Republic the predominance of certain virtues in each part and its political meaning. This idea is later developed by other Greek philosophical schools in imperial time. Plutarch's commentary on the Platonic passage let us know how Neoplatonists, Neo-Pythagoreans and Stoics have enriched the identification between Soul and Virtue with elements taken from the musical system and from the latestdoctrine on virtues, even establishing links with theory of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the Stoics, ordinary unified bodies—animals, plants, and inanimate natural bodies—each have a single cause of unity and being: pneuma. Pneuma itself has no distinct cause of unity; on the contrary, it acts as a cause of unity and being for itself. In this paper, I show how pneuma is supposed to be able to unify itself and other bodies in virtue of its characteristic tensile motion (τονικὴ κίνησις). Thus, we will see how the Stoics could have hoped to account for corporeal unity by positing another body (pneuma) apparently itself in need of unification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Section 32 of Iamblichus' De anima begins with the analysis of three possible explanations about the way the soul enters the body. The first two are anonymous while the third one is attributed by the philosopher of Chalcis to Plotinus's followers. The theme is announced in the previous section (31) where from the beginning a reference to "Hippocrates, the Asclepiade" can be read connected to a previous lost sentence which would mark the argument's outset. As a possible source for Iamblichus, Porphyry is often cited. Porphyry includes views from Hippocrates, from an anonymous philosopher, and from Numenius of Apamea about the moment when life begins and the soul naturally becomes associated with the body. In the development of the aforementioned sections 31 and 32, an implicit knowledge of the embryological hypotheses of the time is appraised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is dedicated to exploring the alleged difference between Cleanthes' and Chrysippus' accounts of the post-mortal survival of the souls and the conceptions of personal identity that these accounts underpin. I argue that while Cleanthes conceptualised the personal identity as grounded in the rational soul, Chrysippus conceptualised it as the being an embodied rational soul. I also suggest that this difference between the two early Stoics might have been due to his metaphysical commitments arising from his response to the Growing Argument put forth by the Academics rather than the critique of his teacher. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Hypnos is the property of Hypnos / Instituto Hypnos and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The present article is divided into two parts: the first focuses on the affections of the soul in general, while the second part investigates the case of melancholy, as it is studied from Aristotle and the Stoics to Galen. The main point of the first part is an analysis of the Chrysippean treatise On the Affections of the Soul as it appears in the Galenic treatise On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato. The analysis identifies several Chrysippean influences from Plato and Aristotle regarding the psyche. In the second part, the case of melancholy is analyzed through the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise Problem XXX 1. The discussion shows the common points between the Aristotelian text and the Chrysippean fragments regarding the issue of melancholy. This article aims to bring to light the evolution of the phenomenon of melancholy in Galen's thought, which is connected with the study of both medical and philosophical texts already existing before him. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Stoics try to demonstrate, in a theoretical context, more than any other philosophy, the link unifying the parts with the whole, in all areas of existence; namely, from man to divine reason, from god to nature – a tautological link in some cases – from matter to logos or creative pneuma. This unifying bond – hexis or continuity – guarantees the attachment between bodies which are in a state of sympathy (or interaction) which also constitutes their existence. It remains to seek the meaning of this notion; draw on its etymology: according to Bailly’s dictionary, the term hexis in Greek means among other meanings: action of possessing, possession. And according to the dictionary of L.‑S.‑J., hexis (proper noun) derives from the future of the verb ἕξω, from the verb ἔχω, (to have, to possess); in its intransitive form refers to a permanent condition, namely to an act, which results from practice. In order to make an attempt to define this concept or to orient its function, it seems appropriate for us to do some research – we could say historical –, consulting texts prior to Stoicism, examining its place and the nuances it takes in different contexts and finally, follow its interpretation where, according to philosophical approaches, it sometimes means disposition, habit, or situation. Nevertheless, the Stoics give this term an original meaning, different from the one that was granted to it until then. It is the hectic pneuma or the tension (tonos) prevalent in the universe. In this perspective, we will try to define its function and compare it with the notion of hexis in Aristotle, where it acquires the meaning of metaxy, in his Metaphysics, Δ, 1022b12. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay analyzes the ways in which, in his Nova de Universis Philosophia, Francesco Patrizi uses, adopts, and, in some cases, rejects the Stoic philosophical tradition. Although, at first glance, most of Patrizi's remarks on Stoicism and Stoic understanding of nature are critical – as this article demonstrates – he widely relied on Stoic teaching that he sought to combine with Neoplatonism and the prisca theologia doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Academic Journal of Philosophy / Felsefi Düşün is the property of Pinhan Yayincilik and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In Stoic physics, blending (κρᾶσις) is the relation between active pneuma and passive matter; natural bodies from rocks and logs to plants, animals and the cosmos itself are blends of pneuma and matter. Blending structures the Stoic cosmos. I develop a new interpretation of the Stoic theory of blending, based on passages from Hierocles. The theory of blending, I argue, has been misunderstood. Hierocles allows us to see in detail how the theory is supposed to work and how it fits into Stoic physics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most important paradigm shifts in the history of Greek philosophy was the 'rediscovery' of transcendence in the movement of Intermediate Platonism. Less than a century before the birth of Hellenism (late 4th century BC), Plato had advocated an intentional preoccupation with the life of the mind / soul, encouraging the individual to avoid being entrapped in the material limitations of life and instead discover its transcendental dimension. The conquest of Athens by the Macedonians, followed by the invasion of the Orient by Alexander the Great, set in motion sociological and cultural changes that challenged the relevance of Platonic philosophy. The transcendental vision of Platonism left the individual still struggling to find happiness in the world created by Alexander the Great. This was the context in which the schools the of Cynicism, Stoicism, Epicureanism and Skepticism challenged Platonism with their call to happiness in this world and by means of the Hellenistic dominance and the rise of Roman supremacy stirred a renewed spiritual and philosophical effort to rediscover the world beyond; that is, the transcendental world of Plato. This was Middle Platonism and the Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria was one of its most prolific writers. In this paper, we will examine the concept of the soul in the writings of Philo, with an emphasis on the role that the soul plays in the act of approaching God through the means of the external / material cult (Temple, sacrifices, priests, etc.). Philo offers a complex vision of the soul, one that remains critically relevant to understanding the Greek, Jewish, and Christian thought that emerged after Philo. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The universe is the result of a production that pertains not to craft, but to nature. This production does not involve either reasoning or concepts, but is the result of a power that acts on matter like an imprint. The Intellect transmits the intelligible forms it harbors, to the hypostasis Soul, where they become rational formulas (logoi). The hypostasis Soul then transmits these rational formulas to the world soul, which produces animate and inanimate beings, as if it had been ordered to do so. Yet since it is the lower part of the soul of the world that is responsible for these productions, its action, which depends on reasons that do not hold the first rank and are drawn from itself, manifests inferior quality, which explains imperfection and the presence of evil in the sensible universe, despite its government by Providence.

Aristotle's philosophical legacy should be accepted as one of the historical influences that shaped Stoic moral and psychological thought, even if this influence needs to be demonstrated in each individual case rather than be taken for granted in general. Having discussed the methodological issues raised by the state of our documented evidence, I focus upon the particular philosophical agenda bequeathed by Aristotle, the issue of the structure of the human soul, and the theory of character and emotion. I argue that Aristotle's influence upon the Stoics is not only a matter of their adoption of Aristotelian themes or concepts but that, given the aporetic quality of much of Aristotle's writing, they accepted options as discussed, and actually rejected, by Aristotle. In particular, the Stoics have been influenced by deliberations in which Aristotle discusses, adapts or rejects positions associated with the philosophical hero of the Stoics, Socrates (in particular in De an. II, 9–10 and EN VII, 1–11). Seen in this light, the Aristotelian legacy appears to be even more relevant to explaining distinctive and in particular Socratic features of Stoic moral psychology than has been previously assumed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the ancient idea of the soul that in the patristic era has been enriched by the perception of the methodology of ancient philosophy. Greek and Roman thinkers considered some properties of the soul, its immortality, revealed its “levels and strata” (Plato, Aristotle), expressed first guesses about the nature of sinful passions (the Stoics). But some aspects still remained unresolved so far. This is the issue of materiality or immateriality, of the soul, which "raised" in the Russian Empire in the 19th century (the dispute saints Theophan the Recluse and Ignatius Brianchaninov) and remains relevant today.

The article offers the author's insights on the Anniversary poems by John Donne and their pneumatics and poetic inspiration through the lens of Stoic physics. Topics include how Donne connects the spiritual and material substances of the death of Elizabeth Drury, the use of Stoic ethics and pneuma in the poems, and the evolution of pneumatics in the Anniversary poems through the multiple meanings of pneuma or spiritus in the early modern period.

This review of Engberg-Pedersen’s important new book questions its thesis that Paul, like the Stoics, understood the pneuma to be a physical substance characteristic of the heavenly bodies in the cosmos. For all their similarities in numerous details, there seem to be substantial differences between Pauline and Stoic theology concerning the relationship between God and the world, as seen in the way Paul articulates the character of the ‘new creation’ instituted by the Christ-event. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

A rejoinder to the articles of Barclay and Levison reviewing Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In elaborating the Jesus tradition (Q 11:9-10; 6:22-23) James expands, compresses and elaborates Q sayings in a way which reveals an array of interests in psychagogy and the care of the soul which we know also to have characterized various strains of Hellenistic philosophy of the early Roman period. The author of James displays a remarkable interest, not in such concrete ends as subsistence, debt relief, and the rewards for withstanding persecution, but rather in the psychic processes that occur between stimulus and decision and in the role that proper cognition plays in constructing the subject as perfect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay argues that the traditional dichotomy between 'apocalypticism' and philosophy should be transcended with regard to Paul's understanding of the pneuma in relation to sarx . The essay first analyses the cosmology of the pneuma in connection with the future resurrection of believers (1 Cor 15.35-50), then considers its presence in the bodies of believers here and now (2 Corinthians 3-5), then interprets the 'anthropology' of 1 Thess 5.23 and 1 Cor 2.14-15 and 15.44 and its connection with Paul's 'ethics', and finally proposes a reading of Rom 8.1-13 in relation to 7.7-25 that is based on Paul's concrete cosmology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the present paper will be to analyse the concept of freedom within Epictetus' Dissertations, focusing on the possibility of freedom and its articulation to the concept of proaíresis. We shall prove that freedom cannot be understood within Epictetus' work merely as a negative process of liberation from (internal and external) determinations, but that it demands a complementary moment of substituting wrong determinations with rational/virtuous ones. Such a conclusion will require the clarification that the proaíresis is in no way a naturally undetermined and free faculty of the soul, but that its freedom operates as a regulative horizon which can only be reached through the correct care (epiméleia) of the soul. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]