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How, amidst a crisis of sovereignty and identity, did once-rejected national symbols become meaningful to Kosovo's Albanians? Having declared independence in 2008, a 2014 study found that less than one-third of Kosovo's citizens identified with their newly adopted state symbols. As meanings are always shifting, depending on the contexts in which their forms appear and the actors involved, theories of social construction have focused on the representational aspects of meaning-making: the ways in which the forms stabilize (or destabilize) the constructs they depict. Instead of focusing on the representational—the determinable, measurable, and rational aspects, this article investigates the discursive mechanisms that mobilize meanings and configure contexts, extending Robin Wagner-Pacifici's alternative theory of events. Through discourse and semiotic analysis, it tracks Kosovo's new flag and anthem through the construction, crisis, and transformation of three social realities: political independence, national identity, and the world of international competitive judo, illuminating how changing meanings change, shifting contexts shift, and how to interpret actors' fleeting emotions. In the Kosovo case, the construction is the crisis, as well as the change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kosovo celebrated ten years of fraught independence in February. While there were some good reasons to celebrate, Kosovo still hovers between a failed and a functioning state. Its main economic indicators are extremely bad with no signs of improving. Unemployment, particularly among its youth, is feeding an ongoing brain drain. The legacy of the United Nations Mission (UNMIK) and now the European Union Mission (EULEX) is mixed, but neither was successful in creating the conditions for Kosovo to function as a normal state. Agreements between Belgrade and Prishtina to provide more rights to the Serb communities especially in the north have undermined Kosovo's sovereignty. Now, the buzz in Prishtina speaks of a territorial swap between Serbia and Kosovo that would pave the way for mutual recognition. The domestic elite have proven more interested in short term survival and profit than in making historic progress. A stale consensus prevails that maybe this is the best that can be hoped for. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The task of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it classifies and explores the three approaches to solving the conflict in Kosovo. The first approach, coined into the phrase 'Kosovo as a unique case', undermines academic debates revolving around Kosovo and it is of no use for scientific purposes. The second approach rests on the assumption that Serbia will eventually recognize Kosovo as a sovereign state in exchange for membership in the EU. However, there is no evidence for such a claim - quite the contrary, Kosovo remains an all-consuming issue for Serbs. The third approach states that Kosovo's status will be of utmost importance only when Kosovo becomes fully ready for membership. This might have been the case prior to the Brussels Agreements; nevertheless, the agreements proved that even technical issues related to the improvement of Kosovars' life cannot be achieved without touching upon the question of status. Secondly, this paper aims at setting prolegomenon for future discussions regarding the status. The formula runs as follows: Kosovo is to be independent of Serbia even if it means that Kosovo is not a sovereign country, and Serbia not to recognize Kosovo even if it means losing de facto and de jure authority over the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines approaches and official discrepancies characterizing Western European rhetoric with regard to the Kosovo status question. Since the early 1980s, Kosovo has been increasingly present in European debates, culminating with the 1999 international intervention in the region and subsequent talks about its final status. Although the Kosovo Albanians proclaimed independence in February 2008 and the majority of the EU member-states decided to recognize Kosovo as an independent state, Western European rhetoric has been rather divided. This article shows that in addition to the five EU members who decided not to recognize Kosovo from the very beginning, and thus are powerful enough to affect its further progress both locally and internationally, some of the recognizers, although they have abandoned the policy of ‘standards before status’, have also struggled to develop full support for the province – a discrepancy that surely questions the overall Western support for Kosovo's independence. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article presents a discussion of the book "Unrecognized States: The Struggle for Sovereignty in the Modern International System," by Nina Caspersen. Topics include the notion of sovereignty in relation to unrecognized states, the relevance of the notion of weak states, and the role of formal independence declarations in assessing de facto states. Also addressed are the roles of major powers in recognizing states, the effects of recognition on political legitimacy, and the influence of the recognition of Kosovo on other unrecognized states.

When Kosovo declared independence, in February 2008, it was stated that the move was not an act of self-determination. Instead, the key states that supported the decision insisted that the case for statehood arose from a unique set of circumstances. Kosovo was not a precedent; it was asui generiscase in international politics. This essay considers the arguments underpinning this claim to exclusivity and argues that, taken either individually or collectively, the main justifications used to support Kosovo's ‘unique’ statehood—such as the abuse of human rights—in fact have serious consequences for other separatist conflicts elsewhere. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In international law, the right of peoples to self-determination as applied to remedial secession is anything but clear. The International Court of Justice had an opportunity to clarify this area of law in its recent advisory opinion concerning the unilateral declaration of independence made by Kosovo. Much to the disappointment of international commentators, the Court expressly declined to adjudicate whether Kosovo had, by its declaration, attained state status. Instead, the Court declared that international law does not prohibit unilateral declarations of independence. This Note argues that the proper method for the United Nations to articulate international law of secession is via resolution of the General Assembly combined with application of that resolution by the International Court of Justice. This is the method the United Nations used when it articulated another form of the right to self-determination, the right to be free from colonization. The method's success in this latter area demonstrates its viability for the right to secession, a similarly situated right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For 60 years, the international community has limited the right of territories to gain independence without the permission of the 'parent state.' Such limits were, however, challenged when Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia, in February 2008. As a result, Belgrade referred the matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). On 22 July 2010, it came back with its long-awaited decision. Taking a narrow view of the question, the majority argued that, in general, declarations of independence, as mere statements, do not violate international law unless stated otherwise by the Security Council. Thus, Kosovo's declaration of independence cannot be considered as being wholly 'unique' - as those states that supported its statehood have claimed. On the key questions of whether Kosovo's secession is legal, or if it is even a state, they chose to avoid controversy. On these points, the international community is no clearer now than it was before the case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]