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The shipping industry plays an important role in international trade and world economic development. In particular, the rapid growth of the shipping industry since 2020 has become an important factor in supporting and stimulating the rapid recovery of the global economy in the post epidemic era. However, under the background that climate warming has increasingly become the theme of common concern for all mankind, greenhouse gas emission reduction has increasingly attracted the attention of governments of all countries, and has also become the requirement for production and operation of all industries, the green, environmental protection and sustainable development of the shipping industry have also become the focus of participants in all sectors. As environmental problems put forward requirements of a green shipping industry, some policies aimed at reducing pollution and greenhouse gas emissions, such as carbon tax, have brought considerations to the strategies of ports and enterprises, especially concerning their competition and cooperation. This study established a shipping supply chain system composed of two ports and one shipping company in order to analyse the impact of carbon tax on the shipping supply chain, and to optimize the decision‐making of government, ports and shipping companies. Through three‐level Stackelberg game of four models including ports cooperating or not cooperating with each other, and carbon tax levied on ports or the shipping company, the study finds that the collection of carbon tax will reduce the container handling volume of ports thus reducing the profits of both ports and the shipping company, but the handling volume when the government puts carbon tax on ports is lower than that when it puts carbon tax on the shipping company, and the handling volume under the port cooperation mode is lower than that under the port non‐cooperation mode. As the collector of carbon tax, the government's income when taxing ports is higher than that when taxing shipping companies, and when ports cooperate, the government's income is lower than that when ports do not cooperate. Moreover, no matter the ports cooperate with each other or not, the impact of carbon tax on port container handling volume under the mode of carbon tax levied by the government on ports is more significant than that when carbon tax is levied on the shipping company, leaving the former mode a lower container handling volume and lower profit. The findings of this study have the following significance and suggestions for the participants of shipping supply industry: In order to maximize the government's target value, the government should give priority to taxing shipping companies rather than ports; Under the background of carbon tax, ports should choose limited non‐cooperation strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although previous research ignores other subsidy groups, we conduct a comprehensive study. In our closed-loop supply chain model, the manufacturer can produce either new products or remanufactured products of end-of-life products recycled by independent recyclers. Our core objective is to explore the production and recycling strategies of the two products under different government subsidy plans and which groups the government subsidy plans should target. Considering the consumers' discount perception and uncertainty of recycling quantity, we construct four game scenarios: (1) no subsidy (Scenario N); (2) subsidy for the manufacturer (Scenario M); (3) subsidy for the recycler (Scenario R); (4) subsidy for consumers (Scenario C). The results show that the corporate profits and social welfare under scenario C are higher than those under other scenarios. If the government adopts scenario C, enterprise profits and social welfare will always be higher, but the downside is that government expenditure will also be higher. If considering the limited government funds, the government can set a medium subsidy level. Scenario M will bring sub-optimal social welfare to the government. For scenario R, government subsidies stimulate the recycling of end-of-life products and help recyclers increase their profits, but from the manufacturer's perspective, manufacturers may resist this scenario. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The reduction of carbon emissions is a world-wide concern. Many countries have implemented various policies to reduce carbon emissions, which has affected the operational decisions of enterprises in the supply chain since most carbon is emitted during the production process. In this paper, the mutual relationship between supply chain enterprise operations and government policy are considered. Governmental carbon emission tax policies are examined using the three-stage Stackelberg game model with a decentralized supply chain and the two-stage Stackelberg game model with a centralized supply chain. The optimal strategies of enterprises and governments are theorized for both types of supply chains. In the decentralized supply chain, a product's retail price and the government's carbon tax are higher than those in centralized decision-making mode. In the centralized supply chain, the stocking factor of the retailer, the profit of the supply chain and the expected social welfare of the government are higher than those in decentralized supply chain. With the increase of carbon emissions tax, the wholesale price of manufacturer and retailing price of retailer under the decentralized supply chain, as well as retailing price of retailer under centralized supply chain increase. The results indicate that the centralized supply chain is more beneficial to enterprises and government than the decentralized supply chain. By performing the comparisons of the manufacturer-dominated supply chain with retailer-dominated and no agent dominated supply chains, it is shown that both the environment performance and financial performance of supply chain are better off when the supply chain members have distributed pricing powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]