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Weak supervision (WS) is a powerful method to build labeled datasets for training supervised models in the face of little-to-no labeled data. It replaces hand-labeling data with aggregating multiple noisy-but-cheap label estimates expressed by labeling functions (LFs). While it has been used successfully in many domains, weak supervision's application scope is limited by the difficulty of constructing labeling functions for domains with complex or high-dimensional features. To address this, a handful of methods have proposed automating the LF design process using a small set of ground truth labels. In this work, we introduce AutoWS-Bench-101: a framework for evaluating automated WS (AutoWS) techniques in challenging WS settings -- a set of diverse application domains on which it has been previously difficult or impossible to apply traditional WS techniques. While AutoWS is a promising direction toward expanding the application-scope of WS, the emergence of powerful methods such as zero-shot foundation models reveals the need to understand how AutoWS techniques compare or cooperate with modern zero-shot or few-shot learners. This informs the central question of AutoWS-Bench-101: given an initial set of 100 labels for each task, we ask whether a practitioner should use an AutoWS method to generate additional labels or use some simpler baseline, such as zero-shot predictions from a foundation model or supervised learning. We observe that in many settings, it is necessary for AutoWS methods to incorporate signal from foundation models if they are to outperform simple few-shot baselines, and AutoWS-Bench-101 promotes future research in this direction. We conclude with a thorough ablation study of AutoWS methods.

In order to prevent leaking input information from intermediate-layer features, this paper proposes a method to revise the traditional neural network into the rotation-equivariant neural network (RENN). Compared to the traditional neural network, the RENN uses d-ary vectors/tensors as features, in which each element is a d-ary number. These d-ary features can be rotated (analogous to the rotation of a d-dimensional vector) with a random angle as the encryption process. Input information is hidden in this target phase of d-ary features for attribute obfuscation. Even if attackers have obtained network parameters and intermediate-layer features, they cannot extract input information without knowing the target phase. Hence, the input privacy can be effectively protected by the RENN. Besides, the output accuracy of RENNs only degrades mildly compared to traditional neural networks, and the computational cost is significantly less than the homomorphic encryption., Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:2003.08365

We propose a method to revise the neural network to construct the quaternion-valued neural network (QNN), in order to prevent intermediate-layer features from leaking input information. The QNN uses quaternion-valued features, where each element is a quaternion. The QNN hides input information into a random phase of quaternion-valued features. Even if attackers have obtained network parameters and intermediate-layer features, they cannot extract input information without knowing the target phase. In this way, the QNN can effectively protect the input privacy. Besides, the output accuracy of QNNs only degrades mildly compared to traditional neural networks, and the computational cost is much less than other privacy-preserving methods.

This paper presents a method to explain how the information of each input variable is gradually discarded during the forward propagation in a deep neural network (DNN), which provides new perspectives to explain DNNs. We define two types of entropy-based metrics, i.e. (1) the discarding of pixel-wise information used in the forward propagation, and (2) the uncertainty of the input reconstruction, to measure input information contained by a specific layer from two perspectives. Unlike previous attribution metrics, the proposed metrics ensure the fairness of comparisons between different layers of different DNNs. We can use these metrics to analyze the efficiency of information processing in DNNs, which exhibits strong connections to the performance of DNNs. We analyze information discarding in a pixel-wise manner, which is different from the information bottleneck theory measuring feature information w.r.t. the sample distribution. Experiments have shown the effectiveness of our metrics in analyzing classic DNNs and explaining existing deep-learning techniques.

Previous studies have found that an adversary attacker can often infer unintended input information from intermediate-layer features. We study the possibility of preventing such adversarial inference, yet without too much accuracy degradation. We propose a generic method to revise the neural network to boost the challenge of inferring input attributes from features, while maintaining highly accurate outputs. In particular, the method transforms real-valued features into complex-valued ones, in which the input is hidden in a randomized phase of the transformed features. The knowledge of the phase acts like a key, with which any party can easily recover the output from the processing result, but without which the party can neither recover the output nor distinguish the original input. Preliminary experiments on various datasets and network structures have shown that our method significantly diminishes the adversary's ability in inferring about the input while largely preserves the resulting accuracy.