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Inspired by new technologies to monitor parking occupancy and process market signals, we aim to expand the application of demand-responsive pricing in the parking industry. Based on a graphical Hotelling model wherein each garage has information for its incoming parking demand, we consider a general competitive spatial pricing in parking systems under an asymmetric information structure. We focus on the impact of urban network structure on the incentive of information sharing. Our analyses suggest that the garages are always better off in a circular-networked city, while they could be worse off in the suburbs of a star-networked city. Nevertheless, the overall revenue for garages is improved and the aggregate congestion is reduced under information sharing. Our results also suggest that information sharing helps garages further exploit the customers who in turn become worse-off. Therefore, policy-makers should carefully evaluate their transportation data policy since impacts on the service-providers and the customers are typically conflicting. Using the SFpark data, we empirically confirmed the value of information sharing. In particular, garages with higher price-demand elasticity and lower demand variance tend to enjoy larger benefits via information sharing. These insights support the joint design of parking rates structure and information systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past two decades, bike-sharing systems have grown significantly worldwide. Compared with that of other business sectors, the means by which revenue is obtained in the bike-sharing industry is unique. When the market in a region or city is saturated, an efficient way for a firm to increase revenue is to enter a new market. In this study, we design a revenue maximization-oriented decision tool to support the operational decisions of a new competitor firm entering into competition against a local firm. It is assumed that operational-level information from the local firm is unknown to the competitor firm. A new multi-stage max–min–max robust maximization model is proposed. It aims to optimize the dynamic bike inventory to maximize the worst-case revenue that the competitor firm may achieve. The worst-case revenue is treated as the baseline revenue for the competitor firm according to which rational decisions can be made. Specifically, we construct an uncertainty set to capture the uncertainty in the bike distribution of the local firm. To work with this nonconvex model, we design a myopic method, inspired by a special two-stage model that can be solved with a customized constraint-and-column approach, for obtaining the upper and lower bounds of the potential optimal revenue in our multistage model. The results of numerical experiments illustrate that the approximation approach has satisfactory computational efficiency and generates a tight bound of the optimal baseline revenue. Sensitivity analyses show that the new competitor firm should not increase its investment in bikes when the local firm increases its quantity of bikes because of high depreciation costs. Moreover, the two firms would allocate a similar proportion of bikes to each zone when either of them provides a large number of bikes. When the firms both provide a small number of bikes, the allocation of bikes by the new competitor firm is widely dispersed, while the local firm tends to allocate bikes across several zones with high demand. Furthermore, on the premise of a given target, increasing the bike acquisition can improve the robustness of revenue estimation for the competitor firm. • A revenue-oriented model is presented for a new firm entering into competition against a local firm. • An uncertainty set is defined to capture the uncertainty in the bike distribution of the local firm. • A customized myopic method with CC&G approach is designed to obtain suboptimal solutions. • The results show the new firm may decrease the number of bikes as the local firm provides more bikes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]