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Joint decisions regarding the product service system and supply chain coordination configuration have been made in practice. However, embodying the configuration decisions of the product service system in the supply chain decision-making process has not been clearly described. Existing relevant decision models are originated from an 'all-in-one' approach that assumes that both parties' decisions can be integrated into one optimization problem by aggregating two different types of objectives into a single objective function. Such an assumption neglects the complex trade-offs underlying two different decision-making problems and fails to reveal the inherent coupling of the product service system and supply chain configurations. This study constructs a bi-objective Stackelberg game model for the coordinated optimization of a product service system and supply chain configuration. Product service system decisions are modeled as an upper-level optimization problem (called a leader). Supply chain decisions are modeled as a lower-level optimization problem (called a follower). To solve the bi-objective model, an adaptive NSGA-II algorithm based on the dominance strength (ANSGA-II-DS) was developed and implemented. Finally, the effectiveness and practicability of the ANSGA-II-DS algorithm were verified by calculating the standard test function ZDT1-3, using numerical examples, and comparing it with the NSGA-II algorithm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a novel method to study the impact of green product change on supply chain performance. First, to promote green consumption and information sharing, government intervention (tax and subsidy) and blockchain are well employed. Then, a series of mathematical models are elaborately developed based on green levels of products. Furthermore, detailed performance analysis of two kinds of supply chains are conducted, in which, the equilibrium results are obtained by using Stackelberg game. Finally, extensive numerical experiments demonstrate that mild green product change intensity together with low blockchain cost can improve supply chain performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Modular architecture design can not only increase the product variety and thus make mass customization (MC) easier, but also improve interchangeability and then lower the remanufacturing cost. This paper models a remanufacturing MC supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer. The manufacturer, as a Stackelberg game leader, designs and then sells the new and modular MC products via its brand retailer, and meanwhile the remanufacturing of used MC products would be carried out by either the manufacturer or the retailer. We study the optimal modular design for new MC products and the best remanufacturing mode for used MC products. One centralized and two decentralized decision models are formulated, and the equilibrium solutions of proposed models are compared and analyzed. Findings show that, compared to the retailer-remanufacturing mode, the manufacturer-remanufacturing mode can be superior in terms of the ability to cope with customer customization requirements (i.e., the modularity level), total supply chain profit, and consumer surplus. Moreover, both supply chain members and consumers would prefer the manufacturer-remanufacturing mode when the parameters meet certain conditions. We also extend the model to two scenarios: the remanufacturing is bounded by cores supply and the retailer acts a leader, so as to verify the robustness of main results. The above theoretical results are verified by numerical examples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on a stochastic goodwill model involving a single manufacturer and a single retailer in a supply chain, in which both quality level and goodwill level are governed by stochastic differential equations. In both the linear-quadratic Stackelberg game and linear-quadratic cooperative game, explicit expressions are obtained for the optimal quality improvement efforts level of the manufacturer, the optimal advertising efforts level of the retailer as well as the optimal profit of the supply chain. We also derive the expectation and variance values for quality and goodwill levels, respectively. The distribution of incremental profit and subsidy are analysed in the cooperative game via the utility theory. Finally, several numerical experiments are reported to show the influence of decay rates and white noise disturbance of the quality and goodwill levels on the expectation of quality and goodwill levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, we formulate a multilayer sustainable production-inventory supply chain (SC) model with deterioration and pollution. The SC members are the supplier of raw materials, the producer (vendor/manufacturer) and the retailer. The demand rate of the items follows a comprehensive function of the unit selling price and freshness (related to expiration dates) function at the retailer's shop. Considering a case study, a multi-layer SC model has been studied with the help of the inclusion of a new pollution function. Basically, the manufacturer's and retailer's individual nonlinear average profit functions have been analyzed under various parametric conditions. The retailer's profit function has been optimized with the help of convexity/concavity criteria over Hessian matrix and eigenvalue characterization theorem. With the help of a new solution algorithm via Stackelberg game approach, we obtain the optimal decisions of the supply chain also. Finally, numerical illustrations, sensitivity analysis and graphical illustrations are made to validate the proposed model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has become a common commercial phenomenon for retailers to establish their own brands. The manufacturer referral strategy is studied through a model which includes a manufacturer, a traditional retailer and a store brand retailer. We conduct research on the three cooperation methods of the manufacturer: "no information referral", "exclusive referral" and "nonexclusive referral". The equilibrium wholesale price, the manufacturer's order quantity and the retailer's own product output are studied by constructing game models, and the best referral cooperation choice between the manufacturer and the retailer is analysed according to their profit. The results show that the manufacturer's referral level choice does not change the number of products, while the manufacturer's market loss rate leads to a change in product order quantity among different choices. Under the combined effect of the market loss rate and the intensity of market competition, the store brand retailer will change the output decision of its own products. When the market loss rate meets a certain range, the manufacturer's product sales can be maximized. For the manufacturer, any referral strategy is better than no referral strategy, and in most cases, the manufacturer prefers nonexclusive referrals. The traditional retailer is willing to accept the manufacturer's referral cooperation, and the traditional retailer's profit is better under the nonexclusive referrals; while most store brand retailers are willing to choose the nonexclusive referrals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prefabrication has been generating increasing interest as a cleaner production strategy to promote sustainable development. Alongside this trend, various subsidies have been set to improve prefabrication levels. This paper evaluates the prefabrication levels of buildings through the assembly rate. A series of models are established to investigate the optimal assembly rate under various government subsidies. The optimal assembly rate and subsidy revenue-sharing coefficient are analyzed in both decentralized and centralized scenarios. By comparing the optimal decisions in these two scenarios, a transfer payment contract is proposed that enables the overall coordination of the prefabricated construction supply chain (PCSC). The results show that the optimal assembly rate in the centralized scenario is higher than that in the decentralized one. When the revenue-sharing coefficient is 100%, the subsidy revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the PCSC system and realize the Pareto improvement. When certain conditions are satisfied in the transfer payment contract, business profits can achieve Pareto optimality. This research provides a reference for construction enterprises making decisions to promote the development of PCSC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China is currently the world's largest energy consumer and carbon emitter. In order to reduce the harm of carbon dioxide to the global ecological environment, the use of natural gas instead of coal is a realistic choice for China to achieve the "dual carbon" goal. Opportunities also bring new challenges, and the price of natural gas is an important method of promoting the upstream and downstream industrial chains of natural gas, so it is of great practical significance to study the price of natural gas. This paper builds a three-level supply chain model consisting of suppliers in the natural gas market, city gas companies and consumers in the market and uses the Stackelberg game to study the decision-making models of different subjects under their own dominance and centralized decision-making; it also considers the pricing mechanism and profit situation of stakeholders in the natural gas market under the low-carbon preference of consumers and the level of corporate carbon emission reduction. The research results show that when considering consumers' low-carbon preferences, the sales prices of various stakeholders in the market have increased, which is beneficial for all entities in the natural gas industry chain. At the same time, with the low-carbon transformation of energy companies, the production method drives the price of raw materials to rise in the process of low-carbon innovation, which, in turn, makes the price of various stakeholders in the natural gas market and the level of carbon emission reduction per unit show a positive relationship; in order to maximize the overall profit of the supply chain, the natural gas market should adopt a centralized decision-making method to further promote the reform of China's natural gas marketization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Considering the scarcity of cooperative advertising models on the interaction between product quality and market variables such as price, advertising effort and subsidy, this paper considers the effect of quality in cooperative advertising in a manufacturer-retailer supply channel in which the channel members engage in a Stackelberg game. The manufacturer is the channel leader, while the retailer is the follower. The research adopts the incorporation of product quality into the traditional cooperative advertising model setting through the multiplicative impact of price, advertising and product quality on demand. It considers two channel structures: an unsubsidised channel structure in which the manufacturer does not provide advertising subsidy to the retailer, and a subsidised channel structure in which the manufacturer provides advertising subsidy for retail advertising. It obtains the prices, the advertising effort, the retailer's payoff and the manufacturer's payoff for both channel structures. The results reveal that for both subsidised and unsubsidised advertising, increase in retail advertising and retailer's payoff resulting from quality improvement is limited due to diminishing marginal returns. Also, quality improvement negatively affects the manufacturer's payoff after a certain quality level. Further, it shows that quality can be substituted for subsidy, and can be used to coordinate the channel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To study the impact of manufacturer information referral on the decision-making of supply chain members, a Stackelberg model is constructed based on a manufacturer, a professional retailer and a store brand retailer. The optimal price and profit of the manufacturer and both retailers when manufacturer refers consumers to the professional retailer or not are solved and compared. Besides, the effect of the manufacturer’s information referral on the members of the supply chain is analyzed. The results show that the referral of manufacturer benefits both manufacturer and the referred retailer if the referral level meets certain conditions, otherwise it may reduce the profit of both parties, and the referral level is affected by the market size of the professional retailer. Meanwhile, under the influence of the professional retailer’s market size and the intensity of market competition, the store brand retailer will continue to operate only when the referral level stays in a certain range, but the profit of its store brand is damaged. However, if the referral level exceeds a certain threshold, the store brand product’s profit will increase with free riding.

In the present worldwide highly competitive markets, competition occurs among the supply chain members on behalf of organizations. In this way, partners of the supply chain try to apply effective coordination to increase market shares. Because of the significance and utilization of inventory decisions and pricing strategies on accepting a product in the current business scenario, in this study, decentralized channel coordination is generalized to increase the profitability of a two-echelon supply chain. Here, a one-manufacturer–one-retailer supply chain mechanism for the deteriorating product with a leader–follower relationship under price-dependent demand is developed. Up-stream member-manufacturer sells the on-hand item to the downstream member-retailer in which the retailer faces off the customer. This model considers the effect of the deterioration of the product, selling price of both the channel members, cycle duration, idle time, ordering lot size in a decentralized supply chain system. The Stackelberg game method has been used considering the retailer as a leader and manufacturer as a follower to optimize the sales price of channel members and time–length up to zero manufacturer inventory for maximum profit. Finally, a numerical example and sensitivity analysis are given to demonstrate the model. The result shows that manufacturer profit is far better than the retailer profit though the retailer's selling price is higher than that of the manufacturer's selling price. Also, a little change in the manufacturing cost is highly sensitive for the profit of the channel members, which encourages the manufacturer to reduce the manufacturing cost and increases supply chain profit as well as channel members profit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, there is established a reverse logistics (RL) system to collect unwanted medications (UMs) in households. A reverse supply chain (RSC) is proposed in a decentralized state including manufacturer, and retailer involving a strategic consumer. The novelty of this article is that the model is investigated from the consumer's perspective, whereas in the previous studies, the proposed models were from other upstream members' perspectives such as manufacturer and retailer. Furthermore, inducement and advertising strategies are proposed for stimulating consumers to engage more in an RSC. To analyse the effect of these two strategies, the three‐person RSC game‐theoretical approach is used. A three‐person supply chain consists of a pharmaceutical manufacturer and a retailer who will interact with a strategic consumer in several non‐cooperative Stackelberg games. Three Stackelberg games are established and, each member takes a turn as a leadership role and the other two players assume the role of the follower. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to explore the income distribution of feed enterprise supply chain members under different dominance, the article constructs a Stackberg game model to analyze the optimal decision-making of a three-level supply chain composed of feed product manufacturers, third-party logistics companies and retailers. The results showed that the dominant power had a significant impact on optimal decision-making of supply chain members in feed enterprises. When the supply chain members have the dominant power, the income is higher than when they are in the following position. Under the same dominant power, the income of members with dominant power is higher than that of other follower members, except for third-party enterprises. The total profit of feed enterprise supply chain under centralized decisionmaking is greater than that under decentralized decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an actual case application of a newly developed game-theoretic model in analyzing a single manufacturer-many supplier, multi-period, make-to-order supply chain with fuzzy parameters. The supply chain under consideration comprises an exclusive supplier for every component required by the manufacturer in producing its product. In certain instances, some supply chains enable the manufacturer to opt for a third-party subcontractor to produce a portion of its demand. We assume that the supply chain faces a price and lead-time-sensitive demand, which is relevant in a make-to-order environment. The vertical interaction within the supply chain is played as a Stackelberg game, where the manufacturer is considered the leader and the suppliers as the followers. Results show some important managerial insights in supply chain planning under a make-to-order condition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work considers cooperative advertising decisions in a manufacturer-distributor-retailer supply chain, where the manufacturer is taken as the Stackelberg leader, using differential game theory. The distributor and retailer are the first and the second followers, respectively. We introduce the distributor into the traditional manufacturer-retailer channel through his direct involvement in advertising as being incorporated into the non-stochastic Sethi's sales-advertising dynamics. This is used to model the awareness share dynamics in which the distributor and the retailer directly engage in advertising, while the manufacturer bypasses the distributor to subsidise only the retail advertising effort. We consider a subsidised and unsubsidised channel structures, where each structure results in a system of three nonlinear equations, which cannot be solved analytically, but only numerically. However, we show that the unique solution to each of the systems exists, provided certain conditions are satisfied. The distributor and the retailer's advertising strategies are developed for both when subsidy is provided and when it is not provided. We also obtain the manufacturer's subsidy rate and the market awareness share for both when retail advertising is subsidised and when it is not subsidised. We observe that with the provision of subsidy, the distributor reduces his advertising effort. However, the resulting increase in the retail advertising effort is larger than the reduction in the distributor's advertising commitment, thus making the channel advertising effort larger with subsidy. It further shows that to avoid being shortchanged, each player should adopt only his optimal strategy or strategies as the case may be.

It has become a common commercial phenomenon for retailers to establish their own brands. The manufacturer referral strategy is studied through a model which includes a manufacturer, a traditional retailer and a store brand retailer. We conduct research on the three cooperation methods of the manufacturer: “no information referral”, “exclusive referral” and “nonexclusive referral”. The equilibrium wholesale price, the manufacturer’s order quantity and the retailer’s own product output are studied by constructing game models, and the best referral cooperation choice between the manufacturer and the retailer is analysed according to their profit. The results show that the manufacturer’s referral level choice does not change the number of products, while the manufacturer’s market loss rate leads to a change in product order quantity among different choices. Under the combined effect of the market loss rate and the intensity of market competition, the store brand retailer will change the output decision of its own products. When the market loss rate meets a certain range, the manufacturer’s product sales can be maximized. For the manufacturer, any referral strategy is better than no referral strategy, and in most cases, the manufacturer prefers nonexclusive referrals. The traditional retailer is willing to accept the manufacturer’s referral cooperation, and the traditional retailer’s profit is better under the nonexclusive referrals; while most store brand retailers are willing to choose the nonexclusive referrals.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of wholesale price discrimination by a manufacturer on the profitability of chain members in a Retailer—E-tailer dual-channel supply chain for different product categories based on their online channel preference. We have considered two distinct channel power structures in this study, i.e., (i) retailer has higher channel power than the e-tailer and (ii) e-tailer has higher channel power than the retailer. Game-theoretic models are developed to examine the competition between the retailer and e-tailer and to derive their optimal decisions under equal wholesale price strategy and discriminatory wholesale price strategy for the channel power structures considered. Further, a numerical example was employed to quantify the results and to capture the variation with respect to online channel preference of the product. We have found that discriminatory wholesale price strategy is the gainful strategy (i) for a manufacturer dealing with products having high online channel preference under retailer leader structure (ii) for the manufacturer dealing with products having low online channel preference under e-tailer leader structure. Equal wholesale price strategy is the gainful strategy (i) for a manufacturer dealing with products having low online channel preference under retailer leader structure and (ii) for a manufacturer dealing with products having high online channel preference under e-tailer leader structure. The study helps the manufacturers to maximize their profit by adopting the right wholesale price strategy considering the online channel preference of the product and the downstream channel power structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the conventional Stackelberg game, all players are perfect optimizers, able to choose the best responses to their competitors' decisions. In contrast, in the Stackelberg game with bounded rationality, players are unable to optimize their individual payoffs and face strategic uncertainty due to the performance of competitors. In real games, players are usually unaware of the performance of their competitors. Therefore, to survive in the competitive market, they are forced to make decisions under conditions of bounded rationality. Due to the importance of decision-making in this situation, in this study, the Stackelberg game of deteriorating inventory within a two-level supply chain was developed considering the concept of bounded rationality. The follower in the Stackelberg game (manufacturer) is poorly aware of the leader's performance in terms of order size. Therefore, she/he manufactures the products at rates with normal distribution. For the first time, an algorithm based on Bayesian conjugate pair was proposed to solve the Stackelberg game with bounded rationality for deteriorating products. In addition, a comparison was made between the above conditions and a mode in which the leader's strategy is fully observable to the follower. The approach used in the proposed algorithm to adjust the production rate was also compared with the adjustment based on the partial adjustment model, and the obtained results prove the convergence of the proposed algorithm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an inventory model under inflation for deteriorating items in a single-vendor multi-retailer supply chain. The demand is a function of the retail price. The vendor offers the retailers trade credit. Two scenarios; (i) the changes in the inflation rate as a Discrete-Time Markov Chain and (ii) the changes in the inflation rate without considering Markovian conditions are considered. The relationship between the vendor and the retailers is modeled as a Stackelberg – game (the vendor is the leader and retailers are the followers). The retail price, the number of replenishment cycle, the production rate of vendor and the replenishment frequency of the raw material are obtained by maximizing the present value of the total profit for the vendor and the retailers. The results reveal that in the scenario (i), the present value of the total profits for the vendor and the retailers is greater compared to scenario (ii). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, the pricing competition models have been studied between two substitutable and one complementary products in a two-echelon fuzzy supply chain system. Here, three manufacturers separately (one each) produce and sell their products through a common retailer in the cooperative and non-cooperative markets. The demand for each product depends linearly on the products' prices. Here, manufacturing costs, base demands and price elasticity are characterized as fuzzy parameters. The closed-form expressions of optimal wholesale and retail pricing decisions have been derived for four different market situations under game theory to maximize the expected profit function of each participant of the supply chain. Sharing of profits under co-operation mechanism amongst the manufacturers and retailer in different proportions are presented numerically for the fuzzy model. As particular cases, the optimal pricing decisions have been derived for two substitutable products or two complementary products separately and the results of previous investigators are presented. In addition, the traditional deterministic version of the fuzzy problem is numerically solved. The results of fuzzy and crisp models are presented and compared. Finally, the problem is illustrated with some numerical data for four market situations, sensitivity analyses are performed and management decisions are explored. The products' demands and supply chain profits are graphically presented for different price elasticity of the substitutable and complementary products. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As generators and retailers can trade energy through either forward contracts or a pool in the electricity markets, we propose a hierarchical structure to capture the supply chain decision-making processes taking into account the interaction between the futures and spot markets. At each level, we model the sequential acting of generators and retailers as a Stackelberg game where generators behave as leaders and retailers behave as followers to maximise their individual payoff. Generators and retailers make decisions of the energy quantity in the spot market in the lower level with respect to the contracts signed in the futures market, while they determine contracts in the upper level with respect to the latest information from the spot market. After verifying the existence of the hierarchical equilibrium, we develop a decentralised algorithm to implement the equilibrium with only local information available for both generators and retailers. In the supply chain regime which incorporates both futures and spot markets, we show that it benefits the electricity market in reducing the pool price. The results are corroborated through numerical examples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fairness concern behavior is particularly common among members in supply chain framework. The downstream retailers often compare their profits with those of the other members in the supply chain, especially that of the supplier, and do not like the unfavorable distribution of the total profits. This work considers a supply chain consisting of a supplier and two competing retailers with fairness concerns. The supplier offers a wholesale contract with quantity discount, and the two competing retailers have the options of individual purchasing and group buying. Through a Stackelberg game model, the optimal decisions for the players are obtained for the group buying and the individual purchasing strategies. The results indicate that the supplier benefits more than the retailers from the group buying strategy. In particular, the group buying strategy gives the supplier a higher profit if the operational cost of group buying is below a threshold. Furthermore, the fairness concern behavior of the retailers does not always hurt the profit of the supplier. Specifically, the supplier will benefit from the fairness concern behavior of the retailers in individual purchasing when the retailers operates in a relatively poor environment. Finally, market competition between the two fairness concerned retailers does not always benefit the supplier. Fierce competition between the fairness concerned retailers reduces the supplier's profit if the group buying strategy is used when the retailers operates in a relatively poor environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the government's optimal subsidy provision strategy for a biomass energy supply chain that consists of the power plant, the villagers' committee and farmer. We examine three possible subsidy provision strategies depending on which party (the power plant, the villagers' committee or the farmer) the government chooses to subsidise, and compare how it can influence the government's target by assuming that the subsidy price is exogenously given. We also extend our findings when the government can endogenously determine the subsidy price. Moreover, our analyses reveal the optimal stakeholder selection strategy for each party to maximise its payoff. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By applying fuzzy set theory in game theory, player’s strategies are determined by fuzzy variable with a definite membership function, where the degree of non-membership is stated by supplement of degree of membership, while determining the value of uncertain parameters of decisions may be associated with a hesitation degree. Therefore, in this paper, intuitionistic fuzzy variables are used to better describe vague and imprecise information, and also deals with uncertainty and ambiguity in product pricing process. To provide the proposed model, a two-echelon supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer is considered. For Designing the proposed pricing game, we have considered structure of two-level programming in a Stackelberg game form. Finally, using a numerical example, structural validation and the effectiveness of proposed model is shown in product pricing process

With the intensification of market competition, the cost of advertising enterprises is increasing, so eventually, advertising may unable to increase the profits of enterprises and bring huge consumptions to enterprises. In this case, cooperative advertising came into being. With the Stackelberg game method, the selection and optimization of cooperative advertising strategies in supply chain were studied. Through the comparative analysis, the related concepts of supply chain competition, the level of cooperative advertising and Stackelberg game were determined; from the structures as two chains that are the non-integrated decision-making and the integrated decision-making, and two chains that are the integrated decision-making and the non-integrated decision-making, the existing problems were modeled and analyzed with the method of Stackelberg game theory; through numerical analysis, the optimal cooperative advertising strategy under the level of horizontal cooperation advertisement for each enterprise in the supply chain was obtained. Theoretical and empirical analysis can provide theoretical supports and model references for the research on strategy selection and optimization of cooperative advertising in other supply chains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Capital constraints in the supply chain have linked trade credit to the banks' credit risk exposure. This paper focuses on how trade credit, which is widespread in the supply chain, affects the banks' risk exposure by constructing a two-echelon Stackelberg framework in a case involving supplier dominance. A numerical analysis illustrates the following: First, the contagion intensity, which measures trade credit's impact on the banks' risk exposure, positively relates to the uncertainty of demand. Second, the retailer's characteristics have a significant, moderating effect on this positive relationship between the banks' risk exposure and the uncertainty demand. Finally, suppliers can reduce the contagion intensity by screening different types of retailers, which consequently decreases the banks' risk exposure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain problem that includes a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer plays a leading role in the supply chain and must make efforts to increase sales. Due to many uncertain factors in business, the market demand, manufacturing costs and retail operating costs are assumed to be uncertain variables. Expected and chance-constrained models are developed to address these uncertain variables. Stackelberg game is used to solve the proposed models. The equilibrium optimal wholesale price and unit margin are provided in order to determine the maximum profit. Finally, numerical examples are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role and importance of supply chain management, has faced with many challenges and problems. Although a comprehensive model of supply chain issues, has not been explained, we have to indicate that issues such as reviewing the theoretical foundations of information systems, marketing, financial management, logistical and organizational relations have been considered by many researchers. The objective of supply chain management is to improve various activities and components to increase overall supply chain system benefits. In order to achieve the overall objectives, many contradictions may occur between the components and different levels of supply chain and the contradictions that these disorders over time, result in decreased strength and competitiveness of the supply chain. Such conflicts, like marketing costs (advertising), pricing and inventory can occur during the supply chain life cycle. A Game Theory approach with respect to property is the appropriate tool for collaboration in the supply chain. This tool is used for collaborative making in any kind of supply chain such as cooperative supply chain and non-cooperative supply chain. In the present study and assuming a lack of cooperation between different levels of a supply chain, a dynamic game with complete information has been generated. In addition identifying appropriate leaders of various levels of the supply chain is considered. Non-Cooperative dynamic game mode (Stackelberg Game), for each of the three levels of supply chain including retailers, suppliers and manufacturers are modeled. Depending on the bargaining power and its position in the market, any level of supply chain can make a leader of the following rule. In the present study, the equilibrium model to play Stackelberg game may be led by a leader or leading players and ultimately identifying and modeling the appropriate unlimited three level supply chain are determined.

This paper presents decentralized and centralized decision-making conditions based on consumer carbon sensitivity and carbon tax policy in a supplier-driven two echelons supply chain. The analysis shows that: 1) the optimal emission reduction amount under centralized decision-making is more than that under decentralized decision-making; 2) the carbon tax should be levied properly because the carbon emission reduction will decrease as the carbon tax is higher than a critical value; 3) the consumer carbon sensitivity is positively correlated with carbon emission reduction, but it may cause total mission rised in certain condition. Then an extensive numerical analysis is conducted to enrich the discussion and to draw some managerial insights on how to reduce carbon emission in the supply chain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due to double marginalization effect, the wholesale price contract has been proved that it cannot coordinate a decentralized supply chain (DSC) based on the framework of Stackelberg game, in which the upstream firm acts as a leader and the downstream firm acts as a follower. Nevertheless, it has shown that the partnership between the enterprises tends to be equality. Motivated by this factor, this paper studies the coordination of wholesale price contract under the perspective of equality between enterprises. First, an innovative wholesale price contract is constructed and to prove that the constructed contract can flexibly coordinate the DSC. Second, the adaptability of the constructed contract is analyzed and compared with the revenue sharing contract, which is designed under the framework of Stackelberg game. Third, numerical analysis is calculated to verify the effectiveness and operation of the model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]