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This research examines the applicability of cognitive dissonance theory to explain a judge's decision to author or join a separate opinion. I propose that, following a counter-attitudinal vote, a judge will endeavor to reduce the aversive consequences of being viewed as an inconsistent decision maker by justifying his or her attitudinally incongruent vote choice to the public in a separate opinion. I test this possibility by examining U.S. Supreme Court justices' decisions to author or join concurring and dissenting opinions during the 1946-2001 terms. The empirical results provide qualified support for the use of separate opinions as dissonance reduction mechanisms, suggesting that dissonance theory is both applicable to the actions of elite decision makers and enjoys validity outside of a laboratory setting. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Disputes involving the boundaries of state versus federal power make up a substantial portion of the Supreme Court's docket and have undergone extensive analysis. Yet, the conventional wisdom regarding the justices' choices in these cases is that they are highly inconsistent. I argue that this is primarily a function of the failure of scholars to develop a comprehensive model of the justices' federalism decision making. To remedy this, I introduce an integrated model of the individual justices' choices in these cases, which is then subjected to empirical testing in the Rehnquist Court era (1986-2004). I explore a host of determinants of the justices' decision making, including attitudinal, institutional, legal, and personal attributes, as well as the role of organized interests in the Court. The findings reveal that the choices justices make in these cases are not as discordant as most commentators suggest. Rather, they are relatively predictable through the application of an integrated model of judicial choice. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents research which assessed the Solicitor General's amicus curiae strategies in the U.S. Supreme Court. Factors that contributed to the decision of a Solicitor General to participate as amicus curiae in the Supreme Court; Analysis of the influence of Solicitor General on justices' decision making.

The article focuses on a study which examined factors that affect the consistency of judicial choices. Among the factors that are hypothesized to influence the consistency of the voting behavior of justices include attributes of the justices, cases and the information surrounding each case. To test the validity of the proposed hypotheses, justices' voting behavior in cases decided during the 1946-2001 terms were examined.

Scholars have devoted a great deal of research to investigating the role and influence of the U.S. Solicitor General (SG) as amicus curiae in the Supreme Court. Yet, we know little about the SG's decision to file an amicus brief and how this relates to the SG's success on the merits. We fill this void by examining legal, political, and administrative factors that affect the SG's decision to participate as amicus curiae. We subject our hypotheses to empirical testing utilizing data on the 1953-1999 Supreme Court terms by linking the SG's decision to file an amicus brief to the SG's ultimate success on the merits, employing a Heckman-style selection model. We find that the SG's decision to file an amicus brief, and the SG's success on the merits, is influenced by legal, political, and administrative considerations, suggesting that the SG is best viewed through the incorporation of a variety of theoretical perspectives. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]